Custer and his movement North: A New Look

[mac]

My main interest has always been the events at the end of this battle and the fate of Custer and his 5 companies.

I am now starting to consider the events leading up to Custer presenting at the Northern Valley.

Initially we know Custer sent Benteen off to the left and then ordered Reno into the valley.

The Packs and their escort were still well back and moving slowly forward.

Custer then decided not to follow Reno across the river at Ford A.

After this Custer would never cross the river.

I think it safe to say that Custer intended to cross the river at some point and rejoin the battle in the valley.

I think he had at that time some knowledge of the terrain and that the ford at MTC, Ford B, existed as did the fords further North.

Clearly, he did not feel the need to recall Benteen or to send to the packs for more men or ammunition.

Custer had proceeded with all speed to get to the Little Big Horn. I believe he was very much still in speed mode when he started moving North.

Cheers

[quincannon]

I find no room between your basic analysis and my own Mac. In fact, I believe most will not either.

Where I am troubled though is the interpretation of "knowledge of the terrain and the fords" It is best I believe for those that read both of us here to fully understand that knowledge does not necessarily mean the full and complete knowledge required for unimpeded tactical employment of troops. In other words, just because you know a hill is there does not mean you can climb it, or knowledge of a ford's location does not mean you can cross it. That takes more of an in depth knowledge of terrain, something not achieved by someone who was there last year, or even yesterday.

Custer was not Robert E Lee at Chancellorsville. He had little to no chance of beating a larger force by dividing his forces without having the local knowledge Lee had or obtained, before and during that battle to give him at least an even shot at doing it and getting away with it. Even then, when some goddamned fool like Bill Rini compares what Custer did in his move north to Jackson's flank march, they fail to realize that with Jackson, he had intimate knowledge of the terrain and roads, and still put his entire corps in such a very vulnerable place where, Hooker had he counterattacked could have ended the civil war in the East on the 3rd of May 1863.

The difference here is Custer had no such intimate knowledge of terrain, and the enemy had the home field advantage, and did counterattack.

La Boheme at the Met. Not Carmen, but it is a wonderful day nonetheless.

[quincannon]

Mike: I think you are misreading Mac's sentence concerning Benteen. At the time of the Reno - Custer split he had no intention of recalling Benteen or doing anything about bringing up the trains. I base this upon two known facts.

1) Presumably at the time of the Custer-Reno split, had Custer thought that he required Benteen, he would have recalled him then and there. Likewise had he anticipated the need for the trains he would have ordered them close up on the main body. The fact is he did neither. It is my view that this is what Mac was referring to in his statement.

2) It was not until quite a bit later, having seen the partial size of the village that he decided to recall Benteen and bring up the trains. I presume Mac will cover that in a future posting.

The Principles of War are something that should be read each and every morning with your coffee and corn flakes by any and everyone that dares enter these precincts. Understanding them, along with understanding that people, with all their foibles and faults, are who wage war and not some lifeless character on a printed page that has no life, no soul.

[miker]

Duly Noted.

[mac]

Precisely as you say QC.

I believe that Custer, if only through his scouts, would be aware of the fact that the river was fordable in more than one location. He would also have given thought and consideration to the general tactics he would use.

I do not claim to know what his thoughts were; just that I am sure he was thinking prior to his decision points.

We do know, from his later message to Benteen, that at the time he decided to veer right he had no knowledge of the spatial distribution of the Indians in the valley. Thus he must later tell Benteen that there is a "Big Village".

It seems to me his decision to go right can only be based on a calculation that he can move quickly past the left flank of the Indian defenders while they are engaging Reno and cross the river to strike a fatal blow behind them.

This would plausibly be a much more efficient way to deal with them than taking them on head first in the valley.

If there are other options now is a good time to say it.

Cheers

[yanmacca]

After he decided to mount the bluffs, he was acting blind, it was a risk but he moved fast without informing any one else, so he flew on the seat of his pants.
The bluffs gave him a route and the height gave him a vantage point, he saw what was ahead of him and still carried on. The only real option we know off is that he called up Benteen.

All we have after that is Indian accounts and markers.

I am not a geologists but wouldn't you find crossing points at the bottom of large coulees?
Thousands of years of rain washing silt and stone into the river to build up ford?

Ian

[quincannon]

I'm not a geologist either, and you are quite correct Ian that you would normally find fords at the bottom of large coulees, among other places. That is not really the question though. The question is, is that ford usable at the time you intend to cross. It may have been an hour ago, and not be now.

On the 17th of March 1863, Averill's Union cavalry intended to cross at Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock River, to give Fitz Lee's brigade a hotfoot. They knew the ford was there, and they also knew the ford was lightly outposted due to previous reconnaissance of a few days before. What they did not know is that Lee had increased the size of his outpost within the last twenty four hours, and that the water came up between the time of the recon and the time of intended crossing. Accordingly, Averill sent a small breeching force to cross the river, to be followed up by his main body. The end result was a delay of several hours first fighting off the outpost, then negotiating the crossing getting both cavalry and supporting guns across the river at the ford. Time is money in battle, and the delay in crossing allowed Lee to bring up his brigade from Culpeper about twelve miles away, put Averill in check, and forcing him to withdraw at the conclusion of a several hour long, stand up fire fight in which none other than Captain Marcus Reno was injured or wounded (sources vary) leading a force of regulars composed of elements of the 1st and 5th Cavalry. Most sources say that Averill got the best of Lee, but at the end of the day Lee was still on the field south of the river and Averill back on the north side. The moral of the story is a ford is one thing, a ford that is usable when you want to use it is quite another.

Mac, Custer's decision was just like the Lee/Jackson decision at Chancellorsville, in the end a bad one. Custer got destroyed making his. Lee/Jackson came within an ace of getting the Army of Northern Virginia destroyed with theirs. If Jackson had been faced with an aggressive Sioux/Cheyenne confederation instead of at the moment indecisive Joe Hooker, it would have been like my grandmother used to say, - All over but the shouting. Keep in mind I am saying here that while Jackson had good recon and local knowledge to aid his march and attack, it was still a bone head operation. When Jackson attacked with only two divisions at 5:00 PM his third and arguably his best division was still eight or so miles away at Catherine Furnace, well to his rear. He also attacked much too late in the day, to accomplish anything really decisive. Delay by elements of the initially surprised XIth Corps
ran him out of daylight. Ultimately it was timing that cost Jackson his life.

There are many similarities between the flank attack at Chancellorsville and what Custer did in June of 76. The scale of one is much larger than the other. but the Principles violated are much the same. Both were stupid, launched by men who thought they could not be beaten regardless of the odds against.

[yanmacca]

One thing has not been mentioned yet, but as you all know it has been mentioned many, many times in the past and that was the Indians not taking the assault but trying to save the no-coms etc by blocking the advance allowing time for the village to scatter, which is what the main fear was.

But one thing I am not clear upon is, would the Indians fight the soldiers if they had time to prepare? Custer thought that he had been rumbled so he had little chance of surprise, which is why he quickend up the advance at went for the jugular without any prep or recon, just straint in.
At the washita he had the surprise and it worked, so without the advantage of surprise what was he expecting, did he still expect a blocking force with no attempt at all of being envoled in a fight before he even reached the camps?.

This is important because he sent 140 up the valley and another 200+ to get behind the place, each of these battalions could have been brought to battle before they got in carbine range of the village and probably fought to a standstill or even repulsed.

So if Custer had feared that they knew he was coming, then why attack in the way that he did, why did he even fear the village scattering, why did he leave about 250 men out of the assault, he rode his men hard and then tried to capture a village with carbines drawn against a ready defence and a mass of people fleeing, all this with 350 fighters, not only that but in two groups too, with little or no weight to have an impact.

Why Custer with his 200 was thought by him enough to do real harm while a force more than fifty men less was trying the same thing was crazy.

Hell, bad enough that there was no co-ordination between the two battlions, Custer could have been over half an hour behind Reno.

Ian

[yanmacca]

We have decided to visit the Isle of Man again, we are leaving on Tuesday morning back late on Friday, we are flying this time, sod that ferry it was a four hour sail, the flights take less than 30 minutes.

I want to visit Peel castle this time, when we went nearly two years ago but it was closed due to covid, but it is now open again link

If I dont manage to log on, then see you soon

Ian

[quincannon]

When you boil down your question above Ian, to its lowest common denominator, you are in reality asking WHY. That is the most important question ever ask. Never mind how. Never mind tactics. Never mind strategy or operational concerns. WHY is what we should all be asking.

I have myself asked it many times, too many times to count, and I can only come up with one reason WHY, and that answer is in the last line of my post immediately above - "because he/they thought couldn't be beaten" Anyone who ever thinks that will eventually lose, and lose everything. So manuals, textbooks, training, and the study of war itself will take you only so far. It is the study of the individual man's character that will tell the tale.
Lee and Custer are both prime examples. Custer was an arrogant upstart, up from the social gutter, and his career was his shot at fame, fortune, and his ever craved glory. Lee was born of the elite. In many ways he looked down his nose at what he thought to be lesser men. He though all he had to do was step up to the plate, and he would hit a home run every time. It was his own sense of superiority that laid him low, a victim of his own hand, as it was with Custer. With Lee he was beaten by a man who before that had failed at everything he ever tried doing. With Custer, he was beaten by men that he though to be savages with no military ability, save raiding settlers and capturing white women.

Life is funny ain't it, and every one in life that by their actions set themselves up to fall - fall

Have a good trip.

[quincannon]

Mac: I am going off on a tangent here and need your assistance.

What exactly did Red Hawk have to say? WORD FOR WORD. It's important. It must be word for word. When did he say it, and to whom?

[mac]

books.google.com.au/books?id=3SjG0ZJ4KNsC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Red+Hawk+interview++Nicholas+Ruleau+November+20+1906+Pine+Ridge&source=bl&ots=4ZNO00tHmr&sig=ACfU3U1AFQ1-jSavLpk2m53clCQOrBJ5SQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjHuZHLge3-AhVDb94KHXxXAA84ChDoAXoECAYQAw#v=onepage&q=Red%20Hawk%20interview%20%20Nicholas%20Ruleau%20November%2020%201906%20Pine%20Ridge&f=false

Here is a link to what I have. Mine is from Drawing Battle Lines by Donahue.

Clearly it is not word for word.

The original interview was

Red Hawk interview recorded by Nicholas Ruleau November 20 1906 Pine Ridge. (also present and contributing Shot in the Face, Big Road, Iron Bull all present at Little Big Horn)

Probably you can hunt down the original in the US.

Cheers

[quincannon]

Could not get anything from the link Mac. Maybe my computer or lack of skill.

The question I have is did Red Hawk make any mention of the specific direction of travel of the three companies, or did he just say they came down the ridge in three divisions? It would make a difference.

[quincannon]

It seems the Red Hawk interview was second hand Mac, Ruleau being the second hand. I am not at all sure that anyone can hang their hat on that hook.

WHAT IF - Custer with E and F were separated from C, I, and L much further back, and never joined together again?

WHAT IF - Custer went forward along the ridge line toward the Ford D area, and C,I, and L were still fighting off Wolf Tooth on the southern most ridge complex?

WHAT IF - Custer got to the forward face of Cemetery Ridge, or perhaps further, and C, I, and L trying to catch up only reached the spine of BRE?

WHAT IF - Custer with E and F were driven back and at or near that same time C,I, and L started to withdraw southward?

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WHAT IF - Custer with E and F left C,I, and L to fight off Wolf Tooth back on the southern ridge complex and proceeded northward toward Ford D?

WHAT IT - C,I, and L were caught from behind before they could rejoin Custer by Gall and his loyal companions, and the movement in "three divisions" was northward instead of to the south?

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There are some testimonial inconsistencies to both of these versions, but I think they are both worth exploration.

[miker]

WHAT IF - The crew in the documentary Series The Twilight Zone had used the tank, which I think had ammunition because the crew had ammunition for their personal weapons. Cleary the film from the events is sufficient proof that the incident was as real as the Moon Landing of Apollo 11.