Never Got to Ford D

[rollingthunder]

Feb 25, 2023 15:47:31 GMT quincannon said:

Finding a sock? Come on folks.

There is nothing that would even suggest that Company I was in the lead. The indications are exactly the opposite. Artifacts were found in the abandoned village too. Is anyone suggesting that the wearer of that artifact was in the village during the battle?

We must quit thinking this way. Finding an object where it lies means next to nothing, unless, there in some sort of other supporting evidence, to suggest that something took place where the object was found. Otherwise, it was just some dirty old sock, that some Indian decided they did not want as much as they thought they did. I am reluctant to agree with dear old Dark Cloud here, but that is exactly what he was saying about Ford D, as far back as I can remember. Debris tell no tales. Debris, supported by something else can, but even then, not always.

If one looks at this battle, making the assumption that these fellows would fall back on how they were trained, one will not go far wrong. Follow the period specific TTP for every action or presumed action. If the result of your thinking, your conclusions, are inconsistent with that period specific TTP, the action you ponder probably did not happen.

Once again this seems to beg for a tactical tutorial. Frankly I do not know why I bother because no one seems to pay any attention.

For a moment let us assume that Custer designated Keogh to take command of a portion of Custer's force to conduct a retrograde. Let us further assume that it was exactly like Steve portrayed it in his post above. C, I and L leading the retrograde, while E and F stay behind to cover the withdrawal. Having Company I (Keogh's company) lead that effort would be in violation of everything taught about tactics then and now. Company I, with the effort's leader would be the last to pull out. Why? Because Keogh's job would first see to the other two companies successful withdrawal, before he moves. That's what leaders do in a retrograde. Make sure everyone else gets their job done, before he moves an inch.

Now, the first thing some worthy here will say, is Reno was first out. You bet your sweet ass he was, because he was not leading a retrograde. He was leading an attack. A breakout from encirclement is an attack, an offensive operation, where the leader, well they lead, and are somewhere in the front to provide the direction of that attack, and make adjustments as necessary.

Leaders position themselves where they are most needed. In the attack, it is up front. In a retrograde, it is last out.

We know this was not a breakout from close encirclement in the eyes of Custer the decision maker. They were in fact encircled, but as yet, Custer had no knowledge of the fact. Were it a breakout, Custer would have been exactly where Reno was in the valley episode.

So the ONLY other conclusion one can come to is that Custer's battalion was in retrograde, with the intention of pulling each of his companies out in sequence, and having some sort of senior guy (Keogh) back there to rally those companies at some undetermined rally point, to wait for the rest of the battalion to join up. Keogh's task then is plain as the nose on your face, get three companies out, extract them from  the immediate battle space, establish and man a rally point, and provide a base of fire to aid the other two companies in their withdrawal, lending fire support to those companies to ward off close pursuit.

I keep trying to tell you fellows to study TTP, before you comment, but it seems that no one pays one goddamned bit of attention. Frustrating.

I do pay attention and a lot of attention. What I want to know is why on the way they arrived at the area of the fords D.

I agree that tactically in a retreat the leader goes last to make sure he gets all his men out of the mess.

I also agree that at that time they still did not know that they were surrounded. They did not know because then it would have been Custer himself who would have taken the lead to break the encirclement (the same thing Reno did in the valley).

I also agree that Custer would have set a rally point with Keogh probably at Nye-Cartwright or Luce Ridge. CIL was stopped by large forces and E and F surrounded and destroyed.

[yanmacca]

I don't think Keogh would have sent calhoun forward, if you were in a line and the unit in front of you gets forced away and is being followed, wouldn't you deploy and halt the enemies momentum to allow for your frontal unit to get clear?

I don't claim to know as no one does.

Gotta go watching a movie and enjoying drink.

Ian

[yanmacca]

Hard luck in the champions league Pachi, Man Utd are playing hot at the moment.

Ian

[quincannon]

You were not paying attention to me Pachi. You were paying attention to those who taught you these things long ago. That's the same people I paid attention to. If I did anything I reminded you of what you learned in bygone days. Goes to show that regardless of what army you learned them in good tactical practices are universal.

I don't think Keogh would have sent anyone forward either after he himself was turned back as Steve suggests. So if he did not send anyone forward, how did they end up as they did? That is a very easy answer.  Keogh was not turned back, he sent no one forward, so that whole Keogh in the lead is nothing but crap, and it was put forward without Steve thinking what the whole picture would be, had he been correct, proving THAT IF YOU LIVE BY THE SOCK YOU WILL DIE BY THE SOCK.

Yes busy afternoon for me too, an M4A3 in 1/35 on my plate.

[rollingthunder]

The first thing they taught me, is that the enemy is the enemy. But that he´s not stupid.

[quincannon]

Actually, what they taught me is figure on the enemy always being smarter than you are. That way the only way you will ever be surprised is when you find out they are not.

[miker]

If you have not read, studied, and cogitated on  Crossing the Deadly Ground or Upton's Infantry Tactics and/or similar works you are in no position to discourse upon Custer's tactical application of his regiment at the Little Bighorn which leads you to the point of making frivolous observations and conclusions about what happened or may have happened. 

I also advise you to read  FM 3-90.1 and FM 3-90.2 which are modern as well as the 1941 manual for cavalry FM 2-15. I have to search again for WWI and late 19th century manuals.  

As a contrast I also recommend study of Isandwalna and Rorkes' Drift. There are things to be learned there. 

Tactics were not taught, discussed, or applied in the same manner as today.   Evaluating the tactics of the era using modern concepts and doctrine without considering the doctrinal divide in doctrine, instruction, and careful consideration of the difference (and assuming you have studied and evaluated the difference and similarities between the two systems) you are making a grave mistake. 

For example nowhere in Upton is the term "breakout from encirclement" used and to my knowledge there is no mention of it in any other doctrine of the period.    This does not alter the observation and fact that Reno did execute one, but it was more a matter of "Follow me and do as I do", luck, and surprising the Indians than any rapid planning and communication with his commanders. 

They did have a concept of advancing or displacing by bounds, but it was not as formal as we are today.  They had a concept of encirclement, flank attacks, penetration, and forming, committing, and reforming the reserve.  I would summarize tactics of the time as " Charge or Form Skirmish Line and see what develops " just as the Germans say "First the Panzers punch a hole..." Today. 

Nor would I place great stock in Native descriptions of what they thought units were doing.  They did not know, understand, or study US Army tactics in the way that we do some of our potential opponents today (but Russian/Soviet tactics is still the system we tend to pay the most attention to).  This does not mean they were stupid or ignorant. They had excellent trade craft, could exploit ground, and could spot and take advantage of  weakness and overconfidence. 

 Custer was Not a tactician nor was the 7th Cavalry  Regiment well trained.  Benteen and Godfrey appears to be the two commanders with the best Tactical acumen.  The 4th Cavalry and Mackenzie were much better.  Perhaps wrongly, I would rate Buford as the best cavalryman of the 18th Century. Study his opening day action at Gettysburg. 

Finally accompany your thoughts and descriptions with a map. The level of personnel knowledge and familiarity with the battlefield varies wildly among participants on the board.   Nothing focuses the attention of the student more than an arrow on a map.  Google Earth by The way is not a map. Its lack of contour lines makes it useless to a tactical practitioner unless it is coupled with a map.  It does have useful tools however.   I can send you a map PDF or jpg if you don't have one. 

EDIT:  I found on my computer the following (I don't have the links, but if you message me on the board, give my your e-mail, I will be glad to forward them.  I suspect Beth would not appreciate it if I uploaded them somewhere on the board, if that is even possible.):

1891 Cavalry Drill Regulations
1910 Tactical Principles and Problems
1917 Officers Manual 
1921 Tactics and Techniques of Cavalry
1941 Cavalry Field Manual Employment of Cavalry
1944 Cavalry Drill Regulations - Horse

some things don't change (much)  like the distance between horses and men on the skirmish line, information about how fast horses can move, basic principles, but you can see how doctrine evolved.  When coupled with Uptons Infantry tactics manual, you can also craft a better picture of how things were.

Fred Wagner send me an excerpt of Uptons Cavalry Manual, notably those items that differed from the Infantry version.  I would be happy to send that to you as well if requested.

I remain baffled as to why Uptons Cavalry Tactics is not available.  However you can get Mountain Scouting by Edward S Farrow and Elements of Military Science and Tactics which contains excerpts from Upton and other works of the 1800s from Amazon.

Above all, I strongly encourage and request Mac to craft a Post in which he presents a unified discussion of his Ford D theory together with maps.  The information contained in the various posts is too disjointed and fragemented to easily form a mental picture of the hypothesis.

[mac]

As QC said we must think about them executing the tactics they knew. The archaeology actually shows that they maintained good order right up to the final collapses.

Point to ponder here.

Custer has already messaged Benteen. What does Custer expect Reno is doing?

Fred Wagner has done recent work on the Reno fight. He says in his opinion Reno made only one critical mistake and the was taking the horses of two companies into the timber. This effectively fixed Reno in the timber.

Fred's point was that, with mobility, Reno could have staged a controlled retrograde back down the valley.

My point has for a long time been that, almost certainly, that is what Custer thinks is happening.

Now we can start to understand why Custer is trying to retrograde South. He thinks Reno is dragging the enemy force in the valley back towards Ford A.

Think on that geometry of the forces involved and I will try to create the map Mike requested.

Stand by Ian....I may need your help mate !

Cheers

[yanmacca]

My sword never sleeps in my hand Mac, I await your calling.

Ian

[miker]

What you or anyone else thinks Custer was thinking has no bearing on anything and it's unknowable. He never had a real plan or if he did he didn't tell anyone, he put his Regiment out of supporting distance when he sent Benteen off to the left and lost control of his regiment after he detached Reno.

Custer does not even know if Martini got through to Benteen. (By the way, he should have sent two messengers.). He didn't know where Benteen is.

Reno has no idea what Benteen or Custer is doing, except Custer abandoned him. They are all on their own.

There is no point in exploring a theoretical Reno delay because that is not what he did. Had he done so, the Indians would have pursued him driving him even further from Custer and possibly destroying his battalion. He is apparently running out of ammunition and apparently they were shooting high. The Indians are turning his left flank. there is no defensible ground in the valley except maybe where he went. They then might have caught Benteen in the open.

Benteen does not know where or what Custer or Reno is doing, but he abandoned his flank march to move to rejoin the Regiment. Had he not, it is very likely Martini would not have found him. Benteen very nearly went left up the Valley and not right up toward Reno.

[quincannon]

What is frustrating me about Fred Wagner is that he seems from time to time to forget the lessons he was taught all those years ago at the "Benning School For Wayward Boys". I remember those lessons well, for they were not learned, but rather absorbed to where they became part of your inner being.

Examples:

Reno WAS NOT fixed. He would have been if had stayed much longer, but I say again he was not fixed. To be FIXED, by definition, is when you lose all ability to maneuver. Reno had not lost that ability, as subsequent events vividly demonstrate.

Moving those horses into the timber WAS NOT a mistake. In a stand up firefight, as opposed to a brief skirmish, your mobility must be protected. Moving those horses was how Reno was protecting his mobility.

Fred's point, of being able to conduct a controlled retrograde back up that valley to Ford A, is a venture into Cloud Cuckoo Land on Steroids. Reno's line was flanked to his left and there were probably just as many hostiles filing in behind him as there were to his front. How under those circumstances do you conduct a controlled retrograde? Someone please tell me.

Do what Mike has suggested. Study tactics. When done these things become obvious.

[Elwood]

Feb 27, 2023 7:01:56 GMT mac said:

As QC said we must think about them executing the tactics they knew. The archaeology actually shows that they maintained good order right up to the final collapses.

Point to ponder here.

Custer has already messaged Benteen. What does Custer expect Reno is doing?

Fred Wagner has done recent work on the Reno fight. He says in his opinion Reno made only one critical mistake and the was taking the horses of two companies into the timber. This effectively fixed Reno in the timber.

Fred's point was that, with mobility, Reno could have staged a controlled retrograde back down the valley.

My point has for a long time been that, almost certainly, that is what Custer thinks is happening.

Now we can start to understand why Custer is trying to retrograde South. He thinks Reno is dragging the enemy force in the valley back towards Ford A.

Cheers

Interesting! Also, did not Custer also get intel from Boston Custer on Benteen’s location? Having been messaged and ordered to expedite, George may have been expecting (hoping) Benteen to come over the ridges from the south at any moment. Might help with the retrograde thinking.

[azranger]

Feb 23, 2023 18:09:42 GMT rollingthunder said:

Feb 23, 2023 15:28:58 GMT azranger said:

I believe that Scott is working on a presentation of artifacts at and near Ford Ds.

I believe that Curley was correct in observation of the split in MTC. I believe E and F along with HQ went down MTC. Not to cross the river but slow a response from the village. Three eyewitnesses place soldiers close to Medicine Tail/ Deep Coulee crossings. There are Indians drawings showing the gray horses being chased across what I call the western corridor. The current markers are along that western corridor. It is a single line of markers with over 1,800 yards distance. The end of the movement created the line. It sucks to have the slowest horses.

Undoubtedly, some soldiers went straight across MTC and up a drainage to Luce. They were engaged by a returning hunting party  of Cheyennes. Wolf Tooth doesn't come into close contact until they reach and cross Deep Coulee. As Custer moves north along the western corridor Sioux and Cheyenne move up toward Nye Cartwright. Indians are on both flanks and the rear, with the front open toward the Cheyennes.

Custer reaches the ridge overlooking Deep Ravine but is further west of Deep Gully (Deep Ravine). I believe some fighting took place near the fording place at Deep Ravine. You can see 4-5 markers further west. The Southern Cheyennes were there and protecting some sacred items. Custer continues moving west and north. He moves across drainages and meets C,I,L near Last Stand Hill.  Custer with E,F moves across Cemetery Ridge and down the slope where the old entrance road was located. Scott addresses the artifacts found in the construction of the old entrance road. Also, the Kellogg marker was along this road. Custer runs into Cheyennes moving toward him. He begins to retrograde. Crows have told us that Custer was shot there. Scott tells us that there was timber there in the past. C,I,L moves out down Battle Ridge Extension. They are parallel with Custer's movement. They are stopped by a hunting party returning from an antelope hunt. Also, Cheyenne coming from north of the river. (Ford Ds)

All five companies are in retrograde. E,F, and Custer attempt to slow the Indians while C,I,L continue toward the Calhoun Area. I believe Keogh was in the lead, but he was stopped near Deep Coulee. He may have been shot there. His sock was recovered near that area. E,F, and Custer were fixed on LSH. 

So the markers represent a retrograde that failed with soldiers attempting to move back toward Custer on LSH. Benteen's description of throwing a handful of corn seems appropriate. There is no longer an offense formation, nor is there a defense with all five companies in mutual support of each other.

I can add more details in accounts and artifacts supporting my opinion. Since I am not an author, I can also accept accounts and artifacts that are inconsistent with my opinion and revise them if necessary. 

Regards

Steve

Why don't you draw on a map the route you think Custer took since Custer moves north along the western corridor? No professional work is necessary, a few simple lines would be enough to understand it well

Hi Rollingthunder 

I don't need to draw the map since Maguire drew it. The western route is shown and it even has the route back to Deep Gully in Deep Ravine separate from the route over from MTC. 

Regards

Steve

[azranger]

RT

Here is my working map which can change. The gray line follows the markers and is consistent with the Maguire body map. What I think is missing is the continuance of EF, Custer, and CIL. Since they didn't end north of LSH and the property is mostly private it left out any movement across CR or down BRE.

Regards

Steve

[miker]

Feb 27, 2023 19:34:50 GMT Elwood said:

Feb 27, 2023 7:01:56 GMT mac said:

As QC said we must think about them executing the tactics they knew. The archaeology actually shows that they maintained good order right up to the final collapses.

Point to ponder here.

Custer has already messaged Benteen. What does Custer expect Reno is doing?

Fred Wagner has done recent work on the Reno fight. He says in his opinion Reno made only one critical mistake and the was taking the horses of two companies into the timber. This effectively fixed Reno in the timber.

Fred's point was that, with mobility, Reno could have staged a controlled retrograde back down the valley.

My point has for a long time been that, almost certainly, that is what Custer thinks is happening.

Now we can start to understand why Custer is trying to retrograde South. He thinks Reno is dragging the enemy force in the valley back towards Ford A.

Cheers

Interesting! Also, did not Custer also get intel from Boston Custer on Benteen’s location? Having been messaged and ordered to expedite, George may have been expecting (hoping) Benteen to come over the ridges from the south at any moment. Might help with the retrograde thinking.

We do not know what, if anything, Boston told George.   It's  time distance plot.  Custer had no idea Reno was between him and Benteen and stopped Benteen's forward movement.  Had Benteen gone right (LEFT*), then something else would have happened.  Perhaps all three battalions would have been destroyed.

*I need to not type this stuff on my phone or Kindle.