Never Got to Ford D

[miker]

T+70
I Destroyed
E and F under attack; Stragglers breaking SE, NW, and E and hunted down like stray sheep

[miker]

T+80
E and F Destroyed
Groups of Indians pursue remnants toward the Little Bighorn and in other directs.
Other groups begin moving toward Weir Peak

[miker]

This final map tries to paint a picture as to the paths fleeing troopers took to try to escape. The big difference between my scenario and the standard scenario is, since I have placed C up front with L, the troopers who are regarded as being killed as they move toward the south and then toward L's flank, rather are killed trying to escape to the West from the skirmish line.



The markers, like bullet casings, can portray a pattern but do not of themselves give direction.



Also, while I previously regarded as Mark Kellogg getting killed because he lagged behind the soldiers frantically trying to get away from Ford D, that he was able to flee further West then most and was killed nearer Ford B  I mean Ford D.

[miker]

This photo from The Archaeology of Historic Battlefields: A History and Theoretical Development in Conflict Archaeology by Douglas D. Scott and Andrew P. McFeaters has a very interesting photo with artifacts from outside the battlefield reservation.



It shows artifacts along Battle Ridge toward Ford D.  Alas, it does not explain what they are.  I suspect the Blue dots represent US Army artifacts.

In related news, this bibliographic entry enabled me to find the publisher of the book:
Scott, D. D., and Bleed, P. (1997). A Good Walk Around the Boundary: Archeological Inventory of the Dyck and other Properties Adjacent to Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, Special Publication, Nebraska Association of Professional Archeologists and Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln.

And it is available for 10.00 + 3.00 shipping from history.nebraska.gov or from

History Nebraska
5050 N 32nd St
Lincoln, NE 68504

I have the information for the contact person who is sending me the publication, but I hesitate to put it out for all to smother him with requests, but if you are interested PM me and I will provide it.

I hope/suspect it will provide more information on the topic of Ford D.

[quincannon]

If I accept your scenario of events at face value, and completely accurate Mike, then it begs the question, - Custer faced with an overwhelming amount of opposition coming from the south, engaging or about to engage three of his companies, did Custer ever move north with two? Prudence dictates that he put every man jack of his force into line and conduct a hasty defense. He would have no idea that the Cheyenne were gathering strength in the north. He sure could not see them, but he surely could see what was coming at him from the south. I think had he done that the LSH would have been what we now name for Calhoun, and the eventual outcome would have been the same. BUT,I also think there is a better than even chance the Cheyenne would have remained dormant, contenting themselves with a positive defense of their area. Maybe not, but I think it possible. The bulk of the Cheyenne were a couple of miles away, and under absolutely no threat, had Custer decided to face the Sioux on the southern reaches of Battle Ridge.

A full perimeter in the Calhoun Hill area, is not ideal by any means, but what it would have given Custer is positive control of the battalion, and the ability to mass fires to some extent. What Custer needed was a good 60mm mortar platoon, with a troop of Apache's overhead.

[miker]

The basis of my scenario is they lay where they lay.  I  did not seek to try to fathom why George would have sent people North to LSH except that is where they lie.  Massing at Calhoun may or may not have turned out like LSH or on Reno Hill.

Absent 60mm mortars and apaches, a two gus section of mountain howitzers may have been useful.  I don't know if they were pack mounted, just smaller, or still in service.  Gatling guns might have been useful if he could make them come to him.

[quincannon]

The point with the sixties reinforces your thoughts on how broken the terrain is there, and how it greatly facilitates infiltration. Absent some sort of high angle indirect fire capability, even the mountain howitzers or Gatlings would not have kept those Indians in check. The bow and arrow has indirect capabilities. Custer had none.

As to your scenario. I think that is what people have been doing since the 26th of June 1876. They try to justify where they lay and use it to build a scenario around it. I knew what you were doing from the outset, and I for at least one, am glad you did it the way you did. Actually it fits completely with the conventional scenario, so attempting to tear yours apart is nothing more than putting the conventional to the acid test. Personally, I do not think the conventional stands up all that well. It makes Custer look like a complete boob, and while George was a lot of things, I do not think tactically stupid was one of them.

[miker]

I know my scenario is conventional. I don't think GAC was a nitwit or boob, but I don't think he knew how to handle a regiment or below in combat. I may be wrong, but he never commanded anything below brigade.

On the other hand I never commanded above company (3 times) although I was the senior captain In two battalions and S-3Air in two, was a BDE 4 who also helped keep the S-3 straight (who did command a battalion as did the XO of the BDE), the night battle captain of the 1ID TAC, and one of the day watch officers of the 1IDMAIN in desert storm. I had more responsibility in the DTAC though and did it in 3 or 4 div CPXs.

What I don't like about Ford D is they start in MTC, suffer very few if any casualties out and back, and then get destroyed Practically without a fight. It boggles my mind. Reno was within a whisker of losing his battalion when he - planned or lucked - I to breaking out and getting to his hill. It did not hurt That Benteen showed up when he did.

What were the Indians doing in MTC that caused the volleys to be fired?

Why didn't they eat Custer alive as he moved to and from Ford D? If he went.

I'm hoping for illumination from my recent book order. It will at least fuel more speculation.

[quincannon]

Conventional - Verified

Nitwit or boob - Neither do I

Lowest level he ever commanded - Brigade

Handle a regiment - Anyone that successfully  commanded a brigade in combat can handle a regiment in combat. What he could not do is handle and administer a regiment in garrison, which ultimately led to an abysmal command climate in combat. Tactics are easy. Any dumb ass like myself can read a book, understand what the book is telling you and apply it. Managing people on the other hand, team building, training, building a cohesive collective fighting spirit is the tough work, and that is where most commanders fail.

Who said they started in MTC. They crossed it for sure. Some element may have conducted some maneuver there to get around or flank those harassing the main column on the eastern ridges, but there is absolutely nothing that says that the battalion was in MTC or that they started northward from there.

Volleys. How do you know that it was actual volleys that were fired like at a funeral. I don't know that, and I do not know that because the word volley in the 19th century was used interchangeably with "I heard some firing over yonder" "I heard a volley over yonder" We are men of the 21st Century trying to understand language usage of the 19th Century. If you want to understand the American Revolution my son reminds me, that "Present your firelock" means Present Arms, not show me the lock that you secure your fire with.

Reno executed a brilliant break out from encirclement, worthy of adoption by the 13th Demi Brigade of the Legion Etranger at Bir Hakim. Both had their asses handed to them, but both also succeeded. Both did it just right. They got both creamed but that is what you expect when you are forced to conduct such a maneuver. If Benteen had not shown up when he did, that would have been another story.

Eat Custer alive as he moved to Ford D. Well you have to have something that enables you to eat. They did not, but they were coming.

I had nearly this same conversation with my son last night, as I related to you in an off board message. He had a satellite map for reference, and I pointed out to him what I believe Custer's limit  of advance was, that being the old park entrance road at the western foot of Cemetery Ridge. So I do not think Custer got to Ford D either, nor do I think he got onto the valley floor. That of course was his intention, but there were just enough Indians already there to stop him with fire. Further I believe this accounts for the differences in Indian testimony. Some say he got to the river which would be correct, if his left flank company was down near the now park administrative buildings. Others say no, he never got there, and that too would be correct if his center or right flank companies were on line with the company on the left. Both would be accurate statements viewed from whatever passed for Indian foxholes. All of this leads us full circle to the question I asked a few days ago. Why, with his objective out of reach, did he just not move away, avoid a firefight, and move south to rejoin the other regimental elements. It just does not make any sense not to do so, UNLESS there is something we do not know, and I hold that out as a distinct possibility.

[miker]

Handle a regiment - Anyone that successfully commanded a brigade in combat can handle a regiment in combat. What he could not do is handle and administer a regiment in garrison, which ultimately led to an abysmal command climate in combat. Tactics are easy. Any dumb ass like myself can read a book, understand what the book is telling you and apply it. Managing people on the other hand, team building, training, building a cohesive collective fighting spirit is the tough work, and that is where most commanders fail.

My friend, I don't think just anyone can handle a platoon.  Some do it and some don't.  You get chances, usually only one at each level to prove you can do it and get to try again at the next level.  I had two platoons.  Three companies.  I think I am pretty good, but events, some perhaps self-inflicted others not , which denied me the opportunity to go higher.  Some batalion commanders I regarded highly did not command brigades.  Two of my cadets from 1990 did well enough to command an infantry brigade and an attack helicopter brigade.  Perhaps I helped.  They did compain I pushed them too hard in training.

Who said they started in MTC. They crossed it for sure. Some element may have conducted some maneuver there to get around or flank those harassing the main column on the eastern ridges, but there is absolutely nothing that says that the battalion was in MTC or that they started northward from there.

I am not saying they (Custer or the Indians) started in MTC.  I wonder what happened to make Custer deploy as he did.  That may have been the time to head back to Reno and he clearly didn't.

Volleys. How do you know that it was actual volleys that were fired like at a funeral. I don't know that, and I do not know that because the word volley in the 19th century was used interchangeably with "I heard some firing over yonder" "I heard a volley over yonder" We are men of the 21st Century trying to understand language usage of the 19th Century. If you want to understand the American Revolution my son reminds me, that "Present your firelock" means Present Arms, not show me the lock that you secure your fire with.

Target.  Again.  I wonder what happened to make them deploy and fire.  It seems to be a heavy engagment.  I played with the thought the whole battalion went from SE to NW and halted twice to fire while in very close interval.  Not too satisfying in terms of thinking or analysis.

Reno executed a brilliant break out from encirclement, worthy of adoption by the 13th Demi Brigade of the Legion Etranger at Bir Hakim. Both had their asses handed to them, but both also succeeded. Both did it just right. They got both creamed but that is what you expect when you are forced to conduct such a maneuver. If Benteen had not shown up when he did, that would have been another story.

He got away with it.  I don't think he planned it, but if it works (and it did) it was brilliant.

Eat Custer alive as he moved to Ford D. Well you have to have something that enables you to eat. They did not, but they were coming.

They were hungry.  Crooke was an appetizer.

I had nearly this same conversation with my son last night, as I related to you in an off board message. He had a satellite map for reference, and I pointed out to him what I believe Custer's limit of advance was, that being the old park entrance road at the western foot of Cemetery Ridge. So I do not think Custer got to Ford D either, nor do I think he got onto the valley floor. That of course was his intention, but there were just enough Indians already there to stop him with fire. Further I believe this accounts for the differences in Indian testimony. Some say he got to the river which would be correct, if his left flank company was down near the now park administrative buildings. Others say no, he never got there, and that too would be correct if his center or right flank companies were on line with the company on the left. Both would be accurate statements viewed from whatever passed for Indian foxholes. All of this leads us full circle to the question I asked a few days ago. Why, with his objective out of reach, did he just not move away, avoid a firefight, and move south to rejoin the other regimental elements. It just does not make any sense not to do so, UNLESS there is something we do not know, and I hold that out as a distinct possibility.

Well, he might have been trying to get back, got fixed (at Calhoun Hill) because there were people between him and Benteen, he couldn't beat his way through, and then was encircled and chopped up.   "Why" is what we want to know and no amount of speculation will give us an answer.  The markers tell us nothing about timing, intent, or tactics. 

[quincannon]

Oh I don't think just anyone can command well either. My point was that it is more than having tactical knowledge. I think anyone can obtain and employ those skills. All it takes is paying attention and following the basic rules. Command though is more than that. There is a human element. I do not think that Custer was exposed to the human element in the ACW. All the folks he commanded were dedicated and fully committed to the saving of the Union. Peacetime service though is quite different, the absolute dedication to cause is gone, and factions develop. That is where it takes more than being a sound tactician to effectively command. People management can make or break a unit.

Well, something did happen in MTC, and it was more than likely a result of Wolf Tooth. The most probable thing, I believe, is maneuver with one or two companies in MTC as part of a flanking movement to unhinge Wolfie and the boys. It is during this period when Martini was sent, and people confuse this move with a thrust toward Ford B, which it was not.

They were firing a Wolf Tooth. Simple as that, but they were not firing volley fire. They were just shooting and that was what was heard. You explained yourself, how long that skirmish line on the eastern ridges was, and I do not think volley fire can be controlled with that length of line. The voice only carries so far and true volley fire must be controlled.

Reno planned it. Probably took him 30 seconds if that. He executed it. He got away with it. Therefore both of us are correct. It was brilliant.

The point Mike, was there were not enough Indians standing in Custer's way to eat him alive. There was just enough to stop him.

Custer had no knowledge on anyone between him and Benteen/Reno, with the possible exception of Wolf Tooth's boys and they were small in number. The proof of that is the company that was seen moving south slowly and with caution, taking their time, thus concerned about security, but not aware of any direct threat. If that one company had been Custer's battalion, they would be a lot of old sods wondering what to do on Tuesday night, because they would not be talking about the Custer massacre.

[miker]

MTC. I buy most of that thought. It seems to me the northern line is oriented North and East. At least to me it looks like they are off the crest to the North firing North.

The southern line is facing South and East.

I think then the enemy is on the N, E, and S of Custer leaving the way West open. If so, that may have led him to Go West, Old Son.

I think at this point they could have volleyed the first 2-4 volleys by firing 1's, 2's, 3's, and 4's. That appears to be doctrine from my reading Upton. (We know about doctrine.). After that as fast as you can with maybe some people trying to manage fire discipline. But no cavalry bodies along the skirmish lines. No known Indian bodies either.


I also am fascinated with Cowpens. That was some brilliant and lucky work.

[quincannon]

Cowpens was the most masterful feat of arms ever conducted by an American Army anywhere at any time. If Banastre Tarlton was still alive he would reluctantly agree

[miker]

I've been three times. Small field but fascinating. I have to go back. I can feel the British break when I'm there.

[miker]

I have large scale maps I bought of Cowpens, Gettysburg, and Yorktown in preparation for follow up walks there as well as an excellent map atlas of Gettysburg (the last one of in the store at the time by a wonderful Cartographer.)

It provided the inspiration for my attempt here. Alas, he had better
Skill, data, and patience than I. Also more thorough. I made several mistakes in this scenario but that's why there are proofreaders and associates.