Ford B: Prelude to Destruction

[deadwoodgultch]

Feb 1, 2023 2:42:53 GMT miker said:

Jan 31, 2023 13:12:30 GMT deadwoodgultch said:

To be fair I already knew where the ford was when I first viewed it from Weir and there was activity there in the reenactors camp.

Regards,
Tom

Tom

I just can't let this go.  I may be assuming too much.  Are you saying you could see Ford B itself or you saw riders in the vicinity of Ford B at the riding acadamy?

Mike, please understand that I knew where what is considered Ford B is while on Weir. There are two , maybe there obvious crossings on the Real Bird ranch I have actually been in the water there, waist deep beer in hand,  Andrews has kayaked  there. Say what you will I could see that area. I know Custer did not have that advantage(waist deep with beer), maybe Bouyer did.

Regards,
Tom

[miker]

Tom, I'm not doubting you. I am just trying to end the confusion in my befuddled brain. So to restate and ask you to confirm (again).

You found a place on Weir Point that gave you observation to the vicinity of Ford B because you knew its location?

You saw fords from the Real Bird Ranch.

You then waded into the Little Bighorn.

Thanks.

[quincannon]

Two cents worth: When I visited the battlefield I purposely started at the Reno defense site. I had to drive by Ford B of course, but paid no attention to it, as I have nearly always known where it was. That said, when I started back toward the Custer portion of the park, I took my time, stopped several places including the area near 3411 (did not know about Fred's 3411 at the time) and at Weir Point. At each stop I looked northward trying to get an idea of what Weir, Benteen, and Reno saw as the moved in that direction. At no time did I see Ford B when I stopped. I did not see it until I rounded a corner in the park road where it starts to ascend toward F-F Ridge and Calhoun Hill. I could not see much of B from F-F Ridge, and none of it from Calhoun Hill. Looking over at the eastern ridges though it is not hard to imagine that B could be seen as the column used those ridges to move northward. Could not visit the eastern ridges, so I cannot be completely certain, but I suspect the trained eye could look at B from there, and while they could not access fordability, what they probably saw was enough to convince them B was a dry hole, a place to be avoided.

[mac]

The one thing we know is that at some point before he issued the Martini order, Custer had seen that the Village was Big. I do not see why it matters too much where he was when he saw it, especially since we have no way to know.

We are informed by post battle observations, and by Indian accounts, that the village stretched back past the Ford B area.

We know that from the most likely point that Custer entered MTC; it is a simple thing to move down just far enough to observe the village opposite the Ford B area.

All we need to do now is ask ourselves is there any tactically useful reason for Custer, knowing the village is there, to take Companies E and F down to the river and form up opposite the Big Village?

I just think the whole notion is crazy. But would like to be told why it would be a good idea, or why Custer would do it.

Note I am saying taking the whole two companies because that is the conventional theory.

Let me throw in here that

:- neither Benteen nor Godfrey thought Custer did it. Godfrey found what he believed was Custer's trail on the route that would lead to the archaeological traces on Luce and Nye Cartwright.

:- the only archaeology that has been found at Ford B itself, shows that a cavalry horse was there. We know the Indians drove some cavalry horses over that ford.

:- Battle archaeology is found in, and close to, Deep Coulee (not Ford B) and Deep Coulee is associated with the destruction of Company C by Lame White Man. This action is  surely more likely to have created these archaeological finds.

Just saying.

Cheers

[quincannon]

I am not sure we know that Custer (himself) saw the village. It certainly is readily apparent that he knew it was extensive, thus the note.

If you are looking at me to tell you why taking two companies to Ford B was a good idea Mac, you're going to have to look somewhere else. I can't conceive of a worse idea under the circumstances. There does not exist any useful tactical reason. It would be the military equivalent of finding yourself in a locked room with a four ton bull, who is madder than hell, and discovering that you are dressed in red from head to toe. Very bad form.

[miker]

Feb 3, 2023 0:57:46 GMT mac said:

The one thing we know is that at some point before he issued the Martini order, Custer had seen that the Village was Big. 

Mike:  I accept this.

do not see why it matters too much where he was when he saw it, especially since we have no way to know.

Mike:  I disagree. We don't know where he went, but we can exclude places he couldn't.  Knowing where things aren't can be as useful as knowing where they are.

We are informed by post battle observations, and by Indian accounts, that the village stretched back past the Ford B area.

Mike:  I generally agree.  I think the village was smaller than is commonly believe.  I am impressed by the Analysis found in Lakota Noon. 

We know that from the most likely point that Custer entered MTC; it is a simple thing to move down just far enough to observe the village opposite the Ford B area.

Mike:  I'm throwing the BS flag. From the two skirmish lines formed in MTC, I believe the move would not be simple.  Even if it was, in war the simple is difficult. 

All we need to do now is ask ourselves is there any tactically useful reason for Custer, knowing the village is there, to take Companies E and F down to the river and form up opposite the Big Village?

Mike:  I still think you are using current knowledge of what was going on.  When Custer turned NW he most likely had no clue about what was up there.  Specifically he had no idea Wolf Tooth was up there nor just where Ford B or D was. The Crows and Boyer did, but that is not the same thing.  He does not know where Reno is or what he is doing.  He has lost contact and neither can support Reno nor be Supported by him. 


He MAY have thought he could split the Indians,  hammer and anvil the Indians between him and Reno and that he could capture non-combatant hostages.  He'd done it before and it worked.  It infuriates Chuck, but hostage taking was a tactic in antiquity.  I can see it might be useful in counterinsurgency. 

I just think the whole notion is crazy. But would like to be told why it would be a good idea, or why Custer would do it.

Note I am saying taking the whole two companies because that is the conventional theory.

Mike:  I am still unconvinced as to whether it was possible but I just stated my reasons.  I'm glad you and others are convinced, but you don't know. 

I'm a cavalryman-the only one here one of two here (apologies to Colt)  I don't know about him  but I can see me going down there and exactly how I'd do it.  It doesn't mean anyone but me would do it that way.  And even I might not.  

I want to know if the ford supports military operations.  To do that I split my unit I to two parts. A supporting element (3 companies) and a recon element. (Two companies).  The support elements deploy.  The two recon companies move closer and one company stops to provide support to the other.  That company moves forward so they can see the Ford. 

When they can see near side, far side, and the river in between. The move forward so they can fire across with aimed fire.  When set I follow the maxim of making contact with the smallest element: in this case a four. They go down there. Observe the far bank and get their feet wet and go across.  If they are successful, then the rest move across and firm a defensive parameter. 

I've done this with tank and cav platoons and tank companies.  It works. 

It didn't work there. They were repulsed and Custer went looking elsewhere.  In my view this is doomed to failure.  It will take time.  He will have no idea where Reno is and vice versa. He has no idea of the enemy situation.  He may now know he is under attack in his rear from Wolf Tooth.

He then moves to Calhoun Hill and something happens. 

Let me throw in here that

:- neither Benteen nor Godfrey thought Custer did it. Godfrey found what he believed was Custer's trail on the route that would lead to the archaeological traces on Luce and Nye Cartwright.

Mike:  Benteen believed elements crossed and changed his mind. Godfrey does not become convinced till the 10th Anniversary when Gall convinces him.  Read his century article. 

:- the only archaeology that has been found at Ford B itself, shows that a cavalry horse was there. We know the Indians drove some cavalry horses over that ford.

Mike: I cited archeology finding more than a cavalry horse.  Soldiers Claim thry found bodies. 

:- Battle archaeology is found in, and close to, Deep Coulee (not Ford B) and Deep Coulee is associated with the destruction of Company C by Lame White Man. This action is  surely more likely to have created these archaeological finds.

Mike:  As above. 

Just saying.

Cheers

[miker]

I forgot to add that by moving north with 2, 3,4,or 5 companieshes moving away from his support (such as it is). He doesn't know Reno is moving BACK unknowingly toward Bentsen.

Benteen does not know where Custer or Reno are. He was trying to follow Reno or Fisher's trail. he can only follow one of two trails. No matter how hopeless no matter how far.

In my view, Custer lost the battle when he decided to attack with (probably) no information or intelligence (there's a difference).

No one has cited documented archeological findings of any cavalry artifacts near Ford D. I've not been able to find any sources covering Ford D or reports more recent than 1997.

This probably is a poor reflection on my research skills.

I believe I am the only member of our little group who had read both Greene's book and the 1997 study. But maybe not.

What's more he has no idea of the enemy situation.

[deadwoodgultch]

Mike, two things, here. 1) You seemed to ask me about what I did. I was not in the river, with the beer, the same day that I was on Weir with binoculars (better than Custer's, which he borrowed from DeRudio). Two you mentioned that you were the only Cavalry here , Colt may differ, maybe not.

Regards
Tom

[rollingthunder]

Feb 3, 2023 1:31:15 GMT quincannon said:

I am not sure we know that Custer (himself) saw the village. It certainly is readily apparent that he knew it was extensive, thus the note.

If you are looking at me to tell you why taking two companies to Ford B was a good idea Mac, you're going to have to look somewhere else. I can't conceive of a worse idea under the circumstances. There does not exist any useful tactical reason. It would be the military equivalent of finding yourself in a locked room with a four ton bull, who is madder than hell, and discovering that you are dressed in red from head to toe. Very bad form.

Not even the best  torero (bullfighter) in history would leave that room alive. In other words, neither Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte would have been able to cross there

[miker]

Feb 3, 2023 13:50:05 GMT deadwoodgultch said:

Mike, two things, here. 1) You seemed to ask me about what I did. I was not in the river, with the beer, the same day that I was on Weir with binoculars (better than Custer's, which he borrowed from DeRudio). Two you mentioned that you were the only Cavalry here , Colt may differ, maybe not.

Regards
Tom

What you did.  Okay, thanks.  From the river could you/did you try to see Weir Point?

I believe Colt is Armor.  If he is cavalry, I apologize.   For a while there were three Armor/Cavalry MOS'

12A Armor Officer General (Not a general officer)  Trained in both Armor and Cavalry, that is/was my MOS.  I was in the last class to be trained that way.
12B Armor Officer Trained to operate in tank battalions and cooperate with Infantry Battalions.
12C Cavalry Officer Trained in Cavalry operations.

For 12B and 12C, some of the training overlapped.

Armor Officers were given constructive credit for being cavalry if they were assigned to an Armored Cavalry Squadron or Regiment.

Today, there are no Cavalry Regiments.

Each BCT has a Cavalry Squadron with 3 troops and a tank company or anti-tank company.
Infantry Cavalry Squadrons are mounted in HMMWVs.
Stryker Cavalry Squadrons are mounted in Stryker's
Armored Cavalry Squadrons are mounted in Bradley's.

The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments are motorized infantry brigades, just like every other Stryker Brigade.  They like to pretend they are cavlary regiments because of their heritage, but they aren't.  They have 3 Infantry Battalions mounted in Strykers and the Cavalry Squadron.  The Infantry battalions are not trained in reconnaissance or security missions.

The 11th and 278th ACRs are Armored Brigade.  The 11th is understrength and is the opposing force at the National Training Center.  They have some round out units from the National Guard to bring them up to full strength when required.  The 278th ACR is in the TNARNG and is just an ABCT with three Combined Arms battalions (one has 2 Infantry and 1 tank companies, and the other two have 1 Infantry and 2 tank companies.)  Likewise, they are not trained in Cavalry Operations.

All four regiments like to pretend they are cavalry and wear various Stetson or Campaign hats for head gear and "award" silver spurs when officers (I don't know about enlisted men; they didn't do the spur thing when I was in) pass a series of tests and events to prove they are qualified and gold spurs if they serve in combat.  Combat veterans in some cases wear a gold rope (or whatever you call it) around the hat crown and non-combat soldiers wear silver.

The 1st Cavarly Division thinks they are cavalry.  They are not.  They are just a division, but they make a big think about it because of their heritage.

Edit:  I grant there is a Cavalry state of mind.  Guys who only served in Armor units don't have it, although the people that come from Cavalry units to Armor units infect them with the state of mind.  Thus, you see the four cavalry regiments and the 1st Cavalry Division with a certain style when compared to other units.

[colt45]

Mike,
When I was commissioned, it was as a 1203/1204, which is armor/cavalry. This later became a 12A. So essentially we both had the same MOS. However, I was primarily an armor officer. I did not serve in a cav unit or in a cav function.

[miker]

Thanks for setting me straight. You have the training, so it counts.

[deadwoodgultch]

Thank you both for the clarification.

Mike, yes you can see Weir, from B, there is however a ridge between, I believe it is near where the Crow Scouts lobbed rounds into the village.

Regards,
Tom

[miker]

Feb 3, 2023 15:43:30 GMT deadwoodgultch said:

Thank you both for the clarification.

Mike, yes you can see Weir, from B, there is however a ridge between, I believe it is near where the Crow Scouts lobbed rounds into the village.

Regards,
Tom

Thanks, Tom!

[quincannon]

By the same token Mike, I would expect you do not consider Wheeler's cavalry division in Cuba cavalry either, nor the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralties, the Philippines, and Korea as being cavalry.

I would further submit that there are no cavalry missions, just missions that are done differently when the force is mounted than when all you have is dismounted units.

It is my firm, and unalterable, belief that you can take any combined arms unit, or combined arms task force, and do everything you attribute to built for the purpose cavalry. They can do it, and in some cases better. That is why we do not have armored cavalry regiments anymore. We cannot afford them when you must fit them into a strength cap of 450K. Training is the difference, not structure. Train for the mission, not find a mission for something you have structured. The ONLY reason armored cavalry existed post war was the inter-German border. They probably would not have been around then if the U S Constabulary had not done such a good job with that mission. In Vietnam, any mechanized or armored brigade could have done what the Blackhorse did.  In Iraq the first time any heavy brigade with attached aviation could have done what the 2nd and 3rd ACR's did.

We made a very big mistake when we let the likes of John K Herr upsent the cavalry applecart in 1940. Chaffee should have been allowed to convert everything that rode horses into tanks, add to them dismounts who rode in half tracks, mix them up into combined arms squadrons, and continue as the cavalry arm. Then train them the way cavalry has been trained for two thousand years, multi-mission mounted combat. Instead we made a bunch of horses (pardon the pun) asses out of ourselves structurally. Marshall should have shot Herr, instead of letting him retire 

Now back to the subject at hand. Anyone that took any size force to Ford B, under the circumstances Custer found himself in, is an idiot.