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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 12, 2016 15:04:17 GMT
This battle took place 5 months to the day after the battle of the LBH. The battlefield is located on private land, about 20 miles west of Kaycee, WY. While the battle is mostly referred to as the Dull Knife fight, the primary chief at this point was Little Wolf. There were more than 900 Northern Cheyenne in the camp, 173, lodges(counted).
The objective of this operation by Crook was to attack Crazy Horse's village, as he felt CH was the ultimate leader of the free roamers at this point. While in the planning stages for the movement against CH Crooks scouts captured a young Cheyenne, who under tough questioning gave up the location of the Cheyenne camp on Red Fork. This information was backed up by another Cheyenne spy who indicated that CH had heard of the soldiers in the area and had moved some good distance north. Crook promptly changed the object of this operation to this Cheyenne camp. He sent Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, into the Bighorn Mountains in search of the Cheyenne village. Mackenzie’s force consisted of 700 men in 11 companies of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th cavalry regiments. Augmenting these troops were more than 400 Indian scouts, including about 150 Lakota and Arapaho, more than 100 Pawnee and roughly the same number of Shoshone.
The Cheyenne in the village knew that soldiers were moving through the Powder River Basin. Many wanted to break camp right away and head north to rejoin Crazy Horse. Most of the Council of Forty-Four, the tribe’s governing body, was in the village at the time. The Council itself, comprised of four representatives from each of the ten Cheyenne bands. This body served to oversee most traditional and day-to-day activities, especially during large gatherings of the tribe.
Last Bull, head chief of the Kit Fox military society, which normally took direction from the Council, as did all the Cheyenne military societies, felt it was not necessary to leave, and declared a type of Cheyenne martial law. He ordered his warriors to cut the saddle and travois cinches on the horses of anyone who tried to leave camp and called for a scalp dance to celebrate his society’s recent victory.
The following morning, as the scalp dance concluded, Mackenzie’s troops attacked the village from the east end of the valley. Alerted to the cavalry’s charge, Cheyenne women, children and old people fled to the hills west and north of camp as their men rushed to defend the village and to give their loved ones more time to escape. The fighting was brief, but intense. The Shoshone scouts climbed a high bluff south of camp and laid down a heavy barrage of rifle fire, immediately gaining control of all activity in the village. The Cheyenne managed to save their two most powerful medicine bundles—the Four Sacred Arrows and the Sacred Buffalo Hat, the early morning assault caught many people in bed, forcing them to flee into the mountains wearing little or nothing. In addition to their clothing, all their lodges and winter stores as well as weapons, cooking utensils and other essentials, including most of the horse herd were left behind.
The Cheyenne headed north, over the canyon wall and into frigid mountains. The image of their homes being burned in the valley behind them, while in front of them, a November blizzard rolled toward them across the range. Eleven babies froze to death that first night. It took them almost a week to exit the mountains, and nearly two weeks to find the camp of Crazy Horse, located near the east fork of Otter Creek in southeastern Montana Territory, a distance of nearly 150 miles from the battle site. The pitiful state of the Cheyenne filled their Lakota friends and relatives with fear. To see the Cheyenne so impoverished and badly beaten convinced many of the Lakota that their families could not risk the same fate. I think this battle had a big impact on the many surrenders the following Spring.
The above info comes from Wooden Leg and the Wyoming Historical Society.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Apr 12, 2016 16:40:51 GMT
Did not take much convincing did it Dave?
Captain Pretend will be apoplectic when someone posts how professionals, as opposed to card board action figure heroes, do business.
The only thing missing was a stealth mention of a board that discusses, rather than uses yellow ink to push crap down the readers gullet.
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dave
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Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Apr 12, 2016 16:59:23 GMT
QC I fell in with bad companions and was lead astray by an older man. J. Worthington Foulfellow was his name and lead me into bad behavior what could I do? Being so naive I just did what I was told. Do you think the captain will forgive me my indiscretion? I would really hate being on his bad side. Regards Dave
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Apr 13, 2016 0:53:58 GMT
QC That was exquisite! Regards Dave
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 13, 2016 9:45:22 GMT
A man who understands it is what it is.
I actually started this thread on a serious, informational bent. We had a hole on the board under that battle. I hope I at least filled that void. I am not sure this banter should not be removed to behind the scenes!
Regards, Tom
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mac
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Post by mac on Apr 13, 2016 12:10:22 GMT
Appreciate you filling the void Deadwood! Interesting to see how the use of intelligence changed compared to that at LBH. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Apr 13, 2016 13:44:55 GMT
Use of intelligence did not change. Intelligence was used at Red Fork. It was not used at LBH. Intelligence must be fresh to be useful. The little Custer had was stale as month old bread, and green with mold, and he made no effort to revisit the bakery.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 13, 2016 14:02:09 GMT
Some reports say that the village on the LBH River was between one and one and a half miles long, I have never read anything about its width, but just seeing this mass of tepee’s stretching for nearly one and a half miles along the river, my god it must have put the wind up a few who saw it and were about to attack it, once more it was active and not sleeping, which makes it worse.
Yan.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 13, 2016 14:23:53 GMT
The width was, or so I understand, about 300 yards. So as much as say 270 or so meters.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 13, 2016 14:42:14 GMT
Hi Tom, the width then could be as large as three football pitches.
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dave
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Post by dave on Apr 14, 2016 16:47:00 GMT
I find it interesting that General Crook had once again made the decision to secure the service of over 400 Indian scouts. Why would Cuter fail to avail himself of the many Indian scouts available and use less than 50 instead of hundreds. Where the Pawnee and Shoshone scouts not nearby? Did Custer not want to use additional help to make it a 7th only victory? Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2016 17:32:24 GMT
I think the answer lies in Crook's experience down south.
Crook used indigenous forces as a combat multiplier (similar to how SF does it), as well as scouts.
Custer used his as scouts, not very well, and did not trust them.
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dave
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Post by dave on Apr 14, 2016 18:03:48 GMT
As closely watched as Custer was by Sheridan I am curious why Phil did not tell George to make more use of his scouts. Surely the lack of scouts in the 7th was noticed by the army since Crook had successfully used his against hostiles. Were there not sufficient numbers of Crow warriors so that Custer could have a couple of hundred to ride with him? If there were not enough Crows then could he have used Pawnee and Shoshone scouts? I know so little about the numbers of the various tribes arrayed against the Sioux and Cheyenne that I may be sounding foolish but it won't be the first time. Regards Dave
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 14, 2016 18:39:49 GMT
As closely watched as Custer was by Sheridan I am curious why Phil did not tell George to make more use of his scouts. Surely the lack of scouts in the 7th was noticed by the army since Crook had successfully used his against hostiles. Were there not sufficient numbers of Crow warriors so that Custer could have a couple of hundred to ride with him? If there were not enough Crows then could he have used Pawnee and Shoshone scouts? I know so little about the numbers of the various tribes arrayed against the Sioux and Cheyenne that I may be sounding foolish but it won't be the first time. Regards Dave At what point in his earlier Indian fighting career did Custer need to make extensive use of scouts or show that he screwed up because he did not? Washita was a major success in the public's eye even though it was nearly catastrophic. The Yellowstone incident 5 years later could have been his last stand had henot recognized an ambush. Are these near misses something he would report to his superiors? My guess is no. Strictly conjecture but base on above I do not believe proper use of scouts would be foremost in Sheridan's mind, at least to the extent that he would emphasize it to Custer. Best, David
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2016 20:58:48 GMT
I have all the respect in the word for Sheridan' activities during the CW, particularly setting the prototype for the armored division that would come eighty years hence.
I think his greatest contribution to the Indian campaigns though was in providing Federal resources to help extinguish the Chicago Fire.
Expecting Sheridan to give any advice to Custer or anyone else about tactical matters, is along the lines of Eisenhower giving tactical advice to a platoon leader at Saint Lo, while sitting at his desk in London.
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