Post by Deleted on Jun 20, 2021 17:29:40 GMT
A Sad and Terrible Blunder
Generals Terry and Custer at the Little Big Horn: New Discoveries
Roger Darling
Potomac-Western Press
Vienna, VA
1990
This work by Darling examines the life and role of Terry and his relationship with Custer. His pre-Army and private life is covered in some detail, especially on his role concerning managing the family trust (and pretty successfully, increasing its amount per family member from 10,000 to 21,000 by the time of his death. After the Civil War, he was involved in pursuing Indian Treaties, Reconstruction, and of course commanding the Department of the Dakota. The real meat covers his planning, conduct, and decisions of the 1876 Centennial Campaign. He was reluctant to assume command of the expedition and somewhat resembles a "Chateau" general of the WWI, preferring a comfortable berth on the Far West or in camp rather than moving with the expedition proper. After reforming his plan, he elected to accompany the Montana Column and ended up commanding it due to General Gibbon's illness which placed him in a sick bed for two days. It appears his actions while in command resulted in the Montana Column making a very short move on the first day, leisurely crossing the Yellowstone and camping at 4PM. In an effort to make up time, he diverged from his plan and struck cross country in the Tullock's Creek area hoping for a short cut to the Little Bighorn, this resulting in him entering the battle area along the Little Bighorn a day late (late on the 26th instead of the 25th).
Darling's research is well illustrated by aerial photographs he took himself while flying in the area, excellent terrain sketches, and good maps, mostly based on the 1:24000 USGS map series. One set of maps is particularly interesting showing the relative positions of the two columns on a day by day basis. He notes that Terry has not had a biography written (at least by 1990), and has been dealt with relatively kindly - unlike Custer - and his actions have not been well cross-checked by critical authors.
His conclusions are fairly damning:
0. Terry and Custer did not have a good command relationship, but somehow he came to trust and value Custer. I read this mostly as he did not wish to assume command of the column, but instead to direct it from his comfortable headquarters. As the operation progressed, his confidence in Custer (and perhaps all of the 7th) decreased.
1. His plan was apparently based upon wanting to give the Infantry a role in the engagement.
2. He either did not solicit recommendations from his subordinate commanders, nor did they offer any. Darling thinks the lack of input contributed to Custer's disheartened spirit after the orders group.
3. After Brisbin made his recommendations to him about a united column with him commanding with some combination of the 7th, the 2nd, and the Gatling Guns, he did not critically reexamine his plan to take into account Brisbin's recommendation and decided to let his plan stand.
4. He shared the same hubris about the ability of the US Army to defeat the Indians.
5. He did not aggressively push the Montana Column forward.
6. While his reports appear to be factual, he does not report he commanded the Montana Column during Gibbon's sickness. (Gibbon's did haul himself out of his sick bed and rejoin column.)
7. It appears to me, from Darling's evidence and reading his two reports to Sheridan and letter to Crook, even in retrospect, Terry did not think his plan was flawed.
It is notable that very little contact occurred after the Little Bighorn; the Indians scampering about the region and were never seriously threatened by the US Army, only the later actions by Miles and Merritt appeared to have any effect on them.
I have previously remarked that Terry, as well as Sheridan and perhaps even Sherman, failed to properly designate and source the Main Effort. While Darling does not specifically address the concept, I think the work reveals Terry failed in one of the key tasks of a commander which is designate and source the main effort. Custer with the 7th Cavalry had more troops than did the Montana Column. At minimum he should have moved with Custer and perhaps with the whole command. In hindsight, given the performance of Crook's troops at the Powder and Rosebud Rivers and the poor coordination and performance of the 7th Cavalry, the outcome of any battle, even with a unified Dakota column, would be in doubt.
Highly recommended. There is limited availability on Amazon, so a library may be the best route.
Generals Terry and Custer at the Little Big Horn: New Discoveries
Roger Darling
Potomac-Western Press
Vienna, VA
1990
This work by Darling examines the life and role of Terry and his relationship with Custer. His pre-Army and private life is covered in some detail, especially on his role concerning managing the family trust (and pretty successfully, increasing its amount per family member from 10,000 to 21,000 by the time of his death. After the Civil War, he was involved in pursuing Indian Treaties, Reconstruction, and of course commanding the Department of the Dakota. The real meat covers his planning, conduct, and decisions of the 1876 Centennial Campaign. He was reluctant to assume command of the expedition and somewhat resembles a "Chateau" general of the WWI, preferring a comfortable berth on the Far West or in camp rather than moving with the expedition proper. After reforming his plan, he elected to accompany the Montana Column and ended up commanding it due to General Gibbon's illness which placed him in a sick bed for two days. It appears his actions while in command resulted in the Montana Column making a very short move on the first day, leisurely crossing the Yellowstone and camping at 4PM. In an effort to make up time, he diverged from his plan and struck cross country in the Tullock's Creek area hoping for a short cut to the Little Bighorn, this resulting in him entering the battle area along the Little Bighorn a day late (late on the 26th instead of the 25th).
Darling's research is well illustrated by aerial photographs he took himself while flying in the area, excellent terrain sketches, and good maps, mostly based on the 1:24000 USGS map series. One set of maps is particularly interesting showing the relative positions of the two columns on a day by day basis. He notes that Terry has not had a biography written (at least by 1990), and has been dealt with relatively kindly - unlike Custer - and his actions have not been well cross-checked by critical authors.
His conclusions are fairly damning:
0. Terry and Custer did not have a good command relationship, but somehow he came to trust and value Custer. I read this mostly as he did not wish to assume command of the column, but instead to direct it from his comfortable headquarters. As the operation progressed, his confidence in Custer (and perhaps all of the 7th) decreased.
1. His plan was apparently based upon wanting to give the Infantry a role in the engagement.
2. He either did not solicit recommendations from his subordinate commanders, nor did they offer any. Darling thinks the lack of input contributed to Custer's disheartened spirit after the orders group.
3. After Brisbin made his recommendations to him about a united column with him commanding with some combination of the 7th, the 2nd, and the Gatling Guns, he did not critically reexamine his plan to take into account Brisbin's recommendation and decided to let his plan stand.
4. He shared the same hubris about the ability of the US Army to defeat the Indians.
5. He did not aggressively push the Montana Column forward.
6. While his reports appear to be factual, he does not report he commanded the Montana Column during Gibbon's sickness. (Gibbon's did haul himself out of his sick bed and rejoin column.)
7. It appears to me, from Darling's evidence and reading his two reports to Sheridan and letter to Crook, even in retrospect, Terry did not think his plan was flawed.
It is notable that very little contact occurred after the Little Bighorn; the Indians scampering about the region and were never seriously threatened by the US Army, only the later actions by Miles and Merritt appeared to have any effect on them.
I have previously remarked that Terry, as well as Sheridan and perhaps even Sherman, failed to properly designate and source the Main Effort. While Darling does not specifically address the concept, I think the work reveals Terry failed in one of the key tasks of a commander which is designate and source the main effort. Custer with the 7th Cavalry had more troops than did the Montana Column. At minimum he should have moved with Custer and perhaps with the whole command. In hindsight, given the performance of Crook's troops at the Powder and Rosebud Rivers and the poor coordination and performance of the 7th Cavalry, the outcome of any battle, even with a unified Dakota column, would be in doubt.
Highly recommended. There is limited availability on Amazon, so a library may be the best route.
