DP-14 Attack to the North or Defend

[Deleted]

DP	Who	Timeline	Location	Local Time	Clock Time	Event
14	Custer	S, T	VIC Calhoun Hill DD:-107.418 45.564 MGRS: 13TCL11324844	1426	1523	Custer, Keogh, Yates, and Cooke discuss their dispositions and the situation in the valley. Custer asks Boyer if there ia a ford farther downstream where they see the refugees gathering. Boyer assures him he will be able to find one further north.

Special Situation: Next to last situation as I see it. Custer, still apparently thinking offensively and perhaps thinking Benteen can come up quickly, decides to go North.  Nothng Custer does from this point will probably make any difference.

***COA 1***
North to Ford D
Advantages
Not gonna get them on the reservation via defense.
If we find the ford, we can get North of them and drive some toward Reno/Benteen
Indian pressure does not appear to be too large yet.

Disadvantages
May not be able to cross the ford due to terrain or enemy.
Regiment may be strung out and defeated in detail via infiltration tactics
Enemy force is much larger than I expected.

COA 2
Defend in Place
Advantages
Masses the battalion in one place in an all around defense
Indian pressure does not appear to be too large yet, giving me time to establish a solid defense
Reno/Benteen may be drawn to the sound of the guns
Battalion may have sufficient combat power to hold enemy off.
Defending here gives me a little time to prepare.

Disadvantages
No Water, ammunition limited
Have to wait for Terry for relief

COA 3
Defend elsewhere
Advantages
Potentially masses the Regiment in one place in an all around defense
There doesn't seem to be any great ground around. That bit that became Reno Hill looks okay as does the position displayed on the map.
Trains may be brought into the position, providing some supplies, especially ammnition.
Regiment should have sufficient combat power to hold enemy off.

Disadvantages
No Water
Have to wait for Terry for relief
Moving to another place may gain me better terrain, but will have less time to prepare the ground. May have to do it under fire.

COA 4
Vote/Invent your own.

Comparison. Can't get the Indians back on the reservation by defending, If I can capture prisoners and force them back on Reno/Benteen, we can eek out a win. On the other hand, I can be destroyed. Defending is probably the best course of action, but where? I am already on semi-good ground, but it is cut up by coolies and can be dominated by other heights. Best bet may be to move along the trail and hope to run into Reno or Benteen coming up to link up.  COA 2 Might work, but I may well need relief from Reno/Benteen.  COA 3 will take time and I may have to fight my way through to Reno or Benteen, but we may be able to unite.  All these seem to be bad.

Recommendation: Unite the Regiment


Discussion.  This is the last time he could save the battle/regiment.  As we know, he makes a bad real estate deal.  He may have had several prior opportunities to gain a favorable outcome but his aggressiveness keeps getting the better of him.

One more to go....

[quincannon]

All of them are bad. Custer has little chance of getting back anywhere so the regiment, with it supporting trains, can unite.

This is a prime instance of why situational awareness must be the constant job of the commander. Regimental commanders don't lead battalions, they command regiments. At this juncture, being on Calhoun Hill, Custer has no earthly idea of either Reno's or Benteen's situation, or that of the trains. It was Custer's job to know. You can't make decisions with no information.

Given that Mike's picture in this phase of the exercise paints Custer as a complete incompetent as indicated by my above comments, Custer has only one course of action that has a ghost of a chance of saving the five companies that are with him. Turn east for about five miles. The Indians are unlikely to give chase, then circle south back toward Ford A. Custer just might save something from the abortion he has created.

[Deleted]

Um, I don't get the comment of "Mike's picture in this phase of the exercise paints Custer as a complete incompetent"? My intention is not/was not to paint anyone as an incompetent, but to attempt the current situation accurately as I can. Have I misinterpreted the battle picture at this point? Was not Custer and his battalion at this point in the situation? If the picture is wrong, then I would love to have an accurate situational sketch (on a map) and I would be happy to reconsider the whole affair.

[quincannon]

I think you did portray the situation very accurately.

The picture has Custer commanding a five company battalion of HIS regiment, and not commanding HIS regiment. He has three battalions spread out over hell's half acre with no one exercising control over the three. That is incompetence, he was not doing the job the Army paid him to do.

Additionally he divided his forces in such a manner, and at such a distance, that he was inviting defeat in detail. That is incompetent.

Having reliable communication in this day and age, and I still would not have done what he did, especially not with the puny force he had. That country is just too broken up that you could not even adjust indirect fire, except from above. There could be a thousand Indians secreted in the next ravine over in places and you would never detect their presence.

Custer was a loose cannon rolling around the gun deck of tactical competence.

And if you think LBH is bad terrain to fight in, just wait until you get to the Fetterman fight. It is far worse.

The only thing you can do in that part of Wyoming and Montana is take small bites of the apple, and keep your bib on lest you slobber all over your shirt. 

[Deleted]

Ah. Okay. Clearly I misinterpreted your comment.

[colt45]

Calhoun hill seems to be the point where all 5 companies united prior to the move toward LSH and Ford D. This is the point where Custer should have realized it was time to head back south, closer to Benteen and Reno. If he was forced to defend, the LNC area would be better than Calhoun Hill, as you have visibility of the ford B area, where the majority of the hostiles will be coming from. However, getting back to Reno is the thing he should by trying to do, and as QC indicated, moving east would be the route away from the enemy so he could circle around to Reno.

Defending in the Calhoun Hill area is not a good place for a prolonged defense, as getting the trains and Benteen there is problematic due to the terrain. Being south of deep coulee would seem to me to be a requirement as it puts Custer closer to the rest of the regiment and is also the route covered previously.

[yanmacca]

If he had any doubts about getting any success that afternoon, then I don't know why he crossed deep coulee.

Surly from nye-cartwright he could see that he was facing a lot of challenges.

Huge village, building enemy activity, regiment strung out and still a long distance to cover in any effort to get behind the enemy.
All this on tired horses.

He must have had great confidence in himself and none at all for his foe.

If he did want to defend, what was so different between Calhoun and nye-cartwright?
Crossing deep coulee gave the enemy a gateway to get behind him.

[mac]

I asked before why did Custer go to Luce and now I will double up with why did Custer go to Calhoun Hill?

It is like the old riddle..

Question: Why did Custer cross the terrain features?

Answer: To get to the other side.

Cheers

[yanmacca]

Well Mac, the Custer battalion had just been involved in a firefight which lasted all the way up the slope of Luce and onto the crest of Nye-Cartwright, we have trails of cartridges on two levels which shows this. So, the battalion was actively skirmishing before it crossed deep coulee. But who with and what were their numbers, whatever went on the battalion may have split onto two or maybe three, as it moved across deep coulee to a similar patch of high ground, why, it wasn’t forced there?

Ford B had nothing which gave Custer any interest, but it was a cut off point from the south, Indians must have been active otherwise why get involved in a fire fight on Luce. So surly moving across deep coulee would give this area to Indians to control.

[mac]

There is the thing Ian, Custer had no need to go to Calhoun Hill other than that he wanted to do so. The only reason to do that is to go on beyond the village to Ford D.

Cheers

[quincannon]

Why did the chicken cross the road? To get on the other side. Great analogy Mac.

Custer went up onto Luce, then along the ridges northward, then across Deep Coulee to Calhoun Hill and beyond, because that is where he wanted to go.

Medicine Tail Coulee is no place to launch an attack from. It is too narrow, thus not allowing you to fully deploy the five companies you have under command, plus the fact as it nears MTC Ford (B) you have to swing your assaulting line to the left, like closing a door to face the ford itself.

Going along the ridge line allows you to retain the option to assault Ford B, while also retaining the option to go further north to find an alternate crossing point. Once Custer crosses Deep Coulee he has rejected the Ford B option, and is committed in the north. One thing that this does though is give any hostiles a high speed avenue of approach to his rear. Any Indians that get into Custer's rear need to do nothing more, They can just sit and wait. They have effectively split the regiment in half, preventing Custer from falling back on the regiment (-) should things go badly in the north, as they did. At that point Custer has to either fight and win unsupported in the north or break contact eastward and swing around the long way.

[herosrest]

There was a way of doing this job and it was exampled on 17th March 1876, on Powder River. Scare out the population, neutralise resistance and destroy the camp and property. Take significant figures hostage if possible and pull out - job done with the inhabitants left destitute. That's it. The evidence we have is that Custer intended to repeat the strategy once he saw the standing village.

The Luce Ridge evidence, as I understand it, indicated 15 firing positions with 3 rounds fired for each. That is what Luce located back in 1940 or so. Other finds at what was called Blummer's Ridge predated Luce. In 1873, Custer sent a Lt. off with 20 men to occupy and hold some important terrain dominating his position while he disguised his main strength and provoked the Sioux who had launched a dawn attack on the regiment's camp. Luce's 15 firing positions is an orderly group of 20 troopers, dismounted with regulation horse holders deployed. Once they were on Luce Ridge - they were going nowhere unless or until things went tits up. 20 men put on Luce Ridge to stay there. Would that not be a good idea?

For those with an interest in the minutae

Mar 19, 2094 20:01:56 GMT herosrest said:

US Cavalry Journal, v.15 1904/1905 VOL. XV. OCTOBER, 1904. No. 54.

AN INCIDENT OF THE YELLOWSTONE EXPEDITION OF 1873.



US Cavalry Journal, v.16 1905/1906. VOL. XVI. OCTOBER, 1905. No. 58.

THE YELLOWSTONE EXPEDITION OF 1873. BY LIEUTENANT CHARLES BRADEN, U. S. ARMY, RETIRED.

Oddball anecdote - Dr. James P.Kimball 7th US Cavalry