DP-9: Attack at Ford B, North to Ford D, or back to Reno.

[Deleted]

DP	Who	Timeline	Location	Local Time	Clock Time	Event
9	Custer	N, R	Head of Cedar Coulee and/orVIC Medicine Tail Coulee, near Ford B DD: -107.411 45.549 MGRS: 13TCL11824668	1303	1400	Custer arrives at top of Cedar Coulee; instructs Cooke to send messenger to Benteen

Custer probably could have made this decision anytime between the head of Cedar Coulee (the junciton of Cedar/Medicine Trail Coulee) or as he approached the vicinity of Ford B.
For simplicity, I am just handling it once and marking the area around Ford B as the DP.  Custer has already ordered Benteen to bring up the trains if we use the Ford B location, so he will already have abandoned a course of action.

Remember, we are trying to provide and analyze courses of action at the time, trying to divorce ourselves from what really happened.



Course of Action 1
Attack across Ford B and turn toward Reno
Advantages
1.  Gets me into the village and allows me to provide relief to Reno in the shortest time.
2.  Benteen may come up and reinforce Reno and provide him ammunition, providing the greatest force to trap the Indians.
3.  I should be able to contain at least some hostages providing me some safety even if I am enveloped by the Indians.

Disadvantages
1.  I will be coming splitting the village, since I can see it continues to the North, this allows the enemy to encircle me as I move toward Reno.
2.  Many Indians will be able to flee North, South or West; Terry will not be in position until tomorrow at the earliest.

***Course of Action 2***
Continue North to Ford D
Advantages
1.  Will probably outflank the Indians and let me encircle the entire village between me and Reno
2.  Benteen may come up and reinforce Reno, giving me more time.

Disadvantages
1.  Takes the longest time; Reno could be destroyed or driven back by the Indians, thus no encirclement.
2.  Don't know if there where or the quality of the Northern ford.
3.  Benteen may come up and reinforce  Reno, but will not reinforce me or be engaged by the enemy on the way up.
4.  May not have the strength to prevent the Indians from fleeing South or West; Terry is not in position yet.

Course of Action 3
Back to Reno
Advantages
1.  Perhaps the most direct way of aiding Reno.
2.  Benteen will likely reach the Reno's ford vicinity ensuring we have a good supply of ammunition and the regiment will be united.
3.  Even if Reno is destroyed or ineffective, I will at least be able to join with Benteen and unite as sizeable portion of the Regiment on good ground and with supplies.

Disadvantages
1.  Reno may be destroyed or pushed back by the time I or Benteen get there.

Course of Action 4
Find good ground and defend.
Advantages
1.  Makes it easier for Benteen to find me.
2.  Should be able to hold off the enemy if I can get an all around defense.
3.  Terry's may be able to relieve me; he'll be here tomorrow.

Disadvantages
1.  Defending won't accomplish the mission.  I have to inflict heavy losses on the enemy AND seize hostages to enable me to get them back to the Reservation.
2.  Indians will be able to mass on me.
3.  Does  not provide any support to Reno.

Note 1:  COA 4 is not specifying a position just yet.  He could try to defend somewhere close to where he is now or he could go back closer to what would become Reno Hill (probably the best ground) or vicinity Weir Point (Noted by Benteen as not being a good place to defend.)

Note 2:  Hostages.  Some think this is not a good tactic.  However, hostages have been used to guarantee good contact since ancient times.  If you are also after gold and want to enrich your  soldiers, you may wish to offer ransom for their return.  May not particularly ensure peace as well as retaining the hostages.  It perhaps is a valid, if possibly unethical, manner of moving more quickly to settlement in COIN then in more kinetic actions or in more socially acceptable non-kinetic one such as building civil government, schools, economic aid, etc. all of which may be less expensive than 20 years of failed COIN operations due to lack of adaptability or lack of a strategy/desire to win. 

Discussion.
Perhaps I attacked too early; it appears we surprised the Indians, but that doesn't matter now.
The quickest way to help Reno is to attack vicinity Medicine Tail Coulee, but that invites my own enevelopment and ensures at least a portion of the enemy will escapte, but Terry is coming up.
I can probably hold a defensive position until Terry comes close and drives off the Indians.
Defending or going directly to Reno's aid allows the Indians to escape; Terry won't get here in time to stop that.  Does not accomplish the Mission.
If I go North, I can get behind the Indians, but am unable to directly help Reno.  Benteen may come up and be able to help him, thus we will make the enemy split is forces to watch both of us.  
He may not be able to mass enough force to engage us both successfully simultaneously.
Getting hostages, even a relatively small number, may be enough to ensure my safety.

Recommendation:  COA 2:  Attack across Ford B, turn left and conduct a close flanking maneuver, trapping the enemy between Reno and Custer.

The real error here is not which COA is chosen here; that was committed when Custer decided to go right instead of following Reno and to a lesser extent, detaching Benteen.  Granted I have not been there so the map and Google views of the approach may be deceiving to me.  COA 1 and 3 take too long for Custer to draw the enemy away from Reno.  COA 4 does not accomplish the mission.  Only attacking here seems to me to be the best way to seize hostages and unite the force.  Certainly there is enough room for two companies abreast in column of 4s to move down the ford and seize the near side and suppress the far side while 3 companies abreast in column of fours cross the ford and seize the far side.  Certainly this makes more sense than the apparently popular view of moving to the river with two and attacking (or swinging North through Deep Coluee) while three companies 'overwatch" well outside of maximum effective range of the carbine and the even poorer marksmanship of the troopers.

Overtime, repeated attempted use of terrain over time can convert no-go terrain* to slow-go or even go terrain over time.  This can be seen in areas of the National Training Center where repeated OPFOR explorations have yielded directions of  attack that are undetectable on maps, but may be found through ground or aerial reconnaissance as seen in the attachment below.  See the next post for the map view of the same area.  Note the trails leading to the ford are not visible.  The river itself seems too deep for 4 wheel drives vehicles  to ford as shown by the absenceof entrance or exit trails in the photo, but I should think (not being a horseman and having no/little desire to trust myself to the beast) horses could do it and perhaps tanks and fighting vehicles.  Certainly amphibious carriers such as the M113 could probably do it, BFVs not being amphibious  anymore, but can ford deeper obstacles than an M113.  I have , on occasion, bridged a river by dropping two AVLBs into it, one on top of  the other.  They were a bitch getting out though.



*I have found there is very little terrain that is no-go, even to armor or armored cavalry.  One might be reduced to ground guiding ones tanks along what seemed to be a razor thin edge in Hohenfels Training Area (Germany), but it worked and I got to my objective at the desired time.  Peat Bogs and swamp remain pretty much impenetrable by tanks, although one can usually get through a peat bog in line or wedge, but almost never in column.

[Deleted]

Again, note the trails visible on the photo are not shown on the map.  Map and aerial reconnaissance are no substitute for cavalry actually reconning the ground.

Attachments:

[quincannon]

Custer's responsibility is commanding the regiment. He has made a mistake, and that mistake should be clear to him once he views Ford B. His only rational choice is to return to the Ford A area, support Reno if he can and arrives in time to do so. From that point consolidate with Benteen and the trains, and Reno too if that is still possible, defend at Ford A, and look for an opportunity tomorrow.

You don't reinforce failure. Attacking at Ford B is another version of reinforcing failure. If Reno's battalion dies, George Custer better hope he dies during the remainder of the battle.

It makes absolutely no sense to force a crossing at Ford B and destroy your battalion in an effort to relieve pressure on Reno. By the way, Custer at this juncture (this point of decision) has no direct evidence that Reno may be, or is in trouble. What he can deduce however is by the size of village, if he is not already in trouble he soon will be.

[benteen]

Mike,
My choice is COA3. Let me explain. I believe that when Custer saluted Terry and went on his way, that was the last thought he had about the Army, Terry, or his orders. He was going to attack the village and have a great victory on his own, and gain back some of the fame he had lost. However, he is now at a point where he sees that is not going to happen and he is now in a fight for survival. In this case....

COA #4 could be a good choice IF he could find a place for a good defensive position. Now, let me go off the rails. Since my plans no longer involve mobility but just plain survival, I would get the ammo off the horses and let them go. This will accomplish 2 factors 1...Since you dont need horse holders you have 25% more fire power .2.... The Indians are fighting you only to save their families and village, by you not having horses you provide a much less threat to them, and they would be less inclined to sustain losses just to kill you.

Now, I said that COA#4 could be a good choice BUT for  battalion commander. You are a Regimental commander and are responsible for the entire command, not just your battalion. These are your men, you put them in harms way and they followed you. It is YOUR responsibility to do whats best for them. ALL of them. That is why I chose COA#3.

Be Well
Dan

[Deleted]

benteen quincannon

I think you're recommendation is better than mine.  I think though it is because a combination of the aggressiveness we had in the 11th ACR and as an armor officer and my personnel preference for flanking someone. 

[quincannon]

I suspect Dan's preference is to assail flanks, and mine certainly is. Don't be so apologetic Mike. We all read from the same book of TACTICS, and flanking is a tactic.

There was once an un-lamented person who passed beside me like a ship in the night with relatively little notice who insisted, that there was cavalry, and everything else. Cavalry minded he called it after learning all about cavalry from sitting next to a "cavalry" Colonel at an ROTC awards dinner. I guess the rubber chicken and stale cherry pie gave him insights that all the rest of us mortals were not privy to. Only cavalry could be aggressive he spouted, as if all the rest of us were saddled with a brain and feet that only functioned at less than three miles an hour.

He still roams these precincts, and these words are not addressed to you. but rather to him as I sign that I do care, and have a very long memory for people who spout tripe.

[Deleted]

Well, I do find the attitude between cavalry and armor noticeable and there is frequently, but not always a divide between cavalry and infantry. But I served almost 11 years in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) - as opposed to the 1st Infantry Division (now) - and know that there is really only the 1st Infantry Division and however many replacements it takes to win the war. The replacements don't matter: more infantry, armor, or cavalry or even artillery/aviation. But there you are.

I wasn't really thinking of terms of Reno as failing, though. He done fixed the Indians attention for a time. All in all, Custer made mistake after mistake after turning right or maybe since detaching Reno. Or maybe when he left the Rosebud.

But as you know, even if you might do everything 'right' you might still lose because the other person did less 'wrong' than you. It's not so much about who is best; it's about who makes the fewest mistakes.

[colt45]

At the point Custer sends Martin back with the note to Benteen, he knows the village is much larger than expected. He has only 1/2 of his combat power with him. He should have realized at that time the best option was to beat feet back to Reno and get the whole regiment together again, and see if a full regiment attack in the valley could bring about success.

Attacking via ford B is dumb as it puts the enemy on his flanks and front in a 180 degree arc, thus ensuring his own encirclement if he tries to move south to Reno, or having to retreat back across ford B under most likely heavy, close-in fire. Not good either way.

Setting up a defensive position, per CoA4, is also a non-starter. He doesn't have the logistics to sustain even a short defense, and there is no guarantee Benteen would be able to reach him.

Reno and Benteen survived their defensive position because they had the trains and the supplies with them, and the Indians did not feel the need to totally destroy them. Had the Indians decided to remain another day, Reno and Benteen might not have survived.

CoA3, returning back to Reno's position is the only thing Custer could have done to salvage the bad situation he created by turning up the bluffs in the first place.

[quincannon]

Mike: Some of the most aggressive, hell for leather, balls to the wall, individuals I ever knew were in the 11th Air Assault Division at Benning 63-65. They were all Infantrymen.

What I could never get through to the fellow I mentioned is that it is not branch, it's person. If a person is a naturally aggressive type, it does not matter what insignia they wear on their collar, crossed muskets, crossed sabers, or the Quartermaster Corps.

[Deleted]

Agree. Although it was funny when I got my secondary I was 12A (Armor Officer, General)/71 (Quartermaster but maybe it was some other number.)

After a bit, I got a letter from QM asking me to transfer. It was not even in my chemistry to think about it, but I might have done better had I done so. I must admit I was an excellent BMP, BN and BDE S-4.

Another guy did it who was the Squadron Motor Officer when I was in 1/11 when I next saw him he was a quartermaster LTC and commanded a support battalion. I was shocked.

Then, when I was S-4 of the 2nd Brigade on a recon trip to the NTC, I ran into an old comrade from my drill team in college. He was Infantry and a Ranger, and had branch transferred and was fixing to retire as a major. He was the Log O/C.  Again I was shocked.  The guy that was the log O/C when I rotated wasn't as good as he was.

I met infantrymen who were at ease as either mech or light, and others that were only suited to one or the other. And there are armor guys who I would never want to see in a cavalry squadron (not even in the Regimental Tank Company).  I knew Armor officers who should have been AG.

You need everyone to make up the team.

[quincannon]

Could not get the idea of team or combined arms through his cement for brains head either.

[Deleted]

Argh. In the last battalion I was in, we traded away two tank companies for two mech companies. One was previously a light guy and had a terrible time adjusting. He was kept pure. The other was Mech before getting his company. The two tank companies each gave him a tank platoon, so we were all organized 2T1M. Of course he had his 81mm mortars and a TOW section so we might have been pretty near the same combat power. Neither of them understood the tank company/battalion that the RTO is the commander, unless he is taking a crap. Then the gunner or the XO better be up right quick. I had four radios in my tank instead of the usual two. An RT on my company push. An RT on the BN Push. An RT on the Call for Fire push. And my R442 receiver on one of the other companies (whichever one was ahead or on a flank) or the INTELL push. I managed to 'borrow' them from other places and not rob my tanks. The other commanders were always mystified about how I could react so fast. Sometimes I would be listening to my CO and talking to my platoons getting them ready to move. More often than not, I would be moving by the time the old man finished the order. Even the CO was amazed when he looked in my tank. Of course, when my infantry was dug in properly, we were much less responsive, but he got to be pretty fast.

[mac]

Again I am late to the party and the food and drinks are gone. I agree with the above. Open door 3.

Cheers (darn no drinks!)