What Can Godfrey's Century Article Tell Us?
Aug 17, 2020 20:12:55 GMT
deadwoodgultch, yanmacca, and 1 more like this
Post by quincannon on Aug 17, 2020 20:12:55 GMT
It is absolutely no secret in these precincts that I pay a lot of attention to Godfrey and what he has to say. What I hope to do here is examine the last few pages of Godfrey's Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine article of January 1892 to either bring out for the first time, or refresh ourselves on what battle details can be derived therefrom. The discussion is limited to those last few pages, because up to that point Godfrey, gives us a narrative of events known largely by all. I intend to keep this my only post on the subject, and add to it over the coming few days as my time permits. I ask your patience in that regard, and further to come back to it to see anything you may have missed in an early reading of what I am about to say.
BACKGROUND: I do not for a moment think that Godfrey was all right in what he concluded. I don't think he was all wrong either. I only think he accurately reported what he saw. I also believe he was, like all of us, trying to make some sense of what he saw before him immediately after the battle, and what he later learned by vising the place ten years after and having the opportunity to discuss matters with Gall, and a few other Indian participants. To me that is much like some of the discussions that took place on the video that Ian posted yesterday on the modeling thread for my benefit. I urge each of you to view that. Maybe the content will not interest you, but the first person narratives, especially those between the two officers representing both sides, is instructive in the give and take of the conversations. It's really too bad that we did not have the "Big Picture" available to us in 1876 with Robert Taylor narrating.
What Godfrey did was tell us what he saw, and the conclusions he drew from that seeing. It is well to keep in mind that when Godfrey wrote the article that he had absolutely no knowledge of anything occurring at Ford D, nor is there any indication that he knew anything about it for the rest of his life. Ford D knowledge is a product of "White" knowledge only in the nearly a century that has gone by since Godfrey passed from the scene. The Cheyenne knew about it, but no one seems to have asked them. So, for the purposes of this discussion the Ford D is out of bounds.
GODFREY COMES UPON THE CUSTER PORTION OF THE FIGHT: On the morning of Wednesday the 28th of June 1876, Godfrey along with the remaining rest of the regiment moved northward from the area in which they had previously been entrenched for the purpose of recovering and burying the dead. They came to a high point that provided a panoramic view of the battlefield to the north of them, only to discover that area full of white mounds that soon revealed themselves to be the remains of the Custer Battalion. This sighting of bodies was viewed with the aid of field glasses. Presumably this "high point" was Weir Point, as it gives the best overall view from the south that I know of, but that is far from certain, and is only my guess.
He goes on to say when they arrived in the battle area proper all of the bodies he saw were scalped and badly mutilated, all except Custer, for whom he says was wounded in two places but not otherwise touched, and looked natural. That to me (my thoughts-not Godfrey's) is a gilding of the lily. It makes absolutely no sense that all the rest of these people would be scalped and gutted, and Custer left in repose. Those Indians did not know George Custer from George Washington, so why would they leave this one body alone, and do their worst on the rest? My reasoning is Mrs. Custer, and no other, as an excuse for Godfrey doing more than shading what was most probably true. Her word in the right ear at the time could make or break an Army officer's career.
Godfrey then goes on to say that the bodies of Doctor Lord, and Lieutenants Porter, Harrington, and Sturgis were never found, or "at least never identified" He goes on to say that clothing items from Porter and Sturgis were found later in the village. What we can draw from that is that some due diligence was applied to identifying officer personnel, and it must have been quite difficult due to the condition of the bodies, which lends credence to what was said above about the overall condition of the bodies he observed. The clothing mentioned being found is sort of an afterthought, which to me indicates that it was found later, and the village area was not an area of immediate interest to them. He goes on to state that according to his personal notes that 212 bodies found on the field were buried. He does not say if they were all buried on the 28th of June, but one presumes they were.
GODFREY STATES HIS OPINION AS TO THE CAUSE OF CUSTER'S DEFEAT
a. Overpowering numbers of the enemy, and (REAL IMPORTANT) their unexpected cohesion. There's Dan's - Indians always run - written all over that one. The expectation of an easy time preconceived notion.
b. Reno's panic rout from the valley. That can be debated until the second coming of Christ, and no one will ever completely agree. That no-agreement is not important though. Godfrey's opinion is because it has an effect on his further conclusions.
c. Defective extraction of empty cartridge cases from carbines. That is kind of hard to swallow, maybe. Unless Godfrey personally examined a number of carbines carried by Custer's battalion, then he had no basis for that statement, as I would expect the soldier's carbines left on the battlefield, or at least the majority of them had a new home the night of 25 June. On the other hand if his unit, and the other units under Reno and Benteen experienced the same problems on the 25th and 26th the comment may be not only valid, but valuable. He says later on that this observation was made on his experience, and that it was a maintenance, therefore a leadership problem. Then after making the positive statement that carbine extraction was the third most important factor in the loss, he contradicts himself saying he has no means of knowing if it was a factor at all.
Godfrey goes on to make further comments about the comments the Indians made concerning the "if only" Reno had stayed in the valley. Indians rarely concern themselves with logistics and ammunition resupply, basic loads, food, and medical supplies, and the importance of those factors in decision making. Reno had to. Just about anything Godfrey has to say about Reno indicates Godfrey's dislike of the man. His dislike is not important, but our awareness of it is. It colors things with a sludge that may or may not be justified.
It should be noted here that what is above is the cart being put before the horse. It was purposely done that way. What will follow is drawn from and earlier portion of Godfrey's article.
NOW GOING BACK TO NEAR THE MIDDLE OF THE ARTICLE: Godfrey starts that portion off by saying that Custer was seen on the bluffs with his staff waving to the troops in the valley, but Custer's troops were at that time a mile away to the right (the second line ridges and the Godfrey trail) He has absolutely no way of knowing this at all at the time and place he inserts it into the narration. First: he was not in the valley, and did not see this event. Second: he learned this second hand from people who had so reported. Third: at the distance that would involve those people viewing this supposed Custer and his staff, did so without any visual aid, and without that it could have been their own mother up there waving with a few of her friends and they could not make positive identification. Was someone there? Probably so. Could it have been Custer? Yes it could. But Custer being there is not establish ironclad fact. Godfrey in my opinion should have stated that someone was up there waving, identity unknown. Then it comes to Godfrey putting Custer's battalion a mile to the east of the wavers. That was a very poor time to insert that into his narrative, as he did not discover any trail until three days later, and did not know what he had seen until ten years later. Additionally it is just a bit suspicious to me that Custer and his horse holders would be a mile to the left of their troops, when supposedly his troops were moving fast to get north in the shortest possible time. Is it possible? Certainly is, but it depends upon how badly Custer needed to see in the valley as opposed to being there with his troops motivating them to put spurs to their mounts. It was then a judgment call either way. I have a firm opinion on what my judgment would have me do, but I, in my career have been wrong at least fifty percent of the time, so I will leave it to your judgment not mine.
Now here is where it gets interesting with regard to Weir Point. Godfrey says, based upon what he was told, and maybe observed on the 27-28th of June, that from where he was told "Custer" appeared on the bluffs he could see only a portion, a good portion, but not all of the villages. That place then would seem to be Wagner's 3411, or at least somewhere close by. He then goes on to say that if "Custer: had only gone to that "high point" (presumably Weir Point - but not completely sure), that he could have seen the whole village. Again that opinion is probably based upon Godfrey's personal observation on the 27th or more probably the 28th as the command move north to police up the battlefield. He says that - "Then Custer would have understood the magnitude of the situation" . Well, maybe, and maybe not, but one thing is for sure Godfrey understood it.
GALL AND IRON CEDAR: Here again Godfrey inserts into the story something that is a bit out of order as it relates to how and when he obtained the knowledge. He says that Gall was just finishing up participating in the whipping of Reno's ass, and intended to chase that worthy gentleman up those bluff and finish him. On the way to do just that he was pulled aside by Iron Cedar who told him there was big trouble brewing in River City. Iron Cedar told him, then took him to another one of those goddamned high points, where the both observed Custer's troops in the far distance on the second line of bluffs, heading north. What Gall did not mentioned, AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT, is no other sighting of troops in the area - Like - Yes I saw those people over there, but I also saw some more heading down the coulee in my front, or anywhere else for that matter. Therefore if Gall clearly remembered the one body of troops that he related to Godfrey ten years later, logic tells us that he would also remember anything else he saw concurrently. Well Gall then takes action and gathers his forces to pursue.
GODFREY RELATES THE "ACCEPTED" THEORY OF 1876: Custer turned onto the bluffs so that theory goes, then entered a place he called Reno Creek, by which I believe he means the drainage we call Medicine Tail Coulee, and proceeds on that route until met by an overwhelming number of enemy forces in the Ford B area. From there Custer is driven back onto what we now know as Battle Ridge. There, still according to the 1876 theory, Custer divides his battalion, moved with a portion down river, met more resistance and was again forced back onto Battle Ridge. Does it make sense to any of you, that after just getting your ass whipped at Ford B, you would divide what little you do have and try again with this time a smaller force that you had the first time you tried? Well it seems it did not make a hell of a lot of sense to Godfrey either, but he was a junior officer, among men who were far his senior, and decided I suppose not to make waves. Juniors are like that with seniors, and as far as I am concerned it sometimes turns out to be too bad they are, for histories sake anyway.
EXAMINING THOSE INITIAL 1876 CONCLUSION OF OTHERS: On their face they seem quite reasonable, except that nonsense of a further divide that is. What they did not see was any trail leading down Medicine Tail Coulee. They may have had Martini telling Benteen that he was 600 yards from the ford when he left, but any trail that may have been made was certainly obliterated by later battle events. The also had the F-F Ridge position which taken out of any later context, looks a lot like it might have been a rear guard position that was overrun retrograding from Ford B, so that fits with their theory. They also had the Company E/Deep Ravine location that would support a second movement toward the river, but that movement would have been toward Ford C. The bodies down there would certainly indicate that a heavy repulse occurred there as well, as part of a portion of Custer's battalion being driven back onto the ridge at Last Stand Hill. The scattered bodies that we now call the South Skirmish Line would also support the idea of retreating soldiers being run down, as they withdrew. The handful of corn statement adds the icing that particular cake needs.
The rest of Godfrey's views of June 76 seem to be in concert with the others. After being driven back they attempted to defend to ridge on an axis Last Stand Hill to Calhoun Hill. A mighty long line for so few, but Company I in the middle could add credence to that theory, and its final location in the swale indicative of being driven off the ridge, prior to being surrounded and destroyed.
I am going to leave it there for today. Dinner time approaches and a new Tom Clancy arrived in today's mail. Tomorrow I will relate the "reunion" visit to the battlefield in 1876, and see how Godfrey's opinions and views were changed by that visit, and what he based his Century article on six years later.
THE REUNION AND THE CHANGES IN OPINION: In 1886 some participants in the battle of ten years earlier gathered at Fort Custer, near Hardin, Montana and from there journeyed to the battlefield. Godfrey was there, and by chance his orderly that accompanied him during the aftermath of the battle, was also with him when he visited this time too. Also there was Gall, and one gets the impression some few other Indians that were there on the day of battle. Before going further it is best to step back ten years again to the 28th of June. Godfrey was sent on a mission of recovery by Reno, or asked to go. I have seen two sources on this asked or sent though makes little difference, and while on the ridge line to the south ran across a trail of shod horses. That must not have made much of an impression on him at the time, but during the later visit the subject somehow came up again. Gall stated where he and Iron Cedar had seen Custer on the afternoon of 25 June from that goddamned high point again. Evidently it was a light bulb moment for Godfrey occurring to him that was where the trail was that he and Penwell ran across ten years earlier.
Gall related that he and Iron Cedar gathered the warriors that were then chasing Reno up the bluffs, and from that point on the story follows the conventional narrative we are all familiar with.
Godfrey though does seem to change his opinion quite a bit. He is now convinced based on the verification of that trail that the battalion moved along Battle Ridge and defended that place, and that which you see in the Company C, Company E (Deep Ravine), and perhaps even those few down in front of Greasy Grass Ridge, we trying to escape, which for me was why I really locked on to Mac's theories when we met here in Colorado Springs several years ago. Retreat, escape, withdraw, retrograde, all in the end mean the same general thing when those words are placed in the overall context of the Custer portion of this battle. Godfrey really does not say anything about any bodies found north of Last Stand Hill, on Cemetery Ridge, and out further on Battle Ridge Extension (like Sharrow). Perhaps he did not see them. Perhaps he thought them outliers in ones and twos. Who really knows. We also must question his number of 212 burials. I think that is two over what is generally accepted, but that's not it. He got that total information from someone else. He may, with his own work, have contributed to that number, so we are left with the highly probable speculation that Godfrey himself did not go over the entire battlefield and some of what he learned he learned from others.
THE MAP IN THE MAGAZINE: After almost sixty years hearing about the Godfrey Map contained in the original magazine article, but not included in the book I have that contains the article in full I got my first look at it tonight. The only conclusion I can draw from it is that Godfrey in doing the map for the magazine took the trail that he knew of, and extended it the north to fit in with the theory he presented in the article. That would seem the most logical answer,because that trail in the north would have been completely obliterated north of those southern ridges in the Battle Ridge Area. What is really frustrating is that Godfrey on 28 June makes no indication that he followed it south to its point of origin. I guess we can just put that down to coming across something that seemed to him meaningless at the time.
So that is about all I have on Godfrey's article. His story has holes in it big enough to drive a truck through in places, but in others there are valuable, I think, snipits of what in and of themselves may be unrelated to one another, but when put together with information of a more modern vintage, add a bit more clarity to the overall story.
One in particular strikes my fancy. AZ will go to his grave and his last conscience thought on earth will be E and F in Medicine Tail Coulee, with C, I, and L riding the ridges. Gall mentions nothing of the kind. He and Iron Cedar were at the place and time to have seen both columns, both of which would have been moving across their front at the same time. If Iron Cedar and Gall were on that high place at that time you can bet Aunt Mable's best brazier that Curley was not there then. Curley is filtered through Camp, and Camp was Curley, not Curley himself. It was a different day, and we all should keep that in mind.
No one knew of Ford D in 1876 or in 1886 or in 1892. Ford D changes everything. Indians that said Custer did not get near the river were seemingly contradicted by other Indians that said Custer got really near the river. and both of them were telling the complete truth as viewed from their foxhole. Logic tells anyone looking at this then that if there is a Ford B, there is no Ford D. If there is a Ford D there is no Ford B. Both of those groups of Indians must be assumed to be telling the truth as they saw it, and have no reason at all to do otherwise. Additionally there is no physical evidence at Ford B and there is some small amount at Ford D.
So the only thing I can take away at this very moment from the complete Godfrey article is that Godfrey really is not telling what really happened, because Godfrey at the time of either of his visits was not privy to what we know today. What he does though is give us a couple of pieces that have been largely overlooked or ignored, that do help, in my opinion, tell the story better, not completely, but better.
The two biggies for me were the partial trail, no I don't think Godfrey's map is correct either, but I do think part of it, that along the southern ridges is correct, with everything else being his period speculation. I also think what Gall did not report was very significant. Sometime not seeing something is every bit as important to analysis as seeing something.
That's my take, after a long afternoon and short evening straining my eyes on fading print. Your turn if you chose to take one.
BACKGROUND: I do not for a moment think that Godfrey was all right in what he concluded. I don't think he was all wrong either. I only think he accurately reported what he saw. I also believe he was, like all of us, trying to make some sense of what he saw before him immediately after the battle, and what he later learned by vising the place ten years after and having the opportunity to discuss matters with Gall, and a few other Indian participants. To me that is much like some of the discussions that took place on the video that Ian posted yesterday on the modeling thread for my benefit. I urge each of you to view that. Maybe the content will not interest you, but the first person narratives, especially those between the two officers representing both sides, is instructive in the give and take of the conversations. It's really too bad that we did not have the "Big Picture" available to us in 1876 with Robert Taylor narrating.
What Godfrey did was tell us what he saw, and the conclusions he drew from that seeing. It is well to keep in mind that when Godfrey wrote the article that he had absolutely no knowledge of anything occurring at Ford D, nor is there any indication that he knew anything about it for the rest of his life. Ford D knowledge is a product of "White" knowledge only in the nearly a century that has gone by since Godfrey passed from the scene. The Cheyenne knew about it, but no one seems to have asked them. So, for the purposes of this discussion the Ford D is out of bounds.
GODFREY COMES UPON THE CUSTER PORTION OF THE FIGHT: On the morning of Wednesday the 28th of June 1876, Godfrey along with the remaining rest of the regiment moved northward from the area in which they had previously been entrenched for the purpose of recovering and burying the dead. They came to a high point that provided a panoramic view of the battlefield to the north of them, only to discover that area full of white mounds that soon revealed themselves to be the remains of the Custer Battalion. This sighting of bodies was viewed with the aid of field glasses. Presumably this "high point" was Weir Point, as it gives the best overall view from the south that I know of, but that is far from certain, and is only my guess.
He goes on to say when they arrived in the battle area proper all of the bodies he saw were scalped and badly mutilated, all except Custer, for whom he says was wounded in two places but not otherwise touched, and looked natural. That to me (my thoughts-not Godfrey's) is a gilding of the lily. It makes absolutely no sense that all the rest of these people would be scalped and gutted, and Custer left in repose. Those Indians did not know George Custer from George Washington, so why would they leave this one body alone, and do their worst on the rest? My reasoning is Mrs. Custer, and no other, as an excuse for Godfrey doing more than shading what was most probably true. Her word in the right ear at the time could make or break an Army officer's career.
Godfrey then goes on to say that the bodies of Doctor Lord, and Lieutenants Porter, Harrington, and Sturgis were never found, or "at least never identified" He goes on to say that clothing items from Porter and Sturgis were found later in the village. What we can draw from that is that some due diligence was applied to identifying officer personnel, and it must have been quite difficult due to the condition of the bodies, which lends credence to what was said above about the overall condition of the bodies he observed. The clothing mentioned being found is sort of an afterthought, which to me indicates that it was found later, and the village area was not an area of immediate interest to them. He goes on to state that according to his personal notes that 212 bodies found on the field were buried. He does not say if they were all buried on the 28th of June, but one presumes they were.
GODFREY STATES HIS OPINION AS TO THE CAUSE OF CUSTER'S DEFEAT
a. Overpowering numbers of the enemy, and (REAL IMPORTANT) their unexpected cohesion. There's Dan's - Indians always run - written all over that one. The expectation of an easy time preconceived notion.
b. Reno's panic rout from the valley. That can be debated until the second coming of Christ, and no one will ever completely agree. That no-agreement is not important though. Godfrey's opinion is because it has an effect on his further conclusions.
c. Defective extraction of empty cartridge cases from carbines. That is kind of hard to swallow, maybe. Unless Godfrey personally examined a number of carbines carried by Custer's battalion, then he had no basis for that statement, as I would expect the soldier's carbines left on the battlefield, or at least the majority of them had a new home the night of 25 June. On the other hand if his unit, and the other units under Reno and Benteen experienced the same problems on the 25th and 26th the comment may be not only valid, but valuable. He says later on that this observation was made on his experience, and that it was a maintenance, therefore a leadership problem. Then after making the positive statement that carbine extraction was the third most important factor in the loss, he contradicts himself saying he has no means of knowing if it was a factor at all.
Godfrey goes on to make further comments about the comments the Indians made concerning the "if only" Reno had stayed in the valley. Indians rarely concern themselves with logistics and ammunition resupply, basic loads, food, and medical supplies, and the importance of those factors in decision making. Reno had to. Just about anything Godfrey has to say about Reno indicates Godfrey's dislike of the man. His dislike is not important, but our awareness of it is. It colors things with a sludge that may or may not be justified.
It should be noted here that what is above is the cart being put before the horse. It was purposely done that way. What will follow is drawn from and earlier portion of Godfrey's article.
NOW GOING BACK TO NEAR THE MIDDLE OF THE ARTICLE: Godfrey starts that portion off by saying that Custer was seen on the bluffs with his staff waving to the troops in the valley, but Custer's troops were at that time a mile away to the right (the second line ridges and the Godfrey trail) He has absolutely no way of knowing this at all at the time and place he inserts it into the narration. First: he was not in the valley, and did not see this event. Second: he learned this second hand from people who had so reported. Third: at the distance that would involve those people viewing this supposed Custer and his staff, did so without any visual aid, and without that it could have been their own mother up there waving with a few of her friends and they could not make positive identification. Was someone there? Probably so. Could it have been Custer? Yes it could. But Custer being there is not establish ironclad fact. Godfrey in my opinion should have stated that someone was up there waving, identity unknown. Then it comes to Godfrey putting Custer's battalion a mile to the east of the wavers. That was a very poor time to insert that into his narrative, as he did not discover any trail until three days later, and did not know what he had seen until ten years later. Additionally it is just a bit suspicious to me that Custer and his horse holders would be a mile to the left of their troops, when supposedly his troops were moving fast to get north in the shortest possible time. Is it possible? Certainly is, but it depends upon how badly Custer needed to see in the valley as opposed to being there with his troops motivating them to put spurs to their mounts. It was then a judgment call either way. I have a firm opinion on what my judgment would have me do, but I, in my career have been wrong at least fifty percent of the time, so I will leave it to your judgment not mine.
Now here is where it gets interesting with regard to Weir Point. Godfrey says, based upon what he was told, and maybe observed on the 27-28th of June, that from where he was told "Custer" appeared on the bluffs he could see only a portion, a good portion, but not all of the villages. That place then would seem to be Wagner's 3411, or at least somewhere close by. He then goes on to say that if "Custer: had only gone to that "high point" (presumably Weir Point - but not completely sure), that he could have seen the whole village. Again that opinion is probably based upon Godfrey's personal observation on the 27th or more probably the 28th as the command move north to police up the battlefield. He says that - "Then Custer would have understood the magnitude of the situation" . Well, maybe, and maybe not, but one thing is for sure Godfrey understood it.
GALL AND IRON CEDAR: Here again Godfrey inserts into the story something that is a bit out of order as it relates to how and when he obtained the knowledge. He says that Gall was just finishing up participating in the whipping of Reno's ass, and intended to chase that worthy gentleman up those bluff and finish him. On the way to do just that he was pulled aside by Iron Cedar who told him there was big trouble brewing in River City. Iron Cedar told him, then took him to another one of those goddamned high points, where the both observed Custer's troops in the far distance on the second line of bluffs, heading north. What Gall did not mentioned, AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT, is no other sighting of troops in the area - Like - Yes I saw those people over there, but I also saw some more heading down the coulee in my front, or anywhere else for that matter. Therefore if Gall clearly remembered the one body of troops that he related to Godfrey ten years later, logic tells us that he would also remember anything else he saw concurrently. Well Gall then takes action and gathers his forces to pursue.
GODFREY RELATES THE "ACCEPTED" THEORY OF 1876: Custer turned onto the bluffs so that theory goes, then entered a place he called Reno Creek, by which I believe he means the drainage we call Medicine Tail Coulee, and proceeds on that route until met by an overwhelming number of enemy forces in the Ford B area. From there Custer is driven back onto what we now know as Battle Ridge. There, still according to the 1876 theory, Custer divides his battalion, moved with a portion down river, met more resistance and was again forced back onto Battle Ridge. Does it make sense to any of you, that after just getting your ass whipped at Ford B, you would divide what little you do have and try again with this time a smaller force that you had the first time you tried? Well it seems it did not make a hell of a lot of sense to Godfrey either, but he was a junior officer, among men who were far his senior, and decided I suppose not to make waves. Juniors are like that with seniors, and as far as I am concerned it sometimes turns out to be too bad they are, for histories sake anyway.
EXAMINING THOSE INITIAL 1876 CONCLUSION OF OTHERS: On their face they seem quite reasonable, except that nonsense of a further divide that is. What they did not see was any trail leading down Medicine Tail Coulee. They may have had Martini telling Benteen that he was 600 yards from the ford when he left, but any trail that may have been made was certainly obliterated by later battle events. The also had the F-F Ridge position which taken out of any later context, looks a lot like it might have been a rear guard position that was overrun retrograding from Ford B, so that fits with their theory. They also had the Company E/Deep Ravine location that would support a second movement toward the river, but that movement would have been toward Ford C. The bodies down there would certainly indicate that a heavy repulse occurred there as well, as part of a portion of Custer's battalion being driven back onto the ridge at Last Stand Hill. The scattered bodies that we now call the South Skirmish Line would also support the idea of retreating soldiers being run down, as they withdrew. The handful of corn statement adds the icing that particular cake needs.
The rest of Godfrey's views of June 76 seem to be in concert with the others. After being driven back they attempted to defend to ridge on an axis Last Stand Hill to Calhoun Hill. A mighty long line for so few, but Company I in the middle could add credence to that theory, and its final location in the swale indicative of being driven off the ridge, prior to being surrounded and destroyed.
I am going to leave it there for today. Dinner time approaches and a new Tom Clancy arrived in today's mail. Tomorrow I will relate the "reunion" visit to the battlefield in 1876, and see how Godfrey's opinions and views were changed by that visit, and what he based his Century article on six years later.
THE REUNION AND THE CHANGES IN OPINION: In 1886 some participants in the battle of ten years earlier gathered at Fort Custer, near Hardin, Montana and from there journeyed to the battlefield. Godfrey was there, and by chance his orderly that accompanied him during the aftermath of the battle, was also with him when he visited this time too. Also there was Gall, and one gets the impression some few other Indians that were there on the day of battle. Before going further it is best to step back ten years again to the 28th of June. Godfrey was sent on a mission of recovery by Reno, or asked to go. I have seen two sources on this asked or sent though makes little difference, and while on the ridge line to the south ran across a trail of shod horses. That must not have made much of an impression on him at the time, but during the later visit the subject somehow came up again. Gall stated where he and Iron Cedar had seen Custer on the afternoon of 25 June from that goddamned high point again. Evidently it was a light bulb moment for Godfrey occurring to him that was where the trail was that he and Penwell ran across ten years earlier.
Gall related that he and Iron Cedar gathered the warriors that were then chasing Reno up the bluffs, and from that point on the story follows the conventional narrative we are all familiar with.
Godfrey though does seem to change his opinion quite a bit. He is now convinced based on the verification of that trail that the battalion moved along Battle Ridge and defended that place, and that which you see in the Company C, Company E (Deep Ravine), and perhaps even those few down in front of Greasy Grass Ridge, we trying to escape, which for me was why I really locked on to Mac's theories when we met here in Colorado Springs several years ago. Retreat, escape, withdraw, retrograde, all in the end mean the same general thing when those words are placed in the overall context of the Custer portion of this battle. Godfrey really does not say anything about any bodies found north of Last Stand Hill, on Cemetery Ridge, and out further on Battle Ridge Extension (like Sharrow). Perhaps he did not see them. Perhaps he thought them outliers in ones and twos. Who really knows. We also must question his number of 212 burials. I think that is two over what is generally accepted, but that's not it. He got that total information from someone else. He may, with his own work, have contributed to that number, so we are left with the highly probable speculation that Godfrey himself did not go over the entire battlefield and some of what he learned he learned from others.
THE MAP IN THE MAGAZINE: After almost sixty years hearing about the Godfrey Map contained in the original magazine article, but not included in the book I have that contains the article in full I got my first look at it tonight. The only conclusion I can draw from it is that Godfrey in doing the map for the magazine took the trail that he knew of, and extended it the north to fit in with the theory he presented in the article. That would seem the most logical answer,because that trail in the north would have been completely obliterated north of those southern ridges in the Battle Ridge Area. What is really frustrating is that Godfrey on 28 June makes no indication that he followed it south to its point of origin. I guess we can just put that down to coming across something that seemed to him meaningless at the time.
So that is about all I have on Godfrey's article. His story has holes in it big enough to drive a truck through in places, but in others there are valuable, I think, snipits of what in and of themselves may be unrelated to one another, but when put together with information of a more modern vintage, add a bit more clarity to the overall story.
One in particular strikes my fancy. AZ will go to his grave and his last conscience thought on earth will be E and F in Medicine Tail Coulee, with C, I, and L riding the ridges. Gall mentions nothing of the kind. He and Iron Cedar were at the place and time to have seen both columns, both of which would have been moving across their front at the same time. If Iron Cedar and Gall were on that high place at that time you can bet Aunt Mable's best brazier that Curley was not there then. Curley is filtered through Camp, and Camp was Curley, not Curley himself. It was a different day, and we all should keep that in mind.
No one knew of Ford D in 1876 or in 1886 or in 1892. Ford D changes everything. Indians that said Custer did not get near the river were seemingly contradicted by other Indians that said Custer got really near the river. and both of them were telling the complete truth as viewed from their foxhole. Logic tells anyone looking at this then that if there is a Ford B, there is no Ford D. If there is a Ford D there is no Ford B. Both of those groups of Indians must be assumed to be telling the truth as they saw it, and have no reason at all to do otherwise. Additionally there is no physical evidence at Ford B and there is some small amount at Ford D.
So the only thing I can take away at this very moment from the complete Godfrey article is that Godfrey really is not telling what really happened, because Godfrey at the time of either of his visits was not privy to what we know today. What he does though is give us a couple of pieces that have been largely overlooked or ignored, that do help, in my opinion, tell the story better, not completely, but better.
The two biggies for me were the partial trail, no I don't think Godfrey's map is correct either, but I do think part of it, that along the southern ridges is correct, with everything else being his period speculation. I also think what Gall did not report was very significant. Sometime not seeing something is every bit as important to analysis as seeing something.
That's my take, after a long afternoon and short evening straining my eyes on fading print. Your turn if you chose to take one.