Training and Deployment in and of the US Military

[deadwoodgultch]

This may seem to be a nebulous, at best, topic. From the very beginning, with some blips along the way, we have attempted to better train our various branches of service. Washington saw the need early on, used Germans and other pros to implement this. General George Brinton McClellan, seemed to do a good job in training his troops, not so much in deploying them.

This is simply an opinion on my part, but it seems that training prior to WWI was an ad hoc endeavor. Some units in the same branch seemed to shine and others not so much. Merritt and Mackenzie seemed to shine the 7th on the other hand was living on reputation. This is not to say the 7th was bereft of Officer and NCO talent. Was this representative of training, leadership, or both?   

I was in the military, mostly National Guard, from 1969 to 1994. Training, in my opinion improved vastly after 1980 in both focus and structure. The deployment in and for Desert Storm was very well planned, something to behold. I played a small part in the implementation. 

Focus on and implementation of new and more streamlined training methods continue. This example from the Air Force Times. "   The Air Force has activated a formal training unit for Tactical Air Control Party airmen at the Medina Annex of Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland in Texas. Air Education and Training Command said in a news release that Detachment 2, 6th Combat Training Squadron, which stood up Thursday, will “synchronize, standardize and streamline training” for TACPs, and foster unity throughout the career field.

TACP specialists embed with Army units on the front lines of combat, where they direct air and artillery strikes. They are highly trained and undergo intense physical, mental and technical training to call in strikes under intense combat conditions.

It is evident that as the battlefield changes and our adversaries increase their capabilities, so must the TACP,” the unit’s commander, Capt. Daniel Hill, said in the release. “The activation of this unit will increase readiness and lethality of the Air Force special warfare TACP, and optimize advanced skills training and education to ensure a full spectrum, high end and fully qualified focused force ready to meet combatant commander’s requirements.

The new TACP-focused unit will speed up the training process dramatically, from 18 months to 21 weeks, AETC said. This will also allow the Air Force to produce 270 fully qualified TACP operators annually, as opposed to 220 partially qualified TACPs per year.

The unit will take on the duty of initial qualification TACP training, freeing operational units from that responsibility, AETC said. This will save a significant amount of time, which could be better spent on combat readiness and airman proficiency, the Air Force said.

The new unit will standardize advanced skills and mission qualification training, AETC said, putting all the training and qualification up-front.


“Ultimately, this stand-up is going to produce lethal and more survivable joint terminal attack controllers … for combatant commanders to make their decisions and be able to utilize in the future,” said Lt. Col. James Kappes, operations officer for the 6th, in the release."

I don't know that this is the kind of thought and question Chuck was looking for. Standardization was lacking, prior to WWI. When did we start seeing ORE's and ORI's branch wide for unit readiness and ranking.

I used the above article for Steve, as he has recently gotten to know a USAF Forward Air Control type on another board. I wonder what that dude would think of this new training concept?

Regards,

Tom

[deadwoodgultch]

I know the article I quoted above involves training for joint force operations. But, proper use of scouts, mule train(logistics/transportation), and infantry is somewhat the same thing. Two of the best instances in our history, prior to WWII, involved joint force operations. The first being the British Army being checked by the Continental Army and bottled up by the French Fleet, keeping the British fleet from assisting their Army. Another instance was at the 2nd Battle of Ft Fisher, a successful assault by the Union Army, Navy and Marine Corps against Fort Fisher, south of Wilmington, North Carolina, near the end of the American Civil War in January 1865. Sometimes referred to as the "Gibraltar of the South" and the last major coastal stronghold. Interestingly General Terry was one of the Commanders involved. How's that for a tie in.

Regards,
Tom

[azranger]

I think the Marine Corps equivalent is FAC (forward air controller)



Regards



Steve

[quincannon]

Training and deployment is a little understood concept to our political leaders, It always has been, and at political level it is not liable to change anytime soon.

Our political masters may say send a brigade here, or a battalion there, but what they often do not realize is that to send a brigade sized unit (4500 + or -) entails the sending of about a 7000 strong logistical support force, so the brigade can do what it is sent to do. That supporting force may be from all the services, and rarely from just one. That mandates that the brigade and the force that supports them must train together, so as they both know the strength, weaknesses, and capabilities of each other. To do otherwise is folly. Doctrine helps, but there is nothing like joint training to prepare a force for battle.

Getting to know those you fight with is like getting to know the neighborhood you live in. It may be done in a number of ways, but any ad-hoc arrangement, putting a force together at the last moment, or worse still in the heat of combat is by far the worst, and the one likely to cause you the most casualties. The best trained soldier and Marines are no damned good UNLESS, they train together with a common training objective in mind. They are no good unless the leaders of the various sub-organizations get to know one another, and more importantly trust one another to the point of complete confidence. They are no damned good unless the sub-units maneuver together in training, as they will in battle, BEFORE they go into battle.

One point about these last sentences. On the 28th of August 1862 the absolutely untried Iron Brigade under John Gibbon (another tie in) was marching on the Warrenton Turnpike from Gainsville to Centreville. They were the second element in King's Division, with two more brigades behind them. Suddenly emerging from the timbered lot behind Brawner's Farm, Jackson appeared with the better part of two divisions. The first Union brigade Hatch, fumble farted. The third brigade, Doubleday's, tried to react, and eventually did so. The fourth brigade, Patrick's did nothing. Only Gibbon deployed his brigade in line of battle and advance to meet the enemy. At the height of battle these men who Gibbon had trained mercilessly held Jackson off for several hours, with little help from anyone else. In the process they wounded two division commanders and inflicted casualties on several Confederate regiments that were so high they were rendered combat ineffective for the rest of the campaign. One regiment was as high as 80 percent.The casualties in the Iron Brigade were high as well, but nothing nearing the percentage levels of Confederate units they faced. What is the lesson here. The Iron Brigade trained. The subordinate units of the brigade knew and trusted each other. The battery that supported knew the Infantry would not run and leave them hanging. The rest of that division performed poorly because they gave little attention to the factors that transform a body of men into ready for combat brigades.

We must never loose sight of these factors. Boastful statements such as we have the most powerful Army or Military on the planet, are nothing but empty promises. Those that engage in that kind of crap talk, obviously don't know B from a bull's ass about the military, armies, navies, Marine Corps' or air forces. They live in a never-never land where what they say become so in their minds. No military force, on land, sea, or air is worth a bucket of spit unless they train their individuals to the point where training is harder than combat, their units, to the point where commanders know, with confidence, what their neighbors will do even before they do it, and the force is not a force of one, but a force of all, completely integrated, objective oriented, and bound together with but a single doctrinal vision and understanding.

[deadwoodgultch]

The above is so to the point, training needs to be uniform branch wide, so I as a "sharp Troop" could plucked from one unit and dropped into another like unit and perform without missing a beat, the same for company, regiment, brigade, and division. While there will often be difference due to personal skill levels, time in service, but I, my company, my regiment, my division, should be able to mesh with other like units.

I am going into a little history of cavalry training in the west, but before I do, and before I forget ORI and ORE, when did they become common place?

In 1866 G.A. Custer was offered the Colonelcy of an all black regiment, he thought that was beneath him, so he was given the job of Lt. Col.(2nd seat) of the newly formed 7th. The fellow who took the position with the 9th cavalry was a little known(today) former Brig. General named Edward Hatch. " Hatch, was born in Bangor, Maine, and educated at the Norwich Military Academy in Vermont.

As early as 1858 he was a resident of Muscatine, Iowa, where he engaged in the lumber business.

He volunteered for service as a private in the Union Army at the outbreak of the Civil War. He assisted in raising the 2nd Iowa Cavalry, becoming its major in August 1861. A few weeks later he was commissioned its Lieutenant-Colonel. In June 1862 on the promotion of Colonel Washington L. Elliott to Brigadier-General he was made the regiment's colonel

He served under General Ulysses S. Grant in the South. After commanding the entire cavalry division in the Army of the Tennessee, he was appointed and confirmed a brigadier general in the spring of 1864. His gallantry in the field caused his further promotion to the rank of brevet major general later in 1864.

After the war, he transferred from the volunteer to the Regular Army as colonel of the 9th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (1866). He succeeded General Gordon Granger as commander of the District of New Mexico (which included New Mexico Territory) in 1876, negotiated a treaty with the Ute Indians in 1880, and became widely known as an Indian fighter. Hatches' Lt. Colonel was Wes Merritt. Merritt took a great deal of pride in his regiment. He and Ranald Mackenzie shared training ideas, as in July 1867 was sent to command Fort Davis, Texas, garrisoned by six of the regiment's companies. While the US Army waited 80 some years to integrate and allow blacks to fight along side their while brethren. One of the 1st experiments took place in Texas. There were also, not commonly known, a number of MOH's awarded to the black troops. Here is how these soldiers got their name. In September 1867, Private John Randall of Troop G of the 10th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to escort two civilians on a hunting trip. The hunters suddenly became the hunted when a band of 70 Cheyenne warriors swept down on them. The two civilians quickly fell in the initial attack and Randall's horse was shot out from beneath him. Randall managed to scramble to safety behind a washout under the railroad tracks, where he fended off the attack with only his pistol until help from the nearby camp arrived. The Indians beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind 13 fallen warriors. Private Randall suffered a gunshot wound to his shoulder and 11 lance wounds, but recovered. The Cheyenne quickly spread word of this new type of soldier, "who had fought like a cornered buffalo; who like a buffalo had suffered wound after wound, yet had not died; and who like a buffalo had a thick and shaggy mane of hair." Another account for the name comes from Colonel Benjamin Grierson, who founded the 10th Cavalry regiment, recalling an 1871 campaign against the Comanches. Either way the 9th. 10th Cavalry, and 24th Infantry worked together(early Mackenzie tie in). Even after taking over the 4th Cavalry worked with the combined forces.

Training and cross pollination is critical for joint operations, so is the desire to coordinate(you know, play nice together} Custer never wanted to share. With regard to the LBH all he wanted was a quick victory and to put a thumb in the eye of Grant and others. He refused to coordinate and follow Terry's orders and or advice on multiple moves which should have been made.

Training, training, training. Cross training, joint operations, and cooperation.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

Chuck, how are you on G-Series Tables of Organization.

I need some info on these two tables;

G-100 Marine Division as of September 1945
Amphibious Operations--Battalion Landing Team in the Assault of a Defended Beach (NAVMC-4161--PHIB 10, 1947)

I did find part of the G-100 but part II [the most important part] was missing, but apparently no one has seen since 1950, so you can see rare this is.

Any help would be applicated.
Ian

[quincannon]

Can't help you Ian. Don't think the G series was ever implemented due to demobilization, and by the time Korea broke out and the Corps was again brought up to strength there were new tables published.