dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Feb 11, 2016 1:06:46 GMT
David Custer was a glory seeking missile who thought of no one but himself. Even the love of his life, Libbie, was a distant second who had given up her life and civilization as she knew it to follow him as did all army wives. Custer actively sought postings that would enable him to remain in the public eye and provide positive press.. As soon as the War was over and he was posted to Texas but he soon used his connections to be transferred to the 7th as LTC. Every time I see the movie Fort Apache I think GAC, as the character LTC Owen Thursday is displeased with his posting to a fort far from the public eye and fighting the Indians second team, the Apache. John Ford based the movie loosely on Custer and the 7th and provided a glorious end for the cavalry. montrose has often stated that Custer was the least qualified LTC in all of the units of the army both cavalry and infantry but I haven't seen his reasons. I wish he would share his information with us as it certainly would provoke additional study and postings. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Feb 11, 2016 1:10:21 GMT
David, I believe that if Custer had handled the aftermath with tact, it would have gone far to mend some of the bad feeling the incident created. I suspect though his attitude was more of 'how dare you question ME.'
I also believe that since TPTB brought him back from his suspension because he was the only man they believed could handle the mission, it probably inflated both his ego and his arrogance. He might even have resented the shadow that Elliot's death cast on his "victory."
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Feb 11, 2016 1:25:55 GMT
David, I believe that if Custer had handled the aftermath with tact, it would have gone far to mend some of the bad feeling the incident created. I suspect though his attitude was more of 'how dare you question ME.' I also believe that since TPTB brought him back from his suspension because he was the only man they believed could handle the mission, it probably inflated both his ego and his arrogance. He might even have resented the shadow that Elliot's death cast on his "victory." No argument here Beth. Dave, we will have to badger Montrose into explaining himself. He will likely find an appreciative audience. My only point is that I cannot disagree with Custer's decision to skedaddle at Washita. Fanboys might object to the term so perhaps we should call it a "breakout." ;-)
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Post by quincannon on Feb 11, 2016 3:47:45 GMT
Custer made the correct decision. Had he been a good commander though he could have mitigated what happened afterward to some extent. Don't think he could have ever convinced Benteen, and perhaps a few others. Regardless it was a correct decision.
It is very easy to criticize decisions of this type. Put the critic in the same spot though and see what decision he makes. As fate would have it Benteen was put into a very similar situation during the LBH fight. He too made the correct decision.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 11, 2016 12:42:07 GMT
Well I repeat what I wrote back in July (in fact I forgot I even wrote this), and say that a battalion commander is responsible for the companies under him and not to lead battle groups which are really only detail sized. He had the courtesy though of asking for volunteers for this fool’s errand.
Elliot’s Company commanders were; Captains Barnitz (G), Benteen (H) and 1st Lt. Hale (M), surprisingly enough four of the troopers who died with Elliot were not even from his battalion, and these were two E Company men and two from I Company, two these men were actually Corporals, so I wonder what their Company commanders or Battalion commander for that matter, thought of these NCOs and troopers simply swanning off with Elliot.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 11, 2016 13:16:10 GMT
Elliot was a bone head.
A commander has the obligation to use his judgment. Benteen used his judgment and his decision to place himself under the command of Reno was the correct one.
From that point on Benteen's obligation was the follow the orders and direction of the senior officer on that part of the field.
Orders like plans rarely survive first contact. Situations change, sometimes moment by moment. The bone headed move would be in not recognizing that fact and adapting to the change.
Custer made the correct decision in regards to Elliot. Benteen made the correct decision in recognizing the situation had greatly changed since he received the note from Custer, and adapted to the change.
Did I meantion that Elliot was a bone head. Benteen was not.
Frankly I am surprised you hold this view having had several combat tours. I am curious how you think Benteen could support Custer during the given circumstance, and avoid courts martial for failing to obey his superior Reno. "For God sake Benteen help me" IS AN ORDER. Blow by blow if you don't mind, with specific supporting actions spelled out in detail, so they may be closely examined for viability.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 11, 2016 13:23:42 GMT
I would agree Chuck, and if Custer followed what JSIT said in his account then GACs tactics were to keep his men safe, because it looks as if he kept to the high ground by following the LNC ridges and then using the spine of battle ridge, and this would give him ample warning to react to any Indian movements, but that’s for another thread.
Yan.
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Post by Admin1 on Feb 13, 2016 18:51:42 GMT
The discussion about Custer's order to Benteen was moved to here.
I left the question about HIJMS Amatsukaze in the moved conversation since it was just a short discussion. No posts were deleted
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Feb 23, 2016 16:05:31 GMT
David Custer was a glory seeking missile who thought of no one but himself. Even the love of his life, Libbie, was a distant second who had given up her life and civilization as she knew it to follow him as did all army wives. Custer actively sought postings that would enable him to remain in the public eye and provide positive press.. As soon as the War was over and he was posted to Texas but he soon used his connections to be transferred to the 7th as LTC. Every time I see the movie Fort Apache I think GAC, as the character LTC Owen Thursday is displeased with his posting to a fort far from the public eye and fighting the Indians second team, the Apache. John Ford based the movie loosely on Custer and the 7th and provided a glorious end for the cavalry. montrose has often stated that Custer was the least qualified LTC in all of the units of the army both cavalry and infantry but I haven't seen his reasons. I wish he would share his information with us as it certainly would provoke additional study and postings. Regards Dave I would suggest Montrose has zero evidence to support his statement that Custer was the least qualified LTC across all disciplines. It is a silly absolute statement that can neither be proven or disproven. Matt In answer to your believing montrose has zero evidence to support how poor a commander Custer was I have pasted his post on another board dealing with this matter. He speaks better for himself than I can. Regards Dave "1. LTC Custer served in ACW as brigade and division commander. Managing scouting was done by his subordinates, at regiment and company. From 1866-76 he served as deputy commander of the 7th. Throughout this period he showed a remarkable lack of ability in managing the scouting function, with either his own unit or with auxiliaries. Remember, Custer was convicted by court martial for gross incompetence. The easiest example is the pajama fight. In Aug 73 he led the scouting force in hot pursuit of an enemy village. He stopped and took a nap. The Indians saw his slack ineptness, and attacked. He was literally caught napping. Then there is Pawnee Killer running circles around him. Or when he shot his own horse by error, when screwing off deep in enemy territory. Or failure to identify 90% of the Indian villages at Washita. Or the fact that the Fort McKeen Scouting Company was stood up in 1872, and 4 years later LTC Custer still had no integration or training plan and procedures with them, in stark contrast to how other regiments interacted with their dedicated scouts. 2. Estimate of the situation. Part of leadership is knowing how to operate under uncertain conditions. A competent leader makes an estimate, and then adjusts this estimate as new data emerges. LTC Custer was not capable of doing this very basic task, done on every campaign in the West by all officers in this era. His estimates kept proving to be false, but he ignored not just what his scouts reported, but what he saw with his own eyes. From 3411 he saw the massive Indian attack sweep around Reno's left flank. The village was now known, vicinity Ford B, not between Ford A and B, which is the only reason to go one foot north of 3411. Right in front of him is the battle every regimental commander hoped and prayed for. And LTC Custer rode away from the battle, and remained passive from that moment until his death. "
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Feb 24, 2016 16:33:42 GMT
Matt Please do not think I was attempting to speak for COL montrose a decorated combat veteran, I just wanted to share one of his posts. He speaks for himself with his posts and I recommend you see them for yourself. Very enlightening and worth the effort to find them. Regards Dave
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Oct 21, 2016 20:11:52 GMT
Some of the fallout from the Elliot affair and further thoughts. This comes from the History Net.
Benteen’s opinion about the Elliott affair first surfaced in a private letter forwarded to the Missouri Democrat and published on February 9, 1869. In high 19th-century melodramatic style Benteen described what he imagined to be the last moments of the forsaken men: “With anxious beating hearts, they strained their yearning ears in the direction of whence help should come,” he wrote. “What must have been the despair that, when all hopes of succor died out, nerved their stout arms to do and die?”
Benteen then claimed that his commander had remained in the Cheyenne village as his men rounded up prisoners, took inventory and slaughtered Indian ponies—perfunctory tasks at best—all the while oblivious to the plight of Elliott and his men and making no effort to search for them. Benteen’s claim, right or wrong, sprang from a rift that had plagued the regiment before the Washita and only widened after Elliott’s death: The 7th Cavalry officer corps was divided in its loyalties to its commanding officer. The accusatory letter from Benteen, self-anointed leader of the anti-Custer faction, did not initiate this conflict but merely brought it out into the open.
Throughout Custer’s tenure in the 7th Cavalry subordinates complained bitterly about his lack of recognition for the actions they performed on campaign. This included the commander’s report from the Battle of the Washita, in which he merely mentions the deaths of Hamilton and Elliott, the wounding of three other officers and that two officers (Benteen and Barnitz) had personally killed three Indians between them. Custer cited no other officer for his accomplishments that day, despite many praiseworthy examples.
One was Godfrey’s masterful three-mile leapfrog retreat with his platoon from the mass of warriors approaching Black Kettle’s camp from villages farther downstream. Moreover, Godfrey’s field report had alerted Custer to the threat of retaliatory Indian attacks. Custer also failed to cite the bravery and leadership of Captains Thomas Weir, Benteen and Myers during the 7th Cavalry’s withdrawal. These officers had met Indian charges with countercharges, forcing back the enemy and enabling the regiment to escape.
To top it all off, Custer never credited the late Elliott with finding the Indian trail that ultimately led to the discovery of Black Kettle’s village. Many in the 7th Cavalry ranks thought that omission in particular slighted the memory of a fallen comrade and revealed Custer could not be trusted, especially after the lieutenant colonel had seemingly abandoned Elliott at the Washita. If Custer could treat his second in command in such a fashion, would he not also ignore and betray their interests?
In his writings about the 1873 Yellowstone Expedition fights at Honsinger Bluff (August 4) and the Bighorn (August 11), Custer made only oblique references to his officers’ accomplishments, while highlighting his own actions and those of brother Tom. When approached about his refusal to acknowledge fellow officers in his reports, Custer replied that to single out exemplary individuals would be unfair to those not cited, and that among professional soldiers such laudatory remarks were unnecessary and unbecoming. But such acclaim in reports was a prime avenue toward promotion and honor; Custer had had his activities announced in numerous official Army communiqués, reports and newspapers during the Civil War, with great benefit to his career. Thus his excuse for slighting his officers was disingenuous at best.
Another point of contention was Custer’s practice of sharing with subordinates as little as possible about his intentions. First Lt. William W. Cooke, the regimental adjutant general, was firmly in the Custer “camp,” yet even he once exclaimed that when it came to being informed of critical matters, George never told him anything. Custer made officer calls—such as the one held before the attack at the Washita and through the Little Bighorn campaign—purely to give out instructions; input was neither requested nor tolerated. This approach to command did much to erode relations between Custer and key subordinates, stunting initiative and clouding mission objectives.
Custer’s prickly personality exacerbated problems with the officers and men in his command. According to John Burkman, the lieutenant colonel’s orderly, his boss had a tendency to overreact, “flying off the handle suddenly, maybe sometimes without occasion.” He did not have the capacity to counsel men on points of dissatisfaction, preferring to believe the officers would resolve such problems themselves. Even with brother Tom, George depended on wife Libbie to curb the younger Custer’s excessive drinking habits. By 1869 Custer had stopped caring whether his officers liked him; the criticism he had received over the loss of Elliott had helped push him in that direction. In a letter to Libbie that year he confessed, “I never expected to be a popular commander in times of peace.” His expectation was fully realized.
When the 7th Cavalry rode to the Little Bighorn—and death and glory—in June 1876, it was a military column fractured by internal dissent. Other such units on the frontier had their share of personality conflicts and cliques, but few to such a degree. The mistrust, resentment and fear of betrayal many 7th Cavalry officers harbored toward Custer were in no small part a result of the Elliott affair. Whether it adversely affected the regiment’s martial performance after the Washita is a point for de-bate. But certainly the regiment would have performed its frontier duties with more confidence and less second-guessing had it not been for all the suspicion and mistrust. Custer’s tragedy at the Little Bighorn dwarfed Elliott’s tragedy at the Washita, but it is impossible to forget or dismiss the obvious links between the two.
Maryland attorney Arnold Blumberg has indulged his passion for military history as a visiting scholar with the History and Classics Department at John Hopkins University in Baltimore. Suggested for further reading: A Hoosier Quaker Goes to War, by Sandy Barnard; The Battle of the Washita, by Stanley Hoig; Crazy Horse and Custer, by Stephen E. Ambrose; and Custer: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer, by Jeffry D. Wert.
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