Ford D---> Ford B redirect

[crowsnest]

Ok, we all know the story of the Ford B scenario.  Custer splits the command and takes one wing down MTC, attempts to cross at Ford B, and pulls out either because it seems unsuitable, or he's deterred by the numbers, he then pulls back to LSH, and is overwhelmed.  We've picked that theory apart numerous times. 

The main train of thought in here is a Ford D attempt, and it pressured by too many warriors in the vicinity, pulls back, and attempts a retro-grade back the way he came.  

So I want to throw a curve ball scenario in (while I've read probably 80% of the posts on this forum by now, it's possible I missed conversation about this concept)


I've struggled with the limited battle evidence around Ford D.  We know there must've been action there, but the quantity seems underwhelming for such a quick retrograde.  ( I know this could be explained by a leadership wounding/death, but we have no direct evidence of that)

As the original story goes, Custer can't find good footing around MTC to get the unit across and pulls back.  My question is, why can't that be what happened around Ford D.  Not so much horses getting stuck in the mud, but just a lack of suitable crossing point for a larger force, so they don't enter piecemeal and get picked apart.  It's possible Custer found Ford D too wooded, and to difficult to clear, and instead of continuing North too far away from the camp he attempts a move back at Ford B.  Custer then instead of retrograding back south to reconnect with the Reno/Benteen location.  He decides to move back to Ford B the less "preffered" choice.  This might explain the Company C deployment extension south of Calhoun.  

The concept of the group being caught in transition, from an unexpectedly large number of natives still fits in this scenario.  It also allows for Calhoun's forces to have come down off of Calhoun hill heading towards MTC initially only to be pushed back up the hill.  

This allows for E and F to protect the "backdoor" of the movement to MTC.  This also allows for an understanding of why when men break down towards Deep Ravine it might be because the aiming point might still have been Ford B area.  Instead of the aim to being to hold LSH, and the Deep Ravine group being guys in flight or retreat. It might present us with a scenario where as pressure hits from the North or East an excuse to vacate.  A bugle call is reported, and the decision is made to vacate towards the planned target.  They run into a similarily bad situation, but they may not have realized the pressure in that direction existed.  

This allows for Mark Kellogg's position as well, veering just south of Ford D to watch the excursion and staying along the east bank of the river as the movement moved back towards MTC/Ford B.  

I don't believe it fits Custer's personality or leadership style to move that quickly all day, see part of his unit engaged, move down for Ford D, probe and decide to backtrack 4+ miles and reunite.  If he decided Ford D was not the place he'd push to a different location.  

This scenario allows for Butler not to be a late survivor, or even a messenger back to Benteen, but for his to be in front of the pack on the redirect gathering last minute intel on the ability/difficulty of a Ford B attempt.  

The huge swell of warriors returning from Reno, stop this movement in it's tracks, and before Custer has a firm grasp on the severity of the situation he's forced to defend an increasing swell coming up from Ford D, another group infiltrating from the west up the various coulees, and then CH and Gall from the south.

Alright pick it apart, as I'm sure it's flawed in several ways.  

[quincannon]

What you are trying to do here CN is get inside Custer's mind to view his decision process. In short Custer thinking were screwed at D, let's go back and try B, then the effort is overcome by events, but the maneuver looks an awful lot like what we have collectively presented here. Good for you. Excellent tactical reasoning and overall effort. You are to be applauded.

The most likely reason for Ford D being largely barren of artifacts, is that two roads, an interchange, and a railroad have come through that area since Custer's day.

[crowsnest]

QC, the construction of the Ford D area certainly could eliminate the finding of artifacts, I admit that whole-heartedly. I guess I need to request info from those in here that know better how many bodies the Terry crew found around Ford D. Because that would be the path they entered from and would have record of that. Shouldn't we have evidence from near the Ford of several remains at least 1-2 dozen if they were driven off from that spot. It seems that we find more from the trading post back towards the cemetery.

[quincannon]

You are assuming they were driven from Ford D, after close combat. I do not think there is any Indian testimony that tells us that there was close combat in that immediate area.

My personal belief is that there was enough resistance to make Custer conclude that he was not crossing there on that day, but not enough to cause anything more sinister. A dozen to two dozen bodies would mean very close combat and for an extended period of time, say 20 to 30 minutes. Such an action close to D would not benefit Custer in any way, and the most probable result of such an extended action would be to move Last Stand Hill to Last Stand Highway Interchange. In short if they were at the ford for 20 to 30 minutes they were not going to get to any high ground like CR, BRE, or LSH. Only Billy got off the low ground (hope you are familiar with old fiddle tunes to appreciate that).

Don't think Terry ever reported anyone dead that near the ford

[deadwoodgultch]

Either Ford!

[colt45]

Another possibility is once Custer got to ford D, even if the resistance was not enough to force a withdrawal, he could have seen hostiles coming up deep ravine, which would mean his left flank was exposed. In order to avoid hostiles getting behind him, he would have had to cancel the crossing and move back toward BRE and CR, where the higher ground offered some advantage. The pause on CR could have been to set up the organized withdrawal back south which we believe happened, as that would have been the tactically sound move in the face of an aborted attack.

Also, if you look at the map of the river where it ran in 1876, you can see he would have had to cross in more than one place in order to move 5 companies across at the same time. The bends in the 1876 river, along with the trees on the bank, could have also convinced Custer this was not the best place to cross, hence time to pull up stakes and try again another day, given that the cat was out of the bag and the hostiles were rapidly advancing in large numbers.

I don't believe after all the fun at ford D, Custer would have been considering moving back to ford B to try and attack again. By this time there was just too much enemy activity in his area to allow for that kind of action. Once an attack at ford D was off, Custer was no longer on the offensive but rather was in defensive mode, trying to get his fat out of the fire.

[mac]

Love your work CN!

I think QC and Colt have answered the tactical questions of the withdrawal. Check out the old path of the river and you will see what Colt is referencing and why I too feel that the stay at Ford D was brief and the withdrawal was tactical rather than forced. As to bodies, we have had some evidence that there were originally two markers over near the Trading Post on the highway. Also I think it likely that wounded or dead were recovered if possible and ended on LSH...we just do not know.

You are probably aware that we are still actively discussing all these things so keeping up the thoughts and contributions.

Cheers

[yanmacca]

Mar 23, 2019 0:59:14 GMT colt45 said:

Another possibility is once Custer got to ford D, even if the resistance was not enough to force a withdrawal, he could have seen hostiles coming up deep ravine, which would mean his left flank was exposed. In order to avoid hostiles getting behind him, he would have had to cancel the crossing and move back toward BRE and CR, where the higher ground offered some advantage. The pause on CR could have been to set up the organized withdrawal back south which we believe happened, as that would have been the tactically sound move in the face of an aborted attack.

Also, if you look at the map of the river where it ran in 1876, you can see he would have had to cross in more than one place in order to move 5 companies across at the same time. The bends in the 1876 river, along with the trees on the bank, could have also convinced Custer this was not the best place to cross, hence time to pull up stakes and try again another day, given that the cat was out of the bag and the hostiles were rapidly advancing in large numbers.

I don't believe after all the fun at ford D, Custer would have been considering moving back to ford B to try and attack again. By this time there was just too much enemy activity in his area to allow for that kind of action. Once an attack at ford D was off, Custer was no longer on the offensive but rather was in defensive mode, trying to get his fat out of the fire.

Yes, Colt I agree with you, just because they withdrew from ford D, doesn’t mean that they fought a battle there.
Custer should have known that this area was not a good place when he arrived on site as this being a low flat area by a river, would mean that there would be a high concentration of trees and vegetation. And once they started taking fire this would be enough for him to either deploy elsewhere or even get back to the high ground south of MTC.

If he reached the high ground, there could be a good chance of meeting his support elements and take it from there.

All this though, would need orders and given that all five companies would be pretty much spread out, would take some kind of rallying point to give these orders out, so moving back to BRE would be a logical choice.

By the time they reach BRE, surly they would know that the longer they stayed there, the more chance of being cut off, the Indians may have not been in clear sight but boy I bet they threw up some dust, so reading these signs, the HQ element must have known that they had drew a lot of attention to themselves and they had to move fast.

This is why I don't think that ford B was an option, at that point what would be the point of staging a river crossing against a prepared village, especially one this large.

No I guess that Custer knew that he had to shorten his lines and get his regiment back in order before he tried to wrestle with this village.

Here is the area of ford D showing the old river course;

[yanmacca]

I don't know if I have posted this before, but I found it by chance when I was streamlining my folders. I contains written data on the JSIT info;

INDIAN ACCOUNTS John Stands-in-Timber, Cheyenne Aug. 8, 1956

The informant, now 70 years old, spent much time gathering data on the Battle of the Little Bighorn from Cheyenne warrior participants, including his grandfather Wolf Tooth. Ili3 other grandfather, Lame White Man, was killed in the Battle. Stands-in-Timber is educated, and made written notes on his information after returning from school as a young man, fifty years ago. Through the offices of Mr. J. W. Vaughn, attorney of Windsor, Colo., Stands-in-Timber I’m brought to the Battlefield, where he related his information to Mr. Vaughn and Historian Rickey.

Lame White Man's widow, Stands-in-Timber’s grandmother, was named Twin Woman. Her brother was Tall Bull (Cheyenne), who was also in the rattle and provided some of the information.

Wolf Tooth (informant's other grandfather) took Stands-in-Timber over the Battlefield about 40 years ago, and showed him where Lane White Man and Noisy Walking were found dead after the fight. These places have been marked with stakes.
The Chiefs in the fight were all equal. The leading warrior was Crazy Horse - also Gall, Iron Thunder, Two Moon, American Horse (Cheyenne), Dull Knife, Little Wolf, Crazy Head, and lied Cloud (a Cheyenne-Sioux, not related to the Oglala chief).

The village first knew of Custer's approach when Low Dog and Red Tomahawk saw the troops at their second carp on the route up the Rosebud. The village was then at the site of Busby. The Indians watched the soldiers constantly from then on. The day before the Battle (June 24) village criers announced that no man was to leave the camp, and that night the warrior societies held dances and the chiefs agreed on a plan of Battle. The warriors prepared ritually (Sioux). When the Indians knew that soldiers were coning, the throe Cheyenne soldier societies - Grassy Dogs (60 members), Foxes (60 members), and Foxes (60 members), each led by Ü leaders - began taking turns watching the soldiers.

Since much honor would case to those who first fought the soldiers, a group of 40 to 50 warriors (Wolf Tooth among then) left comp, and rode past the members of the warrior societies for a distance of 4-5 miles east of the Battlefield. They there halted by two Indian scouts sent to recall then with the news that the soldiers were already getting in position to attack the village from the southeast. The Crazy Dogs had held a "suicide" meeting the night before.
Six Cheyenne’s were killed in the Battle Lame White man (an "old nan chief," and the eldest to die), Noisy walking, Long Roach (killed east of Custer Ridge, near I and F Co.), Scabby (died in his own lodge and buried at the mouth of Prairie Dog Creek, in the rim rocks, on what is known as the Mash place). Informant cannot Immediately recall the names of other Cheyenne’s killed.

Monument: The Arickaree scout Little Soldier's name was really Little Brave; he was a brother of Bob-Tail-Bull. The 3itl brother was in the Battle, with the Cheyenne’s, as he had been a Cheyenne captive since he was a little boy, and was a noted warrior.

Custer came toward the village from the high ridges to the east. The Custer men tried to cross the river at a ford west of the present railroad tracks, on what is now the Willy Bend place (behind Sage Motel). Cheyenne’s hidden in the brush on the south side of the ford drove the soldiers back and killed a couple of them in the brush by the river. Then the Custer men retreated to the flats below where the superintendents house is now located. They waited there for about half an hour, while Indians assembled in the vicinity and fired on the soldiers from the ridges north of the flats (six empty 45/70 cases were found there subsequent to this interview, in a place where the cartridges could not have been fired at targets anywhere but on the flats mentioned). Stands-in-Timber said that the Indians wondered why the soldiers did not move south to rejoin the others.

[azranger]

Hi Ian

That narrow gulch is sometimes called Crazy Horse Gulch. You can see where they filled in the road bed for the new entrance road. At he left side and top of your labeled Dry River Loop you see a green finger that is where Gibson's crossing is located. Just on the other side of old road and adjacent the end  a branch of BRE is where the photo showing Kellogg's marker is located. The photo was taken from the new entrance road during the dedication.  Tom and I have been all over that area. One year we observed Cheyenne's holding an event near one of the Ds.

Regards

Steve

[johnson1941]

OP - Terry may agree with you…

“His trail from the point where Reno crossed the stream, passes along and in the rear of the crest of the bluffs on the right bank for nearly or quite three miles; then it comes down to the bank of the river, but at once diverges from it, as if he had unsuccessfully attempted to cross; then turns upon itself, almost completing a circle, and closes {ceases?}. Knowing thats not what Macguire meant to show on his map, but anyway…

[johnson1941]

As for D, Philo Clark seemed to think something went on there…is the ‘trail’ he shows from LSH the narrow gulch?
Or is that “trail” supposed to be Deep Ravine?

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