Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 28, 2019 0:06:59 GMT
I will put this where it belongs. Shortly after Yellow Tavern the following took place. I think I have mentioned to Chuck and Dave that I actually have a few trenches on my property. A little background and one sentence or more.
The main Union force, The Army of the Potomac, began its long push toward Richmond with a bloody struggle in the Wilderness. Grant’s forces side stepped the Army of Northern Virginia but were headed off at Spotsylvania Court House where a lengthy standoff would prove particularly lethal. The pressure on all fronts left the Confederate leadership scrambling to move troops to the threatened areas. After his resounding victory at Drewry’s Bluff and with Butler immobilized in the Bermuda Hundred Beauregard was in a position to distribute some of his troops. The most pressing need was with Lee’s army at Spotsylvania Court House. Beauregard immediately began to send troops to Lee’s assistance. For a small group of Virginia soldiers the movement to reinforce Lee would lead to a small but interesting affair. Lost in this period of hectic activity is a small battle that has remained almost unmentioned in the usual sources. Little evidence of it exists outside the writings of three Confederate soldiers who took part in the Battle of Milford Station. Hancock was to cross the Mattapony at Milford Station get behind Lee and threaten his lines of communication. ... the advance division of Grant's army, instead of a raid to burn Milford Station.
The 1st Virginia was joined by their brigade mates, the 7th Virginia, five companies of the 11th Virginia (A, B, C, E, and K) and a company of unarmed Georgia artillerymen. The train departed about 2 P.M. on 20 May 1864 with about 450 men aboard. The defections at the capital left only one field grade officer present, Major George F. Norton of the 1st Virginia.
The train arrived at Milford Station, a hamlet consisting of a depot, engine house, and a small collection of dwellings and shops, at 9 P.M. and the men marched west across the Mattapony River and made camp. Major Norton coordinated with a detachment of cavalry troops to place videttes on the roads approaching the station and settled in for the night. After eating a late supper the exhausted men went to bed “upon the ground” little suspecting that the randomness of war would make their routine trip into a deadly adventure.
While the members of Kershaw’s Brigade were making their trip to Milford Station events at Spotsylvania Court House were putting them squarely in the path of Grant’s next move. Frustrated by the stubborn defense being mounted by Lee’s forces Grant developed a plan to lure him from his works. He ordered Hancock’s II Corps to begin a march around the Confederate left. Hancock was to cross the Mattapony at Milford Station get behind Lee and threaten his lines of communication. Grant theorized that a single corps threatening his rear and exposed would be so tempting that Lee would have no other option than to attack it. If the Confederates acted as expected Grant could then use his remaining forces to crush them in the open or at a minimum attack a depleted defense.
Hancock dutifully dispatched his chief of staff, Colonel Morgan, to perform a reconnaissance of the route. Morgan went as far as Guinea Station and returned with a report that the way was clear of enemy troops. Hancock, in an effort to preserve a measure of secrecy around the move set the departure time for after dark on the 20th. To brush away any Confederate cavalry that might be patrolling the roads in that direction Grant added a cavalry vanguard to the movement. BG Albert Torbert attached three regiments of troopers to Hancock to secure the march. The march was relatively uneventful as it entered Guinea Station in the very early morning hours of the 21st. When they resumed the march they were detected as they approached Bowling Green by the Confederate cavalry videttes.
While the members of Kershaw’s Brigade were making their trip to Milford Station events at Spotsylvania Court House were putting them squarely in the path of Grant’s next move. Frustrated by the stubborn defense being mounted by Lee’s forces Grant developed a plan to lure him from his works. He ordered Hancock’s II Corps to begin a march around the Confederate left. Hancock was to cross the Mattapony at Milford Station get behind Lee and threaten his lines of communication. Grant theorized that a single corps threatening his rear and exposed would be so tempting that Lee would have no other option than to attack it. If the Confederates acted as expected Grant could then use his remaining forces to crush them in the open or at a minimum attack a depleted defense.
Hancock dutifully dispatched his chief of staff, Colonel Morgan, to perform a reconnaissance of the route. Morgan went as far as Guinea Station and returned with a report that the way was clear of enemy troops. Hancock, in an effort to preserve a measure of secrecy around the move set the departure time for after dark on the 20th. To brush away any Confederate cavalry that might be patrolling the roads in that direction Grant added a cavalry vanguard to the movement. BG Albert Torbert attached three regiments of troopers to Hancock to secure the march. The march was relatively uneventful as it entered Guinea Station in the very early morning hours of the 21st. When they resumed the march they were detected as they approached Bowling Green by the Confederate cavalry videttes.
Major Norton immediately decided to use his meager force to defend the station. The 1st Virginia was sent to occupy the buildings around the station. Sergeant Loehr, being the only non-commissioned officer present, took command of his company, which consisted of ten men. They occupied “an old log blacksmith shop a short distance east of the depot.” Loehr described the position stating “the door faced the depot and a wooden shutter opened on the back from which there was an excellent position to fire on the advancing enemy with comparative safety.” Seeking a means to verify the report Sergeant Loehr went to a nearby dwelling to gain an elevated perch from which to view down the Bowling Green Road.
He reported;
“Seeing the lady of the house, I asked permission to deposit the articles* entrusted to my care by my captain, which was granted, and I thought I was making a satisfactory arrangement when I placed the sword and blankets in the parlor of that dwelling. Having got rid of my charge, I climbed upon the roof of the front porch, on the lookout for Yankees.
I soon saw them coming, tearing down the road, and got ready to leave my elevated position, when the lady above referred to called out to ‘be careful or you will damage my shutters.’ I advised her to move herself to safety, or the enemy would soon make it uncomfortable for her. I believe that she took my advice, and finding that time for me was short, I jumped down to the ground, perhaps twelve feet, without hurting myself. Then seeing one of the enemy's riders, who had stopped under a tree about 800 yards off, getting on his horse and taking a survey of our position, I took a good aim at him and blazed away, with the result of seeing him change base at double quick time. Thus the first shot was fired, and the ball was opened in due form.”
While the 1st Virginia sought cover in the nearby buildings the 7th Virginia took a more traditional approach to the coming fight. Awakened to the warnings, the men of the 7th were told that “the Yankee cavalry are just beyond the depot and we are going to drive them off.” The regiment fell in and marched across the bridge and formed a line on the east bank of the river. Within moments of completing their deployment “several regiments” of Union cavalry appeared and matched them with a heavy line of skirmishers. As the opposing skirmishers clashed several squadrons of Federal troops charged forward. The Confederate skirmishers collapsed back into the regiment and the mounted attack was repelled by a resounding volley from 1st and 7th. Sergeant Loehr remarked; “a volley from our rifles sent them back in confusion, leaving several of their comrades and horses bleeding behind.” Several more attempts were made before a high knob was occupied by the Federal troopers who then brought forward a battery.
*The company commander, Captain E. Payson Reeve, had remained in Richmond with the others to visit friends and family but had given Loehr his sword and blankets for safe keeping.
As the number of Union troopers continued to grow they were dismounted and formed a line that made a crescent around the Confederate position. A steady advance was made “while the firing was kept up at a lively rate.” It was soon obvious that the slim number of defenders would be overwhelmed by the Federal line. Major Norton now ordered up the reserves. Instead of fortifying the threatened defense the 11th Virginia he ordered "take that hill and hold it at all hazards". The initial stages of this attack was successful as they pushed back the Union skirmishers and took position on a hill east of the Bowling Green Road. The new position immediately drew the fire of the Federal artillery. By this time the advancing columns of the II Corps infantry could be seen and it became clear that any further resistance would be futile.
Major Norton ordered a retreat across the river. The cavalry was ordered to carry the order to the 11th regiment but for these men the order came too late. Regimental member David Johnston described the scene;
As soon as the hill was occupied, no Yankees being in sight, I walked up on the northeast side of the grove of trees and saw half a mile away, thousands of Yankee cavalry; the hills were blue with them. It turned out to be General Torbet's Division, the advance division of Grant's army, instead of a raid to burn Milford Station. I went back and told Capt. Bob Mitchell, of Company A, who was the ranking officer, that we could not hold that hill — that there were ten thousand Yankees over on the next hill. Mitchell replied, "We have orders to hold the hill at all hazards." I said, ''All right, we will all be captured." I have often thought Captain Mitchell should have sent a messenger to inform Major Norten of the situation, but he did not. The Yankee skirmishers, dismounted cavalry, soon began to advance on two sides of the hill, when a long-range skirmish began, which continued for some time, growing hotter as the Yankees approached nearer and nearer, protecting themselves behind trees and whatever they could. They were held at bay for an hour or more. During this time the Confederates had several men wounded. The Yankees were being hit also. Captain Mitchell was shot in the chin and left the hill. Lieutenant Atkins, of Company K, was also wounded. I saw him clap his hand on his side as the ball struck him. I never learned his fate, and I am not certain that I have his name correct, but know he was a lieutenant of Company K. Capt. Thomas B. Horton, of Company B, was next in command. Going again to the crest of the hill, on the northeast side, I saw a regiment of dismounted Yankee cavalry forming in line of battle a few hundred yards away; a colonel or general with gray hair and mustache was riding along the rear of the men getting them into position, the men seeming very awkward and hard to get straightened out.
But they continued forward anyway. Many of the Confederates realized the nature of the situation and began to move to the rear without orders. Those that did not made good on Johnston’s prophecy. The advanced position was swept over by the advancing wave of Union troopers and 66 men were captured.
The men of the 1st Virginia received the order to retreat and began a slow move back to the bridge “the firing being kept up on both sides.” The 7th Virginia, posted near the bridge, covered the passage of the 1st. Once the last of that regiment passed the 7th began its own retreat across the bridge. The last to depart were the skirmishers who departed “but kept up a running fire.” While they moved back an effort to render the bridge unusable was being made. Captain Parr, regimental adjutant, directed that the planks being removed and tossed into the river. For the last of the skirmishers it created a dangerous situation. To remain on the east bank meant certain capture. Two men leapt to safety over the growing gap while others threw away their weapons and swam the river. Norton’s command then marched to a ridge about three miles west of Milford, where they joined Barton’s Brigade* and entrenched fully expecting to be attacked; “but no enemy appeared.”
The Federal cavalry crossed the Mattapony on a bridge just north of Milford Station and the bridge there was repaired. By late on the 21st most of II Corps was on the west bank of the river where they remained for the better part of three days.
The Virginians believed that their resistance at Milford Station allowed Lee time to move to a new line. It is more likely that it was not the three hour fight that made the difference. Their mere presence where they were not expected however may have changed the Union plan. Hancock, having met resistance in an unexpected quarter, may have believed that Lee was being strongly reinforced. Seeing the new line west of the Mattapony (Kershaw’s and Barton’s Brigades)Hancock stopped probably thinking that he was facing the right wing of Lee’s army and threw up heavy breast works. Lee did not take the bait. Instead he opted not to attack Hancock but rather established a new line on the North Anna setting the stage for another static showdown between the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac. The actual impact of the fight is open to several interpretations.
There were critical moments in the fight that need closer examination:
Major Norton’s decision to stay and fight at Milford Station was based on an incorrect intelligence assessment and cannot be faulted. He probably had sufficient combat power to defend the station against a raid. He failed to reassess the situation as the number of Federal troops continued to grow. The 11th Virginia should not have been placed in such a vulnerable position.
Captain Mitchell could have, and probably should have, acted unilaterally when informed of the growing Union presence and ordered the 11th to fall back. At the very least he should have attempted to verify the report. He did not, nor did the officers that replaced him thereby dooming a large portion of them to capture.
More interestingly what was the Union reaction to the small fight? Did it factor into what happened next? Was Hancock’s decision to stop within the spirit of his orders and what might have been the impact had he determined to continue on? Did 450 overmatched Virginians ruin Grant’s plan?
I would like to thank the local Library and the list below.
Bibliography
Books
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Volume 36
Personal reminiscences of the war of 1861-5; in camp--in bivouac--on the march--on picket--on the skirmish line--on the battlefield--and in prison"; W. H. Morgan (11th VA)
War history of the 1st Virginia Infantry Regiment; Charles Loehr (1st VA)
Four Years a soldier: A Member of Company D," Seventh Virginia Infantry, and Sergeant-Major of the Regiment, David E. Johnston (7th VA)
Historic records of the Fifth New York cavalry"
Articles
The Battle of Milford Station, An Address by Sergeant Chas. T. Loehr, before Pickett Camp, U. C. V., August 31, 1896. Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 26
Ans a special thanks to 1SGDAN
I hope I have not bored you all to death. There is more but the above are the guts, There were actually two more skirmishes here earlier in the war. The above battle was part of the Overland Campaign.
Regards,
Tom