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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 23, 2018 19:18:58 GMT
One of my hero's, William R. Corson, USMC . This program below was his baby, he was also an expert on the KGB. He wrote several books, his first almost extended his time in the USMC for a Courts Martial
The Combined Action Program was a United States Marine Corps operational initiative implemented in the Vietnam War and proved to be one of the most effective counterinsurgency tools developed during that conflict. Operating from 1965 to 1971, this program was characterized by the placement of a thirteen-member Marine rifle squad, augmented by a U.S. Navy Corpsman and strengthened by a Vietnamese militia platoon of older youth and elderly men, in or adjacent to a rural Vietnamese hamlet. In most cases, the Popular Forces militia members (Nghia Quan) were residents of the hamlet who were either too young or too old to be drafted into the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) or the Regional Forces (Dia Phuong Quan). The entire unit of American Marines and Popular Forces militia members together was designated as a Combined Action Platoon (CAP).
The program was said to have originated as a solution to one Marine infantry battalion's problem of an expanding Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). The concept of combining a squad of Marines with local (PFs) and assigning them a village to protect proved to be a force multiplier.[1]
While the exact implementation varied with the stage of the war and local command variations, the basic model was to combine a Marine squad with local forces to form a village defense platoon. It was effective in denying the enemy a sanctuary at the local village level. The pacification campaign seemed to work under the CAP concept, and the Marines fully embraced it. Objectively, there is no solid proof that the CAP concept was a resounding success; however, subjectively the evidence suggests otherwise.
"Counterinsurgency operations and, in particular, the establishment of a foreign internal defense lends itself for the greatest utility of employing a CAP-style organization. Recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia suggest a CAP-style organization could accomplish the assigned mission." In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines reinstituted a variant of the CAP
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Post by quincannon on Nov 23, 2018 23:00:30 GMT
I appreciate this information Tom, and it seems that it is a step in the right direction, but a step only significant on the micro level.
To achieve macro success eventually in a counterinsurgency situation the one factor that must be present is the people themselves MUST have faith in their government. That was not present in Vietnam, nor has it been present in any insurgency opposed by the west since WWII, with the exception of Malaya and Greece, in my memory. Without that popular support it is impossible to win such fights, no matter how successful one is at the lower levels. Supporting corrupt governments, because they are the enemy of your enemy is a rat hole you can never get yourself out of, once committed.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 25, 2018 11:28:46 GMT
You're so right, I ran this up the pole as I don't think we have anything on the Vietnam War on the board. Below is a review of Corson's book "Betrayal." Your comment/post above could have been excerpted from the review. Good job.
"Nobody who cares about American foreign policy and the repeated messes we have exacerbated can reasonably articulate our recent history or analyze current problems if they have not read Bill Corson's, The Betrayal. LtCol Corson was a phenomenal US Marine intelligence officer who the establishment, including US Marine Corps headquarters hated for his refusal to shut up and parrot the drivel that passed for policy and reporting during the Vietnam War. I was fortunate to meet him as I worked in Combined Action for part of my tour in the mid 1960's as a Marine. An honest, independent and thoughtful man. He wrote clearly and concisely of what needed to be done to influence events in Vietnam, condemning the road to defeat and waste that we were on and, unlike so many critics then and now, GAVE A DETAILED alternative plan for what needed to be done to provide a hope of success. The Powers that Be threatened him with courtsmartial if he proceeded to publish this book, but they got lost in their own b.s. and the book came out. Bill retired and tried to keep the message out there for those really concerned. The idiocy of our actions in Iraq and Afghanistan was an unnecessary repetition of our hubris and ignorance displayed in Vietnam."
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 26, 2018 16:48:48 GMT
Fehrenbach, writing on the Korean War remarked (and I paraphrase) that no one gives two hoots in hell about wars on the far frontier. So it was with Korea, and all the rest that have followed.
Korea is a success story of sorts in that the south was preserved and has prospered. As we know from recent history though the issue has not been settled, and an open wound remains.
With Vietnam, what difference would it have made in the relationship between our two countries had not we spent fifty thousand plus lives to support corruption, but saying to ourselves we are supporting democratic ideals in that part of the world. NONE. ZERO. NADA. 2018 would have still found a united Vietnam as one of our trading partners.Vietnam itself has a traditional enemy in China. We failed to leverage that until someone realized the fact over a half a century after they were told.
Iraq and Afghanistan are beyond hope. They will still be beyond hope at the time of the second coming. Both are due to corruption which is so ingrained in the national culture of these two boils on a pig's ass. Every life lost since 1991 in trying to change, that which cannot be changed, has been wasted. Our government will never admit that, but failure to admit does not change the basic fact.
There is only one way to deal with countries that harbor terror, small or large, oil or not, and that is by surgical strike, that continues as long as necessary to lance and drain the cyst, then pack up and go home, with the warning that we will be back if necessary. Democracy cannot take hold, where there is no history of it ever existing, and we are much to impatient, to plant a seed and water it for five hundred years.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 26, 2018 20:50:02 GMT
I know what you mean Chuck, but in the case of Afghanistan and in some cases Pakistan, these places not only harbour Islamic nut cases, but harbour and train Islamic nut cases who lean their art in these countries and then move abroad to kill on the streets of Europe and the USA. The main Islamic nut jobs also don't care about fighter jets and drones flying over their heads as they will just move their base right next to a hospital or school.
I don't have an answer to this problem, but in the case of Afghanistan, you had the two largest and best equipped armies trying to subdue the place [USSR & USA] and both have failed. In my mind if they want to treat their own like slaves and kill men for not having a beard or stone a woman because she can read, then any over throw should come from within. But it is the fact that they are reaching out and hitting Christian countries which gets us suckered in.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 26, 2018 21:06:12 GMT
Truly astute last paragraph. Financial and social leverage is a third option, even with our "allies" such as Saudi Arabia. We never should have given Iran their money back nor caved to hostage money for our sailors. It matters little how Europe responded we had the money. Much of which is now going to Hezbollah et el, which was created after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and active especially in Lebanon. We so weakened Iraq that Iran now runs much of it.
Saudi Arabia is not Lilly white as you know. Turkey has taken a slight turn to the new Russia. You can go back a long ways to blame administrations. We could compare and contrast out opinions on administrations for hours. The Dulles boys dropping the Bay of Pigs on JFK. Johnson painting Goldwater as a hawk, the doing what he said Goldwater would. Carter's weak Kneed response to Iran. Reagan lacking a proper response in Lebanon. Even Desert Storm was not completed.
I could go for hours.
Regards, Tom
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 26, 2018 21:13:03 GMT
If we had offered a Marshall plan as ongoing option for the last 65 years to the people of N. Korea, the family Mafia might have been bounced by now, but then again.
Regards, Tom
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Post by ray on Nov 27, 2018 13:50:20 GMT
I appreciate this information Tom, and it seems that it is a step in the right direction, but a step only significant on the micro level. To achieve macro success eventually in a counterinsurgency situation the one factor that must be present is the people themselves MUST have faith in their government. That was not present in Vietnam, nor has it been present in any insurgency opposed by the west since WWII, with the exception of Malaya and Greece, in my memory. Without that popular support it is impossible to win such fights, no matter how successful one is at the lower levels. Supporting corrupt governments, because they are the enemy of your enemy is a rat hole you can never get yourself out of, once committed. Hi QC,
Agree that success at lower levels (e.g., in the field), however important, is not the be all and end all. I seem to remember a wholistic approach taken in Counterinsurgency training at Bragg. That said, I don't seem to recall a magic formula.
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Post by ray on Nov 27, 2018 14:19:14 GMT
I respectfully disagree that "the one factor that must be present is...." More important than the people's faith in their government (and who has faith in their governments and, BTW, isn't EVERY government corrupt by its very nature - it's really a matter of degree) - and there are many "more importants" and they change with the situation - is whether or not the main actor (that would, in this case, be us) has clear strategies (political, military, security, etc.) and commitment to them. That doesn't guarantee success, but lack guarantees failure. The British succeeded in Malaya for a host of reasons, including a focus on the problem, ethnic and racial differences between the Communists and the general population, heavy reliance on SAS and, amongst others, Aussies, etc.
On another matter where I disagree with somebody is that the US HAS won some recent asymmetric wars including both in Iraq (think Desert Storm) and Afghanistan (think Northern Alliance), only to throw success away politically. Does anyone remember the feeling of relief when GEN Westmoreland was replaced by GEN Abrams? Finally, I remember many saying, there's a GENERAL in charge (of course, "in charge" is a relative term).
So mark me down as a true believer who believes that wars can be won, have been won, and will continue to be won... just as victories will continue to be thrown away (don't mention the election). As an engineer and project manager through the years, my role was solving problems and fixing broken things, including some that were nuked (figuratively). It can be done. Alas, what can be done can be undone. One measure of success was whether or not organizational changes or improvements had lasted six months after hands were taken off. After that, there were different hands steering the Titanic through stormy seas.
I've used up my mixed metaphor quota now, so will try to find my (very distant) cousin George Armstrong to see if he might know where the Indian roamers whom we seek to entice back to their Reservations are.
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by quincannon on Nov 27, 2018 16:44:08 GMT
Perhaps you should define winning. My definition is fairly simple - Remove the cause of conflict. Absent that no one has really won, and no one truly lost. Winning is both a political and military function. Unless the politics go hand in hand with battlefield success, battle, for its own sake, successful or not, is an exercise in pissing up a rope. Strategy is the level where politics and the military mesh. If you have not achieved, or even developed, strategic goals, all of the operational and tactical successes you might have are for naught. Sidebar: There is not one person in a hundred who ever heard of the M56 SPAT (no one ever called it a Scorpion, although that was its given name) that was the original equipment of Company D, 16th Armor. You did, which in my mind speaks well for your bona fides. Ian: I am afraid you are reading too many newspapers and watching too much telly, in thinking that surgical strikes are the solitary purview of manned aircraft and drones. Surgical is defined as having one single objective focus, and all of your hardware and organizations from smallest to largest (up to an army corps) can and are employed in the venture. The term surgical is borrowed from the medical profession to be sure, but it means the same in the military as it is for a doctor - cut it out and close it up.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 27, 2018 18:20:45 GMT
By the way, Ray, I meant to mention, when you see a white number above messages or notifications that means an individual or individuals is reaching out to you. Be careful of Quincannon he is an argumentative sort. His bark is worse than his bite, rounded gums and what not, it comes with age. His first enlistment was under Roosevelt, Teddy. He was too young for the charge up San Juan, however.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 27, 2018 18:48:41 GMT
Actually it was my great uncle that was a Rough Rider Tom, but alas a member of the squadron left back in Tampa, while the other two squadrons went to Cuba.No kidding.
What are we here for but to determine and discuss the facts, and that occasionally leads to firm ground being held.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 27, 2018 19:33:06 GMT
Chuck when you used the term ‘’Surgical Strike’’ it does sound like a small unit action to land among the enemy, kill their leaders and then get out.
Wouldn’t sending in an army corps simply play into their hands? There is a lot of logistics to a formation that large which takes time to get organized, in which time the bad guys have got on their camels or yaks or whatever and simply left the region. Once you have organized your forces then you have to start to patrol the area and branch out, this is were all of your casualties will accure with suicide bombers, IEDs and other nasty little surprises.
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Post by ray on Nov 27, 2018 19:50:24 GMT
Perhaps you should define winning. My definition is fairly simple - Remove the cause of conflict. Absent that no one has really won, and no one truly lost. Winning is both a political and military function. Unless the politics go hand in hand with battlefield success, battle, for its own sake, successful or not, is an exercise in pissing up a rope. Strategy is the level where politics and the military mesh. If you have not achieved, or even developed, strategic goals, all of the operational and tactical successes you might have are for naught. Hi QC,
Perhaps the best definition is Potter Stewart's statement, "(I don't know what it is, but) I know it when I see it." I agree with most of what you say above, but will agree to disagree on your definition because I have bought into the trope about there being different kinds of "winning"; e.g., a search for satisfice, win/win, win/lose (why does lose/lose seem to be such a common goal?), etc. My alma mater clearly won in the Apple Bowl, but the battle will be re-fought next year. It seems to me that there were clear winners and losers at BLBH, but history records that conflict didn't end as a result and still manifests itself 150 years later. Conflict (verb) seems to be part of human nature that we will never be free of, whereas many (a) conflict (noun) has been successfully brought to a close with the cause(s) not addressed (WWI springs to mind and so does WWII and ….). So "winning" seems to mean achieving a closure that at least (most people on) one side is okay with and the other side(s) don't (can't) say much to the contrary (mumbling is okay, though, isn't it).
One of the problems with your "fairly simple" definition is that history can be cyclical as well as linear. It is IMHO possible to win on an occasion or for a time. As you noted, perhaps the issue is definitional. Perhaps it's merely that I chose to view "operational and tactical successes" as wins, even as I grudgingly acknowledge that the USA didn't "win" in Vietnam. After all, I know it when I see it (most of the time, anyway).
Oh, I didn't understand your comment on the M56; I mentioned that I went from a tank battalion in Germany to Nam on DA orders to command D/16 (true) but accepted the 173rd's kind offer to take a temporary Infantry company command in lieu of kicking around HQ until the slot came open (true). What I didn't say is that I was S4 for a few months after turning my company over when we lost a Company CO in the field and my Bn CO sent me (five months before DEROS) as emergency replacement (true) so I never did get to D/16 (true). I also mentioned that I never saw a M56 which they didn't have anyway as they used ACAVs (true, although I may have passed by a M56 unawares in a military museum like at Knox or Benning). How does this make you doubt my bona fides (with so many unhappy faces) and why should I care?
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 27, 2018 19:53:47 GMT
Looks like this is turning into a two horse race, my lot had nothing to do with Nam, so I leave you to it.
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