dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on May 1, 2017 19:45:48 GMT
Today marks the 154th Anniversary of the Battle of Chancellorsville a Confederate victory with a heavy cost. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's accidental wounding and subsequent death days later had a profound effect on Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.
Lee scrambled to reorganize his army and was forced to create another corps as neither Ewell or A.P. Hill had commanded more than a division. Going into a major campaign, Gettysburg less than a month after Jackson's loss, Lee was compelled to rely on corps commanders he did not know.
Hooker's handling of the Army of the Potomac was superb right up till he meet Lee's army on May 1. He ceased his offensive movement and suffered a devastating attack on his right flank on the evening of May 2. When Hooker retreated across the Rappahannock May 5 it marked the last retreat made by the Army of the Potomac during the War. Meade's retaining the field after Gettysburg was soon followed by Grant's relentless march South. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2017 21:55:51 GMT
I disagree.
Lee was not "forced" to create another corps. In fact that creation of another corps I look upon as probably the greatest mistake he made during the course of the war, that led directly to the sloppy performance of the ANV at Gettysburg, and thereafter. Sloppiness is here defined as not what you do, but in the professional manner you do it.
I also disagree that Lee did not know Ewell or Hill. He knew both of them very well. Ewell was by that time used up, and should have been made commandant of the Old Folk Home. Hill was erratic, but he was also the senior most officer in Jackson's Corps, and for a few moments after Jackson was wounded commanded the corps until he himself was wounded. Stuart took over that corps with no preparation and in the middle of the night, and handled it superbly throughout the remainder of the battle. Politics, specifically Virginia politics, entered the picture, and Lee did not have the gumption to have a come to Jesus with the powers that be, and tell them he commanded the goddamned army and he would do as he saw fit, and if they did not like it relieve him. The powers that be would have pissed their pants and shut up.
The correct course of action in my opinion. would have been to retain Stuart in command until either Jackson or Hill recovered. It would have been Hill (and he quickly did) give the corps to Hill, and then for Lee to give him the tender love and attention required on the part of commanders for all new subordinates. Personally I would have left Stuart in command, and if Hill objected tell him to stick it up his ass.
We talked about BUT FOR decision making on the Isandlwana thread, so I will again disagree, saying that Hooker screwed the pooch from jump street when he turned his cavalry loose to go raiding. So no, Hooker did not handle the AoP superbly. Anyone who enters the Wilderness of Virginia in 1863 without cavalry is the worst kind of jackass, and I would be most hesitant to do it today without cavalry.
I disagree again about this retreat business on technical grounds. Operationally the statement is correct. Tactically the statement is far from correct, citing Buckland Mills, Bristoe Station and the Wilderness. There were tactical withdrawals made on all three occasions.
Other than that a much needed remembrance of a battle that is a must study of how to fight outnumbered and win.
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mac
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Post by mac on May 1, 2017 22:09:21 GMT
I have just been watching Ken Burns doco on the Civil War after first seeing it many years ago. I am not up to speed on this yet. Maybe QC can expand on the notion of fight out numbered and win in this context. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2017 23:00:28 GMT
First off the best modern book on the battle is by Sears. There is another that was better, and the name will eventually come to me, but it is 80 or more years old and long out of print. I sold my dad's copy twenty odd years ago for two grand, and the buyer considered it a steal. It was however a numbered copy of the first 400 in print, and signed.
Fighting outnumbered and winning is an art form that western armies in todays environment must cultivate and make their own. Victory, unlike what that puny little frog said does not always go to the big battalions. It goes to the best battalions. Best is defined as best equipped, best trained, best led, physically fit and heathy, best educated, and best organized. These are some of the reasons you will often see me say on the founders thread that health care, education, and technical expertise that matches innovation are as much a national defense issue as guns, tanks, planes, and ships, and that bigger is not better,only better is better.
Chancellorsville Mac has its beginnings in the dictum, concentrate to fight, disperse to feed. In the winter of 1863 Lee sent Longstreet's Corps less a division or so down to Suffolk (below Norfolk and jus above the NC/VA state line). This was done basically to feed, with a wee bit of fighting. Lee meanwhile remained on the Rappahannock Line, with one reinforced corps spread out between Fredericksburg and the upper fords.
Hooker moves, but first he sends the bulk of his cavalry off to tear up some railroads much further south down around Orange, and well out of timely recall distance. He then proceeds to march his army across the rivers Rapidan and Rappahannock, and enter into the most goddamned godforsaken place on the earth at least at that time. It is a place full of narrow trails and foliage so thick you can't see ten feet. Lee displaces most of his force and gets into position on Hookers south, just about the time that Hooker reaches a large, in fact very large cleared area, around a crossroads called Chancellorsville, after the Chancellor house that occupies one corner of the cross roads, and promptly sits on his ass waiting for his next shoe to drop .
At this point he is about 10 miles from Fredericksburg, and to the west. The next part of Hookers plan is to have another part of his force assault Marye's Heights (yes the same place) turn Lee's right and Lee being caught between, the plan was to crush him.
Along comes the Confederate Cavalry, you remember the stuff that Hooker turned loose and they spot the XI Corps sitting on their fat asses like donkeys having a picnic. I would add they had not entrenched their camp, but that is a sore spot with Ian right about now. This information was reported to Lee, who says, maybe we can hit these people a lick, even though we are outnumber two to one. So he sends Jackson's Corps around the flank on a march of about 17 miles, and lights into Howard and sends him a running. Lee whips Hookers ass over the next few days, and even as his flank at Fredericksburg is turned and Mayre Heights taken those holding that place fall back and stand at Salem Church (on Virginia Route 3 - correct Tom)which is still there today.
Thumbnail, but the message is that smart wins over big.
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Post by quincannon on May 2, 2017 1:25:39 GMT
Bigelow's Chancellorsville
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dave
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Post by dave on May 2, 2017 3:38:12 GMT
QC Lee did not know how Hill or Ewell would do a corps as they had not handled or cared for 20,000 plus men. I believe Lee decided to decrease the unit size by dividing Jackson's corps and reshuffling Longstreet's. I agree that Ewell was a poor choice but Little Powell was as erratic as any member of that army. Up until Jackson's death A.P. had refused to serve with him. Hardly the behavior of a military leader. Jubal Early carried too much influence with Ewell and feed his doubts. Powell's sickly health record was on record and could not have given much relief to Lee preparing for the Pennsylvania campaign
Lee needed Stuart out front, to the sides and behind the Yankees more than he needed an Infantry Corps commander. Lee was all out of sorts during the Gettysburg campaign because he had not heard from JEB. There were sufficient cavalry troops and leaders but Lee wanted and needed Stuart.
Hooker's reorganizing and refurbishing of the Army of the Potomac after Burnsides dismissal was what I was referring to as superb. Hooker treated Ambrose poorly and schemed behind his back but he brought the AOP back to a fighting unit. Joe could not restrain his mouth and promised the moon to one and all. But once the fightitng began to seew Lee everywhere and lost his control.
My comments were not in depth nor intended to be anything but a quick scan and hopefully encourage others to study the battle. Regards Dave
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mac
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Post by mac on May 2, 2017 8:13:41 GMT
I can see what each of you mean.
One thing about the civil war is the number of battles in close proximity with different names. Having sorted that...my understanding is that Hooker wanted to squeeze Lee from 2 sides but when through the wilderness he ground to a halt and that allowed Lee to "side step" him and turn the tables. I find it hard to see why ,having made the effort to move into position there would be any pause in prosecuting the assault. This does seem to be a Union characteristic in the early stages of the war up until Grant came along and said giddy up. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 2, 2017 13:14:49 GMT
Excellent points from both of you. Let me address them together for a slightly different view.
1) There is knowing, then there is knowing. Lee knew both Hill and Ewell. Dave makes the excellent point that Lee did not know how well either of them would handle a corps, which was several times the size of their previous responsibilities. What commander does? Who knew how well Collins or Ridgeway would handle a corps until they were given one by Eisenhower? That is always an unknown, and you pays your money and takes your chances. Corps commanders can be relieved.
2) Lee chose to make the corps smaller. That is a good thing. Both of those corps were too large, having a span of control of four and five respectively. The problem created (the real problem, the real root cause) was that expanding to three corps headquarters required that there be three corps staffs, and while Lee could easily subdivided from two to three, he could not create three well functioning staffs to control what he subdivided. Staff work in the ANV was always sub par. Spreading the butter much thinner made it far worse. That is the reason for the demonstrated sluggishness of the ANV after Chancellorsville, poor, far sub par staff work.
It would have been much better in my view to increase the size of the divisions and reducing the number of them, by brigade and regimental realignment. In that manner your existing staff functions would remain constant. The extra benefit would be to create a pool of experienced division and brigade commanders from those displaced by restructure, so they would be available, when people like Hood fell wounded, and brigade commanders like Armistead were killed. In short Lee's army required reorganization but he did it on the wrong level.
3) It has often been said that Lee needed Stuart more that he needed cavalry. Balderdash. He needed a cavalry commander who was completely competent and who could be trusted as much as Stuart was trusted. Unlike the dismounted components of the ANV, the cavalry, at that time had two such trusted competent officers who could step in Stuart's shoes any given afternoon and the cavalry would not miss a beat., Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Neither one was prone to Stuart's mistakes. Both were equally aggressive. Neither of those officers would fail Lee in anything given to them.
4) Like knowing, there is handling, then there is handling. Hooker was an exceptional administrator that is directly responsible for the organization of the AoP into its most efficient configuration, one that did not really change throughout the rest of the war. Absolutely no question about that. he was a better administrator than McClellan in my view, but not as good a trainer. My apologies , to me the word handling first evokes the operational and tactical arts, not administration.
5) The plan was to assault the Rappahannock Line from both ends, then squeeze the middle, just the same way the jaws of a pair of plyers close in around the nut you wish to loosen. Hooker paused because he became blinded for lack of cavalry. Lee was able to sidestep because Hooker lacked cavalry. He had to pause, and probe for Lee. He found him in short order, but by then the damage of letting Lee slip slightly away from the jaws had been done. It was also not such a bright idea to again try to assault Marye's Heights, with the attendant delays that could be expected, caused by a determined confederate defense.
Why are so many battles so close together? The defense of the Rappahannock River Line is the reason. Although it is named for the largest river, the line actually consists of the Rappahannock, Rapidan, Matta, Po, Ni (all of which eventually form the Mattaponi), and is a wide belt obstacle between Washington and Richmond. There is really no good place to defend north of it toward Washington, or south of it toward Richmond. Now take all these rivers in the same general area, and surround them with dense jungle like woods also, them in a seventy mile wide belt, and you have a formidable defensive area, not unlike the Hurtgen Forest.
Here is what I want you to place in your minds eye. A belt of land as described above, with only one town Fredericksburg, and a number of tiny villages, like Port Royal, Bowling Green (Tom's home town), Spotsylvania Court House, Ladysmith, Ashland, and a few others. The rest of this land was jungle like, with a clearing every now and again used primarily for agriculture. Roads were few and poor. Bridges were nearly nonexistent. You either forded the rivers or you did not get across, When it rained you went nowhere.
I trained in this area fifty years ago, and the place I trained, Fort A. P. Hill, was in 1963, not much changed from that same area in 1863. When you moved out of those widely separated cleared areas, and you were in deep, thickly overgrown with underbrush, forest, where your visibility was cut to a matter of a few yards. The defensive advantages of such places cannot be overstated.
So to answer your question, you could base yourself on Tom's back porch and never travel over forty miles to see the Civil War in the east for two years.
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mac
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Post by mac on May 2, 2017 22:12:15 GMT
Looking, I did note "The Wilderness" and remembered it too was a battle site and as you say a horrible place for that activity. The geography makes sense now. Tom is not challenged for interesting places to take a stroll! Probably an aside but it seems to me that the civil war towards the end was veering towards a trench warfare set up. Is that a reaction to the equipment development or a reflection of the confederacy being pushed into a much more defensive posture? Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 2, 2017 23:34:52 GMT
Essentially the latter. The lost the ability to perform operational maneuver. There was much more to it, the supply situation and so forth, but the loss of the ability to move operationally is the root cause of their defensive posture in the waning days of the war.
Tom is about fifteen miles from downtown Fredericksburg. Within a twenty mile radius from there, is Chancellorsville, Salem Church, Spotsylvania Court House and the Wilderness. Expand that a little further and you encompass Kelly's Ford, Brandy Station, Cedar Mountain, and a host of small actions that never make the history books.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on May 3, 2017 12:45:59 GMT
Essentially the latter. The lost the ability to perform operational maneuver. There was much more to it, the supply situation and so forth, but the loss of the ability to move operationally is the root cause of their defensive posture in the waning days of the war. Tom is about fifteen miles from downtown Fredericksburg. Within a twenty mile radius from there, is Chancellorsville, Salem Church, Spotsylvania Court House and the Wilderness. Expand that a little further and you encompass Kelly's Ford, Brandy Station, Cedar Mountain, and a host of small actions that never make the history books. Have to ask if Tom is familiar with Dahlgren VA and the US Naval Surface Weapons Laboratory.
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Post by quincannon on May 3, 2017 13:26:49 GMT
Both of us are.
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on May 3, 2017 16:05:59 GMT
Dahlgren. That is an interesting name to bring up with a discussion of Northern Virginia battlefields. Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, who led General Kilpatrick's inspired raid of Richmond, was certainly a controversial figure. The supposed/alleged or real documents discovered upon his person after his death created quite a firestorm which rages to this day. Where the documents real or forgeries? Make your best case.
I have never seen copies of the two documents found on Dahlgren which called for Jefferson Davis's death, freeing of POWs and burning of Richmond the only action I know of called for. My question is would these be possible orders by Union leaders? Assassinating Davis, burning Richmond and freeing prisoners?
Would Secretary Edwin Stanton have ordered the raid directly or just tacitly approved it? -I believe Stanton would not hesitate to use any measure or means to end the War and crush the South. He would tacitly approve the plan having Kilpatrick as the creator but would he authorize the killing of Davis? I believe yes.
Would Judson Kilpatrick have odered the raid? -In a heart beat! His ego was a large as Custer's and he loved the ladies and what better way for glory than ending the War and killing Davis and edging out all the other popinjay boy generals?
Was General Benjamin Butler the first to conceive this raid to capture Davis but was too incompetent to attempt it? -Butler was a brilliant lawyer but an inept military leader. He probably did come up with the ideas as it would appeal to his ego to capture Davis but HE could not have planned a 6 year old's birthday party!
If the raid had been successful would the War have ended sooner? -As bad as a leader Davis was, he was the best of the litter. Who could have taken place? No one successfully, however the I believe the South would have dissolved internally and been full of partisan rangers, guerrillas and outlaws and the Reconstruction would have been far longer and worse for all.
Was this raid the key to the Lincoln assassination? -I am sure Booth was both intrigued and inspired by this aborted raid but cannot come up with an answer for this one. Booth's erratic behavior and flights of fancy coupled with copious amounts of alcohol fueled his ambitions to be famous but he did develop his lust for Lincoln's demise till later. At first Booth's plan was to capture Lincoln and only at the last hour did he decide to assassinate him. I do not think this raid affected Booth as he was too wrapped up into his self for almost a year before Lincoln's death.
One of the ironies, to me, of this affair is that Jefferson Davis was a very poor leader, unable to compromise and ignore veiled barbs. His constant micro-mangement, selecting generals on a personal not ability basis condemned the Confederacy to defeat. Other than Robert E. Lee, Davis continually distrusted his generals, especially in the Army of Tennessee, and attempted to direct the campaign from over 500 to 600 miles away. Davis crushed state's rights as required to fight the War generating a central government (Don't you know that was a popular decision in the Confederate Congress). The governor's of Georgia and North Carolina fought against him almost as hard as did Grant and created as much heart ache for sure.
Comparing Lincoln to Davis clearly shows the vast difference between the two men. Lincoln's ability to suffer slights and insults yet continue on working with any and all who would save the Union where as Davis could not forgive or work with the insolent individual.
Thankfully for this nation and all its citizens Lincoln was able to save the Union. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on May 3, 2017 16:56:41 GMT
The weapons lab is named for his father, who unlike the son, did accomplish something.
Even among the honored dead you find the occasional ass hole, and Ulric Dahlgren proved the rule.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on May 3, 2017 19:17:20 GMT
As is often the case the good ones are forgotten and only the rascals are remembered. Regards Dave
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