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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 19, 2017 12:33:51 GMT
I've read attempts to compare Islamdwana with BLBH. Very different events but do recognize some similarities. Starting an audiobook later today called Custer and the Sioux, Durnford and the Zulu by Paul Williams which evidently attempts to draw parallels between the two battles. Will provide an opinion when done. General comments on both battles welcomed.
PS-used the Overdrive App to check out from local library via Kindle. App highly recommended!
Best,
David
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2017 13:10:32 GMT
Similar in result, but very different in the causes of the defeat.
Had these people commanding the British Army been conversant with Caesar's Commentaries, and heeded the precepts therein, this would have and should have been a devastating defeat for the Zulu force.
In short, when you stop, you fortify, then secure by reconnaissance.
When you stop, you are saying to the enemy - Come to me. You would not invite guests to you home, and not be prepared to greet them would you?
In other words, whenever you stop you have selected a temporary battle position. You fortify that position by digging in, and constantly improving that position, until it is time to leave. You get patrols out that keep you informed of enemy presence or possible presence. You are prepared to meet the enemy then at any time on ground of your own choosing.
Freeman and the 23rd RCT met a very similar situation at Chipyong Ni. Freeman read Caesar. Evidently Chelmsford did not.
None of this crap is new. The same problems you face, have been faced by commanders before. It's all in the book, but you have to read.
Look what Chard and Bromhead did a day or two later with one reinforced company against this same enemy.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 19, 2017 14:21:15 GMT
True dat, QC, on the outcome at Rorke's Drift. I recall that the man left in charge by Lord Chelmsford, LTC Henry Pulleine was a staff officer who had never commanded men in combar. There was even some argument as ro who was in charge when Durnford arrived. Should be a good read.
David
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2017 14:59:23 GMT
Neither have I. but never having done it, and knowing how to do it are two different things.
Most officers spend more that 50 percent of their time in service on a staff at various levels. Probably only 30 percent with troops, and the remainder in school. Probably different percentages in the 19th century, but it was rare indeed not to have been a staff officer at some point. In fact it could be rightly said that staff assignments prepare you for higher command more than anything else. It is on the staff where you learn how an army works.
That sounds like the reasoning the Creep from Queens would apply.
If a staff officer does not know how to command in combat, that Army has a hell of a lot more problems than facing a mere 20,000 Zulus.
Look forward to your periodic reports.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 19, 2017 16:38:28 GMT
Or 2-3K native American warriors. Have to give the Dogbrush Dog Soldier credit for being a master of the obvious that Zulu warriors and Plains Indians did not fight the same. I will try to find the link but I watched a documentary on Islandwana that illustrated one of Pulleine's gravest errors was deploying his companies too far away from their camp; as much as 1/2 mile or more. Wasn't hard for the Zulus to flow like water around stones and outflank/bullrush the Brits presuming the above is accurate. Of course there were many more errors. Best, David
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2017 18:22:14 GMT
That was the critical error.
That is why you choose where you camp carefully, dig it in, no matter how long you intend to stay, half a day, a month, whatever/ You have chosen a position that can be defended. You have improved it to strengthen that defense. Why in the name of Christ Almighty then would you venture outside the area YOU have chosen for battle, only to give battle on someone else's terms.
I don't care if you are stopping for a pee break, you had better be prepared to defend nature's toilet.
These things are always important, but especially important if you are fighting Gauls, Britons, Zulus, or Sioux, whose only great advantage is in numbers. Good armies learn what it takes to fight outnumbered and win. The others just die.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2017 20:30:04 GMT
By the way David the Zulus used the same tactics as the Indians. They used differing techniques and procedures in implementing those tactics.
Try that one on El Creepo de la Queens.
"There were many more errors"
1) Don't screw down the lids on your ammo boxes then forget what you did with the screwdriver
2) Shoot the Quartermaster who wants you to account for every round of ammunition when your position is about to be overrun.
3) Quartermasters are chosen from societies that practice incest, and count beans instead of, and in preference to, wenching with wild women, and drinking hard liquor. They are in an eternal state of unnatural being.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Apr 19, 2017 21:23:18 GMT
That was the critical error. That is why you choose where you camp carefully, dig it in, no matter how long you intend to stay, half a day, a month, whatever/ You have chosen a position that can be defended. You have improved it to strengthen that defense. Why in the name of Christ Almighty then would you venture outside the area YOU have chosen for battle, only to give battle on someone else's terms. I don't care if you are stopping for a pee break, you had better be prepared to defend nature's toilet. These things are always important, but especially important if you are fighting Gauls, Britons, Zulus, or Sioux, whose only great advantage is in numbers. Good armies learn what it takes to fight outnumbered and win. The others just die. Agree with you. In addition send out a patrol. Even if you have a good defensive position, it is always good to know if the enemy is near. Be Well Dan
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Apr 20, 2017 1:29:13 GMT
By the way David the Zulus used the same tactics as the Indians. They used differing techniques and procedures in implementing those tactics.
Absolutely agree! I know most members here appreciate this, probably better than I do. Anyone reading this board who does not see the similarity and the differences in the above quote should do the necessary research or questioning to understand. No one can comment meaningfully on any battle without understanding such military fundamentals. Great discussion...but hard on Quarter Masters ....fair in this case however! Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Apr 20, 2017 3:01:07 GMT
I am always fair to Quartermasters Mac, very balanced in my approach, I treat them all with the utmost distain.
If you take a deep dive into Navy lore, there is a story of a ship's supply Chief on I think West Virginia at Pearl on 7 December 1941, that refused to distribute the keys to the ships ammunition, and in particular the ready ammo boxes without the written permission of the ship's supply officer. All this of course while the ship was crippled by air attack and was sinking. Like I said I think it was the WV, but possibly the California, which was in the same general situation
That is how these people think. Now I fully understand the fiscal contraints and pecuniary liability of their jobs, but there are limits.
One of the things David will find is that Quartermasters refused to give ammo to people in need, who did not belong to their particular unit during this battle, and that was a partial causal factor for getting over a thousand men killed.
Yes Mac
It's still the same old story, a fight for love and glory, a case of do or die.
A flank is still a flank, and envelopment is still and envelopment, as time goes by
Dooly Wilson
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 20, 2017 19:21:36 GMT
So far the book reminds me of the lesser attributes of Barbara Tuchman's "The March of Folly." Tuchman's is a fine book but the 'once again we see' got tiresome.
Williams follows a format: general topic followed first by LBH issues then Isandlwana for comparison. Surprisingly the LBH portions have been longer and more detailed than Isandlwana. Paul Williams is from Australia and my first thought would be that he would show more interest in the British perspective.
A few other thoughts: The camp was drawn up on Jan 20. Pulleine did send out scouts on Jan 22 of which Lt. Raw's small force came across over 20,000 Zulus resting up for a planned attack the next day. Some articles are vague but it seems that Lt. Raw's men unwisely fired upon the Zulus triggering an immediate response. Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford had led a force of 2500 troops on a wild goose chase after a force of Zulus tasked with separating this body from Pulleine's defense force.
Pulleine knew by 8 am that Zulus were present in large numbers and sent a messenger to Chelmsford. Chelmsford received this message around 9:30 am and chose to ignore the warning. The latter sounds much like Custer's failure to respond to Reno's two messengers. Whether or not any scouting was done on Jan 20-21 is not clear from what I have read and comments about the camp's lack of defensive positions are spot on.
As to the book, I an about 18% thru it and will give it 3 of a possible 5 stars so far.
Best,
David
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 20, 2017 19:30:11 GMT
I suppose rhe big question on gathering intel has to be how in the hell did 20,000 Zulus get so close to the British camp before being detected? The attack on the camp began within 2-3 hours of detection.
Best,
David
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Apr 20, 2017 21:44:55 GMT
I suppose rhe big question on gathering intel has to be how in the hell did 20,000 Zulus get so close to the British camp before being detected? The attack on the camp began within 2-3 hours of detection. Best, David David, Fine topic I appreciate you starting it, and look forward to your next post about it. As to the above, as I previously stated, patrols, and more patrols to try to prevent just such an event. Gen Crooks failure to send out a patrol is why the warriors were able to surprise him. If it were not for his scouts seeing them and riding out to confront them, who knows what would have happened to his command. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Apr 21, 2017 0:38:20 GMT
As much as I agree that reconnaissance is a constant, not knowing of Zulu presence was not a factor here. There was plenty of warning and plenty of time. The reaction to the intelligence was wrong.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 21, 2017 0:43:48 GMT
As much as I agree that reconnaissance is a constant, not knowing of Zulu presence was not a factor here. There was plenty of warning and plenty of time. The reaction to the intelligence was wrong. Yep.
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