dof Unconventional Warfare

[Deleted]

One problem of all unconventional wars is maintaining standards. What do you do when your soldiers cross the line?



This article examines a unit that crossed the line repeatedly 2002-2011.



theintercept.com/2017/01/10/the-crimes-of-seal-team-6/

[dave]

montrose what do you think? What actions should be or not be taken?
Regards
Dave

[deadwoodgultch]

Dave,

I think Montrose believes we should not respond to one illegal act with another, even if the enemy will not stop theirs. The enemy understands they get a pass if we play by our rules. When we play by their rules they get propaganda from the conventional press. I don't have to like it, but sh*t happens. The rules of the old testament are a wee bit tougher

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

When you respond in kind you are no better than those you seek to defeat.

Morality means something.

[Beth]

Morality means everything on both at home or world stage. You can not expect to take the high ground when it comes to international affairs when you are hiding a bloody hand behind your back.

[sgttyree]

Apr 11, 2017 16:11:52 GMT montrose said:

One problem of all unconventional wars is maintaining standards. What do you do when your soldiers cross the line?

Montrose, 

I'm sure you are familiar with Major Gant.  What's your take?  Lawrence of Afghanistan or Colonel Kurtz gone rogue?

The book American Spartan was written by his then mistress, now wife.  So I'm not sure it's an objective portrayal.  But it certainly was an interesting read.

[Deleted]

You mean Captain Grant. He was reduced a grade. He took his girlfriend on combat operations, committed adultery, used alcohol and opioids illegally and misused op funds.


His claims that the concept of training and organizing indigenous forces was original with himself is laughable. Our branch insignia is crossed arrows tracing this concept to the Alamo scouts. Our organization design is from the OSS in WW2.  Working by, through and with indigenous forces is what Special Forces does.


A CSM in 5th SFG told me his nickname was the Pony, a reference to dog and pony shows. He excelled in self promotion.


He would fit right in with the Custer clan.


Respectfully,


William

[Deleted]

The US military has made a deliberate decision to wear white hats. There are tactics we are not using.


1. Protected village tactic. Concentrate locals into a controlled environment, particularly near an unsecure border. It has been effective (Malaya). But it often causes heavy suffering in civilians.

Please note, the Indian Reservations of 1876 were part of this tactic. On numerous occasions, tribes were moved to very different terrain and weather from their homeland, resulting in heavy loss of life.


2. Counter gang tactic. Form your own fake element. Create a small Taliban or AQ cell, use them to link up with real ones. Use this data for drone strikes or raids. I remember folks I respect with red faces, trembling with rage over this.


3. Phoenix program. The Phoenix program in Vietnam was not an assassination program. It was an effort to copy UK Malaya pacification. The ALP program that Captain Gant was involved in was a slow, hesitant copy of this effort.

The key was forming a united civilian and military team for the same district. It may surprise some folks to know that military boundaries often have no relationship to civilian boundaries.  Remember, police units also follow the civilian boundaries. Coordination becomes very difficult. In this war, US military has killed many, many friendly indig police over this issues (Hundreds are a fact, but that was when I was still serving. I believe it is a safe assumption to say over a thousand now).

4. Integrated units. This means US officers and NCOs as a core cadre, leading a unit of natives. The unit is manned, trained and equipped by US, to include hiring and firing. Advising a native unit is always, always, inefficient and ineffective. Not a new concept. I can literally walk out my back door and walk 500 meters to a place CPT Benjamin Church fought with an integrated unit, in the 1690s, in King Philip's war.

We last did this in Vietnam. This concept has caused strong opposition by conventional military, and State. I believe the opposition is selfish interests, not national strategy. Big Army fears it will make SF/USASOC too powerful, etc, etc. Only one service supports the concept. The USMC.

5. Spy versus spy. Mad magazine ran a spy versus spy comic for decades. Running your own spy networks is very important. A CIA source reports to Langley and the President. Whatever data that guy gives you will never get to the US garrison located in the same village, the battalion in the district, the brigade in the province, the division commander.

The answer is Low Level Source Operations, where we get to recruit and pay our own spies. In GWOT, we did get authority to do this. The problem is blowback. We rotate folks every year, so our spy managers lack knowledge and experience in that area.

So we get con artists, double agents etc. We get "single" agents, meaning a spy with an agenda attached to his clan or group. He provides false information to target a rival clan or group. We end up paying folks fired by other intelligence agencies for lies or incompetence.

And eventually, we murder a double agent. This generally leads to LLSO being banned. In Vietnam, 5th SFG murdered a double agent. No doubt he really was. This led to Congress passing a law that kept military out of LLSO for decades. We have murdered two that I know of in GWOT. There are 2 more investigations that I know of. I talked with a senior general in SF about this last month. The intent is to prosecute the killers, and preserve the program.

I still expect something will blow up at a very low level, with national consequences.

[quincannon]

The building of local forces around a cadre of US officers, NCO, and specialty facilitators is the only real method with a time proven track record. Montrose is correct that the concept goes back to Church and probably long before.

The concept is also viewed as dangerous by conventional thinkers, in that it pees in their rice bowl, the rice bowl of funds and resources, and that it drains off into special operations, the most highly qualified. It does do all of these things of course, but the results are ten fold from what the conventional force can produce on the battlefield.

The Marines do embrace the concept it seems with both their history in the Banana Wars, and their relatively recent formation of the Marine Raider Regiment, which from my reading suggests has as mission somewhat similar to Army Special Forces.

Montrose did not go into this, but I think it would be well to review the differences between Special Operations Forces the whole JSOC, and clearly define the piece of that mission that 1st Special Forces Command has. JSOC being a joint all services command, while 1st SFC has a unique Army mission within that whole. 1SFC for instance, as Montrose said, is based on Jedberg, and the OSS Operational Detachments such as Det 101 in Burma with the Kachin Rangers. I probably could, but Montrose was/is a player, and he will not miss what I may.

So Will as time allows I, and I think everyone else, would enjoy and gain knowledge of this important subject.

[sgttyree]

Jul 18, 2017 13:14:41 GMT montrose said:

4. Integrated units. This means US officers and NCOs as a core cadre, leading a unit of natives. 

And this is surprising to me.  

I know what CIDG, Mobile Strike, and Mobile Guerrilla Forces were.  And my former BN CSM (Sam Hernandez. He was a contemporary of men like Billy Waugh and Jerry "Mad Dog" Shriver) said his recon teams were usually made up of four Nung Chinese with two SF NCOs.  

It's odd to me that we are not using the same types of forces today.  Even if the indigenous troops in many areas are untrustworthy, I would think the Kurds would be prime troops and Kurdistan would be prime territory for these sort of operations.  

[sgttyree]

Jul 18, 2017 14:30:41 GMT quincannon said:

The building of local forces around a cadre of US officers, NCO, and specialty facilitators is the only real method with a time proven track record. Montrose is correct that the concept goes back to Church and probably long before.

I'm just familiar with Church (and Gorham) but I've not read as much about either as about Rogers.  I know Rogers had a fair few Indians in his ranging companies but I don't think they would really be considered integrated units.

The closest thing I am aware of on the western frontier is the Pawnee Battalion.  It was about 200 Pawnee scouts organized in four companies of 50 and advised and led by Major Frank North.  There were four clans of the Pawnee and North selected the top 50 warriors from each clan.  They were the creme de la creme of the Pawnee Nation.

[quincannon]

Kevin: Montrose is the resident expert on Church and King Philip's War, and that is completely outside my area except that it is Church who is widely recognized (but not by all) as the grandfather of American ranging.

I am more familiar with OSS Det 101 in Burma and people like Fertig, and Vlockman in the Philippines. I have more than a passing acquaintance with the Alamo Scouts as well.

Typically the American idea of the guerilla force is built around a cadre of regular soldiers. These provide training, and fill most of the leadership positions. As time passes and locals demonstrate their abilities, they too fill some of the leadership. This is particularly true as the force expands in size from small beginnings. US personnel also are slotted in the specialty positions, for instance communications.

There is a book I read long ago called "The OSS and I" and tells the story of one man, commanding a three man Jedberg team that built around them a guerilla battalion supporting the invasion of Southern France (Operation Dragoon) Aaron Bank did the same thing in France and later in Indo China.

Some of the real old Special Forces documents say that a Special Forces Operational Detachment A was capable of raising and training a guerilla regiment. Don't know if that is true or what size regiment they are talking about, but that is what they said.

There is also something that I have never really looked into, but does sound interesting, the 121st Infantry Battalion (Greek), that evidently was a cover name for OSS operations in the Aegean. The 99th Infantry Battalion (Norwegian) was also raised for some similar special purpose, but ended up being employed as conventional Infantry and ending up forming the 99th Battalion, 474th Infantry Regiment (later redesignated the 74th) which was literally thrown together by joining that battalion with the Americans of the 1st Special Service Force and the surviving Rangers of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Ranger Battalions. The 474th had the 1st, 2nd, and 99th Battalions, in much the same way that the 442nd had the 100th, 2nd, and 3rd.

You also have to recall that most if not all the cavalry regiments contained a troop(s) of Indians with a cadre of regular officers and NCO's for a year or two late in the 19th century. If memory serves it was after the accepted close date of the Indian wars but I am not quite sure of the exact dates.

Of all of them I have read about the Kachin seem to be the best, but they also had some very fine people training and leading them.

[deadwoodgultch]

Things such as what this woman went through might cause one to canoe a terrorist!

www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/woman-freed-from-isis-captivity-returns-for-revenge/ar-AAos0B3?li=BBnbfcL&ocid=HPDHP17