The Doolittle/Shangri La Raid

[quincannon]

In ten days we will mark the 75th Anniversary of the Doolittle Raid launched from USS Hornet.

I will withhold my views on the raid, hoping that some of you will present your own, pro or con. In so doing I hope that you will dismiss the obvious publicity stunt/revenge motivations, and concentrate on the strategic and operational aspects as they apply to the overarching "big picture" of the first six months of the war in the Pacific.

[yanmacca]

Chuck, I do not know too much about this raid except for the obvious but apparently the Japanese thought that the raid came from Chine because they could not accept that bombers such as these could actually take off from a ship. This made them commit forces in an attempt to find the place where these planes took off from.

Another vital result of the raid, was that the Japanese brought back Nagumo and his task force to Japanese waters, thus giving the British some breathing time. Funny enough they then thought that Midway was the source of the raid and brought forward plans to take the island earlier then they wanted to, and we all know what happened at Midway.

Check this out;

link

[quincannon]

Don't think I can agree with the conclusions in that link Ian, not completely anyway.

There is no doubt in my mind that the IJN knew where those aircraft came from. Knowing and admitting you know are two different things.

Using Midway as a launching point was an excuse to move forward the timetable for the already planned operation against the island and still save face.

The IJN looked at Midway as a desirable outpost for their planned outer defensive ring. Midway was always designed to bring out the American carriers.

The mistake the IJN made was moving Carrier Division 5 down south for the New Guinea operation, and not keeping Kido Butai intact for Midway. The original plan of course had CARDIV 5 slated for Midway after New Guinea, They never considered that CARDIV 5 would run into Lexington and Yorktown.

Keep in mind my view of all this is that it was one continuous campaign starting with the Gilberts and Marshalls raid, the Doolittle affair, Coral Sea, then finally Midway. All of them, for good or bad set the stage for Midway. Along the way we made just as many mistakes as the IJN did, and Midway in my opinion could have been much more decisive than it was had we not made them. I consider the Doolittle Raid the worst of those mistakes. To find out why though, you must look at the whole picture, including best use of forces available.

[BrevetorCoffin]

Some similarities with the missile strike from a few days ago? I believe it was a necessary action even though there are some publicity stunt aspects thrown in. It had to be good for morale to strike back at the Japanese capital even though damage was fairly minimal. The ability to launch medium bombers from a flattop was priceless. I have to think the Japanese knew where the raiders came from as the bombers were launched prematurely due to being sighted by the Nitto Maru.

Best,

David

[quincannon]

Would the loss of two carriers been good for morale?

Completely different operation than that conducted a few days ago. The risk in the Doolittle raid was beyond risk, into the area of extremely rash. The risk this week was next to none. No ships at risk, them being completely covered by carrier and land based air assets, and no risk to air crews. The message of course was the same - bad actions result in worse consequences for the offender. That is where the similarities stopped.

Consider this when looking at risk. We knew that Kido Butai was not in the area. What we did not know, and had no way of knowing is if any submarines were in or presently transiting that area, as they well could have been. Just one or two torpedoes into either Enterprise or Hornet would have cost us 25 to 50 percent of our available combat power. We also knew that Coral Sea and Midway was on the IJN target list. We did not know when, but we knew that they were there. A torpedo into Enterprise or Hornet would mean the raid ends then and there, and you are not going to be able to tow one or both back from that deep a penetration. Attempting to do so puts the remaining ships at risk, so they would have to be abandoned, even if they could have potentially be saved in other waters.

Read what Nimitz thought about the concept of this raid. Don't waste your time in trying to find it though, for to my knowledge he never wrote a word, which if you know Nimitz tells you all you need to know about his opinion of it.

Getting back to my main question though, was it the best possible use of forces available? Should they have been doing something else that would positively effect campaign objectives?

[quincannon]

Forces available in the Pacific on 1 April 1942.

Lexington - Operational - Air group reinforced - combat experienced.

Saratoga - Under repair and modernization - Air group disbanded and pilots and aircraft, also complete squadrons distributed to other carriers - New air group forming - Combat capable projection June 42.

Yorktown - Operational - In the Pacific only a short time but with a very experienced pre-war air group - Air group reinforced from Saratoga 

Enterprise - Operational - In combat since 7 December 41 - Very experienced pre-war air group. - Air group reinforced from Saratoga

Hornet - Operational - Totally inexperienced air group with practically no training on either current operational aircraft or combat training. Transferred to the Pacific in March 42. Photos taken of Hornet at the end of February 1942 show her still having SBC bi-plane dive bombers in her air group. No time for operational training using current service aircraft. Some reports have her as having uncorrected faults due to early Pacific deployment and no or shortened post shakedown overhaul. Hornet commissioned in late October 1941.

That is essentially the same status of forces information Nimitz had to work with.

[dave]

I know I have mentioned this before but the first book I ever bought was 30 Seconds Over Tokyo for 50 cents. I also remember seeing the movie with the same title starring Van Johnson and Spencer Tracy which really impressed a preteen kid. 

QC I agree with your strategy opinions but like David I can only imagine the political pressure FDR put upon the military along with the clamor from the civilians. Morale was a critical factor along with the need to sell War Bonds to pay for the required military build up. Yes they knew that the Japanese were going to be in the Coral Sea and around Midway soon but not when. I admit to being very ignorant regarding the Navy's participation and who did the planning and realize the Army Air Corps had to provide the planes and crews. If I remember correctly a Naval Officer suggested the idea of the raid, did he not? Or am I thinking of the Naval Officer who trained the bomber crews to do short run takeoffs?

My question is, was this the most reckless use of vital assets by the US during WW II? If not what was?
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

The problem was that no one, including King or Marshall had the guts to tell Roosevelt to go piss in a cocked hat. I must admit that would be a very difficult task to do with the President of the United States. He would have listened to Marshall though.

With strategy you think with your head, not your emotions. Revenge say the Sicilians is best served cold. In this case practical revenge could have been had by four carriers destroying three (Shoho-Shokaku-Zuikaku) at Coral Sea, then going north and beating the snot out of Akagi-Kaga-Soyru and Hiryu at Midway.

The implications of that are enormous. You could have skipped Guadalcanal, secured Australia beyond dispute, and destroyed IJN air power forever. Remember here that IJN air groups were part of the ships company. After Santa Cruz IJN airpower never again regained first class status, but if that could have been brought about in May and June 42, the war may have been shortened by a year, with a lot less bloodshed on both sides.

Yes, Dave I think this was the most ill advised move ever participated in by the U S Navy. It was a political raid, where strategy and potential consequences were thrown out the window in favor of a press conference.

[dave]

Well explained argument that will require some study on my part to know enough to agree or disagree. 
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

Both were naval officers. Roosevelt wanted some sort of strike back. It was a naval captain that happened to fly over NAS Norfolk that saw an outline of Hornet's deck painted on the runway for training, that was the genesis of the idea. It was floated to Roosevelt, probably to get him off the Navy's back. I don't think he ever thought anyone would buy the idea. This last being only my opinion.

Later, down at Eglin Field in Florida, the painted outline was duplicated and the air crews trained there by another naval officer.

This raid would have terrible effects on Hornet's performance in combat. They never got any real chance to train, and by that I mean intense combat training while at sea. For nearly a month their air group was confined to the hanger deck. Their performance at Midway was awful. Waldron complains of this just before Midway. Ensign Gay, the only survivor of Torpedo Eight, says that not only was 4 June the first time he ever dropped a torpedo, but it was also the first day he ever took off with a torpedo. That type thing is inexcusable when you are sending young men into combat. Totally inexcusable. Throughout her career Hornet was a poor performer. Some of this was leadership, Ring was a disaster, but most of it was in not allowing the normal course of pre-combat training to take place.

It is not widely known, but when Essex was commissioned the following January, the lessons of Hornet had been absorbed and never again would we rush one of those very valuable assets into combat, without a thorough work up and training period.

[dave]

Is there a parallel between the Hornet and the 7th Cavalry as with Ring and Custer?
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

I don't think so.

I don't know who Ring's sea daddy was but he obviously had one. After Midway he went, only to resurface commanding a Commencement Bay Class escort carrier very late in the war and as far as I know saw no further action. He retired as a Vice Admiral. Now either he was the world's best staff officer and was rewarded for his work at the very end with a command at sea, which is a ticket punch, or he had someone that was looking out for a fellow ring knocker. His failure at Midway nearly cost the battle.

With Custer, I think there were those lined up who would screw him to the wall in a New York second. Remember what I said a few weeks ago about do no harm to the institution. He had already damaged the institution, with his political conduct. The choice was to either restore him to command in hopes that the damned fool would get himself killed, or let him loose in Washington, where he could cause even more harm to the Army, and the administration.

Battles are won and lost by human decision. As long as humans run the show, there will continue to be mistakes like those we discuss here. The best thing we an do is look at things through the lens of good judgment, to determine what outcome we ourselves place upon an action taken.

That is why I brought up the Shangri La raid in the first place. In popular history it was a great adventure that hit the first blow against Japan. It is only when you closely examine it in the complete context of the time, that you begin to question it. I remarked earlier that I look at all this time from the Gilberts and Marshalls raid to Midway as being one campaign. That is a very important statement of mine to pay heed to in trying to do some analysis of the Doolittle affair. If you take it alone, it is American heroism at its best. I read that damned book too Dave. When you put it in context though it ain't so great after all and may very well, in fact quite easily, become a complete disaster causing the war to be extended a year or two more, with the attendant loss of life, just because someone(s) were afraid to speak truth to power.

Read H.R.'s book "Dereliction of Duty". Betting and losing your stars is not such a bad thing if you are right. At least you can sleep and shave. Civilian control of the military is a foundation stone of our Republic, but the Constitution mandates, that for it to be viable, the guy wearing the uniform must be someone of honor and moral courage, who will speak truth to power, and be willing to accept the consequences of his actions.

[yanmacca]

If the Japanese thought that the raid came from China, then was this feasible? If so was this option ever discussed?

I mentioned the other day about the Vichy French flying a bunch of fighters around 2000 miles to Syria to fight the English, so could a similar journey been done with a flight of heavy bombers from the nearest American base?

I know that it was too early in the war to launch any bombers from bases in the Aleutian Islands as Shemya air force was not thought of by then, but the US military had considered China as a base for air attacks on the Japanese mainland, but this lost flavour after the conquest of the Marianas, as these islands offered both a platform for air bases and could be easily supplied.

I cannot really answer the question of the reason of the raid, was is right or was it wrong, I guess like we said a while ago about El Alamein, it was a moral booster with Churchill ranting on about "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein, we never had a defeat", but the second world war was full of stupid missions which resulted in the loss of mens lives, just look at Crete 1941 [4000 Fallschirmjäger casualties], Vyazma 1942 [10.000 trained Soviet airborne troops wasted], Dieppe [900 Canadians killed], these were just as bad or even worse then the Doolittle Raid.

[BrevetorCoffin]

Ian I think the difference is that the campaigns you mention incurred real casualties for minimal results, kind of like Grant at Cold Harbor. QCs critique of the Doolittle Raid is more hypothetical. The casualties and results were what they were certainly and there was the potential disaster that could have happened.

Fascinating stuff and why I frequent this board!

Best,

David

[BrevetorCoffin]

I also have to admit yhat my knowledge is limited to Captain Lawson's book 30 Seconds Over Tokyo (never watched the 1944 movie).