After Ford D Companies E and F and also the Journey to LSH

[quincannon]

I expect more from him based upon his experience. For me he failed to deliver the more I expected.

[azranger]

So what would a retrograde look like? Could E,F & HQ beholding the rear while C,I,L move toward the Calhoun Area (CA) and beyond. What if E was hold CR and F & HQ LSH.  C,I,L moving toward the Calhoun Area.  If C was actually moving closer to where Maguire shows a line from MTC toward LSH.  Would L have gone first and set up on CH and C moved past L while  I was in progress.

I think they knew of where to cross MTC out of range from the village side of the river and not going through that ambush area that they went through on the way over. I think E saw the need to return the same way they came and bailed into Cemetery Ravine and crossed into Deep Ravine. They moved to far toward the river and ran into the Deep Gully of Deep Ravine.

Regards

Steve

[yanmacca]

Hi Steve, what I have been thinking lately is, why would Custer personally stay behind with the HQ element, if they were planning to pull completely from the northern fords. Surly the HQ element should have gone directly behind L Company, with Capt. Yates commanding any rear-guard.
Leaving Yates and Smith behind with F and E, whilst Custer commanded the pull back, would make more sense to me, as he would be doing his job as battalion commander by leading this retrograde to get his men back in order and hopefully in one piece, whilst leaving the rear-guard job to one of his experienced captains.

[colt45]

Ian,
The normal procedure is for the commander to remain with the delaying force, while the unit XO leads the withdrawing unit. His XO was in the valley or up on Reno hill, so the next ranking officer would normally lead the withdrawal. That could have been Keogh. It's possible Calhoun was leading the withdrawal since L company made it back the furthest south. Things would have been happening so quickly it is not possible to know what the withdrawal plan was in detail, other than everyone trying to get the heck out of Dodge.

I can't see Custer leading a withdrawal, that is not in keeping with his personality, let alone doctrine.

[quincannon]

I completely agree with Colt, both in doctrine and the commander's personality.

More then likely there was no plan as we would consider a plan to be. The most likely scenario to me is that a general order to withdraw was something delivered by messenger saying something on the order of - Tell C, I, and L to withdraw - I will cover with E and F. At that point the commanders of C, I, and L would withdraw as their own situation permitted such, and be on their own hook as far as the direction/supervision of that withdrawal, with no command level in control above that of company.

Another possibility is that Custer was attempting to defend the ridge (Battle Ridge) and what we see today is the result of a scattering of companies from some central point, probably Cemetery and Battle Ridge Extensions. I cannot dismiss that, but it would seem that they could have chosen better positions for that defense if that were the case.

Regardless, our collective efforts have proven to my satisfaction that there was movement south along the spine of Battle Ridge for some purpose, either withdrawal or deployment for defense, and rumor has it that certain other folks, not on this board, are starting to think in that direction too, if that rumor is anywhere near true. I depend upon rumors, for I do not associate with the anointed, and am sure they wish no association with a sinner like me.

[yanmacca]

Hmmm…….you military men do give out mixed messages to a civilian like myself, for one, I have always taken your stance on the notion that a commander is there to lead and not to fight and I get that so surly his first consideration would be to lead the largest group and leave any blocking force to do just that, block.

We are talking about a regimental commander here, whose job was not only to lead five companies, but twelve. We also have the case of the dozen men in the RHQ, which included civilians. If he did go by doctrine and stay with the 70 or so soldiers to act as a rear guard, then why would he need all of his HQ, surly he could have got by with just his Regimental Sgt and a Trumpeter, leaving the rest to progress behind the units which progressed south.

But if you say that military doctrine says this and that fair enough, but then why wasn’t this doctrine adhered to across the board.

Both Reno and Benteen, never stayed back to make sure things went smoothly, in fact Reno got out of the woods so quick, he left a portion of his command in the timber and Benteen in his haste to get from Weir peaks, did so without making sure if all company commanders knew his intentions or even provide a covering force. Neither of these two seasoned battalion commanders acted according to military doctrine.

If what everyone says is right, then It looks like we have a case of Custer acting in character and by the book and Reno and Benteen acting to save their own skin and certainly not by the book.

Custer doing things properly eh, now that is refreshing

[quincannon]

Ian: The commanders place in battle is where the commander feels he should be. That place he should be is where he can have the most positive impact on the critical part of the fight that is underway.

Colt is absolutely correct. In a withdrawal the commander should be with the delaying part of the force and trust someone else with getting with withdrawing troops out of contact.

Whom he chooses to remain with him is up to the commander. There is no set formula. You really don't know who was alive that could remain do you? I see a Sergeant Majors marker quite a ways away from Custer. There are a couple of other markers down hill from Custer that if they are correct, mark the place where people you might think would be with the headquarters fell. Please get over this idea that these little groups of people moved as one, as they do on a game board. They don't. Battle is a messy place to be.

Keep in mind here you are not talking in this instance about a rear guard. Those are done with a whole different set of parameters. This is a withdrawal from contact, something done in a totally different manner. You must learn the difference, to understand.

No one ever said that Reno and Benteen covered themselves with the laurels of battle. I assume you are speaking about the withdrawal from Weir Point. They did what they did to suit themselves, and presumably did it to the point where it was successful. Success is the only measurement that counts in battle, and none of us were there to be able to grasp the whole situation that confronted them, so we really do not have all that much to base any criticism on. They got away with what they did and in the end that was all that counts. Battle is neither pretty or orderly.

Custer was a rash and reckless idiot, but that does not mean everything he did was wrong. It only means he was rash, reckless, and an idiot.

[quincannon]

Ian: You have mentioned several times over the years that we who have been in the military tend to stick together, and more often then not concur with one another as to what we think, or how we see things in much the same way. That is because we were all trained under the same doctrinal basis.

Your query above, that we say that the commander is there to lead. Primarily that is so. His job is to command, through exercising control. That does not mean that he does not fight when he must, or be at any certain place. He does what he needs to do to fight his unit, and win.

You go on to say that you think he should have led the troops trying to get away, and not stay with the detachment of his battalion left in contact. Well you are confusing one type of operation with another. In fact what him staying behind tells us, and I am sure Colt will concur, is that Custer by staying behind, had absolutely no idea he was cut off and nearly surrounded. Had he known this he would have been in the lead of Companies C, I, and L leading a breakout from encirclement in just the same manner that Reno did earlier in the day.

How many times have you heard over the years on the other boards that Reno retreated, and by him being in front was a cowardly act designed to let him get away first. They go on to say that the "retreat" was miserably conducted. It was not until I brought these Bozos up short and told them they were full of shit, and that it was not a retreat, but rather a breakout from encirclement, and that Reno was just where he should have been, that some of them took heed to what I was saying. Unfortunately those, many of whom should know better, numb skulls are still calling it a retreat, and they will never understand the difference no matter how many times you tell them.

Yes I am critical of them, and rightly so. They do not know B from a bulls ass about tactics, the difference between one type of operation and another, and base all their theories on their emotions, and not by using their brains. It's the old story of leading a horse to water, and not being able to make him drink.

So, the bottom line is that those trained under the same basic doctrine will tend to agree, and we also understand that in battle there is no such word as always. In battle you do what you must, be where you think you should be, decide quickly, take risks but manage them in the taking. and never do stupid.

[yanmacca]

Sept 11, 2019 3:10:51 GMT quincannon said:

Ian: You have mentioned several times over the years that we who have been in the military tend to stick together, and more often then not concur with one another as to what we think, or how we see things in much the same way. That is because we were all trained under the same doctrinal basis.

Yes Chuck, I may have eluded to that, but not taken it as seriously as some posters have in the past, because you see that in all walks of life, even in bands or groups. When I was a musician, I was aware of every player in the town and knew most of the bands personally. We used to see each other quite a lot, some of them would try and pass you a joint LOL, but that is another story, and if we got someone who didn’t play telling us what we should do regarding our act, we would be polite but not really take them seriously, because to us they had never put it the time and effort to learn how to play and learn by heart loads of tunes and songs. We were also critical of bed room players, people you have never ‘cooked it live’ we use to say. But I realise now that some of the comments made by these none players, did have some merit, mainly because they could have seen things from the audience point of view, which we on stage could not see.

[yanmacca]

Sept 11, 2019 3:10:51 GMT quincannon said:

You go on to say that you think he should have led the troops trying to get away, and not stay with the detachment of his battalion left in contact. Well you are confusing one type of operation with another. In fact what him staying behind tells us, and I am sure Colt will concur, is that Custer by staying behind, had absolutely no idea he was cut off and nearly surrounded. Had he known this he would have been in the lead of Companies C, I, and L leading a breakout from encirclement in just the same manner that Reno did earlier in the day.

Good point Chuck, he may have had no idea that Calhoun would hit a brick wall when he reached deep coulee and his position behind E and F would give him some time to command and react.

That could also be a two fingered salute to those who think that Custer formed into two battalions. If Yates had his own battalion, would he have been the commanding officer who stayed behind? It would his battalion and not Custer’s.
If the RHQ, stayed behind these two companies, then I feel that it was commanding them and Yates was a company commander and not a battalion Co.

We will never know but, had the RHQ had been behind Calhoun, that Custer may have done things differently, would he have waited till he had sufficient clout to force his way through aka Reno?
I don’t think that Calhoun or Keogh would have done this operation unless they knew that Custer and the others had fallen, they could have been waiting for him to contact them to make the next move.

[yanmacca]

Sept 11, 2019 3:10:51 GMT quincannon said:

How many times have you heard over the years on the other boards that Reno retreated, and by him being in front was a cowardly act designed to let him get away first. They go on to say that the "retreat" was miserably conducted. It was not until I brought these Bozos up short and told them they were full of shit, and that it was not a retreat, but rather a breakout from encirclement, and that Reno was just where he should have been, that some of them took heed to what I was saying. Unfortunately those, many of whom should know better, numb skulls are still calling it a retreat, and they will never understand the difference no matter how many times you tell them.

I have been a supporter of Reno and Benteen in the past and you are right that some of the comments aimed at them are ridiculous, which has prompted me to jump to their defense. You are right in your earlier post, that I was not there but there are enough officers who were there who said it was a fiasco.

That is why I have said in the past, that Reno should have ordered his company commanders to prepare to charge. I must stress that some of the accounts that I have read concerning the timber fight, do show that some of the officers were at times not even with their men, so this could add to Reno’s defense but according to witnesses he lost it and dithered somewhat before he got going, which meant that some never knew they had to even mount.

The retreat from Weir is also clouded by lack of composer, mainly when they pulled out. But according to accounts, the Indians were only yards away from some of the companies, which would have made things rather hairy. Benteen seemed to think that someone else should have made the relevant contacts regarding pulling back. I have not read any accounts of the Weir point actions for a while, but did any trumpeters give any orders to pull back? Surly this is what the cavalry should do to units not in direct contact?

Sorry to swamp everyone with mulitply posts, but I had the morning off to wait for a new cooker to be dilivered

[quincannon]

Ian: I believe you have hit the trifecta, missing nearly every point I was trying to make. I do not believe this is because you are not intelligent. In fact I believe it is because of what you have experienced in life, being in the construction trades and a musician. Both of these require a person to think in an orderly fashion. It causes them to think everything must be in its place, and when you finish a job it is readily apparent to you if the construction went well, and you achieved what you set out to do, or the song you were playing was played the way the composer intended.

Military people do not think that way. For them there is no good day in battle, and the day always turns out to be a complete mess. Our only measure of success is did we win, and even the best win is still a shambles. Nothing ever goes right. The fog and friction of war, as Clausewitz states, is always present. You never know enough. You are never able to do all you want to. The only thing that keeps our heads on straight is doctrine. We know what perfection looks like, doctrine tells us that, but doctrinal outcomes always fall short in application.

Let's address your orderliness first. You keep insisting in your writings that the headquarters element, is a player piece in the game, as if it was one inseperable thing. Once and for all disabuse your mind of that. Your idea of such could not be further from the truth. The purpose of a headquarters is to assist the commander in his job of commanding. To do this they will be found throughout the battle space, and not in one spot, surrounding the commander. Wire men will be laying wire, communicators will be communicating, doctors will be doctoring, messengers will be delivering their messages, and so on. About the only thing you will find that generally travels together is the command group - the commander, and one or two assistants. Headquarters personnel are never together in one spot, nor do they ever move together. Do you understand what I am saying? If so stop using the term headquarters. For our purposes here it does not exist. If you wish, use the term commander, that gets the point you are trying to make across, without giving the reader the false idea there were six units up on those ridges, when in fact there were only five.

Next, my example of "The Tell". In poker there is such a thing as a "tell", something that one player does that may tip off one or more of the other players as to what the player with the "tell" is going to do. Does he hold the cards? Is he bluffing? The tell will "Tell". So it is with the study of battlefield actions. If the commander is here, not there, it may very well tell us something. In the case in question it tells us that by staying on LSH and not leading C,I, and L out he was with his delay force in an attempt to break contact. That further tells us that he surely had no knowledge of the fact that he was already surrounded, OR, he would have been with C.I.and L leading a breakout, an altogether different type of military operation

Other "tells" might be taking one route as opposed to another, occupying one piece of terrain as opposed to another, maneuvering this way, instead of that way, making a frontal attack as opposed to a flanking attack or envelopment. All of these things , when the analysis is done tell us something about the situation, the knowledge of the situation the commander has, and yes the personality of the commander himself. If you know how to read a "tell" half the job of battle analysis is done. If you do not, nothing else you can do will suffice to find you a complete answer.

Why in the hell should you label yourself either a sometime or full time supporter of Reno, Benteen, or anyone else. This is not a f**king fan club. If you want to support someone, start your own admiration society. If you want to understand battle, be no one's jock strap.

You were not there is the valley, and you were not there in the retrograde from Weir. You have no basis to pass judgment, nor does anyone living today. Those that were there universally say both were a complete mess. A complete mess is what I and anyone else that studies battle should expect. Both are high risk, and usually high casualty producers. In the breakout, that resulted in high casualties as expected. No one was disappointed. In the retrograde from Weir it was confused, but it also produced only one casualty (a frigging miracle) and that force that broke away had time to establish a new defensive position before they could be overrun. That my friend is a resounding success any way you look at it. So those that participated may have shit their pants a time or two, and may have told all assundry what a confusing mess it was, but most of them lived to tell the tale, and they would not have had it been as bad as they relate.

WINING IS THE ONLY MEASURE OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE AND IF YOU EXPECT PRETTY AND ORDERLY, DON'T, FOR GOD SAKE, STUDY BATTLE

[quincannon]

To determine for yourself if I am giving you the straight stuff, or just slinging a lot of bull in your direction, I challenge you to obtain and read "Alamo In The Ardennes" by John C. McManus. The book is a few years old, not very expensive and should be available to you in your library, by inter-library loan, or by purchase.

The book tells the story of three Infantry Regiments, all from the 28th Infantry Division, and two Combat Commands, one each from the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions.

Two of these regiments, the 109th and 112th, were hard pressed, and their battles made LBH appear as if it were a garden party.

The two combat commands were reduced to remnants, taking very high casualties, and losing a large portion of their equipment.

The 110th Infantry was virtually destroyed, taking 2800, out of 3300, casualties including the Colonel, and most of the company and battalion commanders. The supporting artillery (in the RCT) lost many of its guns, and a tank battalion (the 707th) was nearly wiped out in both men and material.

Judging only from what I have just said one might think that the battle was a total defeat. NOT SO. IT WAS A SUCCESS, in that all of those units did what they were supposed to do.The 110th and the two combat commands bought a precious few days, so that Bastogne could be defended by the 101st, and what remained of the three units I mentioned. The 109th and 112th held the shoulders, and as blooded as they were succeeded in their missions.

The book will tell you just how bad it was, and you will note that headquarters people were not in any one place. They were doing their various jobs and when called upon were fighting beside the riflemen in the villages and foxhole. It is the best account of that portion of the Battle of the Bulge ever put to paper, and illustrates (as much as the printed word can) just how very bad it was, and still success in terms of accomplishing the mission was achieved. Accomplishing what you set out to do, regardless, is the only reward of the soldier, and it is never pretty.

GET THE BOOK

[mac]

So much to comment on!

Ian you ask good questions and have had good answers, we both have been educated over the years one way and another .

All I say now is my opinion, based on the archaeology and the warrior accounts, and is subject to change in the light of new evidence.

AZ is, rightly, interested in the Maguire map trail he mentions and how it fits into the "what happened" question. I have no definite answer yet, and look forward to whatever further data he can dig up or observe in the future.

As to Companies C,I,L; their movements are best treated separately in the other thread but it is enough to say that I believe they left the Ford D area in the order L, C, I.
Now to the confusion of battle. For a theory to be viable it must explain all the evidence in a credible manner.

From the evidence available I believe Company F were at the northern end of BRE, and around that area they lost the majority of their mounts, and were forced to run under warrior fire along the ridge to LSH.  At this time they were given covering fire by Company E who were holding Cemetery Ridge. 

Later Company F were assaulted on the east flank of LSH where they took losses including their officers. The remaining members of Company F retreated over LSH as the warriors also continued their assault over LSH, with some men escaping down to Company E on Cemetery Ridge. 
Ultimately Company E and the remnants from LSH were forced off Cemetery and down along the SSL towards the river with many entering Deep Ravine.
A check of the mapped body identifications is entirely consistent with this scheme of movements, within the bounds of the confusion of battle, especially the last moments of a tremendous collapse.
The evidence for this is contained in the 5 companies thread and is too great to revisit here.

Question for AZ
Steve does the route shown on the Maguire map, a route I know you see as viable for travel to LSH,  overlap with the general line of the SSL?
Cheers


  

[yanmacca]

Mac, over the last eight years, I have been analyzed, scrutinized and even had my mental health questioned, as far as I know I have never favored any of the big three officers who saw action that day, I have even poured scorn on em all, even DeRudio. I always try to use accounts of battle survivors to get my point across, but lately even this plus my imparity to all officers has not saved me. Bottom line is that this board his facing lean days and I thought that I could drum up a discussion on the back of Steve’s post, but we can’t score a goal every time.