mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Mar 26, 2017 21:09:23 GMT
To be read in conjunction with the Custer attacked Ford D with 5 Companies thread. We have threads concerning the three companies that left the north end of Battle Ridge. What they left behind was turmoil and a confusing picture. Substantially Company E finished in the Deep Ravine area. (My view is they ran there when their position on Cemetery Ridge was over run. There was no movement off LSH.) Company F substantially finished on LSH. Noting that in the confusion of battle there were many men scattered over the landscape. We have a broad picture of their movements in the 5 companies thread.
The discussion is open for how they each got there.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 27, 2017 11:06:31 GMT
I feel that company E was isolated pretty quick. I don’t think that Custer would have ordered this company to ditch their horses and take up positions if he knew what was waiting out there. As I see it, they probably faced the river in an effort to engage targets coming up from Gibbons ford.
But I think that they were hit from their right flank initially then from behind. I would further add that the Indians saw the need to isolate both E and F in an effort to defeat them individually and I would think that they filled the void between the two companies pretty quick which gave E company nowhere to run except for deep ravine.
I do feel that both companies were hit before they had chance to really defend themselves, not that it mattered as these small formations would be quickly isolated once they dismounted and driven to the places where they fell. I wonder if F company had any idea that the area east of LSH was occupied by Indians and that the route between Keogh was also blocked.
The debate concerning who died last is still open, had the Keogh position fallen by the time F reached LSH? Was E still active in deep ravine when LSH fell?
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Post by quincannon on Mar 27, 2017 15:08:02 GMT
My impression is that what happened to E and F is not all that complicated.
I think there initially was a line formation of all five companies. They generally fought to retain CR and BRE, but were pushed back off those features generally southward, Three companies managed to leave. Two could not, as the act of those three leaving encouraged the Indians to press the attack, and E and F (probably split by the others leaving) were fixed in place and destroyed. This was a simple battle, and I believe we tend to try and overcomplicate it. Read how the NKPA did it to Task Force Smith, and I believe you will come to realize how simple these things are.
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on Mar 27, 2017 15:24:08 GMT
QC Is is it just me or do others see a correlation between the Army discounting the abilities of the Indians to fight as the Army did in Korea with the NKPA and Chinese? Sorta of took them for granted. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Mar 27, 2017 15:50:58 GMT
Well it's not just you, if you count me as also seeing it.
The overarching situations were quite similar. In both cases the Army had just won a "big" war, with all the hubris attending to the winning. In both cases the Army forces were occupation troops, ill trained, ill equipped, understrength, and not anywhere near combat ready or capable. In both cases the enemy was underestimated. In both cases the enemy had surprises in store for the opposition.
The only saving grace for the Army in both instances is that they did have some good people who came to the fore after disaster unfolded. By late summer of 76 the Army knew what it was up against and they brought in as much of the first team as they could muster. In six or seven months they had the situation under control. In Korea once the dead wood was removed say by October 1950 they were functioning very well, and had the Chinese stayed out it would have probably been over by March=April 51.
The question of the Chinese Intervention is one that does not belong on this thread, but one that needs addressing in light of the situation that exists in that theater today. Ask it on one of the threads like Questions on the U S Army and I will give you an opinion that may both satisfy and slightly shock you.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 27, 2017 18:45:38 GMT
Yes it was simple but effective, but this simplicity was brought on by the Indians way of fighting, I suppose they were formed in bands and these bands could range from a dozen to anything over a hundred. These bands would fight what was in front of them and as more and more bands joined the fray they began to hit the soldiers from different directions which were dictated by the location where they crossed the river.
If one band crossed at Gibbons ford and fixed the men on cemetery, then any more bands coming via ford D would exploit any void left by L, C and I as they moved south.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Mar 27, 2017 21:06:38 GMT
Well it's not just you, if you count me as also seeing it. The overarching situations were quite similar. In both cases the Army had just won a "big" war, with all the hubris attending to the winning. In both cases the Army forces were occupation troops, ill trained, ill equipped, understrength, and not anywhere near combat ready or capable. In both cases the enemy was underestimated. In both cases the enemy had surprises in store for the opposition. The only saving grace for the Army in both instances is that they did have some good people who came to the fore after disaster unfolded. By late summer of 76 the Army knew what it was up against and they brought in as much of the first team as they could muster. In six or seven months they had the situation under control. In Korea once the dead wood was removed say by October 1950 they were functioning very well, and had the Chinese stayed out it would have probably been over by March=April 51. The question of the Chinese Intervention is one that does not belong on this thread, but one that needs addressing in light of the situation that exists in that theater today. Ask it on one of the threads like Questions on the U S Army and I will give you an opinion that may both satisfy and slightly shock you. The similarities with Task Force Smith are interesting and apt. If someone wants to start the thread QC suggests I would be very interested. I have no time to do that at the moment myself. In the matter of Companies E and F the composition of men (as identified) and their distribution in the SSL and the Deep Ravine catchment may be interesting. Do you have anything on that in your excellent collection Ian? Gotta go for now. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 28, 2017 14:02:19 GMT
Sorry Mac, all the data I have concerning the men from these two companies was posted up in another thread [210 one].
But one report stated that between nine and ten bodies were found between LSH and deep ravine.
These men gave reports about 28 bodies in deep ravine.
Lt. Godfrey: 28 bodies Lt. Hare: 28 bodies Sgt. Kanipe: 28 bodies Lt. McClernand: 28 bodies Lt./Dr. Paulding: 28 bodies
Sgt. Rafter said he saw the body of an L Company trooper on SSL and that man had not been mutilated, he said his name was Private Weston Harrington.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Mar 28, 2017 20:42:10 GMT
Thanks Ian, that information is right on point. I am pretty sure there was a soldier from Company F out there too. As QC has pointed out there are many reasons why men from various companies become separated from their company during engagement. I feel the markers in the Deep Ravine catchment originate from the cemetery position near the current information center which is where the trail down the SSL begins. This leaves the group on LSH isolated from the south (no soldiers escaped to LSH from the southern end of Battle Ridge hence the gap in hence the markers end well short of LSH) and suggests to me that the group on LSH made their way there from the BRE direction rather than up from the cemetery. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Mar 29, 2017 4:14:20 GMT
Concur.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 29, 2017 13:05:52 GMT
Some authors have F Company defending the area known as the "basin" which sits near the top of deep ravine, now I am not agreeing with them "Capisce", but we must debate them to allow for a balanced view, other wise we may as well flit over to the brown board.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Mar 30, 2017 20:55:10 GMT
I absolutely agree. Lots of different opinions there Ian! One thing is that they are all based on there being troops in the south of the ridge and Custer at the north. The article with the picture suggests that there was heavy fighting in this "basin". The topography and marker evidence does not match the text! It is a case I think of putting events in places that sort of work for the flawed theory of companies left behind at Calhoun Hill. The fighting "below the monument" is far more supported by the evidence from the Ford D region. I remember Fred somewhere puts Company F in the basin firing to support Keogh. I believe the reason is the identification of one man from Company F being found in the basin area. This was in my mind earlier concerning the composition of the identifications in the SSL. I think the idea that a man from Company F finds himself with Company E during battle, in our explanation, is a much more likely probability. The short answer is that in the past people have played the game of leave the markers in place and explain the pattern; we have asked , and answered, the question of how a mobile force using military procedures finds itself distributed in the pattern shown by the markers. I like our way better! Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 30, 2017 21:10:40 GMT
You do get extremes when you read some accounts Mac, there is also one from a Private from K Company [John Creighton] who said he saw the body of Sergeant Vickory (F Coy) in a ravine between Calhoun and Keogh.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2017 21:49:11 GMT
What the purveyors of conventional pap do not understand is that if these units were not mixed up as they were, and instead were in neat orderly packages, then there would be something wrong, so they feel they must build scenarios to explain, what is in fact normal, and they universally fail. I don't expect anything other than SCENCRAP from the likes of the pretenders, but I really do expect more from Wagner, and he fails to deliver, because he cannot bring himself to think beyond the force fed crap of 140 years duration. Truth is he has all the pieces, but he can't seem to put the puzzle together.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Mar 31, 2017 9:51:34 GMT
You, we may be being hard on Fred here. What he did was take the conventional theory and give timing to that theory. He was not looking for a full on(5 companies) move to the Ford areas, yet he agrees with the move, itself, his timing allows timing for it. He does not come down on any side in the often exploited Custer, Reno, Benteen controversy crap. He lays responsibility where it belongs and for the first time brings the gap into play and its importance.
None of us has done the work/research that Fred, Michno, Hardorff, Green, Donohue and others have. Donohue and Green worked at the battlefield and in my minimal time around them, they are more flexible, but they still tend toward the conventional.
We are exploring ground that has, for the most part, been ignored. Nobody quotes Godfrey writing about the line of march he followed, few use the NA accounts to say anything other than something taken out of context. The Weiberts are considered local ranchers who were nothing more than more than back yard researchers.
Farmers generally rotate crops from one field to another, so as not to burn out the ground. They also fertilize and lime to renew nutrients, I think our quest here is tilling fertile ground, but it may take a while to produce the abundance we are looking for.
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