Battle of the Rosebud - duties to notify?

[royalwelsh]

Another of the controversial issues from the June 1876 element of this campaign was the fact that the Department of Dakota's 7th Cavalry attacked the hostile Sioux and Cheyenne village in the Little Big Horn valley on 25 June 1876 in ignorance of the fact that the Department of the Platte Gen Crook had suffered a defeat against the same hostiles at the Battle of the Rosebud on 17 June 1876. What were the reporting obligations within the division? What were the communication obstacles to one department directly notifying the other of a significant event such as this?

[Deleted]

What I don't understand is how Crook would have had any idea where the 7th was to send a message to them. Yes, sending a message to "home base" was possible - still, the amount of time to get from Crook to "home base" to Custer was very long. Sorry, does that make sense?

Best,
c.

[royalwelsh]

Chris,

That is a great point. The communications of the era, and reporting back to Division via the Dept. It would be a brave man to ride north alone, but weren't the hostiles expected to be in one of those river valleys between the Powder and the Big Horn and that's where the 7th Cavalry would be heading...?

RW

[deadwoodgultch]

Any body ever hear of Charlie Reynolds mad dash? I think that is what it was called?

On August 19, 1873 Reynolds and another Scout Gilman Norris were dispatched by Stanley to carry orders requesting boat transportation as well as provide an escortfor two Englishmen to Ft Benton. Stanley's orders stated " They will both be paid ($100.00)One Hundred Dollars for the trip." The two scouts quickly and safely traversed the 150 miles between the Musselshell river and Ft Benton. In 1874 Charley Reynolds traveled 100 miles in bout 24 hours through hostile territory to deliver the message that gold had been discovered in the Black Hills. The message was delivered to Sioux City, as directed by Custer, so it could be delivered to the rest of the nation, by wire.

I think Crook's Crows and white scouts might have been able to find Terry or Custer in a week, maybe not. No attempt was made and could tell us something about egos and thought process of the officers. Crook did little more than lick his wounds. We might do well to understand Crook did not share his pre battle or campaign plans with his subordinates either.

Regards,
Tom

[Deleted]

Yes Tom, cannot remember where though. As I recall, Lonesome Charlie traveled mostly by night to avoid conflict and if the info is accurate, even wrapped his horse's feet to muffle sound. My favorite line about Lonesome Charlie (no offence to any former and present military members or anyone else of this board):

In the spring of 1867 an army officer at Fort McPherson disagreed with him about something and when the quarrel ended the officer had just one arm.

Connell, Evan S. (2011-04-01). Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Bighorn (p. 19). Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kindle Edition.

Best,
c.

[royalwelsh]

Jul 20, 2015 15:01:50 GMT deadwoodgultch said:

I think Crook's Crows and white scouts might have been able to find Terry or Custer in a week, maybe not. No attempt was made and could tell us something about egos and thought process of the officers. Crook did little more than lick his wounds. We might do well to understand Crook did not share his pre battle or campaign plans with his subordinates either.

Regards,
Tom

Tom,

I have highlighted what I found surprising, and I don't think I will be alone.

RW

[Beth]

I agree. Didn't he send a message sort of by slow boat to China though? Instead of directly to Terry, he sent it to a Headquarters who then relayed it to Terry?

Beth

[royalwelsh]

Beth,

And that sort of hierarchical communication would be slow, when lateral communication was required...?

RW

[Beth]

But if there was no way to communicate laterally they would have no choice. It was a bit faster than it first sounds because telegraphs could be sent but it is easy to forget how hard it was to communicate in some areas and the distances that were involved. And there are people today who think it's rough when they only have two bar reception.

[colt45]

It seemed none of the departments were under a single command. Crook was doing his thing, Terry was doing his, and neither had any responsibility to the other in terms of communication and coordination. When Crook decided to turn back, he should have sent a messenger north to try and communicate with the Terry forces advising of his withdrawal back to Goose Creek. And Custer should have continued up the Rosebud, as he had been instructed, or at the very least had a scouting party continue up the Rosebud while he turned toward LBH. If that had occurred, it is very possible he would have discovered the Indian trail coming back from the Rosebud battle, and that would surely have given him an idea that these folks were serious about fighting, and might have changed how he approached LBH.

[dave]

The whole US Cavalry offensive of 1876 was a disjointed poorly planned---if planned at all---groping toward the Indians somewhere in Wyoming or Montana. No coordination and dissemination of tactics between departments and individual unit commanders and this is Sheridan's fault.

As Beth pointed out to me recently, Terry comes out of this whole botched offensive against the Indians as the best man. He cleaned up Custer's mess, organized the transportation of the wounded and reorganized the troops after the worst disaster in the annals of the US Army.
Regards

[quincannon]

Would not say that LBH was the worst disaster in the annals of the U S Army.

That dubious honor goes to St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash, and at the hand of Indians. In the eyes of the Army it transcends all that came afterward still in an Army that has had quite a few near fatal bumps in the 240 year long road.

The problem with remembering St. Clair is that his disaster did not take place in a Centennial year, inflicted on an army that 11 years before had completely defeated a very formidable opponent, at a time when the country was in a state of euphoric feel good. Even the majority in the Army today do not know, and give no conscience thought to St. Clair, but they all remember LBH. The irony is that both defeats had the same causal factors.

[Beth]

I will have to admit that I only remember it as sort of a footnote until someone brought it up recently.

Beth

[royalwelsh]

Jul 22, 2015 14:05:04 GMT dave said:

The whole US Cavalry offensive of 1876 was a disjointed poorly planned---if planned at all---groping toward the Indians somewhere in Wyoming or Montana. No coordination and dissemination of tactics between departments and individual unit commanders and this is Sheridan's fault.

As Beth pointed out to me recently, Terry comes out of this whole botched offensive against the Indians as the best man. He cleaned up Custer's mess, organized the transportation of the wounded and reorganized the troops after the worst disaster in the annals of the US Army.
Regards

Dave,

But wasn't Terry the consummate CYA politician.....requesting GAC and then look at his orders to GAC? Bask in glory if GAC successful? Protection if GAC screws up?

RW

[Beth]

Sometimes though you need someone who knows how to deal with the aftermath. What Dave and I were talking about was how Terry arrived to a horror of a battlefield and quickly dealt with it, his actions from the 27th until reaching the Far West or perhaps Bismark--not further down the line when it got to the CYA stage.

I've been through a couple of situations in life where you quickly see that there are people who are great at coming in when things go belly up and getting things working again. It really takes someone who can act with a detached logical way, if they get caught up in the moment things will grind to a halt.

Beth