|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 3, 2016 15:03:37 GMT
I better amend my web site then; link
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 3, 2016 15:06:37 GMT
I have amended the basic squad, but now it has a sergeant as squad leader and two fire teams, but the fire teams are different sizes, Alpha has four and Bravo has five with the additional rifle man.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 3, 2016 15:14:33 GMT
It sounds strange but I still find the prospect of the US army being short on equipment rather surprising, my dad use to say that they were constantly short on stuff and especially ammo, but when he observed his American counterparts, they always had plenty.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 3, 2016 19:13:53 GMT
Ian the basic TO&E is what determines the number of people and type of equipment at every level.
The basic TO&E for an Infantry battalion and its subordinate units is 7-15. When you see it listed though on an official document it is shown as 7-15, then a letter, followed by another series on numbers and letters that identify the unit not as a generic battalion but as a specific unit.
When I got in the Army we were on the D series as in 7-15D. When I had a company is was the H series and my unit had a MTO&E as follows 7-15HNG02WPHLBO, in other words the MTO&E was designed down to my specific company, and it was quite likely that except for the other two rifle companies in my battalion WPHLAO and WPHLCO there were no others organized exactly alike. That is why you have a hard time with these things.
During the post ROCID/ROCAD (battle group) era the Army went from the 11 man squad with two balanced fire teams to the 10 man squad with two unbalanced fire teams Alfa 4 and Bravo 5. Today for the most part we have nine man squads with two balanced teams of 4 each.
ROCID = Reorganization Objective Current Infantry Division 1957 - 1964 ROCAD = Reorganization Objective Current Airborne Division 1956 - 1964 ROAD = Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 1962 - 1980 then onward but ROAD became a dirty word. MOMAR = Modern Mobile Army a pipe dream of the armor guys never implemented Vintage 1960 Division 86 = A pipe dream of Shy Meyer, ran out of equipment and the money to buy about the first S curve in the 8 Vintage 1980 There was then a period or organizational wandering in the desert where reorganization was the catch phrase du jour, until the present BCT nightmare of about 2003. We are now in a posture of correcting the nightmare we had, and not preparing organizationally for the nightmare that will surface the day after tomorrow.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 4, 2016 10:28:36 GMT
Thanks Chuck, you are right about the differing totals, and I thought that the Soviets were a nightmare with their chopping and changing, I have even come across TO&Es that were issued but never implemented in the field, so you would have new regiments with the new set and old regiment still using the old set virtually serving together.
Then you have the case were a new TO&E is ordered but before they get chance to implement the change, the top brass issue a brand new system, which renders the supposed system obsolete.
Yan.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 4, 2016 17:56:56 GMT
Judging only from my experience Ian in peacetime it takes about two years, and the effort of literally thousands of people to take a TO&E design, marry it up to equipment levels, personnel availability, and TDA (tables of distribution and allowances), then turn that TO&E into a MTO&E designed for a specific unit, before you can activate a division, or convert a division from one type design to another. Then, and only then can you start training based upon doctrine modification, and new or newer types of equipment.
The driving factor in all this is ALO (authorized level of organization)
ALO1 = The highest level of organization, usually your forces deployed in theater, get first call on personnel and equipment, or those kept in near immediate readiness for worldwide deployment, like the 82nd ABD.
ALO2 = Not quite as good in either personnel or equipment. Usually about 90% fill in both. While they have mostly current equipment, they also have some hand me downs. You figure these people can be combat ready in 30-60 days.
ALO3 = Even less in the way of fill in personnel and equipment. Not combat ready for 90 to 180 days. Hand me downs are a way of life.
When you change something as basic and simple as a rifle, you think of how much other stuff has to be changed as well. It starts with items like an armorers tool kit and an individual weapons cleaning kit and supplies, then has further far reaching implications throughout the whole logistical chain, including recalculation of unit basic loads, then figuring if you have enough (or too much) transportation to carry that basic load. If you need to add you might also have to add drivers, mechanics, perhaps another fuel truck, more vehicle mechanics tool sets, and so on until it reaches the level of a triple migraine headache, that does not go away until the last person and item is found, allocated, and on station, doing their job. Then you just may find out you still under or over calculated based on the unit validation process, and field experience. Then you start all over again at square one. All this for one piece of equipment so basic to the needs of an army. the rifle.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 4, 2016 18:20:37 GMT
Chuck, You clearly know how forces are structured, starting from the lowest sub-unit and up-wards.
I can see why both the British and the Americans kept hold of their basic equipment for so long, in the US army it was the M1 Garand coupled with the Browning M1911, with the British it was the Lee Enfield 303 rifle and Webley .38 revolver. In the case of the M1 it was still in use in the early sixties and the M1911 is probably still in use.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 4, 2016 18:26:56 GMT
Going back to the air assault battalion, now you was a battalion commander, so you know how things tick, now if you battalion was ordered into action and using a phrase used by Gibson in his movie WWS, you were expecting a hot LZ, then what happens if there is not enough birds to move your full battalion, would you as the colonel take the lead chopper or would you send a major or captain or your executive officer in with the first lift.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 4, 2016 21:40:03 GMT
Well if I was an Infantry battalion commander, and I was not (FA instead, and that's a long story not worth telling), I would indeed be in the first lift.
You never have enough birds to lift a battalion, for the following reasons.
1) There are never enough birds. It would take 50 or so UH1D's or H's to lift just your assault echelon. 35 to 40 UH60's
2) You would need a huge PZ, and an even bigger LZ, and they are few and far between.
3) You lift a company at a time in most cases, and under optimum conditions a reinforced company. If that LZ is hot you are going in with that first company to develop the situation (yes just like Reno was supposed to do), hopefully clear it, and get your next several lifts into a clean LZ. If it is too hot, you get out, by any means possible. Remember, again at the risk of sounding callous - It is easier to replace soldiers than airframes.
Why first lift? The battalion commander needs to be there and see. That is why he draws pay. Now we are talking a battalion level assault here. The principle is the same though for the company commander. If he has four birds (not unusual) and is ordered to make a company sized assault into a small LZ, he is still on the first lift. The commander at whatever level must be there to make the call stay or go. He must feel the pulse of the battle, to make those decisions, not be sitting on the can doing his daily duty to nature, with a handset to his ear. It is his company or battalion, and no one can do that for him.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 5, 2016 12:11:04 GMT
Chuck, I should have added that was there any protocol that laid out that any air assault should be led by the exec officer and not the commander, sort of like Custer moving over the bluffs with Yates and F taking the lead and himself and the HQ following plus the other four companies.
I agree that the situation had to be assessed and this would better done by the chap in charge (battalion commander), but wouldn’t it be best to have a couple of platoons securing a perimeter before you land? Otherwise you and your HQ could just hop of the bird and immediately come under fire from an enemy which was unsighted, not located and of undetermined strength.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 5, 2016 14:04:26 GMT
Little different situation than with Custer.
You must also remember that Moore (2-23I then 1-7C commander) and his associates in the 2nd ID/11th Air Assault both of which combined to became the 1st CD developed all this doctrine in the period 63-65. I will stick with what they had to say. If Moore says first in - last out is the place for the Bn. Cdr. then that is what I would do.
You must also remember that in an air assault timing is everything. Your birds are coming in just as you lift and shift fires, and the objective of that is to have those of your enemy on or near the LZ to have just had the pee pounded out of them. You also come in gun blazing.
You are going to lose people. That is a given on a hot LZ. You cannot make a determination unless you can see, and feel the flow of battle.
The Bn. XO does not even participate in an air assault. If the Battalion Commander goes down, normally the S-3 takes over. The XO is in the rear with the gear. That is why I always refer to the assault echelon, the battalion's shooters. The rest are well to the rear at the airmobile forces assembly area.
You might want to find a copy of "The Plekeiu Campaign" for a complete background on how these things are done. The book covers the whole Ia Drang Valley affair from the time the NVA are detected by 1-9 Cav until all of the 3rd Bde./1 Cav. Div. get into battle. The brigade rear area was split between a tea plantation and the division base camp.
The most telling part is not LZ XRAY but rather the march to LZ Albany where 2-7C nearly got destroyed in a classic L shaped ambush. Moore knew his business, and the relatively new guy that had 2-7C did not. One, Moore, was McKenzie like, the other guy was a throwback to Georgie. He would not listen either.
You must strive not to compartmentalize your thinking Ian. Compartmentalize in that you might think that one part of a force does all things. It is through the combination of arms that battles are fought. An Infantry commander that goes anywhere without his supporting artillery is just plain nuts. In an air assault you achieve surprise by short duration, but devastating, prep fires, followed immediately by attack birds sweeping the LZ with fires, before moving off to support deep, and your Infantry puts there feet on the ground as soon as those fires are lifted and shifted away and onto deep targets, thereby impeding enemy response. It is orchestrated like a symphony, where all the players know their part, for the music to sound sweet.
As to assault echelon. 1-7 had on the order of 600 soldiers. I do not think more than 350-400 were on LZ XRAY when all of his assault echelon were there. The rest were at the tea plantation, and probably quite a few at the division base camp as well.
If I remember correctly Moore only had eight to twelve birds to lift his battalion, I think only eight. The way the aviation brigade of the 1st CD was organized was two assault (UH-1) battalions, and one GS Aviation (CH47) battalion. One assault battalion was allocated to two of the three Infantry brigades. The third brigade was the immediate reserve brigade. Normally only one assault company was allotted to a battalion actually making the assault, while the other two lift companies were allotted to the other two battalions in the brigade. They were normally doing something similar at the same time.
There is one thing you must always remember about the U S Army. Our strength is in flexibility. How you see a brigade or division configured for combat today, is not how you saw it yesterday, and not how you will see it tomorrow.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 5, 2016 16:36:21 GMT
Chuck, in the movie WWS, they never included the LZ Albany segment, the film’s director Randell Wallace cut the part that covered LZ Albany, he said that he wanted to concentrate on Moore and LZ X-ray, and that LZ Albany would require a separate film to cover the heroism that was displayed there.
McDade was an experienced soldier who had previously fought in WW2 and Korea, but made some basic mistakes that day, not just from declining artillery support but from slack security on the march.
Yan.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 5, 2016 16:58:33 GMT
If you do not go into all combat situations Ian, mentally and physically loaded for bear, the bear is going to eat you. If you do then the bear is going to miss lunch.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 6, 2016 15:48:39 GMT
Chuck, I have found an old British document relating to Royal Marine Commandos being issued with M1 Garand's (or Garrand as the typist spelt them) in the last couple of years of WW2. Some some sources say that entire marine troops (which is the British term for marine companies), were armed with the M1; It is a little faint, but one of the lines says Corporals in charge of Bren Gun Groups will replace their Thompson SMGs for Garrands, and then goes on to name its uses for example for firing tracer and close quarter fighting.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 6, 2016 16:29:10 GMT
Did not know that. I did know that the Royal Marine Commando attached to the 1st MARDIV had them in Korea, to alleviate the logistical issues associated with being supplied with 30 Cal rounds distributed in eight round clips.
|
|