Doolittle's Raiders

[yanmacca]

Looking at the bigger picture then I suppose the risk to the Enterprise and Hornet is the issue here, as these 80 men volunteered for this mission. I cannot think of another example of which so much was risked for so little, the Dam Busters spring to mind as this was another moral boost to Britain, so I suppose the shock that the Doolittle raid achieved would make fools out of the Japanese military as no one expected this raid and this forced the Japanese to keep back vital aircraft to defend against another raid.

[dave]

The Doolittle raid was never designed for military gain it simply was to boost American morale. December 7, 1941 to April 18, 1942 witnessed an incredible spread of the Japanese Empire where they occupied territory from Japan to New Guinea in the South, Wake Island to the East, Singapore, Malaysia and Java to the West and South and left the Dutch, British, Australians, New Zealanders and Americans reeling. 

I am know venturing into QC's area but other than a couple of carrier raids against Japanese bases on the fringe of their occupied territory and the success of US Submarines executing unrestricted warfare, America was taking continual blows to the chin and public morale was very low.

FDR knew he needed to gain a quick success and this mission was designed to cause the Japanese halt their outward expansion and be concerned with protecting the home islands. The use of the 2 precious carriers was a gamble they evidently believed was worth the effort and they threw the dice successfully. What could have happened if we lost one or both of the vessels boggles the mind but thank God we won.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

Balderdash to the tenth power.

We had five carriers in the Pacific. In early April two were guarding the lifeline to Australia, and ultimately fought and won Coral Sea. Had it not been for them New Guinea would have fallen and the northern coast of Australia would have been completely open and vulnerable.

Enterprise was the only thing we had between Japan and Hawaii, and Hawaii the only thing we had between that place and San Francisco.

Hornet had not even completed its shakedown, its crews (air and ship) half trained, and you compound that by loading 16 B25's on deck makes her completely non operational for the duration, until the raid was actually launched. That gives you a grand total of 18 obsolete fighters to protect a two carrier battle group.

Saratoga was high and dry in Dry Dock 2 Bremerton and would be there for several more months.

Do you all remember why Sara was recalled from the Wake rescue mission the previous December. It was too much risk to be accepted, against the potential loss of a carrier. Hint Wake is in the Central Pacific, and a hell of a lot further away from Japan than 400 miles off Tokyo.

So here are the operational considerations and risks surrounding the loss of one or both of those carriers in that silly adventure

Lose E and H, and Y and L are recalled to cover Hawaii. Y and L being recalled means no Coral Sea, and potential catastrophic results for Australia, New Zealand and Samoa. Ask Mac what he thinks about that.

That leaves Midway. We barely made it at Midway with a four carrier equivalent (Midway Island's airbase being the fourth equivalent. Would you really like to have fought Midway with one modern carrier and the old clunker that was Lexington. She could not cycle air groups as fast as the more modern Ytown, and that contributed to her loss at Coral Sea, along with a poor damage control posture that really could not be helped because of her design.

So that is what would have most probably happen. Sound good to any of you?

Now to Morale raising on the home front. It has come to my attention over the years that a good solid entry in the win column raises moral. We had two such in the space of a month, both of which combined destroyed the Japanese fast carrier striking force.

So which is best for moral, bullshit with potential CATISTROPHIC (emphasis added) RISK or good solid operational blocking and tackling resulting in overwhelming tactical victory. Is the objective to feel good or be good.

Now the real rub. Read Prange. He will tell you that instead of doing the things Ian mentioned, draining resources for defense and such, and the halt of outward expansion as Dave mentioned, they did nothing of the kind and the Doolittle Raid served to speed up their Pacific expansion program by moving Midway and their northern operations to the top of their immediate must do list. You have to think like a Japanese in these matters, not the conventional western approach. The Japanese approach was to extend further away from Japan, and that is exactly what they did.

Submarine Operations. They were dismal failures on a wide scale which means strangling Japan economically until late 43, hitting their stride in 44.

The bottom line is how many ships and planes, men and treasure are YOU (both of you) willing to risk to put a few five hundred pound bombs that cause no lasting damage on the enemy?

I am putting both of you in the decision makers seat. You make the call, and if it fails and thousands of lives are lost in the process you take the fall, and you live with it. Good Luck

God had nothing to do with it so don't thank Him. He hates war, because those He loves suffer and die. In WWI the belt buckle on the German soldier was inscribed God is with us. Are they frigging kidding me, but that bull shit has been fed to soldiers sailors and airmen, since man first picked up a rock. God is with us. God is with both sides equally for they are all his children. Thank the guys who put their lives on the line at Coral Sea and Midway, so you might have a brighter future and are not force fed Sushi.

[dave]

QC
I'll take my hiding and still disagree as to the value to the American people of striking against the Japanese. I do not wished to be seen as just argumentative as I am far less knowledgeable as to military strategy, tactics and evaluation of risks versus rewards as you are but am trying to explain my thinking.

The military is not always right and some times great gambles must be taken and the Doolittle Raid was one such gamble. You need to stop looking at this issue with your knowledge and experience from serving as soldier, enlisted and as an officer, and see it a civilian who has no idea of how large the Pacific is or where Pearl Harbor, Wake Island other islands and countries are located. The Americans of 1941 and early 1942 had no idea of American strategy or what the Hell the Army of Navy was doing "out there" wherever there was.

The US submarines were poorly skippered by pre war Commanders who had no idea of offensive operations, having been trained to be fleet scouts with an inordinate amount of respect and fear of Japanese Anti Submarine tactics and weapons. The solution and correction of the horrendous torpedo scandal was far ahead in the future and our boats did in fact attack the Japanese Merchant Marine and Naval vessels with defective torpedoes that did not explode on contact or in the magnetic field as expected. Starting in 1943 with effective and somewhat reliable torpedoes, they still had circular runs and we lost at least two boats because of this flaw, US submarines sank over 5 million tons of Japanese ships.

The Enterprise and Yorktown in February 1942 launched raids on the Japanese facilities in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. I doubt much tactical gains if any where accomplished and yet the Navy decided to use both of the carrier task forces. I expect the experience gained by the air crews was one of the factors leading to the raid as was the moral factor of attacking the Japanese.

God was involved and I see nothing wrong in thanking him for the outcome. I agree that it is wrong to invoke God as a support whether it is for a football game or battle. Asking Him to teach me His will and bless my actions is certainly within Christian principles.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

With the exception of the value of the raids on the Gilberts and Marshalls, which were relatively close range raids designed to deceive as to the amount of combat power we had and where it was I agree with everything you said.

You still have not answered my question though.

Were it up to YOU and YOU ALONE, knowing the complete friendly situation, not knowing squat about where Kido Butai was or their intentions, WOULD YOU say YES or NO to that raid? YOU ALONE, YOUR CALL. You have the lives of ten thousand men and twenty irreplaceable ships resting on your decision.

That Dave is what commanders do, and it is a close as I can simulate the commander's decision making process. The same process your father's commander had to make every day his ship was at sea. The same process that David's father went through each time he stepped on the bridge of his ship. You have never been trained for this, especially the evaluation of military risk and reward, but I do this to show you, and others, there is more that goes into it than the admiration of those that were childhood heroes, and that those heroes, perhaps became heroes because someone led them down the garden path when that someone should have known better, and spoken up saying this is not smart, this is the wrong thing to do. That speaking up risking everything by doing so is part of what makes heroes too.

[Beth]

You guys might find this article of interest.

www.angelo.edu/content/news/1466-doolittle-raid-remembered-for-impact

I personally believe that the Doolittle Raid had a huge impact on changing the Japanese war plans and forcing them to have view themselves a nearly as vulnerable as they were before Pearl Harbor. They now had to spend a lot more energy and resources to fighting in the Pacific sooner that they thought would happen. It exposed them to being unable to truly exploit the resources in China and mainland Asia by bringing the US into the war too soon.

[dave]

QC
I have never thought about such responsibility and have no idea how well I would perform, hopefully well but not sure. My greatest responsibility was and is as a husband and father and I have more than I can handle at times and not sure how well I have done.

I see your point regarding the lives and valuable ships but much as Hancock did with the 1st Minnesota at Gettysburg, sometimes people and equipment may be sacrificed for the greater good. I wish we had some members, both on the board as well as family, who could recall and comment on the public response to the raid.

Regardless of our discussion the airmen who participated are and where ordinary Americans who were trained to do a job as best as they could. Their performance was legendary and honored today especially by the Air Force Academy and its cadets.
Regards
Dave                  

[quincannon]

No you are not qualified to speak on this issue if you equate the Doolittle Raid with the 1st Minnesota at Gettysburg.

The First Minnesota was the deliberate sacrifice of men to achieve an end and the sacrifice was worth the reward gained, in that time was bought, and plans foiled. The First Minnesota was not a publicity stunt, it is an example of risk taken and reward gained at its finest.

Your own father participated in a similar risk worth reward action on 13 November 1942. Had we lost every ship with all hands the risk and loss of life would be justified by the reward gained.

I would have reluctantly ordered both myself given the same two situations, and knowing full well that I expected none to return.

You are still not seeing the forest for the trees. Review what I have written on this matter in these pages, and show me where I made any remark that could be construed as being against operations that raise moral on the home front for the sake of raising moral alone. I am all for the Makin Island raid. I am all for the shoestring invasion of Guadalcanal. Both raised moral, the latter was our first take back from the Japanese. Both were extremely high risk, but both were more than justified by the reward gained.

What I am not for is risk,that is totally out of proportion,for no tangible reward, for moral raising or any other purpose under God's heaven. Lives, preservation and retention of combat power, and worthwhile operational imperatives are far too important to me for that.

So would you YES or NO have ordered that raid knowing only what was known then (which was not a hell of a lot) Only two answers Yes or No.  Make your call. That is what you paid me for and expected me to do for you.

[dave]

I mentioned the 1st Minnesota as an example of of a hard military decision not equating the sacrifice made by the Gophers. I admit I approve FDR's decision's which was approved by King, who was not awed by FDR, and other military leaders who were more informed of the facts at the time than I am.

As to what my dad would have thought about my ideas supporting the raid, I really don't know but as I know nothing about the process of making military decisions he more than likely would slap the back of head and growl. Sure do miss that aspect of dad and his wise counsel I lost in January of 1989.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

There is only one man on God's Green Earth that Roosevelt would not have fired if he disagreed with him, that being George Catlett Marshall.

The King of February to April 1942, was not the King, Man of Steel, of the latter half of that year and beyond.  If you need proof of King's jelly belly at the time, look at his risk avoidance views during May 42 concerning Midway

Arnold would kiss Tojo's ass if he thought in so doing it would further his air power agenda.

When the President of the United States gives you an order, you only have two options, obey or resign. The other two did not have the guts to resign, Marshall did, and Roosevelt knew it. Why do you think they found work arounds concerning Marshall in this affair?

The only saving grace in this whole affair is that they gave it to Halsey. He was THE ONLY man who could stand a ghost of a chance in pulling it off.

[yanmacca]

Well I would have not come up with such an audacious plan in the first place, the idea of bombing Japan would be low on my list if I was a commander as the main threat would be to keep Australia and Indian from falling into Japanese hands. But the powers that be thought that this was worth it and went ahead with the mission.

When you look at how the Japanese expanded their control over the pacific, you can see how this differs from the war in Europe, as they had to garrison all the islands under their control, and because this campaign was fought mainly over islands we can see that whoever controls the sea will win, this was not the case in Europe as land based air power was the key.

So if you throw a hand full of pebbles onto your lawn and imagine that these were the islands under your control, and then you had to defend those island and keep them supplied, you can see the problems Japan had to face, and once your fleet is neutralised and all your major air bases are destroyed, then all those island garrisons are now sitting ducks, the problem now faced by the allies is to choose which to assault and which to leave.

[mac]

The geography of war as Ian points out is difficult when you are Japan. In a way the same kinds of problems always..how do you expand and still keep what you have?
Geographically Australia was important as a base of operations naturally, and was probably too big for the Japanese to swallow, but the north of Australia then, and even to a degree now, was largely empty so the Japanese opted to bomb stategically close places like Darwin and Broome knowing they would be hard to resupply.
Their submarine raid on Sydney makes little sense other than the psycological.
Re Doolittle I would agree with QC. It looks like great bravado when you succeed but if anything goes wrong it is a "what were you thinking?" moment.

[yanmacca]

Hi Mac, do you think that by mid-1943, that the Japanese had reached their limit? For a nation of that size they surly had to defend a lot of ground, China alone was large enough and they were still fighting the Chinese in most of the country, they also had to garrison Manchuria and other places against the Soviet threat. That leaves Burma and the British 14th army in India, as they knew that we were not going to go away and sooner or later we would be back to kick them out.

Then they had to fight the USA and their allies in the pacific region and they knew that once the US had got their act in order, that they would start to produce ships at an alarming rate and soon the IJN will be swamped.

As we saw in Europe, Africa and Russia, it is hard to maintain your strength when fighting on different fronts and as Germany found in Russia, you can soon burn yourself out especially when your supply line are stretched to the limit, at least the Germans had a rail network and some good roads to fall back on, the Japanese were fighting in areas that had few roads and very little rail lines, and add to this their many island bases and you have one super supply head ache.

[quincannon]

What were you thinking indeed.

There are several parallels in the Doolittle raid to what we discuss here as our main topic.

"Fortune Favors The Bold" only if the bold get away with it.

[yanmacca]

"listen to me Fido, one day I am going to pull off one of the most incredible military maneuvers ever tried by the US Army, I will start with 600 men and end up with around 50 and hell those Indians won't know what hit them, talk about being bold, Ill show em"