Tactical Wisdom

[quincannon]

1. Combat situations cannot be solved by rule.

2. In war obscurity and confusion are normal. Late, exaggerated, or misleading information, surprise situations, and counterorders are to be expected.

3. Simple and direct plans and methods make for foolproof performance.

4. Every attack should have a scheme of maneuver. The main effort should strike the enemies weakness.

5. In the absence of definitive information, small units must be guided by their mission and the terrain.

6. In war a large safety factor should be included in all time-and-space calculations.

7. Open warfare demands elastic tactics, quick decisions, and swift maneuvers.

8. Surprise is a master key to victory.

9. A leader must meet battle situations with timely and unequivocal decisions.

10. A unit must be engaged in accordance with a definite plan. It must not be permitted to drift aimlessly into battle.

11. An order must clearly express the will of the leader and must fit the situation.

12. The test of control is the ability of the leader to obtain the desired reaction from his command.

13. A headquarters must be mobile, and must keep close to the troops. From this forward position, communications must be rapid and reliable.

14. Leaders must supervise the execution of their orders. The more untrained the troops, the more detailed this supervision must be.

15. The compass is the officer's most reliable guide.

16. Fire without movement is indecisive. Exposed movement with out fire is disastrous. There must be effective fire combined with skillful movement.

17. There is no substitute for massive firepower applied in an intelligent manner.

18. The effective functioning of the combined arms team depends upon intelligent and unremitting efforts of all members to solve the difficult problem of liaison.

19. In a meeting engagement a great advantage accrues to that side which first succeeds in making effective preperations for battle.

20. The approach march should bring the troops into their assigned zone, opposite and close to their attack objective, in good physical condition, and with high morale.

21. In an attack reserves should be used to exploit a success, rather than redeem a failure.

22. Commanders of all grades are responsible for continuous reconnaissance.

23. Rapid changes in the situation often require rapid changes in decisions. Therefore counterorders should be accepted as normal incidents of battle.

24. Action, physical and mental, is an efficacious antidote for battlefield nervousness.

25. Success in a night attack depends largely on direction, control, and surprise.

26. Resolute action by a few determined men is often decisive.

27. Optimism and tenacity are attributes of great leaders.

[Deleted]

I've heard some of Custer's actions (or intentions) at the LBH focused on the idea of "pivot and maneuver."

Would someone explain what that means?

[Deleted]

Make that "maneuver."

[deadwoodgultch]

A portion of an attacking force attempts to immobilize the enemy while another portion attempts to strike a decisive blow. Maybe bait and switch in military terms.

In this case, I guess Reno was the bait. To catch a big fish you are generally going to lose your bait. Meaning Reno was expendable? Limited/faulty intelligence in this case makes it seem so.

There are many more knowledgeable than I, but,that's my two cents worth and maybe it is not worth that.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

Manoeuvring formations can be a simply as sending a half squad to move round to a back of a building to shoot down any escapees, while the rest of the squad kicks in the front door and flushes them out. More ambitious manoeuvring is something like army group south drawing off Soviet reserves to allow for army groups north and centre to surge ahead.

Pivot and Manoeuver is similar to a hinge and door, one group anchors one end (pivot/hinge) and the other group swings around (manoeuver/door), basically it is forcing your enemy to focus on his front, while you swing round his flank.

Tom, your description is just as valid as anyone else’s.

Yan.

[deadwoodgultch]

From the pros, I guess. Once you open the link click on the PDF link. oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA240322

[Deleted]

Thanks all. VERY helpful.

[quincannon]

For it to work effectively the pivot must contain as much combat power as the force you face, perhaps minus a little, but not much. The pivot is not the main attack. The force using that pivot to maneuver is the main effort, with the objective of either driving into a flank, or swinging wide around that flank to envelop either the near or deep rear, depending upon what the situation calls for, and the terrain, and enemy response allows you to do.

Winging it is not pivot and maneuver.

Be careful in reading too much into the very good link that Tom posted. At the operation level, which the link addresses, the restrictions upon gross maneuver are not nearly what they are at the tactical level. Think of the operational level as maneuvering across the terrain from DC to Boston, many ways to go that get you to the same place, some more direct, some more difficult, and chances are all those routes cannot be covered by the enemy effectively.

Tactical pivot and maneuver, may only give you one choice, and that choice less than desirable. It then comes down to a determination if pivot and maneuver is the correct tactical choice. The only way you can determine that is prior close reconnaissance.

Pivot and maneuver was not a viable option at LBH, in my opinion, and I frigging love flank attacks and envelopments.

[yanmacca]

One of the options which we have not covered is the role of the locals, if you are the good guy and are fighting to defend your own turf then the locals will provide you with the knowledge you need, this what the British and Americans have faced ever since WW2, because we have always fought over seas and had to deal with locals who either love you, hate you or could care less.

Yan.

[quincannon]

So what you are saying Ian, and I fully agree with, is we need to add Number 28 to Tactical Wisdom

28) In modern warfare the populace becomes key terrain.

Therefore strategy must be directed toward the populace of the greater battle space, Diplomatic-Information Operations-Military-Economic in such a manner as to facilitate operational maneuver and tactical execution.

To put it in very plain terms. For an insurgency to exist the population must be sympathetic to the insurgency or at least neutral to its presence. An insurgency cannot exist when the population is hostile to its existence. Therefore the strategic imperatives are reverse the trend of the sympathetic population, if required, turn neutrality into hostility where the insurgent is concerned, if required, and if neither of the first two are required, insure that hostility toward insurgency remains constant in the battle space. Then implement the strategy with enlightened application of operational maneuver and tactical application.

[yanmacca]

For the pivot and maneuver tactic to work at the BLBH, Custer would have to be positioned behind battle ridge and ready for Reno to begin his valley attack, Benteen too must be included somewhere.

And that was the major flaw in Custer's assumed plan, the distance was too great and it meant that Reno had to handle the whole village on his own for far too long.

Yan.

[quincannon]

Still would not work Ian. Reno did not have the combat power required to prevent, or at least delay, reaction. Plus there was no way to communicate between the pivot, and the force using the pivot to maneuver. Communications between forces, and timing of each supporting action, are the basic requirements for such solutions to a given tactical problem, involving pivot and maneuver.

To answer your other question sent by PM. I have given it some thought and were it me making the decision I would leave your reference base at the company level. The company is the basic building block of all armies, and there are so many variations at battalion, regiment/brigade, and higher levels I think such and addition would be more confusing than helpful.

[yanmacca]

Custer’s tactics at the Battle of Washita, were totally different to what he did at the BLBH, at the Washita he split his regiment into four and had two battalions sweep wide to converge from both flanks (Elliot and Thompson) whist his own and Myers battalions went straight through the front door. Here is a breakdown of the 7th that day;

Lt. Col. Custer: A C D & K
Maj. Elliot: G H & M
Capt. Myers: E & I
Capt. Thompson: B & F
(Apparently L Company was on detached service in Colorado at Fort Lyon)

Yan.

[quincannon]

Each engagement calls for its own unique tactical solution. It is a fundamental error to apply the solution used in the battle you fought yesterday, to the engagement of today, or today's to the one you fight tomorrow.

That said, I don't think the fundamentals behind Washita were a heck of a lot different than what was done at LBH, in that Custer split combat power four ways, just as he did at LBH. At Washita though, the situation, and the enemy arrayed against him were totally different, and while the solution Custer applied at Washita allowed him to get away with what he did, he barely got away with it.

So the tactical lesson is, if you think that the correct solution when fighting Indians is ALWAYS split and attempt to surround, then you had better damned well look and see how big that mass is your trying to surround before you apply it.

In baseball, if a batter always swings for the cheap seats, he is going to strike out a hell of a lot more often that he hits a home run. Ask Babe Ruth.

[yanmacca]

Yes the village on the Washita was tiny compared with the one on the Little Bighorn, at least at the Washita he kept his regiment together, as we know at the BLBH he attacked with eight under strength companies against a massive group of camp circles.

Yan.