Cheyenne and the "Suicide Boys"

[quincannon]

Then you have joined ranks with the analysts Beth as opposed to the story tellers.

You have determined through the analysts eyes that he was either an idiot or was going someplace. Further, I am sure you determined for yourself that having risen to the position he was in the Army, and having a reputation for bold action during the civil war he was not an idiot. Rash. certainly. Reckless. That too at times. He certainly demonstrated that he could be irresponsible on many occasions. Selfish always, but certainly certainly not an idiot. He had many personal failings but being an idiot was not one of them.

I forget who it was that said how could Lee have done so badly at Gettysburg. He was answered by someone else whose name I can't remember - I think the Union Army had something to do with it. The same applies here - The Indians had something to do with it. 

So when you determined for yourself that George Custer was not a military idiot, you must then turn to your second answer - He was going somewhere. Going somewhere does not necessarily involve the routes he traveled or even incidents along the way, the encounter with Wolf Tooth for instance. Those things only add color, but no real substance. The substance is found at the decision points. That is where the tale is told

[yanmacca]

It would be natural for pressured units to take to the high ground, by the looks of it the Headquarters seemed to be the only mounted and intact unit as all of them made it to LSH , well that’s if the reports on identification are correct. Once reaching a high point I would guess that the regimental standard would be planted in full view to give any survivors a chance to rally round the flag, which could have happened because around 30 troopers were found dead in this area not counting HQ personnel. The HQ horses may have been used as a breast work too, or have I read it wrong.

We know very Little about any fighting on the east slope of LSH plus cemetery ridge BRE, out of the three the cemetery position fairs better then the other two because of the grave stones, the Indians say that the area around the stones was were the soldiers halted and fought. Talking about the east side of LSH, is the Indian memorial near this area? Or was there some other site around there which had significance to the Indians. If so why would they build it there, was this area of some importance?

Yes and I agree the Indians did play a big part in making the soldiers dance to their tune, but I guess that these small units had no clout when it came to suppressive fire, as the old saying goes “He who lives by the Carbine, should train with it frequently”.

[quincannon]

Ian: I am going to tear into your above post, not because I don't like you, I do, nor because I wish to upset you, I don't. I am going to do it because it is illustrative of what I have been trying to say on this thread, the story teller is a disservice to the history and analysis of this battle. Now I know none of the above is original to you, but rather gleaned from the writings of others. They are the story tellers who have not served your understanding well.

1) For some reason, unknown to me, it is man's natural instinct to seek high ground or high places in times of danger. Man will do that if he is allowed to do it by whatever is the danger he perceives. We DO NOT KNOW that happened at LBH. We know that it happened in part. Regardless of what you now see on LSH, there are also just as many bodies, indicated by markers, on low ground. Therefore there is at least an equal chance that those folks ran to or were driven to low ground as opposed to high.

2) How can you possibly know that the only mounted unit to reach LSH was the regimental headquarters? The short answer is that you do not, nor does anyone else. To be sure there were a number of dead horses found there, that were apparently (not for sure) used as makeshift breastworks. The story tellers have taken that fact, then made the leaping assumption that the headquarters was mounted and intact when they reached LSH. There is absolutely no basis in fact for that. Any live horse that anyone from any unit that reached last stand hill found itself possessed by some Indian that evening.

3) "Reports of identification correct". The vast majority of those people were so mutilated their own mothers would not recognize them. So then there is a greater possibility that anyone assigned to the headquarters, meaning only six or seven people including, Custer, Cooke, Lord and Sharrow could have been just about anywhere. I would venture to say, that anyone of the minor player officers were identified by gun decking the report of their body recovery and subsequent burial, probably for the best and most sympathetic reasons, but gun decked just the same. Gun deck is a false report if you are not familiar with the term.

4) The regimental standard was present at the battle, in its case, in the pack train. It does make a nice addition to any painting of the battle though, and its presence is an absolute necessity if you are doing a diorama. It is what the story teller thinks should be there. Thing is though, that it was not there. So no flag waving that day, at least no flag waving with the regimental standard.

5) What is a headquarters? You speak as if it is a unit. You are a stickler for TO&E accuracy. In the 1876 Army there was no headquarters unit. What there was is 12 companies (units) and some, less than a dozen people who functioned as a command element, that were not assigned to any company. Some of these people were other places during the battle, the regimental quartermaster for instance, while others accompanied Custer. But the error here is assuming that they would all remain together as if they were an organized unit during battle. I have seen at least three different locations for Doctor Lord for instance. Sergeant Major Sharrow is another who was not with Custer when he died. The point is minor, and most will assume I am knit picking, but here's why. All to many of the story tellers assume that because Kellogg was found where he was, that Custer and the headquarters must have been there too. Same with Sharrow's location, the story teller will assume if the Sergeant Major was found there, Custer and his strap hangers must have been there too. There are any number of reasons why all three of those people, Lord, Kellogg, and Sharrow might have been where they were found, and none of those reasons is indicative of Custer being there too. None of them.

6) What stones? The damned place is full of stones and those stones have been moved at least once over the years since the battle. The original national cemetery was on the very top of LSH. In fact the ground was leveled off from its original configuration to install the cemetery there. It was right next to the monument that is still in place there.

7) The Indian memorial is slightly north and a very little bit east of LSH. It is in sort of a depression on the east side of Battle Ridge Extension.I have no idea if the place is considered of significance to the Indians, but if I had to guess I would say that it probably is. They tend to do things that way.

So what are we left with here? False trails based on someone's assumptions that over the years have turned into someone else's fact. All of us better realize that much of what has been said about LBH is myth, and where myth leaves off artistic license takes its place. There are few, very few, facts that are known, and virtually none about the Custer portion of the fight. The chance to gather those facts has been lost forever, and we have few snipits left from people like Red Hawk, and Wolf Tooth, who most storytellers pay not a goddamned bit of attention to.

[yanmacca]

That is what the board is for Chuck, but just do it with decorum and manners you have shown above.

I can’t see much wrong with most of my post, the Indians did say that the soldiers headed to the high ground after the fight at the river and three other location where they fighting took place are on high ground like LSH, FFR and Calhoun hill. The Indians also mention of soldiers running down hill off the high ground towards the river.
The Indians mention the stones in regard to the cemetery not the markers on LSH.
Regarding Custer’s battle flag, I meant the flag carried by sergeant Hughes.

The HQ was a command unit, but wouldn’t this unit keep mounted? Would they move behind any companies engaging the enemy? If so they would be the first to arrive on LSH with their horses.

The Indians did say that where Custer fell there was about 30 troopers on foot and 20 on horses. At the end the only Troops now remaining were the ones on the western end of the ridge, concealed behind dead horses.
So I was really only giving you what the Indians said themselves but it a little extra from me regarding plonking a flag in the ground.

[quincannon]

There most probably is not much wrong with your post Ian.

1) Yes, the Indians did say the soldiers sought high ground after the fight at the river. What they did not say is what high ground. We can make some educated guesses based on body markers, and further make educated guesses that the battle was fluid so there may have been more than one piece of high ground that was occupied in sequence. For instance CR and BRE, occupied before LSH.

2) The Indians also say that some soldiers ran off of high ground down hill to low ground toward the river. Some idiotic MFer concluded that that must mean that they ran off of LSH down toward the river ending up at the bottom of Deep Ravine. I want to see some group run six hundred yards in summer weather, as tired as they must have been, carrying a carbine, through a thousand Indians that would have been surrounding them were they originating from LSH. Whomever concluded that was one stupid son of a bitch. On the other hand being driven off of the high ground that was CR back into Cemetery Ravine, toward the river makes all kinds of sense, and no one ever mentioned that "all kinds of sense" anywhere else but on this board.

3) You really don't know what stones they were talking about and neither does anyone else unless they know exactly when the statement was made. Assuming they were talking about grave stones and not markers. the graveyard until early last century was on Last Stand Hill, not its present location. So if someone said where the stones are in 1890 they were talking about the LSH location. Anytime in the 20th Century they were talking about Cemetery Ridge. So to know what they were talking about we must know when the statement was made. and not when the story was told. If, for instance Wolf Tooth told JSIT that story in 1890, and JSIT relayed it just as it was told, then they are talking about LSH. If, on the other hand JSIT originated that statement based upon his knowledge of what WT said to him, but modernizing the statement to fit 1950 landmarks then the area in question was the modern cemetery. The reason I do not know, nor you, nor anyone else is we do not know how JSIT related the story. Being that he is long dead, I doubt if we will ever find out. If you have more solid information than I have on the matter post it here as soon as possible. The reason I think JSIT was relating the story just as told to him from WT, is that JSIT was an educated man, and if he modernized the story he would have said the cemetery, not where the stones are. It is also possible that JSIT did not understand what WT meant by where the stones are. Nothing should be taken at face value. Everything said must be examined for content, context, and the time when it was said. 

4) That was not a battle flag either. It was a division level guidon, completely unauthorized for a Lieutenant Colonel, that that egotistical son of a bitch carried along with him, a hold over from the glory days of what once was.

5) No the headquarters was not a unit, it was the regimental command element. I don't have a clue if they remained mounted or not, and I do not have a clue how they moved, where they moved, how fast they moved, and if they got to Last Stand Hill, first, last, or somewhere in the middle. Neither do you, or anyone else living on this planet in the Year of Our Lord 2020. All the folks that knew are dead, most of them on the afternoon of 25 June 1876. You cannot let "your vision" of how these things are done be inserted into the historical record, because while it is your vision, and we all have them floating around in our heads somewhere, it is not fact, for there is no one to verify it as fact. If it is not verified as fact, it is not fact, and such things should never be written in books, and sold as if they were fact. All that said, you are possibly correct, with possibly being the operative word.

So that you will understand the difference here in using the words unit and element, the unit is something you would expect would remain together, maneuver together, and fight together, as if they were one. The command element can theoretically have all of its members at different locations, engaged in the exercise of command in the various ways that is done. So, in theory if there were ten men in the command element, they could, in theory, be at ten different locations all engaged in carrying out the commander's wishes and orders. It is like when we spoke on the other thread about your 88mm gun. You chose to portray it in game piece fashion having everything that belonged to that gun in one small locality. Reality is that the gun would be separated from its prime mover at a goodly distance, and the crew separated between gun, prime mover, gun security, and some poor son of a bitch hauling ammunition from another truck a hundred yards away. None of them therefore would fit on the base of a game piece, if you were in the real world, as opposed to the gaming table. Battles are fought in the real world.  

6) I am well aware of what you are giving me, and as far as I know the Indians did say exactly that. The thing is that may be completely accurate, but you do not have enough data contained therein to make any further conclusions, that are also factual. The only fact is 30 soldiers, 20 dead horses. Nothing else.

7) Who knows when Hughes died. If he had any goddamned sense he would have thrown the goddamned thing to the ground, grabbed his carbine rather than waving that stupid guidon around like some bloody fool, drawing both attention to himself and incoming fire.

Ian: The one thing I despise about this battle is the fill in the blanks story telling that has gone on unabated since 26 June 1876. When one has few facts and fills in the areas unknown with speculation, passed off as fact, there is a name for that - HISTORICAL FICTION, not history. If I want to read good historical fiction, as I love to do, I go to someone who knows how to write it like Shaara, or the late Paul Wellman. I sure as hell don't go to Grey or Wagner. They write historical fiction too, but it is far from good or plausible historical fiction.

I am going to close by giving you an example of, in this instance, Grey's historical fiction. He talks about the detail from Company F. He has absolutely no idea there was any such detail, and further no idea where that detail came from, were the detail itself a fact. HE MADE IT UP. Now would it be a good idea to have such a point detail out in front of Custer's battalion? It sure as hell would be. It is totally consistent with proper Tactics-Techniques-Procedures (TTP), but no one knows if anything of the kind was in fact employed, or if it was, who (what unit) provided such a detail. In Grey's warped vision of things he has it set in his mind that Company F was the leading company in column. No one knows who was in the lead, that is fact. In Grey's world though it was absolutely Company F, and therefore they too must have provided the detail, whose existence cannot be verified. Are you starting to see the picture now? 

So in summation, let me say this. No one will ever stir my ire, or get in any trouble with me if they refer to these vast amount of unknowns in terms of I THINK, I SPECULATE. MAYBE, MIGHT BE, COULD BE. and I will even accept SHOULD HAVE BEEN. Where I see red is when someone says he KNOWS, when he or she has no possible way of knowing. I extend that further to the same standard we use in our courts KNOWING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. That is my standard, and you know better than most that I can speculate with the best of them. Speculation is stirring mental exercise, but I would never commit that speculation to writing without clearly labeling it as such.

I do hope you are feeling better.

[yanmacca]

Jul 27, 2020 20:47:07 GMT quincannon said:

I do hope you are feeling better.

Thanks Chuck, you have always been my favourite!

[deadwoodgultch]

Chuck. to your #2 the troops found in and around Deep Ravine were probably pushed and chased from the ridge that is now the Cemetery, after losing their mounts. This, to Ian's point is where the Suicide Boys may have been in action. These troops never ascended LSH, maybe they were cut off while acting as a rear guard. This is somewhat supposition, backed up by Sioux art work displayed at the Brinton Museum and last years conversation with the current head of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers Society. The Sioux Art was done by a participant. Steve has posted up a picture of that elsewhere. This account dovetails nicely with JSIT's narrative given to Mary Liberty as taken from participants.

As a follow up yo my previous post, I would like to expand upon the fact that the village was asleep, I think one of the quotes attributed to GAC was "We caught them napping, boys". This assemblage of Native Americans was prepared all Spring and Summer for the expected assaults' by the Army.

The individual tribes traveled in a specific order. The Cheyenne at the head of the column followed by the Oglala,(Brule-Blackfeet-&Two Kettle), Minniconjou, Sans Arc, and lastly the Hunkpapa. This may have been strategic as well as tactically designed.

The Cheyenne traveled first due to the fact they rarely resided or visited their Ft. Robinson Reservation, they were truly wild roamers, They knew the territory and were fierce fighters and superior hunters. The Oglala were made up, for the most part by Crazy Horses' band. Crazy horses band was allied with the Cheyenne and he was a member of one of their Warrior Societies. The Brule, Blackfeet, and the Two Kettles were an amalgamation of smaller tribes not as familiar with the area. The Minniconjou were a group made up of wild roamers and Reservation Indians as were the Sans Arcs. The Hunkpapa was a large group and mostly free roamers under Sitting Bull, Gall, and Crow King. The Hunkpapa protected the rear, the Cheyenne and Oglala were the tip of the spear.

As reservation Indians joined throughout the Spring they joined their respective tribe and family groups. While many experts say that the Indian fought as individuals, they were arrayed to know what the guy next to them would do in a given situation, that goes for the leaders down to the newest warrior.

Numbers for the individual tribal circles at the Little Bighorn were(as counted by soldiers) Cheyenne 120 lodges, Oglala 240 lodges, (Brule, Blackfeet & Two Kettle)120 lodges, Minniconjou 150 lodges, Sans Arc 110 lodges, and Hunkpapa 235 lodges. Additionally there were nearly 400 Wikiups to the north and west of the Cheyenne.

I guess what I am saying is that even if some were napping that afternoon, there were more lodges (975) than Custer had troopers. That is not counting the Wikiups.

The lack of scouting, planning, sharing the overall plan, fall back plan, and lack of a stationary/stable command ad control center cost GAC and the 7th dearly.

There was one person asleep at the switch, however.

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

Chased from Cemetery Ridge is the only logical explanation for the story, a story I find to be perfectly plausible and consistent with what happens in battle. It is completely illogical for the story to have been chased from LSH or Battle Ridge (anyplace on it) down the complete length of Cemetery Ravine, ending up in Deep Ravine near the river. My point is that this is what the trash peddlers have put out for a hundred forty years, and still do. They are numb skulls and they peddle their shit to such an extent that most people believe it. Most people do not have the benefit of the - Wait a goddamned minute, that does not make sense minds, that inhabit this board.

Please tell me you do not take "We caught them napping" seriously or literally. What does the typical Sunday afternoon look like in America? That is what Custer saw. At rest perhaps, but certainly not asleep. If they were in fact asleep those sleeping sons of bitches sure showed Custer how to take a dirt nap.

I concur on scouting. You forgot reconnaissance (scouting and reconnaissance are two different things). I also concur on failure to make his plan known to all concerned, and lack of a contingency plan. I disagree on the need for a stationary/stable command post. His command post should have been exactly where it was, in the saddle and mobile. His two mistakes in that regard were failing again to tell all concerned where he would most probably be, and him not positioning himself so he could completely observe and direct what promised to be a mobile battle. Had he done these two things and stuck to them it would have been impossible for him to move as far north as he did without losing control.

In a mobile battle Tom, the commander must have his finger on the battle, as it is prone to rapid changes. You can not adequately exercise command and control in such circumstances from a stationary/stable location. You must be as mobile as the forces you command, lest you not be in a position to see then react to what inevitably is an ever changing, fluid, set of circumstances. The trick is to keep mobile, while still exercising positive command and control. It is a mistake committed by the best of commanders, to be so mobile. so out front, trying to accomplish the first requirement of this two edged sword, that you lose sight of the second requirement, maintaining control. The best historical example of what I am saying here is Rommel's "Race to the Wire" during the Crusader battles. He was so concerned  with the opportunity one part of the Panzer Armee had, that he lost sight, and then control of the other forces under his command. Had it not been for the moral courage of two of his staff officers Westphal, and von Mellenthin, who overrode Rommel's orders, he would have lost his entire army. 

Lodges, warrior societies, and most things Indian have no real interest for me. I care about how they fought and not much else.

[azranger]

There is a chance that Cheyennes may have staked themselves to the ground to prevent soldiers from crossing at Deep Ravine. There were sacred items right across the river by some accounts. Look at the markers that are west of the deep gully and they are consistent with those accounts.

Regards 

Steve 

[deadwoodgultch]

Quincannon posted, "I concur on scouting. You forgot reconnaissance (scouting and reconnaissance are two different things)". To your point, Chuck,I completely agree that recon is different than scouting, but the rush to battle precluded that. However, the "Boy General" did not even avail himself of the resources he had at hand. He was informed of the size of the village at the Crow's Nest from the size of the pony herd. He knew the location of the village due to the fact that his Crow scouts themselves had camped and hunted there. Now he did the right thing by sending troops to the left to search for satellite camps. He also had at hand Herendeen and Mitch Bouyer. This was the second misuse of Herendeen, Herendeen had been here just 2 years earlier and had fought these ssme Indians on these same grounds. John Gibbon called Bouyer "next to Jim Bridger, the best guide in the country". At the Crow's Nest, Boyer was one of the scouts who warned Custer about the size of the Indian village, which Custer claimed he couldn't make out. Boyer told him, "General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever known of." After failing to convince Custer, it is reported Boyer gave away his possessions, convinced he would die in the coming battle. These two, Herendeen and Bouyer new the ground, they were not used, After seeing the village, for himself Custer chose to head north over broken ground, rather than detour less that a half mile to the east and avoid the time consuming task of taking "the direct route". He would have remained out of sight, saved wear on his horses, and arrived at the north end of the village quicker.
Custer was a man in a hurry to restore is reputation, and gain a quick victory after his time spent in Washington intrigue and pissing off his commander and chief.

Proper tactics, as I see it would have been to follow up Reno's attack south of the village and to use the high ground south of Reno's crossing point(the picture I sent you 4 or 5 years ago via Joan's cell) as a command center and rallying point. You can see the marker on LSH from there and view the entire valley area.

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

I do not concur with your views here.

The rush to battle is never an excuse for not having reconnoitered properly. Yes he did have many the things that you mention, but those things were not nearly enough to enable successful attack planning. Having the best scout, or someone who had been to that location before is not enough. What Custer was missing were the "essential elements of information" (EEI) that are necessary to effectively know of the enemy disposition in detail, and their present activity.

What is often overlooked I believe is that the Indians had given Custer all the time he would require for adequate reconnaissance and battle planning, and Custer did not make use of it. Had he been completely aware of the situation before him he would have known that at the Crow's Nest. If those Indians were still in camp at that time that Sunday morning they were not going to move that day. The earliest estimated move time then would be in the early morning of Monday the 26th. That would give Custer a full day to gather in all of the EEI he needed.

Another huge mistake was sending Benteen out to gather information on any outlying village circles. Had Custer done what was suggested above he could have attained that information on the afternoon of the 25th with no more than two or three personnel directed (by EEI) to obtain that information. As it is, by his hasty and wasteful movements, he was forced to send one fourth of his combat power to both obtain that information and do something about it at the same time. Had he waited and had he done what any right minded commander would do under those circumstances he would have then known there was nothing to fear from that quarter, and he could have adjusted his distribution of forces accordingly.

Haste makes waste. There is no excuse for frivolous haste, when that haste is not necessary. Haste, driving your people forward is not a bad thing in itself. It is only bad when the situation does not call for it. This situation did not call for haste. It called for deliberate reconnaissance, good planning, and decisive execution.

I also disagree on this fixation you seem to have on some kind of fixed location command center. Not for a mobile battle. That position would be very nice, for that very purpose under some circumstances, but not this one. An Infantry slug fest perhaps, but not maneuvering two or three mobile elements, that you must retain positive control over.

What no one seems to realize here, and I also include those in other places that comment on this battle, is that had Custer had an overwhelming force at his disposal, the need for a more thorough reconnaissance would not have been as vital as it was. He could have afforded to send Benteen out on what proved to be a wild goose chase. He could have attacked when he did, with little fear of situational reversal of fortune. He did not have that overwhelming force, and going in he knew he was outnumbered better than two to one, which in the end proved to be at least a couple of times more than two to one. A commander in the circumstances Custer found himself in that morning of the 25th called for concentration of forces, and a thorough knowledge of just where to hit, that would do the most damage. Something like that can only be done when it is based on timely up to the minute information. Possession of that information would mean that where he did decide to hit would give him the best chance of overall success, and even more important it would insure that he was not biting off more than he could chew on any sector of that battlefield. He would have been able to allocate portions of his force based upon what he knew was in front of him rather than guessing what was in front of him, and where the application if his own force would do the most good. He did none of these things.  

[deadwoodgultch]

He needed a safe place to park his pack train and a rallying point to fall back on, if plan A did not work. Then again he never shared a plan A. Please remember, that I am a lowly wing washer, not a combat vet. Be gentle.

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

Anyone who goes into battle without a plan B, and maybe even a Plan C, if things do not go as they wish is a ninny, unfit for command at any level including a mess hall.

Part of that planning would be to get the non-essentials for battle out of the way, and leave them to the security and supervision of someone designated that responsibility, including what to do about moving and under what circumstances. It would also include the designation of a regimental rally point in case of a reversal of fortune.

Perhaps you should confine your talents to the mess hall, but even in a mess hall you have a Plan B to serve shit on a shingle, if your deep fryer gives out before you can cook the chicken. All that meaning that anyone who sets out in this life to do anything had better have an alternative in mind just in case what they plan to do proves to be impossible with the resources at hand.

You do not deserve gentle, nor will you get it from me.

[azranger]

Tom

I think William would agree with you. He states that the decision point in Reno Creek where he could either follow Reno or move to the bluffs was decisive and a bad decision. He believe Custer erred by not following Reno and maintaining control over the regiment. Col Hoyt agrees with William but his issue is the Center of Gravity (COG). His paper on the horse herd being the COG lays out why he feels Custer went the wrong way. 

I believe Benteen was sent to cut off the south fork of Reno Creek (SFRC). There had been a fight there two years before and Herendeen would know it is well used travel corridor. He fought against 600 warriors in SFRC. I visited that site a few years ago. I think they observed Indians in Reno Creek also.  So Benteen would block that escape route and then join the regiment. If he was delayed because of contact he was to notify Custer. There was no need to notify Custer since no contact was made. The route Benteen took was across drainages and just as he describes. He ends up around 5 miles upstream SFRC and is there before Custer passes. Seeing no Indians (Gibson) they return to Reno Creek  and arrive between Custer and the pack train.  My question is why wouldn't Custer inform Reno and Benteen that he was not going to follow Reno into the valley and tell Benteen what he wanted him to do? Is it because he doesn't know where Benteen is at?

I think that hill we looked at would be good place to park the pack train.

Regards

Steve

[azranger]

The U.S. Army's Sioux Campaign of 1876: Identifying the Horse as the Center of Gravity of the Sioux

By Hoyt, Mark V. If the Army had a complete understanding of the Sioux they would have realized that the hub of all power or center of gravity of the Sioux was the horse, which every major aspect of Sioux life was augmented and dependent upon. The first three expeditions of the Sioux Campaign of 1876 demonstrate that: senior Army commanders planned their campaigns, expeditions, and organizations around their knowledge of Sioux mobility, the primary source of power for the Sioux warrior was mobility gained from the horse, Army forces could not bring their advantage in firepower to bear on Sioux warriors.


apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a416928.pdf