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Post by deadwoodgultch on Dec 20, 2015 14:27:10 GMT
Did GAC leave the sabre's due to noise or lack of training and ability of the troopers? How proficient were the troopers firing while riding or mounted, pistol or carbine? What was the level of horsemanship command wide? How many tales have we heard of horses carrying their riders where they pleased? What was the overall level of marksmanship of the command? Roughly 130 of the troops deployed had a year or less, how many rounds had they put down range? How many troops were left at the depot due to, in part, lack of mounts? Who's responsibility was that?
There are more issues, one of the biggest I left out.
We have modern military officers and EM's posting here, what do they feel about the readiness of this command. This might be unfair to ask as they did not serve in the later half of the 19th century.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Dec 20, 2015 15:31:09 GMT
In accessing readiness, it does not matter what the individual soldier is capable of, how well he can ride, how well he can shoot, how well he can handle a saber. What matters is to collective ability of all of the soldiers in a given unit. Some will always be better than others by natural ability. Some will retain skills longer than others. Some will have more experience in field craft, and it goes on a on.
What is important in accessing readiness is the collective level of training of the whole, the ability to function at a certain level together. Regardless of the individual levels of training, if these soldiers had not trained together in the last six months, they were, what is the word - lousy. I don't mean a trip to the range, or some parade ground swordplay, or a ride in the countryside. I mean training over a relatively short time prior to employment in combat, that increases in intensity on a daily basis, until the training becomes far harder than combat itself.
Given three months you can get any unit into shape. There is no excuse now, nor was there then in that time, and long before that time, to take any unit into battle, that is not battle worthy.
There is only one man to blame for the readiness level of the 7th Cavalry, and that one man is the commander. Time was available, and it is no matter that he faced the shortfalls and obstacles to readiness he faced, a commander, who has the right to call himself that will find a way to minimize those shortfalls and adapt to that which confronts him.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 20, 2015 18:58:32 GMT
Tom, this NCO wrote a journal in which he describes some of things you mention, Billy Keogh or Capt. Conz used to post up parts of it on the “arrow dodging horse board” linkThis book looks like a good read actually, just by reading the paragraph it says that it covers fields of fire, weapon effects, training, morale and decision-making. link
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