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Post by quincannon on Jul 25, 2017 17:55:34 GMT
Eighty percent of AP, how were hey packaged, as clipped, loose, or linked.
I might buy linked but am rather suspicious of them being of all types of packaging. That makes no sense to me. None at all.
If a rifleman of that period wanted to go at an armored vehicle of any type, the weapon of choice was the rifle grenade. He might achieve a mobility kill, and if very fortunate could set something on the vehicle on fire. The doctrine at the time was to let the armor pass through and engage accompanying Infantry. You always want to separate tanks, or any armored vehicle from its Infantry and first kill the Infantry, then the armor. Disrupt the combined arms team was the objective.
The only protocol that exists in a rifle company is --- Take this stuff, aim at the enemy, and shoot it.
I can only tell you that the only tracer I ever saw was linked. That is the only place I ever saw AP too. The only thing the rifleman had was ball, and the grenadiers had a few loose crimps in their pockets to use with their rifle grenades.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 25, 2017 22:58:12 GMT
Loose, I told you about the Armorer the other day, it was a favor, 25 rounds.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 26, 2017 1:28:57 GMT
How was it packaged? If it was not in a box of twenty, and loose really means loose as in unpackaged, then they very well may have been linked at one time or other
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 26, 2017 9:38:29 GMT
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 26, 2017 12:40:01 GMT
I do recall reading that US infantry used to place their 57mm ATGs some ways behind the infantry, I would expect that this way the bazookas could take their toll first, but I would guess that any infantry attack would be under intense fire once it got with 100m, because of the amount of automatic weapons available.
I couldn't see any need for tracer rounds to be included in a rifle clip, in a belt yes, as the main point of tracers was to show were your rounds are falling, these would act as a guide to find the area under fire.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 26, 2017 15:21:15 GMT
First off, the 57mm Anti Tank gun was an Infantry Weapon manned by Infantrymen, so no the U S Army did not place the 57mm behind the Infantry because they themselves were the Infantry. Were they most often employed slightly behind and supported by riflemen, yes they were, that is true, but not always.
Second, I have not checked the TO&E's for some time but I recall that the 2.36" rocket launcher was an unassigned "in the trailer" weapon, brought out and employed only when needed. I think (without checking) that the idea of dedicated RL crews came after Korea.
The 2.36" and 3.5" were last resort weapons, not any good at much more than 200 meters if that. The worst thing you can do with them is fire them at tanks coming from your front, especially if there are two or more tanks. You might get a kill on one, but you will not live to enjoy it. So there are no bazookas (I hate that name) taking their toll first.
Anti-Armor defenses like defense itself must be fully integrated to be effective. It starts with the regiment/brigade identifying the high speed avenues of approach into their area of responsibility, and allocating resources to address those avenues. In WWII that meant that the regimental commander would allocate his 57mm's and attached company of tank destroyers to plug those avenues. At that point he would assign his three battalions to cover the rest of his sector and support those AT weapons.
Still the idea was if the enemy attacked you with tanks and Infantry, separate the tanks from the Infantry. Kill the Infantry and the tanks are both blind and useless. KILL THE INFANTRY, they are your most dangerous opponents. Then take on the tanks wherever they may be.
The only place you can get away with tanks not being closely supported by Infantry IS, let me see, NOWHERE.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 26, 2017 15:53:48 GMT
No you are correct the 2.36in RL , but in my TO&E I have five 2.36in RLs kept at company HQ, these had no crews as such but seeing that you had up to a dozen basic in this unit, then I suppose you could use them as crewmen, if your company was reduced due to losses, then I suppose it was down to any Joe in the squad to fire it, if and when needed.
I agree if you managed to separate the tanks from their infantry support they are vulnerable, but doing this would be a challenge in itself, what if they were panzer grenadiers riding in armoured half-tracks?
Also what type of tank they were attacked by as the 57mm was known to be wanting against the German heavies, unless they got really close.
I suppose it comes down to what the commander had available to supplement his defense line, what if there was no tank destroyers in the area?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 26, 2017 16:42:08 GMT
In the defense those RL's would be parceled out to the rifle platoons, and the crew was made up of "you and you come here".
If they were panzer grenadiers in a half track, they would get out of that half track, or be dead. The half track then used for fire support. The half track was a means of transportation and fire support. It was an armored personnel carrier, not an Infantry fighting vehicle. Infantry fighting vehicles differ from half tracks only that one is a larger coffin than the other.
The 57mm was a piece of crap against armor. It had some value, in built up areas and against Infantry with canister rounds, but against armor it was generally useless,except for the occasional mobility kill. Even the 57mm RR was pitiful. The 75mm a little better. The 105/106mm RR's especially the 106 with the 50 Cal spotter rifle were the only things tanks really had to fear until the TOE came along, but the larger RR's did not appear until Korea and after.
"What if they were no tank destroyers". Then you either set up in woods, forests, and built up areas, used every bit of artillery within range, or you kissed your ass good by.
The best anti-tank weapon is a tank with a high velocity main gun. Everything else is a wantabee. Tanks must be joined at the hip with Infantry, under most circumstances. The tank is nothing more than a well armored gun system, meant to support the advance of, or defense by Infantry. No matter who or whatever you read, that is a basic fact. They are like bread and butter. The tank cannot be effective without Infantry and the Infantry under most circumstances cannot be as effective without the tank.
The only thing that remains then is how to package the tank-Infantry team. If you need high mobility of both, you package it as a heavy brigade today, and then as an armored division. If you need medium mobility you package it as medium Infantry (WWII and Korea U S Infantry was medium Infantry ) with one or two tank battalions in support of a division sized element. If you look at the Korea U S Division you see a separate tank battalion, and three additional very strong tank (22 tanks) companies, one per regiment. Best damned division the U S ever fielded in my opinion.
Never ever forget that the rifleman is the ultimate weapon. He will find you and kill you. He is the Queen (the Chess Queen) of Battle. everything else is his jockstrap that exists only for one purpose, to support the rifleman.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Jul 26, 2017 17:00:24 GMT
No you are correct the 2.36in RL , but in my TO&E I have five 2.36in RLs kept at company HQ, these had no crews as such but seeing that you had up to a dozen basic in this unit, then I suppose you could use them as crewmen, if your company was reduced due to losses, then I suppose it was down to any Joe in the squad to fire it, if and when needed.
I agree if you managed to separate the tanks from their infantry support they are vulnerable, but doing this would be a challenge in itself, what if they were panzer grenadiers riding in armoured half-tracks?
Also what type of tank they were attacked by as the 57mm was known to be wanting against the German heavies, unless they got really close.
I suppose it comes down to what the commander had available to supplement his defense line, what if there was no tank destroyers in the area?
Ian, Very interesting topic. I appreciate the tactics that you and the others have discussed and they seem logical to me. However, depending of course on availability and terrain, my first choice would be air power. Knock out those tanks before they got anywhere near you. What was it Capt Miller (Pvt Ryan} called them "Angels on our shoulder". Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jul 26, 2017 17:58:44 GMT
Air cover, specifically close air support is essential in the practice of combined arms warfare, but I would ask you Benteen, how effective was close air support in the first eight days of the Bulge
Angels on your shoulder need to see the devil in the wood line or those angels are nothing more than the Sugar Plumb Fairy of your dreams.
Combined arms is a combination, where every portion of that combination has a part to play. To do that effectively they must have overlapping capabilities.
When you preface anything with the words "depending of course on availability and terrain" you put yourself in a jackpot of not available and unsuitable terrain. Fighting forces must be designed with the amount of redundancy to take into consideration periods of non-availability, and must also be able to fight on any terrain, good or not so.
It is very true that at a place like Chosin for instance that air power in general, and close air support in particular saved a Marine division. Had the weather been that of December 16-24,1944 in the Ardennes however the 1st Marine Division would have ceased to exist. You cannot, in designing a force depend upon any one thing, rather you must design it to incorporate all, but be redundant enough to give the red headed step child a day off and still fight through.
Bastogne is a prime example of what I am talking about here. Had it been the 101st Airborne Division alone they would have lasted two or three days then been run over like a freight train and destroyed. There was also in Bastogne two combat commands of two different armored division, the remnants of another Infantry regiment (the 110th) and an artillery group of either two or three battalions I forget which. Alone the 101st was weak as a kitten for any sustained combat. They were not designed for such. It was after the war based on lessons learned in the Bulge and in Holland, that the airborne division became just like any other Infantry division (to include organic tanks and heavier artillery). So when you see these stories of a bunch of airborne supermen fighting off all that the panzers could throw at them, remember that there were two division equivalents in Bastogne, and there was a good deal of armor. That is what made the difference when fighter bombers could not fly.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Jul 26, 2017 18:15:14 GMT
Dan,
I don't agree. The right term is not air force, it is long range fire support. We have radios down to fire team level, in SF down to individual. The MBITR radio is a great short term radio, in an emergency, in certain circumstances, you can hit a comsat and ask Trump his golf score. (I gave the brief to increasing the fielding from 1 per ODA to 12, long, boring story. The Colonel at USSOCOM who went from opposed to support is the funny part. Google Dave/Dianne Schroer).
Air planes are scarce assets. We have far less than WW2. To have them in support requires extensive planning. Else, you are competing with every other element in your area of operations.
What we have know is better integration. You can call on support from every fire support asset in range. I remember 3rd Special Forces Group used to have a vignette, on how how a team in trouble in Afghanistan got in trouble, and ended up getting help from a cruise missile from a Navy ship. I think you understand how far Afghan is from the ocean.
But a Navy SEAL Team was destroyed in Operations Red Wings, because they refused support from USMC artillery units on their area. They wanted sexier fire support. It doesn't matter who saves your butt, point is, its your butt. If a Boy Scout sling shot troop is in range when I am in contact, give it your best, boys.
What matters today is a premium on planning. Who is in support range, with what assets, with what ranges and response times. Frequently we still have errors in planning here, within our service, between services, and in particular with other nations.
The US element that should be experts on this is SOF, especially Army SF. The actual experts on this, in US and global, are USMC MAGTF. USMC has spent their existence underfunded and overcommitted by the DoN (Department of the Navy, the claim that the USMC is a 4th service is propaganda, they are under the DoN). So they got smarter, while the other services got complacent.
I understand your point that communications technology allows firepower at levels that could not be conceived in WW2. But remember that means the element the theater commander decides to support. So if 20 engagements going on today, somebody has overwhelming fire support. And somebody else is scavenging dead and wounded for bullets, grenades, water.
I would say the gap between massive support and a fiasco has never been larger in US military history. (My combat experience is US, and I have been at the extremes of supported and not supported. How about calling in your preplanned air support at a critical phase in battle, and being told they were diverted to some other units cockup, which directly caused your mission to fail?
Bottom Line: There is a complexity to modern battle. Massive firepower to the same tactics used in 1976. Planning matters, communications matters. And sometimes we rely on the courage and initiative of an individual soldier/marine, in a desperate situation.
I think theater commanders have too much power, local commanders too little. In GWOT, decisive support decisions are frequently made by the theatre commander. CENTCOM headquarters is in Tampa Florida. For you Brits here, your combat support requests in Afghanistan are being decided by a US HQ, in a totally different time zone.
Now you may be mad. What does an Afghan unit think, who are also having the decision on whether they live or die, made by foreigners thousands of miles away.
So What: Our communications technology allows a new command and control architecture, to optimize abilities. But we have dinosaur command and control. No decision on ire support in Afghanistan should be made by a commander not in Afghanistan. Commanders out of theater should be barred by law and regulations from impacting any decision within 24 hours. This means an Afghan LTG may end up changing support decisions of a US Colonel. Who cares. That should be SOP.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 26, 2017 19:42:59 GMT
The movie “saving Private Ryan” was loosely based on the battle for La Fiére causeway, which had a bridge that and road which ran over the Merderet river. The causeway was defended by men from the 507th Parachute infantry regiment and these were attacked by elements of the German 1067th grenadier regiment supported by tanks of the 100th Panzer reserve training battalion. Now in the film we see Tiger tanks plus other goodies, but in real life the 100th Panzer battalion was equipped with French tanks captured in 1940 plus a few old Panzer IIIs, here is how a company from this the Airborne regiment stopped this attack, see how they positioned their platoons and had three lines of defense in which the Germans had to break through. The first was a belt of mines, the second two bazooka teams and the third a 57mm ATG, two platoons set up on both flaks and one was left in reserve.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Jul 26, 2017 20:51:34 GMT
When you preface anything with the words "depending of course on availability and terrain" you put yourself in a jackpot of not available and unsuitable terrain.
Quincannon. When I say depending on availability and terrain, thats exactly what I mean. Air power would be my prefrence in dealing with tanks and if it was available to me I would use it. If it is not available than obviously I would have to come up with something else such as the weapons and tactics that you and others have described. Keeping in mind I would still be prepared to use them in any event. As far as a jackpot is concerned, yes, any commander that formulated a plan which revolved around or included a support element that he didnt know was available would be foolish and probably would wind up in a jackpot. Be Well Dan
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Jul 26, 2017 21:20:16 GMT
Colonel Montrose, I appreciate your very informative post. Anything you say about the Middle East or any other theater of conflict for that matter, I take to the bank as gospel. Truth be told sir, my post was in response to the theme of the previous posts which was the weaponry and tactics used to take out armor during WWII. My preference would be air power or the modern term "Long Range Fire Support" Sorry Colonel havent been in the military for almost 50 years, My God has it been that long, and I am not familiar with some of the modern terms Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jul 27, 2017 0:35:06 GMT
It cannot Benteen, be your preferred tactic. You as a ground force commander do not own air assets. They belong to someone else. They are not sitting up there waiting for you to be attacked by tanks or anything else. You cannot count on them, you do not own them, therefore you cannot plan on using them.
Air assets are assigned on a preplanned basis in the attack, and an on call basis in the defense. Priority of air is just like priority of fires. If you are not on the priority list, or you are lower down on that list, you get squat.
The point I am making here, is both for you and for people who have not had the advantages you have had. Reading what you have written gives those that have not had experience the erroneous idea that you can preplan a defensive array that has close air support as your prime or preferred means of doing (fill in the blank). What I am telling you and everyone else is that you cannot do that as a matter of course.
You cannot plan for anything that you cannot control. If you are given assets, then you may tell those who control them what you want to see, where they will do the most good, what your most critical requirements are. What you do not have though is anything in the time of need that you do not control. When you call for air it is like Dial A Prayer. If you prayer is answered good for you. If not you damned well have had alternatives worked out from within that which you own.
Now this is exactly what Montrose was telling you, and I still do not think you understand. You understand the jackpot, but I do not believe you are grasping the underlying causes of getting thrown in that jackpot.
Look up what an air tasking order is, and tell me then if you really want to base your planning on what that tells you.
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