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Post by Beth on Oct 31, 2015 1:41:29 GMT
Do you think that given the limits of communications and supplies in 1876, it had a chance of working?
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 31, 2015 12:21:37 GMT
I think it could have been Beth, especially if the three Columns were working towards the same goal, imagine if each of the three columns had used advanced scouts who operated well ahead of each column say a couple of days ride forward, now these scouts would have to work together too by sending riders not only back and to with the columns but with the scouts from the other columns, and once the main village was located then they must shadow the place in case it moved, so once they have discovered the village then each column could keep to a time schedule with the scouts bringing them all together to within a days ride of one and other, but at the end of the day such planning was not envisaged by any army in this period, and the bottom line was that they were only fighting natives.
Yan.
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Oct 31, 2015 14:09:11 GMT
Do you think that given the limits of communications and supplies in 1876, it had a chance of working? Hi Beth, Are you referring to the overall campaign or the battle? Both had three columns. In both cases I would say the answer is maybe. The campaign would depend on how a successful campaign was defined. If you're referring to the battle, it would require some major modifications of Custer's plan, but a three-column attack doesn't automatically mean failure and defeat. Cheers, conrad |
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Post by quincannon on Oct 31, 2015 15:21:47 GMT
The three column movement associated with the campaign were operational movements, and I see no issue with this as long as the three columns are individually resourced, and considering the communications issues have a good deal of pre-campaign coordination.
There is nothing wrong with the use of the three column set up in the tactical aspects of the battle either. It was not the three columns themselves that undid Custer. It was the fact that using the three columns as he did he failed to achieve mass, by the manner in which he used them.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 31, 2015 18:39:14 GMT
The three columns were also not even, I don't have the figures at hand but I think that Crook had the largest, then Terry then Gibbon, as I have said before they couldn't even give a full cavalry regiment to each column as a cavalry regiment and infantry regiment per column should not have been a big ask considering the area they have to cover to locate the hostiles.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Oct 31, 2015 19:19:57 GMT
I often wonder if the biggest fault in the plan is that they felt they could 'trap' the NA in 'the center." I suspect that the NA could make use of escape routes that the more--for a lack of better term-European influenced planning-never considered.
It seems to me that it was more of a plan to make the public happy that the army was finally doing something about the Indians than anything else.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 31, 2015 19:36:40 GMT
It looks like Terry and Crook were suppose to locate any hostile villages and if resistance is met then dish out some heat, Gibbon really didn't carry that much mobility and was lighter on troops, obviously the powers that be must have expected the hostiles to turn and try to out run these larger and more mobile columns and end up hitting Gibbon column who would then hold them until the others arrive to complete an encirclement, but I will let the more experienced ex-officer chaps to divulge what they make of it all.
I have just found some old data on the columns and it says that both Terry and Gibbon had three Gatling guns each, so if this is true then the Terry column minus Custer was almost the same size as Gibbons and had the same mobility too, so maybe both of these columns were to do a similar job by holding any hostile attack using infantry and Gatling guns, leaving Custer and Crook to do the maneuvering.
But forgive me if I am wrong, as this was old data.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Oct 31, 2015 19:53:32 GMT
So perhaps the plan was to narrow down the possible field of battle, have Terry and Gibbon act as a sort of cork or if you wish anvil, then Crook and Custer were to pressure the NA into the range of the guns. Kind of roughly like Sand Creek without the using the dangling carrot of 'peace."
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679 
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Post by dave on Oct 31, 2015 20:18:31 GMT
Beth
Perhaps the root cause of the failure of the Army's 1876 campaign was underestimating the Indians' response to cavalry's presence? None of the military leaders expected the Indians to stand and fight but rather they would scatter.
I believe Custer and the others were afraid they would be unable to round up all the summer campers and force them back to the reservations. Hubris is a dangerous personality trait.
Regards
Dave
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Post by Beth on Oct 31, 2015 20:44:34 GMT
I guess the adage "know thy enemy' wasn't thought to have applied?
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Post by quincannon on Nov 1, 2015 0:13:47 GMT
If anyone takes the field against an armed opponent thinking it will be easy, that person is a fool.
There was a Colonel in the Japanese Army that thought along those lines in August of 1942.His unit, a reinforced battalion of about 1100 attacked much like Custer did, in fits and starts with no apparent objective, and was wiped out nearly to a man.
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Post by Beth on Nov 1, 2015 0:18:32 GMT
It is kind of sad that history is full of examples of one side of conflict attacking while having absolutely no understanding of their enemy or even worse, their perception filtered by prejudice.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 1, 2015 21:05:18 GMT
Is it? I am not so sure. In fact I hope that anyone that would attack us has no understanding of us or that their perception of us is filtered by prejudice. We have done pretty well over the last couple of centuries with enemies like that.
The only trick is not to make the same mistake.
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