Misinformation about the number of Hostiles

[Beth]

How did the misinformation about the number of Hostiles effect the whole campaign, not just Little Bighorn.  Would the whole campaign been planned differently?

[quincannon]

Probably the same way that we lost track of the IJN carrier pre-Pearl Harbor, failed to detect the 5th Panzer, 6th Panzer, and 7th Armies pre-Bulge, and so many other occasions.

Intelligence, and raw numbers of your enemy is intelligence, does not become intelligence until someone looks at it, and draws conclusions about the accuracy and validity of the information gathered.

[yanmacca]

I think you have to look how intelligence was gathered in those days, and with this being a campaign against a force of Indians the best way would be to ask the various agencies to give estimates of who and how many have left, the other way would be from Indians who glean info from other Indians and pass it on to the military, but both ways would not be reliable or inaccurate and a lot of it down to guess work.

Yan.

[Beth]

I've been thinking about Rosebud versus LBH. Custer had the ability to gather a lot of information locally that there was a large number of hostiles in the area. Did Crook have anything besides the official reports to base his understanding about how many "hostiles' were out there? Would the route Crook taken have given him the ability to gain the same information?

[dave]

Yan welcome back. Hope you had a good time. Did you see any ships QC could make? He is only doing about 3 dozen right now.

I think Custer was not really concerned about numbers as much as he was having Kellogg along and the opportunity to spank the Indians for the glory. I don't think he thought much about anything but himself. He's kinda like my cat, Gracie, who knows it is all about her.
Regards
Dave

[yanmacca]

It looked like both Crook and Custer were basing their plans on speed, Crook mounted as many Infantry on mules to aid with their mobility and Custer kept up a good pace too, so I would expect that both men thought that they would be chasing rather than fighting a pitched battle.

Thanks Dave, no models I am afraid but I saw what looked like a Spanish galleon come sailing past the beach, it was choca full of tourists and by the rate of knots it was traveling it was using more than just wind power, I have a shot of it on my camera.

Yan.

[Beth]

Speed would be essential when you are trying to catch up with a moving village.

[quincannon]

No it isn't. Think about it.

No matter what your force consists of, cavalry, Infantry mounted on mules, Infantry walking, you can still move faster than a village. Warriors alone and unencumbered are a different matter.

Speed, most of the time is your enemy in pursuit. You know the enemy is out there somewhere, so the wise commander takes his time lest speed bring about ambush and destruction.

The tactical solution is like the hare, slow and steady. You just keep on coming. Do it long enough, and be persistent enough, and one of two things will happen. You will either catch them, or they will be forced to backtrack and address you. Either way you will be fit to fight.

What have all of you said one time or the other, about the physical condition of Custer's horses and men on the day of battle? How many people do you know that hurrying to catch a football kickoff, or some other such "urgent" matter has led to tragic consequences. If you don't catch them today there is always tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow. Speed Kills.

There are very few tactical situations where speed (in pursuit) MUST overcome security. LBH was not one of them.

Also remember as you deliberate these matters, that the ONLY advantage cavalry has over their dismounted brethren, is short term mobility. The price you pay for that short term mobility is a much larger and therefore less mobile logistical tail.

All military operations have a series of trade offs associated with them. How much more operationally mobile (in 1876) was cavalry vice Infantry. The answer is not much. Both could move 20 miles a day with no strain on physical condition whatsoever. Stretch that, day in and day out, and you are going to pay a price in combat.

[Beth]

You're right. Wasn't it the White Rabbit that said "the Hurrier I go the behinder I get."

[quincannon]

You just finished a book about Crook at the Rosebud. Did that book give you any indication he was in a big hurry. I suspect it did not.

Stonewall Jackson was always in a hurry, and you could follow his line of march, by the hundred, if not thousands of stragglers left in his wake.

Sometimes speed is essential, and I don't mean to say never use it, You use it when the situation calls for speed, and only then. Speed is not a principle of war. Security is.

[Beth]

Oct 4, 2015 5:53:34 GMT quincannon said:

You just finished a book about Crook at the Rosebud. Did that book give you any indication he was in a big hurry. I suspect it did not.

Stonewall Jackson was always in a hurry, and you could follow his line of march, by the hundred, if not thousands of stragglers left in his wake.

Sometimes speed is essential, and I don't mean to say never use it, You use it when the situation calls for speed, and only then. Speed is not a principle of war. Security is.

I need to finish that book but you are right Crook was not in a hurry.

Would Patton at the Battle of the Bulge be an example of using speed or do I get too much history from movies?

[yanmacca]

Yes Beth I suppose it was, Patton though had a fully mechanised force and an agenda to relieve Bastogne, similar to XXX corps racing to Arnhem Bridge.

Yan.

[quincannon]

Patton at the Bulge, more popular myth at the hand of the multitude of correspondents in the south with Patton than anything else. To the public, then and for a long time thereafter Patton was the ONLY story of the Bulge. That is why engagements that were far more important like the northern shoulder and St Vith were largely unknown until the late 60;s and early 70;s in Bulge lore. There were few reporters there. That's the reason it took 40 years to recognize 1LT Lyle Bouck with a DSC, and his I&R Platoon to become the most individually decorated platoon in U S Army history.

Patton had an excellent G-2 who recognized the threat in the Ardennes fairly early, and Patton had the foresight to plan for an attack into the southern shoulder contingency. Third Army had an excellent staff, and their work was exceptional.

It is little known that on 20 December, six days before Bastogne was officially relieved, Task Force Ezell (one tank company, one armored Infantry company, and one battery of 105SP's) literally waltzed into Bastogne to join the 101st in response to a plea from Middleton (VIII Corp commander). When 4th AD (then in a pre-attack assembly area) heard about it, the recalled TF Ezell, and Ezell waltzed right out again to join its parent CCA, 4th AD.

Had the objective been to relieve Bastogne alone Ezell's efforts would have been immediately reinforced, and a corridor could have been opened and a siege largely avoided.

Patton's objective for his III Corps (4th AD - 26th ID - 80th ID - later reinforced) was not to relieve Bastogne, but rather crush the southern flank of the Bulge by crushing the German 7th Army. Bastogne was along the way. It was a hard fight in Bastogne, and the 101 and their two armored division combat commands that were attached to them, earned every accolade thrown their way, but it was not nearly the snow covered Alamo that it is made out to be. St Vith, Wiltz, and the Twin Villages actually came closer to Alamo like enshrinement but no one noticed.

Patton took his own sweet time, destroying all in his path. It seems like he was fast, but that is what pre-preparation, good staff work, and deliberate, unrelenting offensive operations do for you, and there was a cavalry squadron in advance, the 25th, in front just where they should be, providing the entire chain of command from TF commander all the way to Third Army, with up to the minute information by meticulous reconnaissance. It seems that squadron commander learned a thing or two that Custer ignored in 76.

It may seem repetitive, GOOD - I WANT IT TO BE, for me to say, look at the composition of Task Force Ezell. Horse (tanks), foot (armored Infantry) and guns (105 SP's) is the way mobile operations should be conducted. Every TF of 4th AD was organized this way. No one arm can conduct these mobile operations alone, and only fools try.

[Beth]

Thanks for the information. Patton has always struck me as a bitlike Custer and made sure that his part of an operation was in the news. A Jr High friend's father was in the 3rd Army then. I wish I would have listened more to his stories but what I remember most is that he always used some very creative 'adjectives' when describing Patton but would always end swearing that they loved the guy.

[quincannon]

I don't think they were one bit alike. Patton, for all his flamboyance was a pro. He made few mistakes, Hammelburg, being the most notable. He had a very professional staff, who he hand picked and most of them had been with him since North Africa, and before. The response to the southern shoulder of the Bulge was the product of excellent staff work, and more importantly his staff "knew" Patton, knew how he thought, and how he would choose to operate.

Patton was also very colorful, where the other Army level commanders were like watching grass grow with one eye, and paint dry with the other. Color attracts reporters, plus a lot of them were there to report on Patton's planned offensive into the heart of Germany. Hodges (1st Army) had an offensive underway when the Bulge started, quickly canceled, and it was to be a supporting effort for Patton's main effort. So all these things conspired to have the bulk of the press down south. Ernest Hemmingway was with Chance's 12th Infantry (4th ID on the southern shoulder but not part of Patton's effort), and so many more that would later become famous in the post war years.

You must also remember that Montgomery took over 1st and 9th Armies early in the Bulge and his responsibilities included the complete northern shoulder and most of the middle including St Vith, so most of the reporting from that sector filtered through the Brit chain.

Personally I would have fired both Bradley and Hodges for Hurtgen and the Bulge. Neither performed well, and Monty stepped in, pushed Bradley out of the picture, and laid down the law to Simpson and Hodges. Simpson performed very well under Montgomery, and Hodges had a fire lit under his backside and recovered some of his composure.

Hodges and First Army would not have been diddly squat without Bill Kean as Hodges Chief of Staff, and it was no accident that Bill Kean was without doubt the best of the division commanders during the first year of Korea, and the 25th Division, arguably the best in theater for all three years of that conflict. Let me qualify that a bit. The 25th was the best Army Division. The 1st Marine Division was without peer.