colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Dec 1, 2015 22:24:43 GMT
Beth, This could explain why Keogh hung around battle ridge when he should have made a path out of there. If he was always under the fear of doing anything on his own that Custer might not approve of, he would be very hesitant to act on his own, if his orders were to wait there while Custer recce'd ford D, even in the face of overwhelming hostile pressure. He might have feared a rebuke from Custer more than an Indian bullet.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Dec 1, 2015 23:40:11 GMT
The thing is that the markers show evidence that L was supporting C and that C had made some sort of attack from the ridge. The I markers show no particular deployment and no evidence of trying to offer any support to L or C. Hence the notion that they are essentially working fairly independently rather than as a unit under the command of Keogh. Much as Ian suggests, this may be a fairly standard thing? Cheers
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Dec 2, 2015 1:40:08 GMT
You do bring up an interesting point though Ian. Most authors consider Custer's immediate command as being one battalion. I think the separation into two is fairly recent vintage. I remember some talk several years ago on these boards about a formal/informal division into two battalions. I cannot recall exactly when it was supposed to have taken place, but if memory serves it was on the 25th. Regardless, Custer was the type to retain close control, so division or not I don't see where it would make much difference to Custer, in Custer's mind. Close control does not breed independence of thought in a subordinates mind, in fact just the opposite, a state of mental freeze when confronted with the unexpected. I suspect you have a very valid point QC. If Custer was a control freak, then the chances are those under him and especially those he has kept closest to him for the longest period of time, don't have the skill sets or perhaps even the confidence to act independently. They might have been more in the 'what is Custer going to do next' mindset instead of 'what should I do now.' Kind of like when a kid raised by controlling parents leaves the nest to go to college-- Kinda like a man happily married 43 1/2 years who no longer can make an independent decision. He He Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2015 2:44:16 GMT
It is exactly like a kid with controlling parents being sent off to college or out in the world Beth. They are not prepared for life, and in this instance subordinate command.
Power seekers seek the weak to surround themselves with. They have little tolerance for a troublesome subordinate, and troublesome is anyone who expresses independent thought.
Like I said above, we must go deep to understand, and if you want to understand what transpired here, and why, you have to understand the personality that was Custer.
No one can dictate the mental processes of another. What you can do though is deny those that fail to exercise the fundamental precepts of leadership, command of a regiment of cavalry in combat.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2015 2:57:27 GMT
Absent a clear order from Custer forming a battalion under Keogh, I would expect that they all were operating independently.
Absent that order, it may very well have been Keogh you go there, Calhoun there, and Harrington there. I am taking E and F for a little ride and I will be back shortly. I certainly hope it was not that way, or I would be forced to think Custer a bigger idiot than I already do.
The rule in such cases is that the senior man commands when units given independent missions, run into something unanticipated that forces or somehow brings them together.
I am quite up to my elbows in a swamp of other work at the moment. If anyone can trace a specific and undeniable formation of the Keogh battalion before the regiment divided, please cite your reference for all of us. He said, she said, whoopsie doodle, reenactor knows all bullshit is not specific and undeniable.
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Post by Beth on Dec 2, 2015 6:03:41 GMT
What are the known orders Custer gave that day? Are they keeping with detailed instructions or are they more along the you go over there and wait until I get back to you?
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 2, 2015 11:56:24 GMT
Apparently the last officer’s call took place around noon just before they divided according to Private W. Slapper, he states that Reno was placed in command of A, G & M, Benteen was given H, K & D and B with the packs, Custer placed the last five under his immediate command.
Obviously how Custer organised these five companies would be unknown to Mr Slapper, but it depends on how he placed them in line, I remember having this discussion of the other board and the column sequence I came up with was E-HQ-F-I-L-C, so any divide would naturally take the first two and the HQ away from the last three, as one weak company would not be enough to skirt so close to a large camp such as this especially down a long coulee, so E-HQ-F took on this role with the F Coy detain leading the way for the remaining three to move up to the ridge line.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2015 17:27:08 GMT
Slapper is consistent with Godfrey in the Century Magazine article. Godfrey is in a position to know. Godfrey makes no mention of the five companies dividing into two battalions. In fact what Godfrey says is specific in that the battalions were formed shortly after crossing the divide and that Custer's "battalion" consisted of C, E, F, I, and L.
The order of march Ian provided is speculative, but also both logical and pretty accurate from what we think we know. It is an indicator that there may have been a formal split, but nothing I would want to bet my life savings on. An indicator against though is Company F not leading. Do we really know beyond a shadow of a doubt about the Company F detail or is that strictly a Grayism. It makes sense to have a point detail for local security but normally that would come from the leading company
There is no real need to form two battalions. The span of control of five is perfectly acceptable
What we are attempting to do here is explain Keogh's apparent incompetence as a battalion commander, when we don't really know if he was a battalion commander. His actions are more along the line of him commanding his company alone.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 2, 2015 19:26:55 GMT
Chuck you are the person to ask here, so can you see why people naturally think that Keogh was in charge, now here is an example of what I am getting at; You are a Colonel in charge of a battalion, in your battalion you have three infantry, one weapons company and one recce platoon, you are moving through enemy terrain and you have lost contact with the rest of your regiment, you now stop and decided to move only a small portion of you force forward to see what was happening a few miles ahead, whilst leaving the rest to hunker down, so now we have say; The Recce Platoon out in front. Colonel Chuck and BHQ and one of your infantry companies following.
So basically you have left behind two infantry an a weapons company, now these units have took up positions and are waiting for further orders, the weapons company is commanded by a lieutenant and the two infantry companies are commanded by a lieutenant and a captain respectively, now without a word from you about who is in command it seems logical to assume that once you have left that the captain would naturally take over, he may not change anything or give any orders, or even speak to the other two commanders in the group, but if one of the other the other battalions in your regiment stumbled over them 24 hours later and found them all dead then once they found the body of the captain then they would say that he must have been in charge and was left in overall charge of the three companies by you.
I must add that this is not what I would expect you to do so don’t take offence, but you see my point.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2015 20:56:40 GMT
Like everything else the answer depends upon the situation, and in this instance the orders I gave before I left.
If the three units left behind were so spread out, and without reliable communications between them, I would say that no one of the three commanding officers could exercise control over the whole. If I was the one who ordered them to configure in that manner, no blame could attach to that captain or any of the other two. They were there at my orders and blame and responsibility are mine.
On the surface, it would seem, the three companies of history were in the same general area, it would be logical to assume Keogh was in command of the whole, and a separate battalion task force did exist. When you peel back the onion though and look at the nature of the terrain, the probable mission, and the nonexistence of reliable communications, you scratch your head and say I ain't so sure.
Much of what we know of this battle has its genesis in the first impressions of the surviving officers. None to my knowledge made the leap and said that Keogh commanded a battalion, and more pertinent was exercising command on that part of the field. In fact those first impression as everyone here knows have led down many a blind alley.
So the short answer is that they were close enough to command, but mitigating circumstances did exist to the extent that the command function could not be carried out due to lack of comms.
Now to really confuse the issue for you Ian using your example. I see nothing wrong with a battalion commander in your example going off with one company. What I see wrong is that you do not completely grasp how it would be done.
Were I to go off with that company, the majority of my command and control assets would remain in place. I would go with my TAC CP, which is perhaps my 2 and my 3 along with a few communicators. My Command Post would be in the rear and well manned, fully equipped to take over should I be KIA or loose contact. I would never operate with a weapons company whole. That company commander would be in or near my main CP as a fire support coordination, and only the mortar platoon would remain whole and together. All the other weapons company assets would be farmed out by attaching them to the three rifle companies. Each of the two remaining rifle companies would look to the main CP for guidance in my absence, and would take all direction from there UNLESS, I overrode the instructions, via radio, and directed them elsewhere or otherwise.
That is how us moderns would do it, or at least one variation of it. Custer did not have the tools of command, nor were the regiments of that time organized to use those. tools
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Dec 2, 2015 21:14:58 GMT
Let me throw in another scenario that I have considered. Keogh places I in the swale with Porter to watch for Benteen. He is controlling the L skirmish line and sees infiltration from the village to the west and sends Harrington down but just as he does that he recieves a message from Porter that there are warriors going through the gap to the north, so he heads back to the swale. Everything falls apart quickly on Calhoun Hill; Keogh is in the swale and his NCOs have gathered for instructions when they are hit from the north and east and at the same time the battle in the south flows over the hill. Keogh can be hit anywhere in time soon after arriving back in the swale. His problem in any scenario is that there is not, in my limited experience, any spot on Calhoun Hill that gives a clear view, for an individual, of all the approaches. Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Dec 2, 2015 21:23:23 GMT
Just as an addition before I actually do some work. Contrary to what some say, and definitely not being an expert, Calhoun Hill would be a terrible place to try to defend and especially so with the number of men available. There is the ridge to the north, and on all sides opportunities for close infiltration with poor visibility for the defenders. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2015 21:33:34 GMT
Any place can be defended. The questions then are not can it be defended, but do I have the assets to defend it successfully.
In this case the answer on assets and success is not enough, and nil.
There are few places on God's green earth that affords the defending commander and unrestricted view of all approaches, and other things he must see. That is what subordinates are for, to see and communicate to you what they see. Which nicely leads me into the unalterable maxim of command.
IF YOU CAN'T COMMUNICATE, YOU CANNOT COMMAND.
When you reduce any military force down to its lowest common denominator, they must be able to do only three things SHOOT (Fires). MOVE (Maneuver) and COMMUNICATE (Exercise command and control) . The ones that can do these three things better on any given day are called winners.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 3, 2015 12:10:13 GMT
Good solid answer Chuck. Very interesting Mac, you have the advantage on me sir, being a visitor to the area and all.
It can be easy to overlook just how big Keogh’s battalion would stretch, L Company may have already been in skirmish covering the withdrawal of the Custer/Yates battalion from the ford B area, C Company too could have already reached battle ridge, so Custer may have only contacted Keogh with brief orders to move his Company over the ridge along with Custer’s group and then detach and wait out of view of the river.
I know I shouldn’t assume as much as this but I would expect that Keogh’s battalion would be spread out and not in one line, and if they were already on these locations then why would Keogh go riding around with orders, they were only going to be there for a short time and most of the hostiles were still over on the west bank.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 3, 2015 15:30:29 GMT
I don't see how it could be proven that the Keogh battalion ever existed as such. As far as I know there is no contemporary evidence of such a formation. For that matter there is no evidence of a Yates battalion either, only a five company Custer battalion.
We hang our hat on the logic of creating such organizations, but a lot of people over the years have hung their hat on such explanations and theories only to be proven wrong.
I suppose I am turning a new page on LBH, and in future, I will demand proof before I can accept anything. Just because something sounds logical, or someone wrote something somewhere does not constitute proof.
In the case of the Keogh area there can only be two choices 1) Keogh was a battalion commander, formally appointed, and made a complete hash of his duty and responsibilities or 2) Keogh was a company commander given a direct assignment, and stuck to the orders he was given, and went down commanding his company.
I think I could now be convinced, with a very strong argument, that Custer never got near Ford D either, meaning no further than Cemetery Ridge, but that is for another day.
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