A Monograph--"It Was Sheridan's Fault not Custer's."

[Beth]

I found this while googling around and thought someone would find it of interest   "It Was Sheridan’s Fault Not Custer’s: LTG

Sheridan’s Campaign Plans Against the Plains
 Indians and the Ties to Current Planning...

link

[carl]

Sept 13, 2015 22:27:39 GMT Beth said:

I found this while googling around and thought someone would find it of interest   "It Was Sheridan’s Fault Not Custer’s: LTG

Sheridan’s Campaign Plans Against the Plains
 Indians and the Ties to Current Planning...

link

Thanks. All roads lead back to Gray "Centennial Campaign"

[quincannon]

I was not terribly impressed with this monograph. I have seen, and expect a much better product from a SAMS Student/Graduate.

You can apply a lot of buzz words, and the scent of magnolias to cover and hide the rot, but in the end it could be summed up by saying: The Army suffered two gross embarrassments and a good old fashioned ass whipping before they took the problem seriously. Six months later it was done. Only a fool takes the field convinced that it is for the short haul.

[Beth]

I can't grade it as a monograph but to me it's lacking some independent insight. He/She sites a lot of resources.

I was also surprised he/she dates the Cheyenne War from 1868 (Washita) it had been going on long before that.

[dan25]

With my limited knowledge of military strategy even I could not understand why such a military operation or campaign involving so many men and supplies was not coordinated to help guarantee success. It appears that Gen. Sheridan past the buck.

"Sheridan avoided specificity in describing his operational guidance, simply passing on the objective as described by the Secretary of the Interior.
Sheridan in turn told Terry and Crook, “All Department lines will be disregarded by the troops until the object requested by the Secretary of the Interior is attained,” and that, “You are there for ordered to take such steps with the forces under your command as will carry out the wishes and orders above alluded to.”

To Terry he wrote, with an identical comment to Crook, “operations under your direction and those under General Crook should be made without concert, but if you and he can come to any understanding about concerted movement, there will be no objection from me.” He articulated no further operational objectives. On the following day, Sheridan responded to Terry’s request for more specific guidance, and stated, “Your telegram of Eighth received. I have not specific instructions to give you about the Indian hostilities.” Sheridan envisioned this to be a decisive stroke and left any other coordination between Crook and Terry up to them."

This was taken from, "The Emergence Of Operational Art In The Great Sioux War 1876-1877"

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a606045.pdf

[quincannon]

Another disappointing effort from a SAMS student.

After reading this one and going back to re-read the first, my only conclusion is that these two Majors know about as much about Indian fighting, and the conditions of weather and terrain over which they must be fought as nuns know about fornication.

Sheridan was in no position to offer much in the way of guidance. Crook and Terry were separated by hundreds of miles in territory, and if memory serves no direct means of communication. I am also not sure if the maps were accurate enough to predesignate points where they could coordinate in the field.

There is a solution. One person, either Crook or Terry should have been named to command both forces in the field, and both of these forces should have joined together physically before the onset of active combat operations. [For those not familiar look up the Principles of War, specifically the Principle UNITY OF COMMAND, and read in depth as to what the Principle means]  That in the 1876 army environment would be like two kids arguing over possession of the same ice cream cone. 

The Goose Creek (Sheridan, WY) area would have been the ideal location to base the combined force, except for logistical problems, supplies having to come from Cheyenne, via Fort Fetterman. The Powder River Depot was the best place for logistics, but rotten in terms of a base to find and pursue the Indians. Other than that it was a fine day for a picnic.

[Deleted]

Coming to this late, as frequently is the case. At present, EVERYONE goes to Command and General Staff College. The "Worthy" go to Fort Leavenworth for the traditional course while all others go to a satellite school for a TDY version. I have a good friend who teaches at one. He does not have a high opinion of the students. Many/most need to be coddled. Clearly some should not be there. Failing one is verboten and seldom occurs. Those officers apparently need not apply for SAMS.

I have met many officers who were SAMS graduates. Most of them I was struck by their lack of tactical, technical, or analytical knowledge.

Apparently they are becoming stricter about who goes and they are closing the outlying campuses and my friend, who is quite the tactician, gamer, and writer gets to retire early.

Part of the problem is they decided they needed to be certified by the process that civilian institutions use.

The Army used to have a school named Combined Arms Service Staff School. Every Captain went to it between his advanced course and his first consideration year for CGSC. It was a brutal 9 week TDY course many termed "Ranger School of the Mind" I went in the early part of the 2nd year the course existed. After that is appeared to be dumbed down and then was made into an add on course immediately after Advanced School. It was a little funny for me bcause When I went, I had served on the 1st ID Staff as the Armor training officer for 18 months, then went back down to a battalion as the S-3 Air, then commanded another company (#2 out of 3).

It was ultimately closed. It was absolutely the best Army School I went to. We probably worked 80-100 hour weeks. But perhaps I misremember.

In the interest of full disclosure, I was not selected for resident CGSC, but I had completed it prior to being promoted to Major. So I did not get the opportunity to apply for SAMS. Bummer.

I think attendence at advanced service schools should be based on examination.

[quincannon]

I fully agree that examination should be the prerequisite for attendance at Command and General Staff College, SAMS, and the War College. Too many ordinary officers graduate from the first two, and far too many ordinary general officers graduate from the third. We cannot afford "ordinary". They must be outstanding in both educational achievement and performance. Far too many pretty boys are in the upper ranks of the Army, and those should be eliminated, as soon as it is discovered that being "pretty" is their only attribute.