What way did they go?

[Beth]

This seems to be being discussed everywhere but on this board.  What route did the NA take to and from the Rosebud battlefield?  Is there any possibility that the reason that Custer didn't see the signs is because he never crossed the warrior's trail?  

[quincannon]

Beth: I suspect the answer is that everyone on this board understands and appreciates the value of thorough reconnaissance, that entailing scouts ranging far, wide, and deep into the battle space to achieve the necessary and essential elements of information required to conduct a successful attack. That should have started the moment they left Powder River Depot, in fact the should have had scouts out a full day before the main body departed.

I am not sure that determining an exact route to and from Rosebud is all that important. A look at any map will tell you that regardless of the exact route to and from those routes would pass through Custer's battle space, and therefore should and could have been detected. The truth of the matter is we don't really know if those routes were detected or not. We do know that they were not reported, or made note of.

Intelligence only becomes intelligence when the results of the scouting are collated and evaluated. Why should any of us be surprised by slipshod performance when the entire Dakota part of the campaign was equally slipshod?

[deadwoodgultch]

Beth/Chuck,

Custer did cross the trail, nearly 900 warriors, no travois drag marks. Not a hunting party. Steve and I crossed that trail several times, we could not make it out 138 years later. It was probably obvious in 1876 as it had been used in 2 directions, just a week before. It should have been of some concern to management as the pack train was going to cross it as well. It was in fact a week old, but should have still have been of some concern. Were there any warriors in that direction? Benteen, on his oblique would not have crossed it until he crossed the Little Horn River. Custer would have probably crossed it near the morass.

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

So, if he had scouts out ahead like they should have been, you are then telling me Custer would have had this information probably on the mid afternoon of the 24th. Does that sound about right to you Tom and Steve?. Keep in mind I want scouting out a minimum of twenty miles from the main body and in a 180 degree arc centered on the main columns direction of movement.

[Beth]

Do you suppose that the face that Varnum and a lot of the scouts were exhausted at that point might have been a factor? Or perhaps they were a bit too jovial celebrating the fact 'the got them' to notice? Sort of a why look for a trail, when you have your target in sight

[quincannon]

Custer left PRD with a full basic load of ammunition and sustenance for 15 days on the trail. What is the hurry? When you hurry you wear yourself out, needlessly in this instance.

I don't consider these people Custer employed as scouts, at least not in the military sense of the word. With the exception of the two officers, none of those hirelings had any skin in the game, and to my knowledge none had the training, therefore absent the ability, to scout and be an accurate and comprehensive reporter on what they found or did not find. Remember the absence of information is itself information.

In an Infantry battalion, your sharpest 1LT is your scout platoon leader, and all of his personnel are generally head and shoulders above the skill level of the average rifleman. I would suspect that Colt would say the same about the scout platoon in his Armor battalion.

So, if they were tired out, and they most likely were exhausted, it was because they were working for a man who did not know how to properly utilize scouts. A scout should be no more fatigued than the average soldier in Company X.

Of all of the mistakes Custer made, having a case of the hurries and failure to train and properly employ his scouts are probably the worst two. See Montrose's comments on scouts and guides in that other place. A scout is not a guide and a guide is not a scout. If we confuse the two in our lexicon, that is our fault.

[Beth]

Good question. Why was Custer in such a hurry? I've read a rumor in a not totally reliable source that Custer wanted the news of his success to reach the Democratic Convention. I personally don't put a whole lot of stock in it since the Convention was from June 27 through the 29th. Even if Custer had defeated the NA on the 24th, it would have been impossible to word to St. Louis by the 27th.

BTW I was looking to see how quickly Terry was able to get his telegram sent and found this link. I thought it was pretty cool

Terry's telegram

[quincannon]

Hurry! Beth, your guess is as good as anyone else's.

If a source is not totally reliable, then they are not reliable at all. Such is the case you cite.

While we are on the subject of scouting, it would not be remiss to add that there really should have been a few scouts on Custer's back trail, as well as those far in front. Custer's operation in 1876 would be termed today as a long range penetration, meaning that you go in deep (real deep) into known hostile territory. As such it is not dissimilar to the Rogers Saint Francis raid, or the operation of the Chindits and 5307th Composite Unit (Prov.) in Burma 43-44. The technique of scouting the back trail paid big dividends for all three of these operators.

[Beth]

I can't remember if I read it in Donavan's book or Philbrick's. Both go a bit to far into the novelizing of history for my taste anymore. Funny thing is a few years ago I really loved those books. Now I can see what they are lacking.

Did Custer ever work with scouts before this campaign? I wonder how Reno handled his scouts a few woeks before