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Post by Beth on Aug 23, 2015 22:54:57 GMT
I've been reading about the Battle of the Rosebud recently and it strikes me that so many of the stories related by the veterans of Rosebud must have been the pretty much what was experienced at Little Bighorn. One thing that really causes me pause is the fear factor and it's effect that the NA warpaint and battle raiment had on the veterans and especially their horses. At Rosebud they were able to secure their horses behind the rocky terrain but they didn't have that luxury at LBH so the horse handlers really had very little chance of remaining in control of 4 or more frightened horses.
I can't help imagining that when you take Custer's exhausted men, the conditions of the day and they throw in the fear factor generating by chaos of attacking NA with their eagle whistles, war cries, paint, head dresses, screaming ponies and everything else, it must have been hell on earth. Would it have had a big factor in the battle? Had any of the men in the 7th that day ever experienced anything similar?
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 24, 2015 0:25:53 GMT
Beth,
Many were involved in some major skirmishes on the Yellowstone and Black Hills campaigns. A fair number were involved at the Washita. So my answer would on the surface would be yes. Having said this, none had ever experienced the overwhelming numbers faced at the LBH. None ever would again, as many died and the Native Americans would never be able to bring that many warrior together again.
The horror faced by Custer's 5 was certainly, at the end of each action, was something. I am not sure that they had enough time for any factor to come into serious play.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Aug 24, 2015 2:28:58 GMT
Washita was a very different type of battle, more of a dawn raid by the 7th. The NA were taken by surprise and never got their footing.
At LBH they did take the village by surprise but the NA still had time to dress for battle. They also had have been confident after Sitting Bear's vision and feeling strong after Rosebud. Custer and the 7th stepped into the perfect storm as far as the NA being at an emotional high.
Would it be safe to say that LBH was one of those battles that changed status quo. Perhaps loosely comparing it to Gettysburg as being the point a war turned?
I know that LBH has to be analyzed as a battle but it and the whole campaign was also such a cultural turning point-not only for the NA but for the West in general.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 24, 2015 11:38:09 GMT
I noticed that at Washita Custer split his regiment into separate battalions and attacked from different directions, which is a good way of tackling a village the size of Black Kettles, plus it was deep winter and really cold and they put in a dawn attack.
The village on the LBH river would be huge in comparison to Black Kettles, Custer again went for the same tried and tested formula of attacking again from different directions with battalion sized units, but when he got his first real look at what he was facing, he knew he had to adapt his plan to involve every man he had as this place was massive, just look at what he did after 3411, he never even put in a full attack with all five companies, which I think was his intended plan.
Everything altered after 3411, Custer and his main force was never committed to any attack plan, instead they kept their distance holding the high ground and prancing about.
Which doesn’t sound like GAC at all.
Yan.
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Aug 24, 2015 12:30:59 GMT
Converging attacks are great, and a common tactic. But the plan is for everyone to hit the target at the same point in time. If you look at other attacks from this era, there always seems to be a column or two that runs into unexpected problems and are late. Fog and friction of war.
So what was the convergence point at LBH? And what was the designated time they all were to attack this target? If we were to ask the battalion commanders to state the time and convergence point of this attack, would they give the same answer?
The convergent point, we can assume, was somewhere between Reno's timber and Ford D. That is a lot of space.
The false assumption of this battle is that LTC Custer separated his units to conduct a converging attack. This is completely and utterly false, a Rinism. He separated his units out of impatience, with no common plan.
Critical point. All other attacks on Indian villages have an orders group, where detachment commanders are told where to go, the target place for linkup, and the time to initiate the attack. That did not happen at LBH. The wide scattering of units during the recon phase made the follow on attack phase impossible. And the recon phase ended when the Reno Bn crossed Ford A, so LTC Custer's actions from that point forward show rank incompetence.
Punch Mike Tyson or Ronda Rousey in the face, and ask them not to punch back for 3 hours. Let me know how that works out.
Monty
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 24, 2015 13:34:54 GMT
I read you Montrose, if GAC hoped for this battle to be initially fought with only the Keogh/Yates Bns and Reno Bn, then when he saw Reno dismounted in the valley being either advancing on foot or fighting in skirmish line, then would he had ruled out Reno from his battle plan? He must have realized that Reno was going to be fighting for some time and in no position to advance, given the fact that Custer also saw how big his objective was, it must have gone through his mind that he was all alone unless he could bring forward every man he could.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 24, 2015 15:27:44 GMT
If you wish to conduct a coordinated attack, meaning two or more elements of your force converging upon the same objective at or about the same time, the essential ingredient is prior coordination. Coordination requires prior planning, and communication maintained between elements, and given the limitations of that day for the latter, it would also demand that one operates in a much smaller battle space than we see at LBH.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 24, 2015 18:51:49 GMT
That’s just t Chuck, he had no co-ordination, one he split into two commands (Custer and Reno) then he sent Reno down the most likely route and he went away hoping to get around the back.
Did Custer see Indians over in the SSR area and moved to block them? Did he send Reno down the valley because they saw Indians fleeing in that direction? Maybe his movements were down to Indian sightings?
But after he sent Cook with the order to move into the valley and attack, he moved his own command at a rapid speed to cover as much ground as possible, the command could have still been moving when he went to 3411 with a small detail.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Aug 24, 2015 23:01:00 GMT
I noticed that at Washita Custer split his regiment into separate battalions and attacked from different directions, which is a good way of tackling a village the size of Black Kettles, plus it was deep winter and really cold and they put in a dawn attack. The village on the LBH river would be huge in comparison to Black Kettles, Custer again went for the same tried and tested formula of attacking again from different directions with battalion sized units, but when he got his first real look at what he was facing, he knew he had to adapt his plan to involve every man he had as this place was massive, just look at what he did after 3411, he never even put in a full attack with all five companies, which I think was his intended plan. Everything altered after 3411, Custer and his main force was never committed to any attack plan, instead they kept their distance holding the high ground and prancing about. Which doesn’t sound like GAC at all. Yan. I think that your last line is what makes LBH so interesting. If we could see signs of Custer being Custer, it could be chalked up to he wasn't the best commander on the field that day and got beat. What was Custer thinking after he saw the village?
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Post by Beth on Aug 24, 2015 23:14:20 GMT
Converging attacks are great, and a common tactic. But the plan is for everyone to hit the target at the same point in time. If you look at other attacks from this era, there always seems to be a column or two that runs into unexpected problems and are late. Fog and friction of war.
So what was the convergence point at LBH? And what was the designated time they all were to attack this target? If we were to ask the battalion commanders to state the time and convergence point of this attack, would they give the same answer?
The convergent point, we can assume, was somewhere between Reno's timber and Ford D. That is a lot of space.
The false assumption of this battle is that LTC Custer separated his units to conduct a converging attack. This is completely and utterly false, a Rinism. He separated his units out of impatience, with no common plan.
Critical point. All other attacks on Indian villages have an orders group, where detachment commanders are told where to go, the target place for linkup, and the time to initiate the attack. That did not happen at LBH. The wide scattering of units during the recon phase made the follow on attack phase impossible. And the recon phase ended when the Reno Bn crossed Ford A, so LTC Custer's actions from that point forward show rank incompetence.
Punch Mike Tyson or Ronda Rousey in the face, and ask them not to punch back for 3 hours. Let me know how that works out.
Monty Can you elaborate? Was he impatience because the rest couldn't keep up to him so he sort of 'parked' them out of way? Was he impatience because he couldn't get the NA to act the way he wanted? Or am I missing the point? I tend to agree that Custer wasn't trying to set up some sort of converging attack, as you said to converge you have to have a common meeting point--if you extend where Benteen was heading and Reno was heading, if I am imagining it right, they were never going to cross paths. I'm not even sure Custer knew what he was doing other than searching for a way to get the NA to act the way he wanted them to.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Aug 25, 2015 10:20:40 GMT
Fully agree Monty (lol)! At Washita there was planning and a signal (from striking up the band if I remember rightly) but none of this exists at LBH (other than perhaps in Custer's mind). Many want to claim Custer's approach to Ford B was in support of Reno; if so it was pretty poor support. To take Monty's example; let's say I tell you to punch Iron Mike and I will support you and then when you hit him I step right and wave and say "hi Mike" are you feeling supported? My current thought is Custer goes right because he completely misjudges the enemy disposition and morale and thinks he can easily pass their screen and crash through the village. That is why things change after 3411 and instead of attack he starts looking for alternatives. Actually a higher level of fear factor prior to starting might have been a good thing. While we have mention of Ford B and support can I throw in the idea that part of Custer's strategy in approaching was to startle the village and get them moving faster to break up their mass. I suspect this would be part of the impatience to come to grips with them that Monty references. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 25, 2015 10:28:23 GMT
Ever thought that he was caught short by never being in this position before? Let’s face it how many US Cavalry officers or Army for that matter, had been in that predicament before. I may be wrong here but would this be the largest Indian encampment ever took on by the US military? Not only that, Custer had stumbled upon this Indian metropolis with his regiment divided up and he himself had only 209 men with him, now he got himself into this situation and his ego may have kicked in and not wanting to lose face he continued and sent for the rest of his regiment, probably hoping that no Indians would dare come out to take him on.
On the ford B situation, if Custer had taken his whole five companies to the ford and after being repulsed he decided to deny the ford to the Indians by setting up positions, would the Indians be able to get a toe hold on the east bank?
Yan.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 25, 2015 12:30:24 GMT
Ian,
His rear and flanks would have been exposed to warriors from north and south, with his front or rear against the river/village. Very bad move!
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 25, 2015 14:39:30 GMT
Yes Tom exactly, this is one in the eye for those who say that he plunged forward with his whole outfit and was repulsed and drove onto LSH, if he did attack with his five companies and was initially stopped, then wouldn’t they move back on to the nearest high ground and engage the Indians, which would mean that ford B and deep coulee would be under heavy fire from the soldiers.
So if the Indians converged from deep ravine and the northern fords (which would be free from carbine fire) then the LSH area would be full of hostiles before the soldiers were forced there.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2015 16:31:46 GMT
Going to Ford B with everything he has would mean that Custer just changed the venue for disaster. He would be pinched north and south before he could gain a bridgehead over the river, and eventually his rear would have been enveloped. And if you choose to buy in the next five minutes we will double the offer. He would be on low ground, with high ground to his north, south, and east. Only $19.95 friends, and you get it all.
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