THE EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL ART IN THE GREAT SIOUX WAR 1876

[miker]

This is downloadable for free at apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA606045.pdf

It is a mostly interesting approach using the "Operational Level of War" to examine the Great Sioux War.  Unlike many things, this focuses somewhat on Sheridan.  You must understand I deny the Operational Level of War in the US context.  It is a construct we imported from the Russians and/or the Germans and it does not, in my opinion describe the American way of war.

It separates combat into Tactical (individual to Brigade or Division), Operational (Division to Army and maybe Army Group), and Strategic levels (Theater and National).

Whereas I believe that there is tactics (how you are going to do something at any echelon level of command) and Strategy (What you are going to do at National Command, Army Group, Army, and maybe Corps). 

The analysis focuses on Sheridan and claims that Sheridan should have assumed command in the field of both Departments of Dakota and Platte, but did not do so because (1) he had gotten married, (2) was fat and not able to campaign, and (3) had important other details to manage in the Division Area and schmoozing at the Centennial.  The author thinks the strategy and campaign was sound, but failed in execution due to lack of planning (although apparently Crooke and Terry traveled to DC to meet with Sherman and Sheridan) command and cooperation between the two departments (he should have appointed the senior officer between his two subordinate commanders as the commander of the combined force and the Army never really bought into the (incomplete) reports of Indian strength, and improper resourcing.  On the other hand, he thinks there was adequate logistical support and Sheridan learned from his mistakes, recovered and directed greater cooperation and reporting from his subordinate commanders.  The author gives credit to Miles, who mostly fought in the winter and with infantry.  Operations of other cavalry units (Merritt in particular) are not really mentioned.

FWIW I think we had the technology for Sheridan to have located at FAL or perhaps a little more westward and strung a telegraph line from a more secure location to FAL in order to get faster reports from the field and relayed to his HQ whether it was at FAL or Chicago.

I recommend the publication, if for nothing else to give a larger view of the campaign, whether you believe in the operational level of war or not.

[quincannon]

It will come as no surprise to Mike that I disagree with him on the necessity for the operational level of war, a level inserted between the tactical and strategic. That is perfectly OK with both of us as we have discussed it at length before. I like to steal good ideas from others. Mike apparently does not or does not think they are good ideas in the first place. That's what professional soldiers do oddly enough. They disagree more than agree. That does not mean either of us is right or wrong. It simply means we disagree.

Now to the meat of the post. First off I think, more than think actually, believe is more like it, that most of these articles we see in the higher level "trade" magazines and schoolhouse publications are nothing more than busy work and exercises in feel good to fulfill a writing requirement for C&GS, or SAMS. Application of 2023 standards and ideas to 1876 is just bull shit. It was bull shit about the horse herd in one such paper several years ago, and most of them follow the same pie in the sky trend. Why is that? Simple, these people in 1876 did not think or operate on these levels, and there is no better example than the LBH Campaign. With the exception of fighting British, Mexicans, and Confederates the U S Army had absolutely no experience applying strategic or operational concepts. They were confined by mind set to tactics alone. The campaigns, and there were a few, were also pretty far between. It could be best summed up then that the U S Army was a police force, a constabulary, and it would remain so until the outbreak of World War II, when it became an Army on a full time basis, Span-Am and WWI notwithstanding.

Sheridan may well have been fat, but the reason he was not in the field was that he was fat in the head, believing as they all did that it was a local issue and campaigns like LBH differed only in the amount of resources dedicated. All you savages get your ass back to the reservation by 1 January OR WHAT. You don't do an OR WHATING, unless you have the means to enforce OR WHAT.

[miker]

I am very much in the minority for the adoption of the operational level of war, nor do many people think the campaign is the linchpin between the tactical and strategic. I think, for the Germans and (believe it or not) the Russians, there is an operational of war exists, but their approach to war and command and control of their forces is different than ours. But, I might be wrong.

I dislike works that seek to stuff 20th or 21st century concepts into American battles, campaigns, and wars. To my reading, tactics were not much discussed, much less strategy at those lonely forts. But they all wanted to prepare for a European War, even Upton. Just like I know officers that said the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan (and Vietnam) was not real war. Seemed pretty real to me. Fighting in the European way is fine for most parts of Europe, but Europe is not the whole world. Hint: Pacific, the 'Stans, and Africa. Do not get into a war in the Asian or African continent. I am also becoming a partial isolationist.

This reading also prompted me to order the book Phil Sheridan and His Army Paperback in the hope of learning more about the era.  I was put to sleep by his Memoirs before I got to the good part; if there was a good part.

[quincannon]

I think tactics were not discussed in those lonely places because for the most part they were so ingrained due to long service out there. The patrol was second nature. If you want to bore the shit out of someone sit around a table and discuss how to patrol I would imagine. Not talking, did not mean they were not proficient in small unit tactics. They were. Put two companies or more together though and they were not worth a bucket of cow urine. Unless the regimental commander's name was McKenzie.

[mac]

Bearing in mind that I have no qualifications at all.

The classifications seem to me to be based on the scale. Operational is larger scale than Tactical this may well be useful for discussion and analysis but the margins between the two appear fuzzy to me.

That said I came upon this and thought it may be of interest.

cove.army.gov.au/article/covetalk-2-div-pme-series-operational-level-of-war

Cheers

[miker]

Thanks for this. Clearly that officer is a very discerning fellow. I will listen to the topic later. I really hate not being able to read things. I read faster than people talk and I have too many things to do in my "retirement".

I will point out in WWII, the corps was specifically designated a tactical headquarters. I can't remember where I found that referenced, but I've never forgotten it.

Operational Art
Operational Level
Center of Gravity
Army Design Theory
Commanders Intent

My opinion is these things merely add needless work at all levels of commsnd. A good mission statement and concept of the operation provides the last three.

Operations is what units conduct and is analogous to logistics and personnel functions. The US frequently uses Strategic as long range. As in bomber. But we use strategic weapons in tactical settings all the time. My division used 3 cells of 3 B-52s to stun the Iraqi 26th infantry division.

If all this scrap worked like it was supposed to we wouldn't have spent 10 years or more in Vietnam or 20+ in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Russians would have already assimillated Afghanistan, the Ukraine, Geirgia, etc.

Don't worry about your qualifications. We disagree on many things but you are an analytical and critical thinker. Read WR Plan Orange. It was written by an insurance salesman and is the seminal work on the plan. Then read the Great Pacific War by Vector By water. Jane's all the World's this and that started because a guy named Fred Jane wanted to play naval wargames. And somehow another insurance salesman named Tom Clancy became rich, famous, and accepted as a subject matter expert.

So knock off the fact that you are not a soldier. I'm not a historian or an engineer. My degree is in history And I'm not a PhD. I had some success in both areas by turning my hobbies of military history, building models, and playing wargames and was able to hold my own against "real" people in those fields. And since I was never a battalion XO or S-3, I am not considered a branch qualified Field Grade Armor officer, but that doesn't mean I'm not competent.