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Post by herosrest on Mar 31, 2023 19:02:07 GMT
Every now and again, these days - ....... Wow Sunk on the Repulse, rescued by Vampire. Sunk on the Hermes as Vampire went down as well. Hmmmm...............
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2023 19:29:43 GMT
By detected, you must mean that "bedspring" sitting on top of Opana Point, manned by two private soldiers, who saw, then reported, doing their duty, and no one believed it could possibly be an air raid. I will ignore that type of detection twice on Sunday (pun also intended. Information is no damned good if you refuse to use it. Attitude my dear fellow is a military virtue, but it can also be the most deadly of military vices.
Disabuse your mind of the idea that Pearl Harbor was a viable objective. The U S Fleet sitting in Pearl Harbor was the objective, in the same way Lee's Army, not Richmond was the true objective in the eastern theater during the ACW. Grant was a success because he knew that. All the rest were miserable failures because they did not.
The war plan prior to the unfortunate move of the fleet to Pearl, was upon the outbreak of war move to Pearl, and using Pearl as a forward base, then range across the Pacific. The move to Pearl caught the fleet at their forward base, an eventuality that would not have happened if the fleet had remained in home waters. The pre-war plan was a good one as far as the part I mentioned goes. We, before the fleet deployed, still had a considerable number of naval units operating out of Pearl, primarily submarines and destroyers, but nothing that would warrant a six carrier air strike
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Post by herosrest on Mar 31, 2023 20:55:24 GMT
If the fleet hadn't been based at Pearl then it wouldn't have been attacked there. A conventional strategy would meet and defeat in battle at sea. Japan chose not to and rather to concentrate naval air in a crippling blow.
Had the US fleet been based at San Diego rather than PH, Japan could have decided upon the strategy of a crippling blow. It completely required surprise. Not complete surprise but suffient that a line of battleships and subs weren't haunting launching points.
If that strategy had been recommended, it would have been assessed. If decided upon then the force leader would have been instructed to achieve a tactical surprise and his staff left get on with it.
The strategy of that attack on either the US, or PH, was high to highest risk. Going to war with the US was high to highest risk. Japan did both.
Had the IJN carriers been sunk at PH, then the battleship remained Queen of the seas and carrier warfare floundered.
I'm not pushing your outlook andview aside, at all. Conventional is good.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2023 23:03:05 GMT
HR: Calling me conventional is like calling the Pope a Baptist. Ain't going to happen in this lifetime old son.
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Post by miker on Apr 1, 2023 0:02:18 GMT
I strongly, if you really want to understand the US pacific strategy, you read War Plan Orange by Edward S Miller and is highly acclaimed. By early 1940 there was no plan to rush to the Philippines to save them in the event of an attack. This trend started even earlier than the late 30's. There was first the Through Ticket, then a dual between Cautionists and Thrusters, The Royal Road, and several other schemes. There was no way the Japanese could home to defeat the US in a war and, in spite of their initial success, they make Custer's plan at the Little Bighorn look like a well planned operation. There would have be a real chance of another Tsushima if, prior to 1940, they had started something and we responded.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2023 1:32:38 GMT
Regardless of what the war plan said, I believe the political and public pressure would have been so great that it would be very hard to say no.
Actually, a re do of Tsushima Strait was the very basis of all Japanese planning, and that extended to the design of their ships, and naval force structure as well. The Japanese Navy would have liked nothing better than meeting us in the Philippine Sea in early 1942. By 1944, not so much.
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Post by miker on Apr 1, 2023 2:03:42 GMT
In spite of that feeling of yours Chuck, we did not go to the Philippines after Pearl Harbor. We had plenty of available ships to go if we wanted to, although the real force would be on the relatively untried carriers. I'm pretty sure it was a hot debate.
Ranger, Yorktown, Wasp, Hornet, and Long Island (AVG-1) were available, but mostly in the Atlantic or West coast.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2023 3:55:44 GMT
My reading suggest there was no debate at all. Nimitz formulated the entire Pacific war strategy on a train trip from Washington to the west coast, on his way out to Pearl, playing cribbage with his senior aide. Most of it was implemented in spite of Dougout Doug who was a physical bravo and a moral coward.
Only Yorktown and Hornet of those you listed were suitable for full spectrum carrier warfare in the Pacific. Hornet did not even have an air group or aircraft in December 41, and Yorktown was badly in need of an overhaul after very hard Neutrality Patrol service. Wasp did make it out to the Pacific out of pure necessity in the late summer of 42, and was promptly sunk, unable to sustain combat damage that any of the Yorktowns could have survived. Ranger was a mess, not much good for anything except being a training carrier which she eventually became after the crisis years passed. Long Island was put to very good use. Hardly ever mentioned, but she transported the initial wave of Marine air to Guadalcanal.
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Post by miker on Apr 1, 2023 4:49:05 GMT
Chuck, the strategy of NOT going to the PI was set well before PH.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 1, 2023 9:53:50 GMT
War fighting plans are brittle beasts. You went to Australia instead. That was what I studied. Why not Alaska to Japan in January 1942.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2023 14:44:04 GMT
Mike: I have not read that book, so I am completely unaware of any immediate pre-war changes to ORANGE. The original version envisioned the fleet first going to Pearl then on to the Philippines. There would be stops along the way, but the Philippines was their ultimate destination. The Japanese, in their war planning thought that is what we would do as well. Frankly the original version was wishful thinking, and played right into Japanese hands, evidenced by what were we going to do when we got to the Philippines? The Fabukis and I Boats would have had a merry old time picking at our bones, until we had nothing left of real value. Nimitz was the greatest Admiral since Nelson, and the minute he stepped ashore in Pearl was the day Japan lost the war. He did his war planning playing horseshoes with Ray Spruance.
HR: Retention of Australia was vital. There was no choice. Alaska? OK, you operate out of Alaska in 41 and 42, but don't ask me to come with you.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 1, 2023 17:47:31 GMT
Yes. Retaining Australia was as you say. What was Japan going to do with it - Invade New Zealand? Anchorage to Kiska 1,500 miles Anchorage to Japan 3,500 miles San Francisco to Brisbane 7,000 miles Brisbane to Japan 4,300 miles There's an elephant in the room. The King. I know that we are looking way back but they were exceedingly interesting times. A modern day snack The South Pacific Air Ferry Route.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2023 18:50:08 GMT
Indeed they were. Speaking of Australia. Years ago an old man now deceased gave me a box of books. He served aboard Hornet from the Doolittle Raid until Santa Cruz as a junior level communications officer. I remember going through them and pulling out the ones of immediate interest and leaving the rest of them in the garage. In my reorganization and reducing efforts, I chanced to open that box yesterday and ran across a paperback copy of "The Coast Watchers" by Commander Eric Feldt, RAN, and started into it last night, late last night. Very interesting and something that has very little documentation readily available. Sometimes I find a lot of really good information in these lesser known works about nuts and bolts, and I love nuts and bolts as opposed to big picture stuff.
Japan did not have a snowballs chance in hell of invading Australia. It was completely unsupportable, except in the eyes of the fairy tale crowd in the Japanese Army General Staff. Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics. The Japanese Army leadership were rank amateurs when it came to grand strategy, but the low level Japanese Army leaders and troops had a PHD in defense. I would have loved to see them have a go at the Kiwi's. Japanese asses would still be burning.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Apr 2, 2023 0:01:15 GMT
A final thing before leaving Niugini. I agree QC that it was about defending Moresby....what are your thoughts on battles of Milne Bay and Wau? How do they fit into your Niugini timeline? Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Apr 2, 2023 0:31:19 GMT
I see no reason to fight those battles. With New Guinea, if you control the Bismark Sea you control New Guinea. It's very much like the Solomons. Control the Slot and you control the islands. Rabaul was the key. Isolate Rabaul and the whole South Pacific falls apart as far as the Japanese are concerned.
The mistake Mac was made when they did not relieve MacArthur after he made a complete shambles of the first few days in the Philippines, when he lost his air force within hours, and did not follow his own pre-war guidance of falling back on Bataan immediately. Relieving MacArthur would not have changed the ultimate outcome in the Philippines, but it would have allowed Roosevelt to appoint one commander, Nimitz, in the entire Pacific, instead of splitting it into two theaters commanded by a fighting man in one theater and a pink panties wearing momma's boy prima donna in the other.
I am steadfastly against spending people's lives when it is not necessary. Other than holding Morsby, none of it was necessary.
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