"Wild,
I find that theory somewhat implausible, in tactical terms, and I owe you the courtesy to explain why in some detail.
(1) The 7th cavalry in 1876 was a poor quality regiment, dominated by a non-combat disinterested Lt Col frequently on extensively leaves of absence. Neither Col Smith or Col Sturgis appear to have had much of an impact on their regiment. The only other officer who appears to have had any imprint on the regiment was Maj Gibbs, and he was dead before the 1870s. It was invariably dispersed on constabulary duty, usually reconstruction, and training was haphazard and dependent upon company level.
(2) The 7th was not a factionalised regiment in 1876, despite portrayals to the contrary. Those officers that disliked GAC, by 1876 were either long gone (West, Barnitz etc) or long detached (Merrill, Larned etc). There was of course ill feeling between GAC and Benteen, but that was because they were polar opposites as cavalrymen and a product of their early service and exacerbated by Elliott's demise (Benteen's column commander at the Washita). Particularly Benteen under Gen Wilson. But, by many accounts, Benteen was on reasonably good terms with both Keogh and Yates.
(3) But there was a nepotism problem, and the detached service absences (including the 2 senior Majors and 4 Captains in 1876) allowed GAC to manipulate commands to put in place acolytes from within the "Custer clan". Calhoun and Smith spring to mind, plus the "gofer" Cooke as adjutant. "Yes" men. Officers were either inside the club or outside to varying degrees rather than "factions". For example, Reno, Benteen and DeRudio were no fans of GAC but neither were they particularly fans of each other. Interestingly GAC fought the Washita (Elliott) and LBH (Reno) with the junior major as the next in command.
(4) GAC was a poor quality regimental commander. As well as the training/meritocracy issues mentioned above, he tended to deploy his platoon size companies like he was still a brigade/divisional commander deploying entire regiments. His offensive deployments were invariably overly intricate with little close mutual support, akin to the Imperial Japanese Navy in WW2. Look at the Washita, where he got away with it. He deployed in 4 columns (GAC, Elliott, Thompson, Myers), the GAC column itself being split into separate battalions under Hamilton and West. Co-ordination was poor, as was command and control. GAC was not a renowned Indian fighter, despite the manufactured reputation, and others such as Crook, Carr, MacKenizie and Miles were far superior. GAC had demonstrated little tactical acumen during his career, but he was a fearless leader of a cavalry charge. GAC should have been utilised under close tactical supervision, with Sheridan probably commanding instead of Terry in the field.
(5) Sheridan had cut GAC loose in 1868, and GAC had not been overwhelmed by those satellite villages. Warnings were missed higher up the chain of command. So it was not unreasonable for Terry, certainly no Indian fighter, and Sheridan to copy the 1868 plan in 1876. Another three pronged attack, with GAC and the 7th again cut loose.
(6) Now my belief is that GAC was "off his game" in 1876. All the political shenanigans with Grant were no doubt weighing on him and he required a "big win". He, and some of the regiment, arrived at the last minute. The Powder River depot points to an equine logistics shambles. The pack train was equally shambolic. GAC poorly used his scouts/guides/trackers. He did not throw them out far enough on the 24th/25th. He brought his main regiment up too quickly, and forced himself into a premature "blind" attack on the 25th with little meaningful recon intel as to hostile strength, location and battlefield terrain.
(7) Once we progress from the operational level to the tactical level, things continued to spiral downwards. GAC sent Benteen with a quarter of his total combat strength to sweep terrain where there were no hostiles. 8 companies proceeded into the LBH valley, with Reno to lead the assault with his battalion. GAC turned up the eastern bluffs with Yates/Keogh, without informing Reno, who simply did not have the combat strength to do much about a village of the size encountered. That was not Black Kettle's little village along the Washita! Reno wisely halted and formed skirmish line, until his left flank was being turned with his remaining unsupported. GAC got his first glimpse of the village at 3411, but continued northwards rather than backtracking to directly support Reno. That was a major mistake. GAC recalled Benteen, also redirecting McDougall/Mathey away from Reno's fight in the LBH valley, with ambiguous and confusing orders (and unfortunately Benteen/McDougall/Mathey's route to GAC would later be blocked by the remnants of Reno's defeated battalion). GAC proceeded towards Ford B, almost certainly with Yates battalion and with Smith actually approaching the river. There was no crossing, wisely given the size of the village but possibly seeking to aid Reno by drawing hostiles off him by way of hostile messengers, and GAC continued northwards. That was another major mistake.
(8) GAC/Yates and Keogh then converged on Calhoun Hill. GAC/Yates would recon northwards towards Ford D and the direction of hostile flight, whilst Keogh would hold Calhoun Hill and effect the still expected link-up with Benteen and the pack train. That would place the main regimental combat strength in that location. 7 companies, 9 companies when GAC/Yates returned from their northern recon. Still those 5 companies if Benteen was required/intercepted by Reno or otherwise unable to join GAC. Keogh deployed according to standard contemporaneous doctrine to deal with expected nuisance harassing hostiles. L Company on skirmish line, C Company mounted covering their right flank, and I Company reserved and ready to reel in Benteen/McDougall whilst also maintaining an eye on Ford C infiltration near the head cut in the ridge line.
(9) The hostiles swarmed across the river at Fords B, C and D. Especially via Ford B. Keogh positioned himself with I Company, to personally effect the link-up with Benteen (line of sight), monitor Ford C infiltration and to maintain the best visual contact on GAC/Yates to the northwards (whilst they were in view). The swale and nearby ridge line was the poorest location to monitor the build-up at Henryville and Deep Coulee, and considerable distance from L/C Companies. C Company went down into Deep Coulee to clear infiltration, but went too far and was routed. This was around the same time that the "heavyweights" were arriving from the valley fight e.g. Crazy Horse (AKA the Constipated Buffalo), Crow King etc. That left Company L exposed, and wheeling right to retrieve survivors when they should have been urgently vacating themselves. With L/C Companies collapsing and falling back on I Company, the battalion was routed. GAC/Yates had returned to the cemetery area, there being no immediate need to backtrack further south. GAC could hamper Ford C infiltration from there, without tiring his mounts further. When the Keogh battalion suddenly collapsed, punching a hole and flight northwards towards Terry was not a realistic option for GAC. It would entail abandoning Reno/Benteen/McDougall, but also abandoning Keogh survivors and also his own troopers who had lost their mounts (and there were plenty of hostile accounts of E Company troopers losing their mounts). Probable career ending disgrace. RHQ/F Company went up LSH to reel in Keogh survivors, where they were fixed and massacred. E Company went or were driven to Deep Ravine, either directly or via LSH, where they were wiped out.
(10) So, was there "a simple single catastrophe explanation rather than a series of convoluted useless tactical moves allied to the officers taking leave of their senses to explain the disaster"? If there was, it was not a continuous action from Ford B. The timeline is all wrong. The massacre would have been completed long before Weir's uncommanded advance.
(11) To understand and explain all that happened, save for the Keogh battalion collapse, one only has to implant one assumption into GAC's head. That he was the hunter, and the hostiles were the prey. The hostiles would not swarm up the eastern bluffs and initiate a pitched battle against the US Army. Sitting Bull would not have central command to orchestrate it. They would scatter, at worst orderly disperse. Defend the river barrier to the east of their village, with the various narrow pinch point fords facing the 7th. Secure their non-combatants, pony herd and apparel, and avoid a pitched battle. There were clues to GAC's mind set. His view's on Reno not following the trail with 6 companies. The number of hostiles that Division and the Indian Agents were reporting as off reservation. The decision not to accept Maj Brisbin's cavalry battalion. And the decisions not to backtrack at 3411 or at Ford B.
(12) So what happened to Keogh, at the worst possible moment with GAC off on his northern recon and with his own battalion loosely deployed to deal with harrying and the Benteen link-up? Was he in the same fatal hunter/prey mind set? The hostiles did swarm across the river, mostly via Ford B, and in unprecedented numbers as the pressure on the southern end of the village by Reno evaporated. And there was instinctive localised tactical initiative, drawing a response from other war chiefs. If Keogh had been with Calhoun/Harrington, he would have been positioned to witness the build-up and to timeously vacate northwards. If he had been WIA at that position, that severity of wounding would not have seen him evacuated all the way to the swale. But if he positioned himself with Porter and his own I Company, he was placed to view and personally reel in Benteen via the likely Sharpshooter/Luce/N/C approach, and to guard against infiltration via Ford C, and to view GAC. But out of position to command his battalion.
(13) So rather than a "single catastrophe explanation", I see a fatally incorrect assumption underpinning GAC's thought process and a mistake by Keogh in prioritising the wrong critical threat to his position. And that was enough to undo 5 companies. War is a business involving narrow margins and a high price.
(14) It was a domino effect, with the GAC wing widely dispersed and with little combat resilience against a mass concentrated assault. C Company undermined L Company. C/L Companies undermined I Company. C/I/L Companies undermined RHQ/F/E Companies. And the first domino was 2nd Lt Harrington's charge too far and rout by Lame White Man.
(15) Some of which will be implicit from what I have written above, but there are a number of problems with your theory:
(a) The timeline would be all wrong;
(b) You would have to ignore practically all hostile accounts of the GAC wing massacre, including the northern excursion;
(c) You would have to ignore nearly all the archaeological findings, particularly on Calhoun Hill;
(d) You would have to explain how Kellogg's body ended up where it did;
(e) You would have to explain why GAC dispersed in the face of assault, rather than was assaulted as a result of dispersal - it is implausible that a continued engagement from Ford B did not result in a concentrated defensive position rather than a scattering of corpses;
(f) You would have to explain why there were so many corpses in company formation, even if scattered across terrain to varying degrees, as most identified corpses were where we would expect them to be with the notable exception of 1st Lt Smith (Dr Lord treating or secured corpse?) or co-mingled consistent with this domino rout."
