Satellite Villages

[crowsnest]

In the 1868 Battle at the Washita, Custer and the 7th when attacking Black Kettle's village were attacking a much smaller satellite village in the area of a much larger collection of villages.  Custer by all accounts was content after attacking the one village and was quick to devise a plan to return home and claim victory.  

I've long considered his intention to repeat that action at the LBH.  While Custer had been told of the "big village" along the river, it's my belief that the goal was to avoid having to strike the main village early on.  

Custer using assumptions from his previous encounters with natives surely assumed while there may be a big village, there certainly must be some smaller satellite villages nearby.  By striking one of those villages he could claim victory, and get out of dodge before things got too hot.  

I believe this evolved in stages, and he blundered into a hornets nest he wasn't ever intending to attack in the first place.  

It's my understanding that Custer incorrectly believed he saw a small collection of Teepee's along Reno Creek.  Possibly in the vicinity of the lone teepee area.  As he crossed the divide and realized he was mistaken he sends Benteen off to get a view down the valley, but also hopeful to bump into a smaller village.  

As he progresses further he gets caught getting closer and closer to the real village.  When he commits Reno I still don't believe the intention was to fight the main village with his main force.  As he progresses down the bluff line he's not finding a suitable minor village in the distance to attack.  He calls Benteen realizing if he does find one he may have to fight in a more defensive posture after the fact and will need his men and the packs.   

I believe a forray to Ford B, and Ford D are done to attempt to locate a smaller satellite village, neither reveals one.   As Custer sits along Battle Ridge contemplating his realities he's met in force with natives before he can really respond, and all becomes lost.  

Anyone else believe Custer had hoped to quickly beat a satellite village and then run away claiming victory?

[quincannon]

Why yes, but not exactly.

The worst thing a commander can do is expect the battle in front of him will be exactly like the battle in his rear view mirror. That, and its twin sister, that the enemy will react and dispose himself today, as he did yesterday. In this instance the Indian turning point was Reynolds' attack on the village on the Yellowstone on Saint Patrick's Day 76. On that day the Indians realized that they must consolidate their tribal circles into a large village complex, rather than their former method of dividing into tribal circles separated by some distance, along a water course. In other words the whole game had changed for the Indians since Washita, and the Saint Patrick's Day battle.

I think it quite apparent that Custer expected that the Indians would follow previous practices. The "new-old" poster Montrose speculates that Custer expected to find the first outlying village in the immediate area of Ford A, thus the separation of Reno's battalion from the main body to deal with that village. If I got that wrong I am sure Montrose will inform me of same. I tend to agree with that view.

Meanwhile Custer pressed on to find the next, intending to chew that one up a bit too. Had he been successful in finding one, I do not think it beyond possibility that he would have further divided his five remaining companies, sending a couple to deal with the second, while he moved on to possibly find a third.

What Custer knew is that there was a sizable trail leading into the LBH Valley. That in itself does not mean the Indians were all camped together. It only means that all the tribal circles were moving in the same direction. The size of that pony herd was the key to unlocking the knowledge that it was not business as usual. The Indians were not following standard practice. They were doing something different.

As to why he sent Benteen into the hinterland, I suspect it was to guard his left flank from a counterattack eminating from any satellite village located out that way. Probably could have figured out a better way to do that, but he did not have the advantages we now enjoy.

Now the bottom line here for the military professional, is that you must conduct thorough reconnaissance, even if you are only traveling to the latrine. The side that wins the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance portion of the battle has several legs up on winning the main event.

As to Custer's motivation, and your speculation concerning it, I really can't say I have any locked in concrete view one way or the other. I can't read his mind, and there have been so many negative comments concering the man's personality and character, along with a few positive ones as well, that the best I can say, and will, is that I would not put what is expressed in your views past him.

Damned good thing though that we did not have electric lighting in Custer's day, because he was the sort of guy to stick his finger in a light socket, just to see what would happen.

Good post CN. Good thinking.

[herosrest]

I'm going to nitpick the Benteen scout or however it is postulated, with some sound military recon.

Firstly, on the day, There was more than a smidgeon of local knowledge available from George Herendeen. Particularly with regard to the South Fork Reno Ck. which he travelled and fought two years prior.

At the end of April, 1876; Ball and Roe of 2nd Cavalry travelled down the Bighorn to Ft. C.F. Smith, crossed over into Rottengrass and travelled down Lodgegrass into Little Bighorn valley where the discovered a huge camping ground from the year before - on the junction and 10 miles above the battlefield. They then travelled past Custer's battlefield (I believe) and used Tulloch's Creek back to Yellowstone and Gibbon.

This excursion, formed the basis of Terry's strategy - if you believe he intended to co-operate with 7th Cavalry. The distances work for the two columns meeting on Logdegrass. Of course the village wasn't at Lodgegrass and was much nearer to Montana Column.

Benteen's mission was to ascertain what was up the river at the location Ball and Roe found a month earlier. 2nd Cavalry's two company scout is written up in McClernands report.

There ya go - Report Mission out 24th April 1876.

Bradley also located the trails of the Indian camps moving from Tongue across to Rosebud. That is in his Journal.

[quincannon]

I don't understand the reason that you think you are nitpicking HR. I don't think you are at all. The presence of that old camp site, provided the rational for thinking that there might be occupation of that same area this time too.

The only question is if there was an occupation of that area, was it tactically relevant. I don't think it was, but then again I was not the commander that had to make the decision

[herosrest]

On 24th June, the camp moved down river 8-9 miles and set up in the bend beyond GO, which 7th Cavalry attacked next day. The camp had been located east of the river stretching from Ford A area, to the mouth of Long Otter Ck. where a town and rail halt named Benteen later stood. That was around 2 miles of tepees along the east bank of the river having moved there as the men went out, up the South Fork of of Reno Ck. into the Wolf Mountains to confront Wyoming Column on Rosebud.

The camps intended to move to Lodgegrass rather than GarryOwen but changed their minds duringg the 23rd and the rest is history. They would otherwise have been precisely where Terry hoped they would be and depending on route, 7th cavalry would have been above and Montana Column closing from below. That wasn't a good solution since Lodgegrass offered an escape route. Herendeen fought 1,500 Indians on Lodgegrass in 1874, and this was the basis of military intel gained by Lt. Bradley, who debriefed the civilian expedition at Bozeman. 

There was a custom of travel amongst the Sioux bands which placed the Cheyenne as honored guests at the head of travelling column and Hunkpapa as tailguard along the route. With intention having been Lodegrass, the Cheyenne were camped on the mouth of Long Otter Ck. and the Hunkpapa in the environs of Ford A. When the camp moved to GO, the Cheyenne led the way and that is chaotically mind blowing. This is confirmed by 2nd Cavalry's Captain Ball who scouted the upper valley for Terry on the 28th June, and detected the trail coming in from the South Fork of Reno Ck. and the fresher trail of the move led downriver from Benteen.

The conclusion at the time was two seperate bands coming together rather than the one reversing course. Of course, the Ree scouts by then were just about returned to their camp after skeedadling, and stumbled into an almighty firefight with their own camp guard. You can't dream it up.

The decison to operate three columns made sense to Sheridan and Sherman and, it seems, everyone else.

[quincannon]

I refer you HR to my comment concerning the reconnaissance/counterreconnisance phase of any battle, not just this one. A wise man does not wonder into a bag without first looking inside and determining the size of the bag he is about to enter, and what's in it. That old son is tactics 101.

In the end it does not matter who moved when or where. It does not even matter if they moved or not. What matters, the only thing that matters is where they were specifically about noon on 25 June 1876, how big was the encampment, approximately how many were there, what were the points of access and egress, and were they alert or not. Custer had none of this information. Custer never even tried to obtain it to the best of my knowledge. At best he had a several day old trail, good information about the size of the pony herd which he ignored, plus a wish and a promise.

[herosrest]

Despite the detail on Indian movements, my point was the purpose of Benteen's scout, which to see what was up the valley towards Lodgegrass. I don't believe Benteen was intended to scout or observe the South Fork since one of the Crows was sent forwrd to do that and observe the valley. This is obscurer stuff and outside the broader remit of authors who shy from the chaos of native accounts. 

We do know where the regiment was, and the relevant distances from information which Lounsberry excluded from the telegraph signal sent from Bismarck. link He published the information in 1919 and it is today as obscure as then.

Regards. 

[quincannon]

And my point is that any reconnaissance that way, or for that matter reconnaissance itself, should have been conducted before battle was joined, and not concurrent with it. Benteen's purpose has been debated literally since it happened. My larger point is that it should not have been conducted at all that late in the festivities. Moreover, one or two pairs of eyes is every bit as good as 100 plus sets of eyes. The purpose of reconnaissance is to see without being seen.

To address CN's subject though. I think there was every possibility that there would be satellite tribal circles out that way, and recon should have been conducted to verify their presence if any. There was also a possability that the were other satellites here and there in the extended battle space. The moral of the story though is that these tribal circles, if they were there, should have been located and accessed beforehand.

If Custer was proceeding on the notion that all the tribal circles were separated, and the end result was much like small villages located along a major highway, and I think that is what CN is getting at here, he was guilty, among many other things, of assuming same old same old, and not giving the Indians any credit for adaptation to a changing situation.

[herosrest]

I agree and you put it better than me.

The incidents and fight of 1873 played a part in setting the scene which Custer developed and he decided attack rather than receive one. On the Yellowstone he allowed the Sioux to envelop him and launched a mounted charge after the initial greeting. This was succesful because it was the way to fight the Indians - charge them mounted. Mind you, the 1874 civilian expedition did this on foot to great effect - the opposition would not stand in that circumstance. They also had artillery and that was a final say everytime.

I think it was Aug 11th, '73, the Sioux forded the Yellowstone above and below 7th Cavalry's bivouac and violently assaulted them. Custer decided to avoid that in '76 and closed to attack. We know the result.

His mindset pressed to attack. He could have holed up in the prepared position on South Fork Reno Ck. or struck for the Little Bighorn above the camps. He could have waited for Terry to come up. He could have sent Benteen to hunt up Crook. He could have waved his hat at Sitting Bull and chewed it over in parley. Unfortunately, the Cheyennes were there, spitting nails and familiar with his tactics at Washita. They knew what he would do and he did it. He walked into an ambush.

I'm going to duck now. 

[quincannon]

Damn , I do love those ducks.

As to the rest of your post HR - Concur

[herosrest]

www.overtdefense.com/2022/10/14/usmc-selects-kaman-to-build-logistics-drone-prototype/

[quincannon]

Remember HR, the primary purpose of that logistics drone is ship to shore movement. It is quite different when you have to supply tanks and other fighting vehicles. Don't think drones can do that efficiently.

[herosrest]

I believe they can through ToT. Efficiency is the name of the game. Don't need roads, bridges, or crew. There is an evolution underway with advances in practical techology.

Logistics - supply and distribution is the primary target of any adversary. Therefore those resources will be distributed to minimise and contain risk. Put all your eggs in one basket or depot these days and it's scambled eggs for brunch.

A 2,000lb payload is optimal. That means 3 off, to supply an Abrahms. One goes astray and no problem. The concept is derived from current Sci-Fi swarms of drones but these are not the little camera and recon things in general use now but a practical airborn jeep which goes where it is sent and returns silent and stealthy. 

That type of platform lends itself to numerous roles and this should be intrinsic to development. The numbers are easy. 3 per M1, etc.. etc... is baseline. Then the technology investment can be priced and funded. Transforming warfare. Armored is no longer tied to supply lines. Moscow in 48 hours.............