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Post by quincannon on Sept 6, 2022 19:18:09 GMT
I know you know Mike, and a few others as well.
When I go on one of these rants it is usually something that irks the hell out of me like bean counters, BUT, the rant's ulterior motive is to educate, not point fingers at anyone in particular. Education is why most people come here, and if we do not comment on a post or thread that takes people's attention away from what is important, and only serves to send folks into the wild blue yonder of - if only he had this, that, or the other thing, or the consistency of Dandy and Vic's poop, and were they well nourished, nothing worthwhile will ever get accomplished.
This board, mainly Mac's theory, that we have examined, spindeled, and mutilated, on these pages, over these last years have served to change opinions in the LBH community. Not everyone, but some, and that is an achievement, but we can't change anything or educate anyone if we only key in on how many soldiers were in Company C. That is tangential information. Nice to have in a notebook, but hardly something that is essential to understanding.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 6, 2022 22:43:14 GMT
I'd like to offer an opinion on this chestnut which is broader than the specific issue and probably outside the sphere which most wish to apply.
Indian fighting was irregular warfare which the army adapted to. Not just in 1876 but forever in the sense that the enemy is often and one could say usually, the civilian population being dominated.
Custer's tactics were not everyone's idea of getting things done and the Washita example is a classic. What was done in essence was concentrate full force on the target. I don't see a problem with that on the Plains even without adequate scouting if the target has been found and fixed.
At LBH, 7th Cavalry failed in that strategy. How is the blame game which goes on and it is broader than bipartisan and subtley vicious and boring. The strategy is dangerous because of precisely what happened but what happened was not intended. Had the various battalions, three, four, five or two, struck from different points and times the Indian defence would have been ruptured and dispersed. Grab the village, hold it, destroy it.
That though is half a victory since the pony herds afforded the Indians mobility which was the basic problem.
Regards.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 6, 2022 23:22:33 GMT
The Indian style of fighting is little considered in studying this battle and they were irregular light cavalry and some (not many) armed with repeating rifles. Whilst superb horsemen they were not drilled or managed in any military fashion and simply charged when it felt good and retreated when an enemy was aggressive. In pursuit they were deadly as buffalo hunters. Their morale and commitment was individualistic and whimsical. They were not military and did not think military. They fought from horseback and dismounted to coup and kill. With Fetterman and Custer they were able to concentrate overwhelming force. Custer was outCustered. The Cheyennes had fought him before and knew him and his tactics.
He should not have attacked given hindsight but his knowledge of 1,500 enemy was just less than 3 to 1. There were nearer 3,000. He screwed up.
Knowing what we know, had Custer continued up Rosebud to Ranchester then the camps disperse and or fall on Montana Column and the World would know how effective Gatling guns were when that happened. There were two with Terry, the third was damaged on the Powder River scout and left aboard Far West river steamer.
Custer had no choice but attack. Absolutely none. This is why the blame game is so futile.
An organised and capable civilian expedition into the Territory 7th Cavlry covered and fought, was undertaken in 1874 with two artillery pieces. The Sioux and Cheyennes would not stand against that directed long range gunnery. They gave up and left the field.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 6, 2022 23:28:26 GMT
We will have to agree to disagree HR, a bit anyway.
There is no excuse for not pushing down the commander's plan to company level, no excuse at all. That being said, such was more often then not the case with many commanders of the 18th and 19th Century.
Sam Houston (one of my few personal heros, I might add) shared his plans with no one, not even his horse, or his most trusted scout, friend, and tactical advisor Erastus "Deaf" Smith, from the time the Texian Army left Gonzalez until he ordered the drums to beat "Come To The Bower" on the Day of San Jacinto. San Jacinto was, in my opinion, the most significant battle ever fought on the North American continent. Some will say Yorktown, others Gettysburg or Vicksburg. They would be most incorrect in those conclusions, If not Yorktown, there would have been another, because the British lost that war on the 19th of April 1775. They could not operate in the American interior. The two ACW battles mentioned were important but neither were decisive. San Jacinto opened a continent, and made an Atlantic to Pacific United States possible.
Daniel Morgan on the other hand shared his plan with every rifleman he could reach around every camp fire the night before, and Cowpens became and still is the greatest tactical victory ever achieved by the U S Army. Tarleton and his British army, what few were left of them did not know if they should pee or go blind, they were so badly wipped. I think some are still running. Imagine a bunch of bumkins who had been shooting for their dinner since they were six years old, bolstered by relatively few Continental Regulars of the Maryland Line (my old regiment) beating the crap out of some of the best of the British Army had to offer.
Houston and Morgan both had their reasons for withholding or sharing, and both were correct. Generally speaking though, you must not glean the wrong lessons from these two examples. Modern armies, and I am speaking from Cromwell forward as "modern" are based upon echelonment, and its companion the chain of command. Modern commanders must share this vital information with the entire chain of command, for the chain to do its job and execute.
So striking on three or four axis was not in the cards, no matter how much Custer was resourced. It would not work, because no one either knew what to do, or for that matter not to do. Custer did not tell them. What you suggest is hard enough today. The way Custer operated, at least that day, it was impossible.
All that said, and disregarding that Custer did not share, his plan, his scheme of maneuver was excellent. Hold them by the nose, and swat their ass is always a good plan. Problem for George was that the swatees village extended past the point of intended swat. Custer, for some reason unknown to me, and only know to God and George Custer decided to ride northward, and he and two hundred nine others died for that gross miscalculation.
Yes it is boring. I am bored so much when the talk returns to Dandy's bowel movements and Reno's drinking that I do not know if I should puke or watch "Father Knows Best" reruns on cable TV.
I trust you are keeping well and one of those goddamned race cars has not run your sorry ass off the sidewalk YET.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 6, 2022 23:53:47 GMT
Doing OK QC.
Custer's communication issues certainly are an oddity.
Anyway, just 'cos hell is hot. 2nd & 7th Cavalry drive out the camp population and capture the 1200 tipis.
Actually its easier with just 7th Cavalry. 12 companies. 1200 tipis. Could they hold the camp long enough to destroy it? I don't know so over to you in your bean counting hat.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 7, 2022 1:45:11 GMT
Well my sense is that if the 7th Cavalry, with or without the 2nd, entered that camp, they were not coming out, at least most of them were not coming out.
I further do not believe Custer had a snowball's chance in hell of ever getting in there in the first place, as exemplified by:
1) The immediate reaction of the Indians that faced Reno. They were on his butt before he even got close. Now, that to me shows every indication of a pre-planned sector specific response.
2) There was a reason that many think it is doubtful that Custer approached Ford B. Opinions differ. Did he? Did he not? Everyone has their own opinion, of which they are entitled. What is safe to say though, regardless of which side of the question you come down on, is that there must have been a reason he either did not go there, or was repulsed from that place. Either way, it speaks of some organization on the part of the Indians. Either they were seen to be strong there from a distance, therefore the place was avoided, or they were indeed strong there and their strength gave George a nose bleed. Again, circumstancial evidence of some measure of pre-planned response.
3) There is also a great deal of conjecture about Ford D. Did he intend to go there? Did he go there? Did he almost get there? The answer to all parts of that question is unknown, but you may remind me when you and I meet in the hereafter, to dig the bastard up and ask him. Regardless, the Cheyenne accounts all tell us they were there in position, waiting for him. That too is evidence of pre-planning
There are only three approaches to the Indian camp that were viable, to the north, south, and east. The west is a non-starter for purposes of a direct attack, as that attack corridor was blocked by the pony herd. More about that in a moment. The Indians knew that, they had probably known it for a century, or at least for as long as their migratory wanderings had led them to that place as a temporary home. Block those three avenues of approach with sufficient force at each potential point of contact and no one is going to get into that place, short of being attacked by a small era specific division, or large brigade.
The western approach was the pony herd area, Now much has been made here about driving the herd into the village, or away from it. One of our posters even wrote a paper on it published by SAMS at Leavenworth, stating the pony herd was the center of gravity. I dispute that, just a bit, but despite not completely agreeing with the authors point, I will certainly agree that the herd was a good part of the COG, the village infrastructure being the remaining part. That is a dispute between military nerds like myself. As such it is not part of this immediate discussion. What I am saying though is that an attack launched from the west would certainly drive the majority of the herd toward the village, and that would have a combat multiplier effect, but there would be a cost entailed. The herd south to north stretched several miles. Therefore to drive the herd would require the regiment to have a several miles wide frontage, which would completely destroy cohesion, and dilute the regiments combat power into at least company sized packets, or smaller, which once the Indians recovered from the shock effect of the herd driving through the village, would be duck soup for the defenders. Keep in mind now, it would not be just warriors Custer would be facing, but also some very pissed off women, and every kid, male or female, above the age of six.
So my bean counting for today says 600 beans in this pile and 20,000 plus in that pile, and the 20K are on home ground.
I understand you folks have a new PM. From what I have read, which is less than extensive, of her background, she appears to know her stuff, and is a hell of a lot more attractive than Boris. At least she combs her hair.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Sept 7, 2022 2:31:01 GMT
A problem with the US Army, dating almost from the time of the Revolution, is that it has a thirst to fight a European style war, ignoring the fact that there were only a very few times in the US itself when that was required: Parts of the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Civil War. There were few, if any, tactical treatises about how to fight a war against the Indians - and the Indian wars were in fact our longest war from the establishment of St Augustine as the first European settlement on the continent, up until about 1912 or so, if my memory is correct. The tactics are all about fighting Europeans. Even Upton, who I admire to a certain extent, was focused on Europe.
For the last 20 years, many in the Army decried that Afghanistan and Iraq were not real wars, they rejoice in our finally getting out of that tar pit/briar patch and are more or less feeling justified now that Russia and Ukraine are duking it out, and we are more than willing in forgetting we ever were involved in them.
While the USMC doesn't think they need tanks, they ignore their own history of fighting the Japanese. Tanks were essential in overcoming the extensive, intricate, and brilliant Japanese defensive system, but more important were marines and soldiers willing to duke it out in close range, and even going into them. In dealing with the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, we forget some of our tactics of the Indian Wars (fight in the winter when they lose mobility and provisions), use blowtorch tactics when they are in bunkers or caves, and we continue to burden our infantry with a heavy load whereas the insurgents mostly fought light. When the Caliphate tried to conventional, they lost their shirt. On the other hand, they are probably right in that in most of the Pacific, there will be little need for large armor formation, until you get to Guam (to some extent) or Okinawa (to a greater extent. Fighting on the continent of Asia is a no go for us and Australia is a long way for us as well as the Chinese.
As to the horses, even John Ford and John Wayne understood about the horses. (Okay, maybe John Wayne only understood because it was in the script) My gaming of the concept though had the ponies scatterng wildly, sometimes through the camp and sometimes toward the soldiers. Maybe it could have worked. Dehorsed, the Indians may not have done so well. But there were still a lot of them.
Mackenzie seem to understand better than most. Even Crook, who was not quite prepared for the Northern Plaines Indians as compared to the Southern ones where he did well.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 7, 2022 3:23:37 GMT
The horses were not the problem. The amount of terrain the horse herd occupied was the problem.
Every tactical situation is unique unto itself. Keep the regiment closed up you can only drive part of the herd. Spread the regiment out to drive the whole herd, and you scattered your combat power over hell's (considerably more than) half acre. That's why I disagreed with the Signal Guy. The COG is only important if you have the means to grab it.
The only guy who knew his crap for real in that movie was Ben Johnson. By the way I have been to that place where they shot the drive the horses scene, It is very small, made to appear much larger on film.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2022 0:13:16 GMT
Interesting responses, thank you.
I see LBH slightly differently in that the village emptied in response to the opening attack, or only attack made. Those not offering opposition were out of there onto the western hills to the south ,,,erm... sorry for that. The village emptied and as best I can figure it out went helter skelter me & the kids are gone. Meanwhile the men folk got it together and did what Papa bear does.
Empty village was good news. A herd of horses crashing the camp would do the same as the attack. Whether the camp was 50 or 1200 lodges, managing the hostages was a burden and impossible with the host at LBH.
That was my thinking and there is enough from participants in camp to show that it was abandoned. I would think that is what Custer expected based upon previous - fight and flight.
The troops then did not take the village but I wondered if they could have held long enough to destroy tipi's, supplies and property.
Tanks were employed fighting New Guinea and up that island chain into the Philipines. Tanks on infantry redoubts were effective. If I remember, the problem at Tarawa was getting them, and actually anything other than Amtraks on the beach because of a miscalculation of the tides. It don't come easy. They were worth their weight in gold to the British forces in Burma but climate was difficult. There were a handful of tank on tank clashes during the Japanese assault on Philipines in 1942. That was companies of M2 Stuarts which did good work but had lousy logistics and support.
As time has gone by with the Custer fight, I find it harder and harder to ignore his previous actions at Washita and on the Yellowstone in 1873. Anyway, I guess that destroying 1200 lodges would have been an immense task. Taking the population captive wasn't realistic and grabbing a few as hostages possibly would mean parley. While the camp was destroyed in front of the Indians.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 9, 2022 2:00:32 GMT
Before you set out to destroy 1200 lodges HR, it might be well if you gave us some explanation of how you get in that village to destroy those lodges.
I have looked at this problem for fifty or so years, and I do not see how it could be done with the resources Custer had at hand, and that would also include the resources offered but refused.
You are simultaniously fighting time, space, distance, and opposition, and you are outnumbered at least four to one.
Victory of limited perportions is possible, but complete distruction of those villages is going to have to wait for much later in the campaign. It ain't going to happen on 25 June.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Sept 9, 2022 4:49:59 GMT
Just to add here that the village was deliberately set in a good defensive position because they thought the army would turn up eventually. So it was no accident that Reno ran into the ground he did.
Secondly the village was deliberately closely packed. Entering by the cavalry would have been suicidal. That is why there absolutely is no point in going to Ford B.
Third the village began to empty, but, when they realized how the battle was progressing most came back. Two Moons records that he was telling the women to stay as they were safer in the village.
These were strong, smart, brave people. They knew how to fight together, and when to stay, and when to go. They stayed because they saw it was the best alternative. They won because they were smart enough to use Custer's errors to their advantage.
Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Sept 9, 2022 9:08:03 GMT
Concur in all respects Mac.
Too much attention is given to why Custer lost his battle, and not NEARLY enough attention is given to why the Indians won the battle. They won because they wre prepared for battle, and Custer was not,
Custer was like the dog who all his life had run chasing the bus. At LBH the dog finally caught the bus, but in the end the bus caught him.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2022 9:49:48 GMT
I'm not defending Custer but rather seeking opinion as to whether, with the village evacuated as happened, it was rapidly deserted; and the regiment et al reaching it, could they have held the ground long enough to destroy the camp. I don t know. Anyway - www.thesun.co.uk/news/19750867/london-bridge-is-down-secret-code-queen-death/Regards. Added - I'm a bit wobbly this morning after PPV vaccination. Let me flesh out the proposition. There is disagreement about numbers and village size but reliable information was gained at the time and subsequently by Lt. Clark for Sheridan that 1,200 tipis is good. They were located along from the timbered river beds 800 yards below the downstream Garryowen loop and stretched along the river bank and dry beds to an old dry creek running into the river opposite the divide of Medicine Tail and Deep Coulees (where the Cheyenne circle stood). A seperated camp of the Ogalala tribe sat to the west and the overview looks like a large circle or more like horseshoe open somewhat down the valley. The layout has caused no end of confusion and efforts at configuration but just go with what i've outlined which is good enough and supported by the research of E.S. Curtis from 1905-1908. Google map - link Curtis map - link
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Post by quincannon on Sept 9, 2022 10:20:28 GMT
But it did not happen HR, so your question in moot. It started to happen, no doubt, but when Reno was sent packing initial panic, which is quite natural calmed and the evacuation was stalled then halted. By the time Custer was engaged in the north any evacuation started had stopped. Indian reaction, with regard to evacuation I expect would mirror, any such emergency event you or I might experience today, First get out of the immediately effected area, then as response came on the scene, a sense of tense normality would prevail, until status quo could be reestablished. Those Indians were no different that we would be today.
Built up areas, regardless if it consists of closely packed temporary shelters or large urban sprawl, are very problematic for the attacker, and give the advantage to the defender. The reason being is that the sprawl itself fragments attackers into penny packets and large unit cohesion is completely lost. It is a complete nightmare, coupled with the fact that to successfully operate in such an environment the attacker must have numerical dominance, not superiority, dominance.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 12, 2022 8:06:42 GMT
The point is whether or not Custer had divined some new method of getting the job done.
Usually destroying the means of nomadic life and the hunting through which it flourished, subjugated a tribe. Destroy the property, transport and food supplies. This was how tribes were overcome and dominated and after the return to FAL for winter, 7th Cavalry gathered in all the ponies from the reservations and problems ceased virtually overnight - the inherent point of Mark Hoyt's assessment. Terry and Crook ran into overwhelming force because it had been massively reinforced during the summer and the means to be aware of the Indian's movements from reservation was deeply flawed. I do believe Custer did the simple maths on odds with a maximum threat of 1,500 although this is moot and understood on the trail he could face 380 lodges which is 1,000 fighters.
Sitting Bull sat waving the burd at Washington and the WH were not for it. Destroy the camp was the long practiced means of subjugation and was undertaken on St. Patrick's Day on the Powder River. It was how the task was accomplished.
Did 7th Cavalry have the means to accomplish this, given that Custer 'understood' he would need to concentrate his strength on the target to destroy it - or had he innovated a new strategy divined on the bluffs looking into the valley with the regiments best optical device?
You may feel that Custer was out of his depth and that opinion has done many rounds, however, he had no choice but attack or be attacked by his own recent battle experience.
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