Interesting discussion developing on the Black Board

[quincannon]

A new fellow has made his appearance on the Black Board, Sir Francis, asking an old, but still interesting, question, would the four 2nd Cavalry companies being attached to Custer have made a difference. Comments by others have seemed to stick to the subject, and Tom also properly injected the Gatling guns as a combat mulitplier. Good for both of them.

I think it is the wrong question though. If Sir Francis' and other's intent, and I expect it is, to answer the larger question, that being, could anything have altered the outcome? Yes, having a full brigade could have altered the outcome - maybe. Numbers would certainly have been better. Would the Gatlings have altered the outcome? Well they certainly possessed supressive firepower, but they were also very immobile, something to be considered if it is expected that they could be used as the 1876 version of the MG43, that was so effectively used for the purpose that Doctor Gatling orginally intended. Weapons systems all have their limitations, and the Gatlings had a lot of them, immobility being the greatest of them.

So where does that leave us? Let's go along with the speculation contained in Sir Francis's original question, and give the four company battalion of the 2nd Cavalry to Custer, and throw in Tom's Gatlings for good measure. Then so reinforced we must then consider:

1) No prior battlespace intelligence/knowledge, as to the extent in terms of space occupied by the village complex. no real grasp of current Indian warrior strength, (Custer's infomation was at least days, and perhaps a week or more old), no information on the extent of Indian security measures, or of outside immediate battle space Indian reconnaissance activity.

2) The key factor in Custer's defeat was going against the timeless military addage of dividing your force in the face of the enemy. Add to that the lack of unity of command. Custer indeed did command all forces on the field. Custer was not able, by his own actions, to exercise that command on the field. Distance, coupled with no action on his part to mitigate the disadvantage that distance incurred, violated the cardinal principal of war. There are no cardinal principals of war as it stands, all are equally important, but if there were one that stands out above the rest it would be unity of command.

SO THEN, could the addition of the 2nd Cavalry battalion and the guns have changed the outcome? The answer is a firm an uneqivacal NO, not by themselves. The answer does not lie in reinforcement, but rather in adherence to the principles of war, and hard earned lessons of previous battles. Ignore them, and while more may have survived, the outcome would have remained the same. The mind of the commander is what spells the difference between victory and defeat. It alway has, and always will.   
 

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I agree, most likely not. The gatlings in my view would only have made a difference, with or without the 2nd CAV, had Custer selected a position which the Indians had to attack him. On the other hand, standard artillery may have been more nimble and effective. Chelmsford did not bring Gatlings with him to Isandalwana, but the 24th (-) did have two guns + a rocket battery. The artillery did good work for a while. He did bring Gatlings with him to the 'final' battle but he was in a square and I think the Zulu came to him. I have not studied that battle overmuch.

More horses may have made a bigger difference, since they left a lot of recruits behind when they rode out on the final march. Not that anyone was trained.

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"had Custer selected a position where the Indians had to attack him" IF is the biggest word in the English Language, superceeded only by "IF ONLY"

The answer is IF Custer had obtained current intelligence, and followed the Principals of War, and was familiar with The Iron Duke, The Corsican Corporal, and Freddie the Big Guy, even at a brief perusal level, he would had adopted your course of action Mike, or at least kept his entire force together, so that he could have exercised positive control of the whole. Those guys mentioned learned their lessons the hard way, at least in part to make it easier on those who followed

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I don't think the Gatlings would have made much difference nor the 2nd CAV. The Gatlings would have been a burden on the 7th.

[quincannon]

Absolutely true, mobility and logistical ball and chains.

Victory was certainly possible. I have no doubt about that. None at all. It was not possible though if Custer had acted in the same manner he did, regardless of Gatlings, four more companies, or a squadron of Michael's very best avenging angels. Victory is in the hands of the commander, no matter what he has, or does not have to work with.

Would victory if achieved been decisive? Not hardly, but a sound bloody nose beating could have been achieved, either by the defense you suggest Mike, or by a limited attack on a narrow front, delivered with maximum shock action and effect, by a commander who refused to get too greedy. He should then be satisfied with one day's work, prepared to fight again tomorrow, and the day after, and for as many days after, until the Indians gave up and decided that watching Howdy Doody reruns on TV was a much better option than fighting the United States Army. 

Fighting is never the right answer to settling differences. Sometimes it is necessary, because one side or the other does not believe that to be true. Usually someone has to have that moral right reinforced by decisive action, before they come to believe in the right of it.

[Deleted]

Well, insofar as it went, even after both Crooke and Custer's 7th Cavalry (-) was defeated (RENO AND BENTEEN SAVE THE 7TH CAVALRY), the United States achieved its objective. It just took a little longer. The outcome was never in doubt.

Sheridan I think did not properly source the effort, plus the command team had issues. None of Terry, Crooke, Gibbon, or Custer distinguished themselves. Reno did okay by taking it upon himself to go look for the enemy instead of following Terry's orders. Had he not, I am pretty sure the Indians would not have been found. And while I think the outcome might - MIGHT - have been different had Custer followed his orders, I can understand why he went after them. Same reason. Had he not, they would have moved and probably would not have been found.

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The four you mentioned were the military Marx Brothers in 1876, for different reasons. Reasons do not matter. Performance matters, Results matter, Victory matters. No one ever gave out a trophy for second place on a battlefield. Runner up in battle is like being last in line at the Porta Potty. You will probably shit your pants before you get another opportunity. to sit on the John of command.

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I am supremely confident the only units I will command will be composed of cardboard counters marked with symbols and made up numbers approximating various capabilities so you can stage combat.

As various conflict models go, all are wrong. Some are useful.

[quincannon]

Went over to the Black Board a few moments ago to see how that discussion was progressing. Frankly, I am disappointed for all, except one, that have posted so far seem to be from the bean counter school of military and battle analysis. That one exception was Colt 45, who understood and addressed the salient issue. Disappointing. Numbers and things are not nearly as important as what is in the mind of the commander, and how he uses that mind to solve tactical problems, thoroughly, but rapidly.

Colt correctly stated, and I paraphrase, no matter what Custer did with the extra assets, as long as he adopted the same historical solutions to his tactical problems, he was going to lose, and the outcome, while being slightly modified in detail, would be the overall same.

Tacticians study tactics and make their solutions work in their favor, and to the severe detriment of those they oppose. Bean counters, count beans.

Disappointing.  Maybe I expect too much.

[quincannon]

Well, hope, as they say. does spring eternal. Noggy has come around over there to what I too feel is the correct and only conclusion, that being that if Custer had done the same and not deviated from his historical scheme of maneuver, the outcome would not have changed, regardless of a 2nd Cavalry reinforcement or not. He goes on to say that the 2nd Cav may have helped, but, (I am putting words in Noggy's mouth now) not changed anything, as long as the same scheme of maneuver stayed in place.

The only person who makes the scheme of maneuver decision is the commander.

All the others save Colt and now Noggy are still in the fruitless process of counting beans.

I think it would do all of us well to remove the myths that have grown up over the years, dismiss the distractions such as notes, volleys, and an overabundance of Victorian romantic notions, and set our contemplative powers to the process of discovering root cause, that being the decisions of the commander who set everything in motion.

It is not what you have in terms of resources and the stratagems in you bag of tricks that matters. It is what you do with them.

[mac]

My daughter has a very good friend who is a career officer in the Aus Army. When he was a newly minted Lt. we had our only brief discussion on this battle. He had never heard of it (no surprise), but said something to the effect that when you divide your forces you broke the most basic rule and  after that you must win.

The fact that Custer divided means that he must have thought he had the force to win. That is why he turned down the 2nd.

I wonder if he had been forced to take them if they would not have been left guarding the pack train.

Like your work Mike, very informative. Thanks.

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Clair's friend was absolutely correct. Custer did break the most basic rule. You never divide your forces in the face of the enemy. Never is an absolute though, and the only absolute that is valid is that there are no absolutes. So, have commanders over the centuries ever broken the rule? Sure, but each one that did successfully, had a thorough knowledge of what he was facing, and decided that the risk of dividing, was worth the potential reward for doing so. Additionally, folks like the Corsican Corporal, often made it look like they were dividing their force as a means of deception. Napoleon used this method many times, but when he did he always kept a string upon those he divided so he could rapidly consolidate them for when battle was joined.There are very few people though that can pull it off, and the rule not broken is still the best bet.

Custer did think he had the force to win, but to Custer force was ecpressed in numbers, and not in combat capability. That is why I have a strong aversion to the bean counters. They analyze, and more importantly think, just the way Custer did. Numbers of people and things do not win battles. Trained numbers, and functional, well maintained, things do. Given the trained numbers and functional things, there is still one factor, that even those numbers and things still won't provide victory for you. That is the ability of the commander to use them, and use them properly, consistent with the situation he confronts, and the doctrine, that is the glue which holds his force together, and separates it from a street mob.

It does not matter how many tools a carpenter has in his tool box. What matters is does the carpenter know how to maintain them so he will get good service from them, and does he know how to properly use them. From the very first moment that someone is chosen to train for a leadership position in the U S Army, two things are ground into his brain, his mission statement. You are charged, they are told, with accomplishment of the mission, and looking out for the welfare of your troops (used to be men, but this is the 21st century after all). All too often the second part of that, looking out for the welfare is taken to mean making sure they have a full canteen, and extra dry socks in their TA50 gear. I personally despise that statement, because the second part is so misleading. The statement should be, in my view, Accomplish the Mission, and Preserve Your Force. Sounds similar, but there is a world of difference, in that preserving the force takes into account the full canteen and the dry socks, but goes further in reminding the leader that he must act to accomplish the mission, by insuring that whatever plan he comes up with must be constantly done with the preservation of the fighting ability of his force uppermost in his mind.

Custer needed lessons in planning, but he could have been also been a better servant (commanders are first servants to those they command) had be understood that success is not only measured in victories won. It is also measured in having something left to fight with, and win again on 26 June.

 In the event you wondering why I am answering your post at this ungodly hour of the morning Mac, a couple of goddamned idiots were racing their motorcycles down Marksheffel Road and their noise woke me up, then the dog got up and wanted to play, I damned near fell over the cat when I went to heat up the coffee, and, and, and. I fully intend to preserve the force, and go back to bed as soon as I put a period on this sentence - Period

[Deleted]

Sept 6, 2022 8:22:44 GMT mac said:

My daughter has a very good friend who is a career officer in the Aus Army. When he was a newly minted Lt. we had our only brief discussion on this battle. He had never heard of it (no surprise), but said something to the effect that when you divide your forces you broke the most basic rule and  after that you must win.

The fact that Custer divided means that he must have thought he had the force to win. That is why he turned down the 2nd.

I wonder if he had been forced to take them if they would not have been left guarding the pack train.

Like your work Mike, very informative. Thanks.

Thanks.  Bean counting and number crunching has its uses, even at the company level.  It is a part of the tool kit.  Not the whole tool kit. 

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Indeed it does, and we seem to do it most every day, with our various force structure projects Mike. The problem with bean counting is when that's all one does and thinks it is the only thing that is necessary to find answers to tactical problems.

Who gives two hoots in hell how many men were in Company C?  It might be thirty, or it might be 300, and it does not make a damned bit of difference if a crap for brains Daffy Duck is in command of Company C, or Company C is in the back woods when they are supposed to be on that hill yonder. Not to mention, that if not one trooper in Company C could not hit Godzilla in the butt with a bass fiddle, or is so physically debilitated they do not have the strength to get their sorry asses out of bed in the morning.

Numbers mean something, not everything.

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Roger