Semi-Official Meeting Report

[quincannon]

It's "semi" because there is only one participant reporting.

Mike and I met yesterday at the Golden Bee here in Colorado Springs and discussed his battlefield visit over Buffalo Burgers which were extraordinarily good, at least I thought so. Our discussion was quite limited because as I related before his visit was greatly effected by snow. He could only visit the northern part of the battlefield. Everything south of Calhoun Hill was closed, thereby no Ford B, no Weir Point, no Reno/Benteen area.

1. My impression is that Mike has not come to any definative conclusion about the number of companies that Custer actually took with him to the Ford D area. It is my belief that he is still holding out the possibility of a company being held a little further south as a rear guard, a hedge against the concern for the Indians (Wolf Tooth's Band) that Custer met on the ridges south of Calhoun.

2. Mike and I both share the opinion that Custer never made it all the way to Ford D. We both agree that the limit of advance would most probably be the old road shown on the 1/24:000 USGS Map that leads off of Highway 212 and ends in the park administrative area. If true that would mean that part of Custer's immediate command would find itself very near the river (in the present administrative area, near where the old Kellogg marker was once located), and the remainder of the command further away. Mike also thinks it is important in understanding what happened next is the manner in which Custer turned his command around. Mike used the two methods of turning used by the British and German Fllets at Jutland to illustrate his point. The German Fleet used a simultanious turn to reverse direction, whereas the British Fleet used a sequential turn. It may seem like a small thing to most, but at Jutland the British choice of method put them far out of position for follow up, while the German choice kept them in full battle order. The same thing very well could apply here.

3. We are both in full agreement that the mythical story of Company E coming off of Last Stand Hill and charging down Cemetery Ravine to end up in the lower part of Deep Ravine down by the river, a distance of between five and six hundred meters, is pure hogwash.

4. We are also in agreement that Company C never entered Calhoun Coulee, for any reason, and their most likely route to F-F Ridge was the higher ground that forms a finger of land off of Battle Ridge descending toward F-F Ridge. The story of Company C going into Calhoun Coulee to clear out Indians that were firing on Battle Ridge from that position does not take into consideration the fact that any firing from the Calhoun Coulee position (very low ground) would have been aimed upward, thus firing over the heads of any on Battle Ridge, mounted or dismounted. The only place aimed and effective fire could be placed on those on Battle Ridge would be where Calhoun Coulee empties onto Battle Ridge, and that would put the Indians well exposed and into the fields of fire of those on Battle Ridge. Therefore there was no need to go down into that coullee to clear anyone out of it.

5. Mike's custom made upscaling of the USGS 1:24,000 topo map was I must say the most valuable aide to the study of LBH in the last 50 years. I would encourage everyone interested in the battle to contact him for the information necessary to obtain one. It made seeing the maneuver easy and covers the entire battle space. I could even use it effectively with my poor eyes.

He was on the road to Kansas when we parted company,  then to Texas, and back home to Florida, so will probably be away from here for a week or so.

 
 

[quincannon]

Addendum: Mike and I also discussed something of special interest to Mac and Colt, the artifact field at the base of Calhoun Hill.

Mike had not looked at the area, except an overview from the hill top and had not reached a conclusion as to the "why" of it being there.  We however both came to the agreement that it was not there as a result of a deliberate defense, as others, including Wagner in his work, insist that it was.

Frankly, I am not at all certain of Wagner being aware of that aritfact field at the base of the hill. I would think he would know of it, having studied the battle for so long a time, but we had never discussed it, so I really do not know for sure. If he is aware of it, then I would think of only one of two possibilities. He either ignored the artifact field as being of no consequence, or as unrelated to an attempt at deliberate defense. The other reason being that he is completely unaware that you do not set up a deliberate defense at the base of a hill, facing high ground to your front and one flank. I find the second reason extremely hard to believe considering his military service.

[mac]

Pity about the snow.

Looking forward to hearing Mike's thoughts and the odds on him being hooked enough to go back for a second look.

Pleased to hear that the burgers were not of the death variety.

Cheers

[quincannon]

Can't speak for Mike Mac, but I got the impression that once was enough.

Anything there is to learn about LBH for guys who interests are like Mike's and mine, tactics, can be just as well learned from a good map, and George Marshall's book. Mike has a better than good map, and I have Marshall's book.

The rest of the drama, intrigue, drunkeness, betrayal, and conspiracy, that surrounds Little Big Horn is more worthy of Shakespeare, and in particular "Much Ado About Nothing", and while I do like Shakespeare, I don't like that one.

The battle fascinates the general public only because the guys that were supposed to win, lost, and the guys that were supposed to lose, won. I already know the reaaon for that, and have for some time, and so does Mike. There were ten regiments of cavalry in the United States Army in 1876,  nine of them were professional, and one, the Seventh, was not. 

I neglected to add to my post above that if Wagner has a reason for apparently not considering that cartridge artifact field at the base of Calhoun Hill in his maintaining that Company L was is a deliberate defensive posture, as a reason for being in the Calhoun Hill position, I wish he would clarify the issue by giving his reason. As long as he has a reason that is perfectly acceptable to me. I may not agree with the reason, but my disagreement is of no consequence, as long as there is a reason. Addressing the issue is, to me, of paramount importance.

[quincannon]

Now that I am feeling better after another bout with a sinus infection. The wind, and the dust it disturbes, has been horrible here in Colorado off and on for a couple of weeks as it normally is this time of year. I am going to try to simplify why I think that artifact field at the base of Calhoun Hill is so important, both to me, and the accuracy of the Wagner timing narrative. It may be hard to believe that I wish Wagner's narrative was completely correct in all respects, so the man could spend his remaining days on earth, knowing, not just thinking, that his life's work was completely worthwhile, and would stand the test of time. I had the same feeling about Gray too.

Here goes.

Mr James Calhoun was murdered in 25 June 1876. His body was found two days later. The area where Calhoun's body was discovered was greatly disturbed. Those that discovered the body and observed the scene drew the then very logical conclusion that Mr. Calhoun was "sitting" on the hill that now carries his name. Why Mr. Calhoun was sitting on that hill when he was murdered was not of concern then, only that he was sitting on the hill. So the story of Mr. Calhoun's murder was reported as such, and that reportage was the accepted story of the murder for over a hundred years, and in some quarters still the accepted acount.

A hundred plus years later a party of scientists come along, and examined the area, and they discovered some long buried evidence that was timed and dated to the day of the murder. Later on these same scientists discovered even more timed and dated evidence between the initial find and where Mr Calhoun's body was found. Together both of these finds could well change the accepted story of Mr. Calhoun's murder. Maybe, suggested by the newly found evidence, Mr Calhoun was not sitting on that hill when he first met his attacker. Maybe he was doing something entirely different than that which was previously thought. Maybe he was going somewhere. Maybe when, in the process of going somewhere, he met that murderer, who was extremely strong and forced Mr. Calhoun back toward the top of the hill where he was killed.

If any of the scientific evidence discovered after the accepted story was promulgated is relevant to Mr. Calhoun's murder it must be fully investigated, and not ignored, as it has a direct bearing on the history, and outcome of the affair. To not do so is irresponsible.

In doing this you will notice that I have not even touched on the near concurrent murders of Mr. Harrington, and Mr. Keogh, who were both found at the same time in  the same general area. Were Harrington and Keogh with Mr Calhoun, or did they come along before or after him, only to be attacked and murdered by the same person or persons? Were Harrington and Keogh attempting to help Calhoun when they too met their fates? Were they all just sitting in the places where they died? Were they all just sitting there waiting for the murderer to get around to them? That's what the initial, accepted, logical at the time, story has to say.

The State of Denmark is a long way from my house, but I can, as Shakespere might say, smell that which is rotten from here

[mac]

Very true QC.

As you know I came to this battle from an angle that was very different to most. I have been delighted to learn things along the way from many people (your good self included) who have opened my eyes a little (yes just a little) to the ideas that you and your confreres have spent your careers learning and practicing.

You know standing on Calhoun Hill was an epiphany for me for the reason you mention, and many other considerations.

One of those considerations is the fact that the troops involved were cavalry. As I see it, one of the main assets of cavalry is their mobility; so to form a theory about this battle based on the notion that Calhoun simply sat still in one place watching the enemy forces build around him until he was overwhelmed seems a fundamental error. As you point out the modern archaeology exposes this error dramatically.

I have developed something of an itch to go back for another look myself. We will see.

Cheers

 

[quincannon]

Frederick the Great said he would cashier any cavalry commander who stayed and waited to be attacked. That dictum of Freddies only applies if the cavalry commander in question retains his means of mobility. Freddie, implies, but does not say the cavalry commander must attack his enemy. All he says is don't wait to be attacked. Cavalry is the arm of mobility. With horse cavalry it is short term mobility to be sure, but then it is rapid short term mobility, enough to clear away yourself, and escape harm. Mike, a cavalryman, might not do the same with his tanks, as the horse cavalryman of the 19th Century, but Mike's cavalry are also proteced by armor, and have some high powered ordnance, two things, two more options, that 19th Century horse cavalry did not have.

A good example of what Mike's cavalry might do in Calhoun's situation is contained in the opening battle of "Team Yankee" by Harold Coyle. In TY Bannon's company team, Team Yankee, sits and waits, and when a seeminly overwhelming Russian force appears to their front, Bannon waxes them, but not without loss, with firepower and preparation. The friendly company team on his flank fares not nearly as well, but also survives.

There is a larger difference though, between Team Yankee and what Calhoun and his cohorts faced. In Team Yankee we know that Bannon's orders were to deliberately defend the area he was given. We have absolutely no idea what Calhoun's orders were. Without knowledge of what his orders were, all speculation on what happened, why it happened, a complete picture of where it happened, and why it was allowed to happen, is for naught, and cannot be, can never be complete.

[quincannon]

There was one agenda item of mine that I intended to discuss with Mike, and time constraints prevented it. Time was limited if he was to reach his destination in Kansas at some reasonable hour. The item was the existence or non-existance of the "Keogh" battalion.

As I am sure that most of you know my position on that battalions's existance is in the negative. I have two reasons for that. The first is Godfrey did mot mention it. In fact Godfrey was explicit that the battalion was Custer's, all five companies of it. The second was that there was no apparent need to organize Custer's command into a two battalion construct. Five companies was completely within the accepted parameters of span of control. There is a third reason though, based upon the scenario, Mac, Colt, and a few others, espouse here, of five companies to the north. Even if one of those companies composed a rear guard, as Mike seems to think might have happened, there was still no obvious need for splitting Custer's command into two component parts.

That third reason is of course speculative. No one actually knows how many companies Custer actually took with him to attack at Ford D. All we can do is go on what would be best practices then and now, you hit with your fist, not your fingers. Fist implies four or five. Fingers implies something less.

So getting back to 1876 reality of what was later seen, and not the 1876 reality of what was actually done, I can well understand why people at that time, seeing what remained, thought that Custer had subdivided into two battalions, with the logical choice of commanders being Yates and Keogh. The two supposed organizations were found some distance apart, therefor it was quite logical to assume two battalions were formed.

If the scenario of leaving three companies behind in the Calhoun area is correct, then the two battalions are also correct. It would be the proper tactical solution to form two tactical groupings, each having its own commander. On the other hand it would be a very poor solution if the intention was to attack. Unity of command, and positive control are vital factors in any attack, as is the rapid communication between commander and subordinate.

So in the end we are left with what was done, in the determination of a one or two battalion construct, not what to have appeared to be done. It is very much like the Calhoun Hill defense issue. We must know what was done, not what it appeared like. Appearnace, as the old saw goes, can be deceiving.

Everyone keep in mind as they ponder this though. A battalion in 1876 was more like a task force in 2022. It could be created by pointing fingers saying you, you, and you, you're now a battalion, something formed if necessary on the fly, and could just as easily be disolved. The question still remains though, was it necessary? The answer is if you are attacking north with four or five, NO. If you are attacking north with two or three, leaving the remainder behind, YES.

If I seem to be straying into Diatribeland here it is on purpose. It is intended as a prolongation of Tuesday's meeting, where not only Mike and I can discuss matters not gotten around to then, but also get the input of others from OZ and other parts of the hinterland.

[mac]

There are as I see it now, three possibilities.

One is the usual, Custer left C,I and L to wait for Benteen while he took E and F to scout ahead. Two battalions.

Problem is Calhoun leaves archaeological traces of skirmish lines down facing "Henryville" and Keogh is parked, in a bunch, in low ground, well North of Calhoun Hill.

Call me crazy but even as a 15 year old cadet I would not have been that dumb. I respect Calhoun and Keogh too much to suggest they were that dumb.

Two is more reasonable; that Custer left about 20% of his command as a rear guard (Company L) on Calhoun Hill. In this case C and I are returning to Calhoun Hill from the North when they are caught up in the action. I could see this but for; Calhoun leaves archaeological traces of skirmish lines down facing "Henryville". If he is a rear guard and sees Gall and his friends coming to Henryville and more Sioux/Cheyenne coming up from the village would he not move out of there and go to Custer shouting "the Indians are coming".

Three is that Custer intended to attack as soon as possible at the point where he felt he could easily get across the river, Ford D region. In this case he would take all his force with him and C,I,and L were returning sequentially when they were stopped at Calhoun Hill.

Lastly we must remember that Gall stated that he saw the soldiers ("Custer") moving along the ridge to Calhoun Hill and they then engaged him there. Red Hawk independently stated that he saw all three companies moving along the back of Battle Ridge and he saw Gall and Crazy Horse at Henryville region.

Cheers

[rollingthunder]

Apr 30, 2022 11:14:38 GMT mac said:

Call me crazy but even as a 15 year old cadet I would not have been that dumb. I respect Calhoun and Keogh too much to suggest they were that dumb.

That's the key, not even a fifteen year old could do worse

[quincannon]

Well Mac, any tactician worthy of the name would not call you crazy for having that view,

In your second of three scenarios, the proper tactical solution for the rear guard is to first warn the main body of hostile presence in the rear, then delay, without becoming decisively engaged in zone, as you withdraw toward the main body. Examining that for a moment, let's say that Calhoun, leading L,  first encountered the threat, not on Calhoun Hill but rather on the ridges south of CH. In that instance, which is possible I suppose given the presence of Indians we are aware of, then conducted himself using the prescribed "best" tactical solution, he still would not have used the bottom of Calhoun Hill as a temporary delaying position.

One argument that could be made for the artifact field at the base of the hill is equally absurd. Calhoun seeing the Indian build up moves off the hill to clear them away. A spoiling attack if you will. Well if there were that many Indians there, and they were a threat to you on the hill, why would anyone move off of that hill, and sacrifice the only advantage the hill offers to an outnumbered force - open, clear fields of relatively long range fire. The answer is that a rational person would not.

I am constantly intrigued as to how those who hold to the old story, consistently paint Custer and his subordinates as being stupid, though they love him so. You would think, considering their worship of the man, they would do the exact opposite, and place him in a light of doing everything just right, but being overcome by the hands of fate. You see the same thing with the defense of the Alamo. Travis did everything tactically wrong and is still among the anointed in Valhalla. There is a reason for Travis though, inspirational leadership, as evidenced by his letter of 23 February 1836, a document for the ages, that will be revered by free men until the end of time. Custer's legacy is defeat, and being the author of a book of self puffery.

[deadwoodgultch]

As I have said before I believe CI&L were returning South either to retreating or attempting to open a corridor for all five companies to fall back on support. I simply can't believe that Calhoun would have allowed the Henryville build up if he was stationary in that position.

Regards,
Tom

[rollingthunder]

May 1, 2022 14:13:07 GMT deadwoodgultch said:

As I have said before I believe CI&L were returning South either to retreating or attempting to open a corridor for all five companies to fall back on support. I simply can't believe that Calhoun would have allowed the Henryville build up if he was stationary in that position.

Regards,
Tom

Completely agree. It cannot be said better with fewer words.

[quincannon]

Well, regardless of thinking the battalion intended to return south, after a bloody nose in the north, or that part of the battalion was left in place in the Calhoun Hill area, the fact remains that no rational commander would allow that overwhelming force to build up in his front, without taking action, as opposed to staying there, awaiting their fate. The key ingredient in the later, conventional, scenario is the terrain itself. Calhoun Hill was not key terrain, it had no value at terrain. You only deliberately fight for terrain if it has value.

This brings me to another point of possible contention. Looking at the terrain on Mike's "custom" map, which in my opinion makes things much clearer, my choice of a route of withdrawal would be the general trace of the now park road. It is the easiest, and certainly the fastest route southward. That together with something Mike pointed out in our meeting, that Company C reached further southward than any of the others. We have kind of been stuck on Company L being first out of the northern starting gate, but I think Company C should be thoroughly examined in that role as well. Company C's final position astride that road gives me pause.

[Deleted]

Well. I flew to Seattle on 19 April to fetch my youngest daughter home. She had reported to her mother all was in readinesd, but in truth nothing was ready and since I couldn't sleep I spent 36 hours making it so and we started only 1 day behind schedule departing on 21 April to meet one of my cousins in Missoula, which went well. Next day we were in billings only to get stopped in Billings by snow. Being a Florida boy without chains or snow tires I decided to stay put.

We made it to the battlefield for 2 hours and did not get further south than about Calhoun hill.

I studied 3 books on the way up and looked at the map. Strategy of Defeat, Last Stand, and History, Archeology, and Clusters last Battle.

My first conclusion is no one understood the mission which wax to move the Indians to the reservations. Instead all parties concerned decided the mission was to attack the Indians. This is because the US Army wants to fight European Wars and makes the same mistake to this day.

If you believe the narrative Sitting Bull have his son his shield and go talk to the soldiers, think of what may have happened if George had moved into position in the dark, deployed the whole regiment on line, all the colors flying, and revealed themselves to the Indians and just sat there. Perhaps they would have gone back. It also nay have helped if he had the gatling guns or mountain how it users set up for a little more persuasion?

Second, the headline after the battle should have been Reno and Benteen save the 7th Cavalry after Custer Battalion destroyed!

Third, I was disappointed by the visitor center display and bookstore.

Fourth, the battle is probably not worth the effort placed into its study. One should probably at least spend ones time studying the 4th Cavalry's campaigns under Mackenzie.

Fifth, don't know that I'm going back. The drive back was totally exhausting and I'm not sure the cost of flying up and car/room rental is worth my time and effort.

I will post some more conclusions later after they are straighter in my mind. I was more intensely concentrating on my main mission: getting my daughter home.