Post by Deleted on Dec 22, 2021 12:17:51 GMT
I am starting this thread here because the task organization fought at the actual battle was determined as the Regiment passed over the divide. One might think it was triggered by Custer being upset that Benteen was comprising the Advance Guard. There is also some digression to Ford B
So, we go back a little earlier when Custer said they would move out, with him still controlling all 12 companies.
We know Benteen is first in line. Godfrey in his diary writes:
This clearly shows Godfrey was way back in the order of march. What we know it was Benteen, ... # 2 through #8, McIntosh, Godfrey, ... #11, and McDougal. (I grant we may know more of the order, but here I am trying to figure out what Godfrey knew to see ifwecan discern the formal Regimental Task Organization.
Later...
This appears to indicate he was not close to where Custer, Cooke, Benteen, and Reno were when the new task organization was decided. As I reread the diary entries, I did not see anything else in his dairy indicating Task Org. Moving onto his Century Article, we see:
Here, he does not state his knowledge about how he acquired this listing. We know he was with Benteen's Battalion because he commanded a company in it, he knows of Reno's organization because he learned of it on the Reno-Benteen Defense Position, and he previously knew McDougal was commanding the train's escort company. He does not state how he knows Custer formed a single battalion or not.
Vaulting ahead to Ford B, he writes:
The italicized portion indicates he previously accepted Custer moved to Ford B, was driven back, and THEN divided his battalion, but he admits he became convinced (over time) due to talking to various Indians and thinking on his observations, he concludes this by saying
Which, coupled with later work, appears to be accurate, but you can see by the phrase "conclusive to my mind" he does not know.
Next, I went on the the RCOI documentation to read his testimony, here we find:
Clearly, he was not present at the task organization decision/discussion.
While not relating to the regiment's Task Organization, at the time of RCOI, he still believed Custer had been engaged in the vicinity of Ford B.
Another reference to Ford B:
And again
And the Recorder now goes to Ford B:
Now let's look at what Benteen knows:
And as to Reno's inclusion in the TASK ORG process:
In total, not much. Or at least he was not asked about anything else he might have known.
Reno:
Change from 12 companies under regimental control to forming battalions:
He seems not to have been asked or had any other information about how the Regiment was Organized. I suppose while he was moving abreast with Custer, the other column may have looked the same way in its movement and formation whether it was five companies in one battalion column, or two battalions in regimental column. We see that again here:
Martini
I did read Martini's testimony because he is the last living Cavalryman to see Custer after the Regiment divided and in his statement he says while in the vicinity of MTC and/or Ford B, that he was within two yards of Custer at the time. This may be unusual, but it seems logical that he might be close enough to hear many of the things Custer may have said to his staff. Sadly, no one asked him about the Regiment's task organization (probably because it was nor really relevant to anything the RCOI was discussing [or cussing]), which seems a pity. (Note: I did not reread the entire RCOI transcript last night to see if anyone else mentioned the Task Organization process or decision.)
Conclusion:
General. It is obvious Custer did not fully brief his officers on what his plan, if any, was other than attacking the village. He did not have a lot of intelligence available to him, even after sending the scouts to the Crow's nest. Accordingly, he either adopted operations as described today as a Movement to Contact or a Zone Reconnaissance, and after discovering the enemy in the vicinity of the "lone teepee" conducted a hasty attack to develop the situation, which is not atypical of cavalry operations.
We see Godfrey did not venture an opinion in his diary and at the RCOI, about how Custer's battalion was organized until he is at Ford B where he thought it was divided. He states he was not present when either Reno or Benteen received their orders and I infer he had not crested the divide when the Task Org was being devised, and he received orders at the top of the Divide from Cooke to join Benteen's battalion. He then goes on to state, at the time, he believed Custer had been repulsed at Ford B, and then divided his command to move to the NW. One may infer that he thought the other five troops, whether or not they were formed in one or two battalions, went some separate way after Ford B.
Only later, in his Century Article, does he state without any source or reasoning, that Custer commanded the five companies destroyed at the LBH, as a single battalion. He does not support this conclusion with a source or reasoning making or breaking the case for one battalion or two battalions.
No matter how strongly any of us may believe it was a single battalion or two, any conclusion one way or the other based on Godfrey's statements at the time is his own speculation and further thought be each of us, based on one's knowledge and application of tactics at the time, ground or map reconnaissance, and our other reading. The best we can say is Custer may have operated in a given way, but nothing can be proven.
Unlike Chuck, I don't believe the task organization would have made any difference in the way the Regiment was fought, because as the end, the locations where the troops and bodies were found indicates not a single battle, but five separate ones operating without mutual support, with no one in command of the battalion or Regiment (-). The best we can say is either way makes tactical sense, some of us would have done it one way, others a second, and who knows, still other's a third (like going in with the entire Regiment).
Thanks for your attention.
So, we go back a little earlier when Custer said they would move out, with him still controlling all 12 companies.
We know Benteen is first in line. Godfrey in his diary writes:
... and that Cos would move out in the order of reports of Co. Commdrs that their Cos were ready. I went to see if everything was ready & I reported just as McIntosh reported but Cook recognized him first & so I came in No. 10. I thought I certainly would be of the advance but some Co. Comdrs reported without seeing to anything and so got the lead. After we arrived at the summit of the Divide between Rose Bud & L.B. Horn I received an order to report to Col. Benteen for duty with his Battln.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 13). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 13). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Later...
After we arrived at the summit of the Divide between Rose Bud & L.B. Horn I received an order to report to Col. Benteen for duty with his Battln.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 13). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 13). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
The inspections were quickly made and the column was soon en route. We crossed the dividing ridge between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn valleys a little before noon. Shortly afterward the regiment was divided into battalions. The advance battalion, under Major Reno, consisted of troop “M,” Captain French; troop “A,” Captain Moylan and Lieutenant De Rudio; troop “G,” Lieutenants McIntosh and Wallace; the Indian scouts under Lieutenants Varnum and Hare and the interpreter Girard; Lieutenant Hodgson was Acting Adjutant and Doctors De Wolf and Porter were the medical officers. The battalion under General Custer was composed of troop “I,” Captain Keogh and Lieutenant Porter; troop “F,” Captain Yates and Lieutenant Reily; troop “C,” Captain Custer and Lieutenant Harrington; troop “E,” Lieutenants Smith and Sturgis; troop “L,” Lieutenants Calhoun and Crittenden; Lieutenant Cook was the Adjutant, and Dr. G. E. Lord was medical officer. The Battalion under Captain Benteen consisted of troop “H,” Captain Benteen and Lieutenant Gibson; troop “D,” Captain Weir and Lieutenant Edgerly, and troop “K,” Lieutenant Godfrey. The pack-train, Lieutenant Mathey in charge, was under the escort of troop “B,” Captain McDougall.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (pp. 73-74). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (pp. 73-74). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Vaulting ahead to Ford B, he writes:
The accepted theory for many years after the battle, and still persisted in by somewriters, was that Custer’s column had turned the high bluffs near the river, moved down the dry (Reno’s) creek, and attempted to ford the river near the lowest point of these bluffs; that he was there met by an overpowering force and driven back; that he then divided his battalion, moved down the river with the view of attacking the village, but met with such resistance from the enemy posted along the river bank and ravines that he was compelled to fall back, fighting, to the position on the ridge. The numerous bodies found scattered between the river and ridge were supposed to be the first victims of the fight. I am now satisfied that these were men who either survived those on the ridge or attempted to escape the massacre.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 90). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 90). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
The italicized portion indicates he previously accepted Custer moved to Ford B, was driven back, and THEN divided his battalion, but he admits he became convinced (over time) due to talking to various Indians and thinking on his observations, he concludes this by saying
No bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, and these facts are conclusive to my mind that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 91). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Godfrey, Edward Settle. The Godfrey Diary of the Battle of the Little Bighorn: (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 91). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Next, I went on the the RCOI documentation to read his testimony, here we find:
Q. State, as near as you can, when and where Captain Benteen’s column separated from General Custer’s column, if it did.
A. It was directly after crossing the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn. I was directed by Lieutenant Cooke, the adjutant of the regiment, to report to Captain Benteen for duty with his battalion. That was about 12 o’clock.
Q. Were you present when orders were given to Captain Benteen or Major Reno, or either of them?
A. I was not.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (pp. 265-266). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. It was directly after crossing the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn. I was directed by Lieutenant Cooke, the adjutant of the regiment, to report to Captain Benteen for duty with his battalion. That was about 12 o’clock.
Q. Were you present when orders were given to Captain Benteen or Major Reno, or either of them?
A. I was not.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (pp. 265-266). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Clearly, he was not present at the task organization decision/discussion.
Moving on, back to Ford B:
Q. How far downstream was the general movement made by the command?
A. Some of them went beyond where Captain Weir went. I could not see how far they went because the hills would intervene. They went below down towards the ford “B.”
Q. When you got down to that advanced position were there Indians confronting the command or engaging it at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. Who halted the command or why was it halted?
A. I don’t know.
Q. What could be seen lower down the river?
A. Lots of Indians.
Q. What did they appear to be doing?
A. I formed the impression at the time that their attention was directed down the river. I supposed hearing but little firing from them, only an occasional shot, that General Custer’s troops had been repulsed and they were watching his retreat.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (pp. 273-274). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Q. How far downstream was the general movement made by the command?
A. Some of them went beyond where Captain Weir went. I could not see how far they went because the hills would intervene. They went below down towards the ford “B.”
Q. When you got down to that advanced position were there Indians confronting the command or engaging it at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. Who halted the command or why was it halted?
A. I don’t know.
Q. What could be seen lower down the river?
A. Lots of Indians.
Q. What did they appear to be doing?
A. I formed the impression at the time that their attention was directed down the river. I supposed hearing but little firing from them, only an occasional shot, that General Custer’s troops had been repulsed and they were watching his retreat.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (pp. 273-274). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
While not relating to the regiment's Task Organization, at the time of RCOI, he still believed Custer had been engaged in the vicinity of Ford B.
Another reference to Ford B:
Q. State if you made any examination of the point “B” or near it.
A. I went down to that ford and thought I saw evidences of where shod horses had gone across the ford and I made up my mind at the time that General Custer had attempted to cross there.
Q. How near to that ford did you find evidences of fighting?
A. I saw no evidences of fighting near there. The first body was a long distance off from that, a half or three-quarters of a mile.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 281). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. I went down to that ford and thought I saw evidences of where shod horses had gone across the ford and I made up my mind at the time that General Custer had attempted to cross there.
Q. How near to that ford did you find evidences of fighting?
A. I saw no evidences of fighting near there. The first body was a long distance off from that, a half or three-quarters of a mile.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 281). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Q. With regard to the ford “B,” state how many horses were found on General Custer’s battlefield, how many shod horses?
A. I do not know how many.
Q. Was there not a much smaller number of dead horses than the number of living horses the day before?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That point “B” was a watering place or fording place, was it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Might not the tracks of shod horses there have been made by just the horses captured by the Indians and driven into the village?
A. They might have been.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 285). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. I do not know how many.
Q. Was there not a much smaller number of dead horses than the number of living horses the day before?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That point “B” was a watering place or fording place, was it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Might not the tracks of shod horses there have been made by just the horses captured by the Indians and driven into the village?
A. They might have been.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 285). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
And the Recorder now goes to Ford B:
Q. Was there not in that command, from the vast number of Indians around those troops, some feeling of uneasiness in regard to General Custer and his command? If there was, state what it was or was there a feeling of utter indifference about him as far as you observed?
A. I think everybody thought he had been repulsed and the Indians had driven him away. There was such a feeling and I heard the men say during the night that they thought General Custer had abandoned them as he did not come back.
.
.
.
Q. In regard to the ford “B,” on which bank of the river did you see tracks?
A. On the right bank.
Q. Could you be positive where the tracks came out on the left bank?
A. I went on the other side and saw no tracks there.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 288). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. I think everybody thought he had been repulsed and the Indians had driven him away. There was such a feeling and I heard the men say during the night that they thought General Custer had abandoned them as he did not come back.
.
.
.
Q. In regard to the ford “B,” on which bank of the river did you see tracks?
A. On the right bank.
Q. Could you be positive where the tracks came out on the left bank?
A. I went on the other side and saw no tracks there.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 288). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Now let's look at what Benteen knows:
Q. State what battalion organizations had been made of the command during his advance towards the Little Big Horn River, when it was done and where.
A. On the 24th of June, we marched till about 3 o’clock, bivouacked without orders to unpack the mules or unsaddle the horses, and on the next morning, when we moved from there, I got no orders, the command moved and I followed the rest.
Q. State in regard to what battalions or organizations were made on the 25th.
A. They were made probably 4 hours after we marched. I think at the first halt. An orderly came to me with instructions for the officers to assemble at a point where he was for an officers’ call. No bugle was sounded for officers’ call, an orderly was sent to get them together. General Custer told us that he had just come down from the mountains, that he had been told by the scouts that they could see a village, ponies, tepees, and smoke. He gave it to us as his belief that they were mistaken, that there were no Indians there, that he had looked through his glass and could not see any, and did not think there were any there. Other instructions were given, those were that the officer who first reported to him that his company was carrying out the conditions of an order that was given two days before should have the advance. Those requisitions were that a non-commissioned officer and six men from each company should be with the pack [train] and no more, and that each man should have 100 rounds of ammunition in is cartridge belt and saddle pockets. I suppose that every officer there could have told him that those requisitions were being carried out, but as the others went for formality’s sake, I went to my company and said to the first sergeant, “There are so many men with the packs?” “Yes, sir,” “...and you have so much ammunition?”, all of which I knew without his answering. I went to General Custer and told him my company fulfilled his requisitions, he then said I had the advance. We moved then probably 8 miles and halted in a kind of valley surrounded by high hills. I suppose that place was selected so as to hide us from any Indians, were any in sight, or in that vicinity, then the division into battalions was made. I received three companies and was sent to the left to a line of bluffs.
Q. How many battalions was the regiment divided into and what officers were put in command?
A. I don’t know, it was not told to me at all.
Q. How many companies were assigned to your battalion?
A. Three companies.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 17). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. On the 24th of June, we marched till about 3 o’clock, bivouacked without orders to unpack the mules or unsaddle the horses, and on the next morning, when we moved from there, I got no orders, the command moved and I followed the rest.
Q. State in regard to what battalions or organizations were made on the 25th.
A. They were made probably 4 hours after we marched. I think at the first halt. An orderly came to me with instructions for the officers to assemble at a point where he was for an officers’ call. No bugle was sounded for officers’ call, an orderly was sent to get them together. General Custer told us that he had just come down from the mountains, that he had been told by the scouts that they could see a village, ponies, tepees, and smoke. He gave it to us as his belief that they were mistaken, that there were no Indians there, that he had looked through his glass and could not see any, and did not think there were any there. Other instructions were given, those were that the officer who first reported to him that his company was carrying out the conditions of an order that was given two days before should have the advance. Those requisitions were that a non-commissioned officer and six men from each company should be with the pack [train] and no more, and that each man should have 100 rounds of ammunition in is cartridge belt and saddle pockets. I suppose that every officer there could have told him that those requisitions were being carried out, but as the others went for formality’s sake, I went to my company and said to the first sergeant, “There are so many men with the packs?” “Yes, sir,” “...and you have so much ammunition?”, all of which I knew without his answering. I went to General Custer and told him my company fulfilled his requisitions, he then said I had the advance. We moved then probably 8 miles and halted in a kind of valley surrounded by high hills. I suppose that place was selected so as to hide us from any Indians, were any in sight, or in that vicinity, then the division into battalions was made. I received three companies and was sent to the left to a line of bluffs.
Q. How many battalions was the regiment divided into and what officers were put in command?
A. I don’t know, it was not told to me at all.
Q. How many companies were assigned to your battalion?
A. Three companies.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 17). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
And as to Reno's inclusion in the TASK ORG process:
Q. State whether Major Reno was present when the order was given to you by General Custer to move to the left.
A. He was not.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 20). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. He was not.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 20). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
In total, not much. Or at least he was not asked about anything else he might have known.
Reno:
Q. Commence from the morning of the 25th of June 1876, and describe what you did as major of the 7th Cavalry.
A. On the morning of the 25th the Regiment was lying in some sage brush, I don’t know the time exactly, and we had something to eat there, and I remember that Captain Benteen came over to where I was. When he came over there I discovered the column was moving. I was not consulted about any of those things. The organization into battalions and wings had been annulled before we left the Yellowstone River. I never received any orders direct myself. I exercised the functions of what I imagined to be those of lieutenant colonel.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 484). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. On the morning of the 25th the Regiment was lying in some sage brush, I don’t know the time exactly, and we had something to eat there, and I remember that Captain Benteen came over to where I was. When he came over there I discovered the column was moving. I was not consulted about any of those things. The organization into battalions and wings had been annulled before we left the Yellowstone River. I never received any orders direct myself. I exercised the functions of what I imagined to be those of lieutenant colonel.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 484). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
As Lieutenant Wallace states, it was about 10 o’clock when Colonel Cooke came to me and said, “The General directs you to take specific command of Companies M, A, and G.” I turned and said to him, “Is that all?” He said, “Yes.” I made no further inquiries but moved with my column to the second ridge, and between myself and the column commanded by General Custer was a small ravine which developed further down into a tributary of the [Little] Big Horn River. I moved my column nearly parallel to General Custer for some time. Previous to that, Captain Benteen had started to the left up the hill. I had no instructions in reference to him, and I asked him where he was going and what he was going to do. I don’t recollect his reply exactly, but it was to the effect that he was to drive everything before him on the hill. That was all that passed between us.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 484). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 484). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Q. You stated in your testimony that no plan was “communicated to us.” Please explain what you mean by “us,” yourself or others?
A. I mean the whole regiment. I might say there that I do not think there was any plan.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 504). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
A. I mean the whole regiment. I might say there that I do not think there was any plan.
Hunt, Brian V.. Reno Court of Inquiry: Conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn (Expanded, Annotated) (p. 504). BIG BYTE BOOKS. Kindle Edition.
Martini
I did read Martini's testimony because he is the last living Cavalryman to see Custer after the Regiment divided and in his statement he says while in the vicinity of MTC and/or Ford B, that he was within two yards of Custer at the time. This may be unusual, but it seems logical that he might be close enough to hear many of the things Custer may have said to his staff. Sadly, no one asked him about the Regiment's task organization (probably because it was nor really relevant to anything the RCOI was discussing [or cussing]), which seems a pity. (Note: I did not reread the entire RCOI transcript last night to see if anyone else mentioned the Task Organization process or decision.)
Conclusion:
General. It is obvious Custer did not fully brief his officers on what his plan, if any, was other than attacking the village. He did not have a lot of intelligence available to him, even after sending the scouts to the Crow's nest. Accordingly, he either adopted operations as described today as a Movement to Contact or a Zone Reconnaissance, and after discovering the enemy in the vicinity of the "lone teepee" conducted a hasty attack to develop the situation, which is not atypical of cavalry operations.
We see Godfrey did not venture an opinion in his diary and at the RCOI, about how Custer's battalion was organized until he is at Ford B where he thought it was divided. He states he was not present when either Reno or Benteen received their orders and I infer he had not crested the divide when the Task Org was being devised, and he received orders at the top of the Divide from Cooke to join Benteen's battalion. He then goes on to state, at the time, he believed Custer had been repulsed at Ford B, and then divided his command to move to the NW. One may infer that he thought the other five troops, whether or not they were formed in one or two battalions, went some separate way after Ford B.
Only later, in his Century Article, does he state without any source or reasoning, that Custer commanded the five companies destroyed at the LBH, as a single battalion. He does not support this conclusion with a source or reasoning making or breaking the case for one battalion or two battalions.
No matter how strongly any of us may believe it was a single battalion or two, any conclusion one way or the other based on Godfrey's statements at the time is his own speculation and further thought be each of us, based on one's knowledge and application of tactics at the time, ground or map reconnaissance, and our other reading. The best we can say is Custer may have operated in a given way, but nothing can be proven.
Unlike Chuck, I don't believe the task organization would have made any difference in the way the Regiment was fought, because as the end, the locations where the troops and bodies were found indicates not a single battle, but five separate ones operating without mutual support, with no one in command of the battalion or Regiment (-). The best we can say is either way makes tactical sense, some of us would have done it one way, others a second, and who knows, still other's a third (like going in with the entire Regiment).
Thanks for your attention.