mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 4, 2021 5:16:15 GMT
Considering the two fords, Ford B and Ford D, I wonder which, just from its physical setting, would be the better one (preferred one) to use to make a military crossing? I would love to hear some opinions please. Cheers
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jun 4, 2021 14:29:23 GMT
Ford D is the preferred crossing point as opposed to B. At ford B, you have high ground to your left and right. Boyer's bluff is to the left and Greasy Grass is to the right. If both those points are occupied by your enemy, he has the high ground on two of your sides. You are in a funnel of sorts by crossing at B. At D, you have the flats and more open ground. Still not ideal, but better by far than ford B.
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Jun 4, 2021 15:21:37 GMT
When you cross a river you clear the near side, suppress and seize the far side. In my view at Ford B you start off the high ground and push the enemy back to the river. You then hold the high ground as you suppress and cross and they are at a disadvantage.
At D the terrain is flatter and there is more cover which favors the enemy.
At neither Ford does the enemy seem to be in any strength on the friendly side.
At this point I rate them about the same, but this may be due to my modern armored cavalry background and misreading the ground. I reserve to change my mind based on personal reconnaissance.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 4, 2021 15:22:31 GMT
Concur with Colt,for all the reasons stated.
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Post by Beth on Jun 5, 2021 20:03:21 GMT
Wasn't Ford B very narrow which would have meant that only a few soldiers could pass at one time?
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Post by quincannon on Jun 5, 2021 21:08:09 GMT
It is.
For years, on all these boards, there has been confusion sewn about fords and crossing places. What is a good ford or crossing place is not necessarily a good place to make an opposed river crossing, simply determined by, not only the shallowness of the fording depth, but also the terrain on both sides of the river, and the configuration of the banks on each side. What then might be a good (enough) place for a single rider or small group to cross, may not be a good place for a company or battalion. The crossing place must also provide direct and rapid access to your objective. Missing any one of these four characteristics, shallowness, suitable surrounding terrain, bank conditions, and rapid access, then you cross that place off your list.
Make no mistake, you assume all river crossings will be opposed, every one of them. If they are not, consider yourself fortunate
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 6, 2021 1:58:42 GMT
Thanks for the replies. My thoughts were that to cross at Ford B Custer would first have to take control of the high ground on each side. There has never been any indication that he tried to do that, so I am back to; he did not try to cross at Ford B. QC's post above adds nicely to the considerations for crossing at Ford B.
To enter the battle Custer must cross the river, hence he moves on to Ford D.
If Ford B is eliminated as his crossing point, then there is absolutely no reason I can see for him to leave a portion of his force behind.
I am back to he must take all 5 companies to Ford D and try to cross there.
Cheers
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Jun 6, 2021 7:18:33 GMT
Mac, this gets a litle tiresome. Both QC and I have explained how to cross an obstacle. Its the same way if its an anti-tank ditch, a minefield, or a river and it doesn't matter if there is no high ground, high ground on the near side, high ground on the far side, or high ground on both sides. Why you cross has nothing to do with how or where or how you individually attempt it. To expand upon the methodology * Suppress * Obscure * Secure * Reduce * Assault In my view, both are doable. Chuck disagrees with me somewhat violently and I respect that. In my experience, its doable. If I am a light infantry battalion, it may not be. I'll know more when I get there. Also in my view, is the battalion's disposition to me indicates they were destroyed trying to move North. Two companies in the lead to attempt to clear the near side and suppress the far side. One company to move through the leaders to seize the far side. The final two companies to cross and continue the operation. I believe I have demonstrated in other posts the companies were not within supporting distance starting with their move to Ford B and north. I believe I have demonstrated in other posts that the companies in a column of fours deployed with two companies up, one company in the middle, and two companies trailing should occupy while moving a piece of terrain about 1/2 x 1/2 mile in area. The battalion was obviously destroyed over a large area and were not in mutual support while they tried to (1) advance, (2) withdraw, or (3) defend. (Compare the size of the Custer Position with the Reno-Benteen Position). There is no way to tell if they were destroyed while trying to move North or South. There is evidence that some or all tried to move North at one point. After he was repulsed and/or decided it was not the place to go, he had three courses of action. Defend vic Calhoun Hill. Move North in some fashion. Withdraw to vicinity Reno-Benteen Hill, not because he knows they are there, but because it probably the best available ground. He clearly moved north and I continue to submit the disposition of the command indicates they were cut up and destroyed strung out in a line of march moving that way. Your question is/was "Why did the 7th not cross the LBH?" He tried to cross to get into the fight. He failed to cross because he was repulsed at the river line and/or determined he did not have the combat power to do so. We do know he went close to the river at both Ford B and Ford D. Why you cross has nothing to with the number of companies or how he tried to do it. The 7th did not cross the river because it was repulsed by the Indian's or Custer realized he did not have the combat power to attempt it. I really suggest you download and read the following field manuals. FM 3-90.1 Tactics Volume 1 armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=103287FM 3-90.2 Tactics Volume 2 armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=103288ATP 3-21.20 THe Infantry Battalion armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1003799 Especially Appendix F (Combined Arms Breaching Operations) - you can also search for cavalry squadron or combined arms battalion, but the 7th is more like light infantry than they are modern cavalry/combined arms ATP 3-34.22 Engineer Operations (BCT and Below) www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/FM90-13%2892%29.pdf (not very helpful, but worth a skim) FM 90-13 (1992) River Crossing Operations (Obsolete). www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/FM90-13%2892%29.pdfIt is not necessary for you to read every word. They are fairly understandable. There may be a quiz.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 6, 2021 12:56:12 GMT
Bouyers bluff was unoccupied by enemy elements, so the Crows said, they where on the feature, I don't think at this stage greasy grass, hill/ridge was occupied.
With having five elements to his battalion, would it be Custer's interest to cross at two places? For example, two companies cross near too but separate fords, and one in reserve. As we don't gave any real idea how the land was around ford d, maybe Custer was searching for a second point, and that is why we read accounts of soldiers at Willy's bend which I think is further west then the one bear to the house.
Sorry Mike, I can't take stock of those links today, we have 16 year old (Jacob), who is having a family party this afternoon.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 6, 2021 13:57:43 GMT
Mike: We of the King's Children learned to cross a river in the same manner you described above.
That is not the way Custer and his contemporaries learned to make a river crossing with cavalry during the ACW. Custer and his fellows would secure the flanks on the near side of the crossing point, and then bull their way across with as much speed as they could muster. The opposition on the other side was always light, compared to the size of the crossing force. The way Confederates defended fords was with an outpost at the ford itself, usually a company, and generally held a brigade in reserve and on call, to rapidly contain the crossing point, then drive the crossers back over the river.
Unfortunately, most of these things were such small affairs that they were not well documented, but two are, Kelly Ford (17 March 63, and Brandy Station where not one but two crossing were done at or near the same time.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Jun 6, 2021 15:13:16 GMT
Ah. So if they used that technique that would support initially three up, two to secure the flanks and one to start pushing across the river, then the other two forge across and through, perhaps troops in line, battalion in column to penetrate and cause mischief on the other side. Might have even worked with the whole Regiment there organized in three battalions. Two two-company battalions for the flank (Keogh, Yates), 5 companies in the center (Reno; Custer moving with the main effort), and three in Reserve (Benteen)
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Post by crowsnest on Jul 7, 2021 16:35:54 GMT
Ok conjecture time.
I've spent quite a while reading this board and do believe the intention was to move the entire battalion at some crossing point, while plausible I don't think what we have is a moment where that actually occurred. While the C,I,L line does have the charachteristics of a retrograde movement, the minimal evidence in the Ford D area makes it hard to believe there was any sort of repulse of a mass crossing attempt. As noted above if D (or B) for that matter had seen a full scale attempt to cross (even opposed) you'd see significant evidence of it (especially if it was opposed).
My thinking is that as Custer leaves 3411 he sends Keough with C,I,L to the right just to keep his flank clear, but with the intention of finding high ground in which to continue visual with Custer and E,F to immediately to join the entire battalion for an official attack at a crossing point.
Making assumptions here but my assumption is Bouyer says down about 2 miles will a Ford (B), and about a mile later another (D). Custer is likely unaware that Reno is (or will be soon) climbing the bluffs in retreat. He's assuming there is enough of a distraction up river to check both out if needed. He knows he's got to hurry but underestimates the timing available.
Continuing the assumption game here, E goes down to the flat area to inspect, Custer and F sit above the flat area on the little bluff to the North, and it's possible a short back and forth with messengers plays out. (If you submit to the Tom was not with Company C, this would be the moment that might have occurred and events don't let him return to the unit later) For whatever reason Custer either decides B is no good, or is convinced by Bouyer possibly that D is worth checking out first.
Assumption game continues........E is waved on to move up to check out Ford D, with F Company continuing to stay a safe distance from the crossing with an elevated view to inspect more terrain. My guess here is that the inspection while not contested at Ford B is contested at Ford D, and that Smith is hit by a bullet, and wounded significantly, probably a couple other soldiers are hit too. It's also possible this is the point where natives begin to infiltrate up the ravines along the river, and possible pick of Mark Kellogg who possibly ventured just a bit too close (why F Company stayed back a ways).
At this point E Company runs back up from Ford D as they are likely not given authority to begin a general engagement. It's likely at this point the situation has changed. Firing begins to occur on Keough's group (who possibly were caught in transit leaving the Calhoun area for LSH themselves as they shadowed Custer) this forces them to begin a retrograde to secure their rear, and they fully establish Calhoun Hill and both sides of Battle Ridge. Custer helps Company E get organized and sets Sturgis up along Cemetery Ridge, sending Company F up to LSH to attempt to connect with Keough. Eventually Custer gets up the LSH, but by that point C Company has moved out towards GG and isolation begins to occur as the company is a bit too spread out to make things work like Benteen and Reno are able to pull off on the other end.
A scenario like this allows for an officer to be shot crossing the river, just the game of telephone gets the crossing point wrong. This scenario also accounts for what natives said looked like Custer just sat up on the bluff for 45 minutes instead of attacking. While Custer wasn't just chilling waiting for Benteen, from a distance if you didn't really see much of Keough or E Company it might look like Custer was just hanging out.
Someone above asked what Custer was wearing, obviously this can be debated but if you take at least some of Peter Thompson's account to heart he says Custer had taken off his buckskin.
Ok tons of assumptions, I'm confident it's not 100% correct I make no assertions to that being the case.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2021 1:48:05 GMT
Well thought out conjecture is a GOOD THING.
My question to you, well not really to you, just a question - Why does nearly e everyone join Companies E and F at the hip? What is the rational, tactical, real, basis for such? I really can't see any after sixty odd years of looking.
From a technical perspective Custer was attacking the moment he crawled out of his blankets that morning. What you are really saying then is that he was not looking for a place to attack, he was looking for a place to drive home his assault (the next to final act of an attack). It is generally found by people who look at these things, that trying to find a place to assault that late in the game, is like trying to find a nymphomaniac, communist, Three Card Monty dealer in a convent. It is unlikely you will have the success you desire.
DAMNED GOOD POST. KEEP IT UP.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Jul 8, 2021 16:16:14 GMT
Well thought out conjecture is a GOOD THING. My question to you, well not really to you, just a question - Why does nearly e everyone join Companies E and F at the hip? What is the rational, tactical, real, basis for such? I really can't see any after sixty odd years of looking. From a technical perspective Custer was attacking the moment he crawled out of his blankets that morning. What you are really saying then is that he was not looking for a place to attack, he was looking for a place to drive home his assault (the next to final act of an attack). It is generally found by people who look at these things, that trying to find a place to assault that late in the game, is like trying to find a nymphomaniac, communist, Three Card Monty dealer in a convent. It is unlikely you will have the success you desire. DAMNED GOOD POST. KEEP IT UP. Chuck, It is not a proven fact, but some authors, and historians believe (You know I do as well) that Custer made 2 battalions out of his 5 companies. Capt Keough commanding Cos C I L and Capt Yates Cos E F. Now again this is not a proven fact, but it may be the reason people have Cos E F as you say joined at the hip. Simply because they believe they made up the same battalion. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2021 17:39:07 GMT
Oh Dan, I agree with you completely, that it is not proven fact, only the belief of some, yourself included. Belief is perfectly OK. I believe that Little Orphan Annie, was not a legitimate orphan either, that is after she met Daddy Warbucks, but opinions about her former status do not seem to hold sway over my private (fairly intuitive I might add) views on the matter.
That does not fully justify E and F being joined at the hip though. Let's say for a brief moment that Custer, sometime after going onto the bluffs did form two battalion. As a commander that was his decision to make, and he may very well have a good reason for doing so. We just don't know. That said, it does not mean that those two battalions MUST HAVE contained E and F in one of them, and C, I, and L in the other. There very well may have been a different task organization.
We hang too many hats on Yates and Keogh being senior, but as I am sure you know in combat seniority does not always rule. Seniority at the point of contact rules. Let's say that for some unknown reason that E and L made up one battalion, a battalion formed by prevailing circumstance of position. I don't know who was senior between Smith and Calhoun (I think Smith), but you sure as hell don't see Keogh or Yates commanding,. It would be either Smith or Calhoun.
So, why then do some join E and F at the hip? Most probably because of final position proximity and the two players Keogh and Yates seal the deal for them. If you take out a map though, you will find that Keogh and Yates, and their companies, were closer in distance than Company F, and the final position of Company E. Food for thought - Yes?
Whoops, did I step on someone's sacred cow? You bet your ass I did. If this crap was easy, there would be no need for this board, don't you agree?
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