Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 3, 2021 22:48:11 GMT
Dan,
This is about exploring alternatives Custer may have/could have considered at points I selected as Decision Points from Fred Wagner's timelines in the Strategy of Defeat. I am not saying that Custer reasoned liked this but I am certain he would have thought of different courses of action at or near the identified points. In the first post (Custer Receives his Orders) I present the Letter of Instruction issued by Terry, said that in today's Army, that is an order but it is usually used for things in Garrison or purely administrative items. And analyzed some key phrases and words. Then I converted it to a modern order, and then determined Specified Tasks, Implied Tasks, Critical Tasks, and Limitations.
Thus each Decision Point sort of stands alone. I determined possible courses of action at each DP, specify the one Custer took, list some advantages and disadvantages, compare them, and then make my recommendation. There may be a bit of commentary before and after the analysis starts.
I would say that Custer was expected to attack the village at some point on or about the 26th. The First DP marks his first disobedience (Not sending Herendeen dow Tullocks Creek), and then we dispatch the Scouts and when Custer moves off the Rosebud to follow the trail is where he disobeys orders again. One may argue that he is close to the enemy at that point, but I don't think so. He hasn't spotted any Indians thus far. He may or may not have been detected and followed the whole way from Fort A. Lincoln, but if so, those people didn't inform their buddies in the village.
Feel free to respond in any way you want to a particular decision point and remember to vote!
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
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Post by benteen on Feb 3, 2021 23:14:08 GMT
Feel free to respond in any way you want to a particular decision point and remember to vote! Mike, Thank you I appreciate that. I may do that until I get enough boos from the audience. LOL Be Well Dan |
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Post by Beth on Feb 3, 2021 23:22:49 GMT
I would chose COA1, it gives Custer the most flexibility to respond depending on need. He could have gone straight in behind Reno or gone to the bench on the left where a large number of the tribe's horses were (As I recall). He would have also had a chance to view the bluffs and judge if it would have been the right course to go up them.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 4, 2021 9:02:48 GMT
I would chose COA1, it gives Custer the most flexibility to respond depending on need. He could have gone straight in behind Reno or gone to the bench on the left where a large number of the tribe's horses were (As I recall). He would have also had a chance to view the bluffs and judge if it would have been the right course to go up them. I agree Beth, you are correct about the horse herd, losing their mounts would be a big shock to not only the warriors but the families too. The warriors would be grounded against a mobile enemy and the families too would lose any horses to transport their big stuff. |
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Feb 4, 2021 11:15:28 GMT
CoA3 makes the most sense. Custer was informed there would be about 1500 warriors opposing his 600 or so. Given that knowledge, and not knowing where the village was exactly or its size, he should have heeded Benteen's advice about keeping the regiment together. Having Reno advance to contact, with Custer following to exploit any weakness or advantage from the valley would give the regiment the best chance for success. We know going up the bluffs was a mistake as it divided the forces, placed Reno in an unsupportable position due to the nogo terrain features, and left Custer somewhat blind as to how Reno faired. As an old armor guy myself, I would want all my resources available given that I don't know the exact strength of the enemy or their exact wherabouts. Also the valley terrain is a much better area for cavalry (or armor) to operate in and take advantage of the mobility. In all likelihood, Custer would have been forced onto the defensive since the hostiles had no intention of fleeing, but the terrain to the west and south of ford A could be defended, and his supply trains would be just back across the river, or might have crossed during the assault phase prior to his being forced onto the defensive.
Thus he would have the entire regiment together in terrain that favored his longer range rifles and provided good fields of fire.
Of course, Custer wanted an all-7th affair. My strategy above relies on knowing Terry will cut off any flight to the north and will arrive in short order, thus meeting the objective Terry wanted, which was a combined forces affair.
I spent a day formulating a response and Colt has done it for me  . Back at Decision 3 we had a unanimous vote for waiting until the 26th, so at this new decision point the logical choice is hit them with everything in the valley. The salient point being that the time waiting would be used for scouting. It has been said before that Custer lost due to his inadequate use of scouts over the days as he was approaching. My feeling is that when he sent Benteen left and Reno into the valley he was effectively using them both for reconnaissance because he had no idea where the Indians were in the valley or how they were distributed (hence he tells Benteen Big Village). Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 4, 2021 13:39:12 GMT
Custer would class his battalion as the main force, Benteen was probably miles away when Reno and Custer made their moves.
There is a short film on YouTube which says that Custer split his battalion into two groups, with L and C attacking at ford B and Custer with E, F and I attacking at ford D.
The reason for the ford B attack was to draw the pressure off Reno.
L and C get forced back up to the high ground and Custer got forced onto BRE.
The film clip shows it better, I can't get to my computer to find a link.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 4, 2021 14:37:05 GMT
I must admit that I did not look at Mike's map before I chose Course of Action 1. I went only on the verbal description. Had I looked at the map, I would have ignored it and chosen Course of Action 1, done my way, anyway. Therefore I can see how Steve was confused by my answer.
A full regimental attack, confining that attack to the valley is the only rational course of action. Without prior reconnaissance it is the only way to go, a movement to contact utilizing the entire regiment in that movement. With reconnaissance, that reconnaissance would have only indicated that Ford B was a non-starter, and Ford D was too far away. Reno attacking independently was a good way to lose a battalion.
My version of Course of Action 1 had one company out front to make contact. That company is directly supported by its parent battalion (the lead battalion) within visual distance of the lead company to develop the situation after first contact. The rest is conventional, Custer choosing to deploy the rest of the regiment as he sees how things develop to his front.
Course of Action 1, as depicted on Mike's map, is just as much a non-stater in 2021 as it was in 1876.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 4, 2021 15:06:46 GMT
I must admit that I did not look at Mike's map before I chose Course of Action 1. I went only on the verbal description. Had I looked at the map, I would have ignored it and chosen Course of Action 1, done my way, anyway. Therefore I can see how Steve was confused by my answer. A full regimental attack, confining that attack to the valley is the only rational course of action. Without prior reconnaissance it is the only way to go, a movement to contact utilizing the entire regiment in that movement. With reconnaissance, that reconnaissance would have only indicated that Ford B was a non-starter, and Ford D was too far away. Reno attacking independently was a good way to lose a battalion. My version of Course of Action 1 had one company out front to make contact. That company is directly supported by its parent battalion (the lead battalion) within visual distance of the lead company to develop the situation after first contact. The rest is conventional, Custer choosing to deploy the rest of the regiment as he sees how things develop to his front. Course of Action 1, as depicted on Mike's map, is just as much a non-stater in 2021 as it was in 1876. Crap. I didn't notice COA 1 and COA 2 both used the COA 2 Image. I fixed that. COA 1 has the whole regiment, less Benteen, attacking up the Valley with three battalions on line. Not quite what QC does which is pretty similar to the COA where Custer does not detach Benteen, but with a little more flexibility than my two wing concept. Thanks for making me go back and look. COA 2 is crap. |
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Post by Beth on Feb 4, 2021 17:16:39 GMT
I would chose COA1, it gives Custer the most flexibility to respond depending on need. He could have gone straight in behind Reno or gone to the bench on the left where a large number of the tribe's horses were (As I recall). He would have also had a chance to view the bluffs and judge if it would have been the right course to go up them. I agree Beth, you are correct about the horse herd, losing their mounts would be a big shock to not only the warriors but the families too. The warriors would be grounded against a mobile enemy and the families too would lose any horses to transport their big stuff. I am confused. Though I answered one. It was the image on 2 that I had in mind--showing Reno going up the valley but by Custer waiting to observe Reno from behind would have gaven Custer the ability to either go to the left on the bench, up the middle behind Reno or the right on the bluffs. If Custer had kept his troops together until this point he would have had even more options. |
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Post by Beth on Feb 4, 2021 17:18:16 GMT
I must admit that I did not look at Mike's map before I chose Course of Action 1. I went only on the verbal description. Had I looked at the map, I would have ignored it and chosen Course of Action 1, done my way, anyway. Therefore I can see how Steve was confused by my answer. A full regimental attack, confining that attack to the valley is the only rational course of action. Without prior reconnaissance it is the only way to go, a movement to contact utilizing the entire regiment in that movement. With reconnaissance, that reconnaissance would have only indicated that Ford B was a non-starter, and Ford D was too far away. Reno attacking independently was a good way to lose a battalion. My version of Course of Action 1 had one company out front to make contact. That company is directly supported by its parent battalion (the lead battalion) within visual distance of the lead company to develop the situation after first contact. The rest is conventional, Custer choosing to deploy the rest of the regiment as he sees how things develop to his front. Course of Action 1, as depicted on Mike's map, is just as much a non-stater in 2021 as it was in 1876. Crap. I didn't notice COA 1 and COA 2 both used the COA 2 Image. I fixed that. COA 1 has the whole regiment, less Benteen, attacking up the Valley with three battalions on line. Not quite what QC does which is pretty similar to the COA where Custer does not detach Benteen, but with a little more flexibility than my two wing concept. Thanks for making me go back and look. COA 2 is crap. That explains my confusion! |
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