mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Jul 13, 2019 13:03:51 GMT
I have been prompted to contemplate what Custer might have done at Ford D. The evidence presented in the threads in this section of the board tells me that once he knew that there was just one "Big Village" in the valley then Custer's only concern was to get back into the valley beyond that village. To achieve this he moved as swiftly as he could with his whole force, all 5 companies, to the Ford D region where he took all his force down towards the river. My reasoning here is that there was no sense in delaying or leaving any of his strike force behind. Had he wanted Benteen's force with him he would send for them before he moved right and left the valley. When he called them on later he made no attempt to wait for them and deliberately put major terrain features between himself and that force. He clearly did not feel he needed Benteen with him. Upon reaching Ford D there is no point to leaving men on the ridge as the fight is in the valley. Custer moves through the terrain as a swift mobile attack force intent on striking where he can have the most effect and that is with all his force in the valley beyond the village. Cheers
|
|
colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
|
Post by colt45 on Jul 13, 2019 15:36:13 GMT
Mac, I agree. After seeing the village, he would know he would need all 5 companies to conduct an attack across the river, in the north end of the village. The idea of leaving 3/5ths of his power on battle ridge while he looked at the ford D crossing is just stupid. He already knew the village was huge and when he emerged around the north end of battle ridge, the river can be seen, so he has to get all 5 companies across in order to complete the envelopment.
Envelopment was a good plan, problem was he didn't have sufficient strength to pull it off. Reno's force was too small to hold Indian attention long enough for Custer to complete the envelopment, plus he didn't have enough force to conduct a successful attack if he had succeeded in crossing in the ford D area.
He also needed surprise, which he didn't have since Wolftooth and the boys had been shadowing and harassing him after he crossed MTC. WT had sent warnings back to the village, as had others who had seen Custer prior to his crossing of deep coulee enroute to ford D. The jig was up just after Custer left the Weir peak area.
As Chuck pointed out earlier, having a good plan and the right tactics don't make any difference if you don't have the combat power to carry out the mission.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 13, 2019 19:00:17 GMT
Nye-Cartwright Ridge is 1.500 yards from ford B and we have discussed in the past how useless it would be for any units to support or cover for a crossing at ford B from this location. So, having said that, the locations mentioned on the other thread, Calhoun Hill and Cemetery ridge are thus; Ford D to Calhoun Hill: 2.33 miles Ford D to Cemetery ridge: 1 ½ miles. So, leaving the same number of men on any ground between these two locations is worse then leaving them on Nye-Cartwright Ridge.
Mac, as I have always stated, I believe that all five went past LSH in an effort to cross at the northern fords.
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Jul 14, 2019 22:16:22 GMT
Congratulations on the cricket Ian...what an amazing match!!!!
Colt thank you for your reply.
I have learned a lot from people like your good self, who actually have commanded troops at a scale where these ideas are seriously understood. Many years ago I was reading some history where an invading force was small compared to the land it was invading. The author referred to them moving through the landscape like a fish through water. This idea popped into my head as what Custer was doing; his 5 companies move to Ford D and must stay together if they are to have any impact on the enemy. Eventually they loose momentum and the water closes around them. Cheers
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2019 3:19:22 GMT
"Eventually they lose momentum". In tactical language that is called the culmination point, where any maneuver just runs out of steam. That may be caused by enemy action, but does not have to be. Often it is the limit of human endurance, individually or collectively.
I mention this because I have always felt that Custer was just about spent as he moved to Ford D, and regardless of enemy opposition of not his further offensive capability had been rendered impotent. When you think about it, that may be why they could not immediately withdraw. Not that the enemy had them fixed yet, but simply that their get up and go, got up and went - without them.
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 15, 2019 11:23:55 GMT
Congratulations on the cricket Ian...what an amazing match!!!! Yes Mac, yesterday was a sporting roller coaster with the CWC, Wimbledon, British Grand Prix and the Widnes Vikings playing Halifax, We were both exhausted by eight o’clock, you think we both had spent the four and a hours on the Tennis court like Djokovic and Federer
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 15, 2019 11:34:51 GMT
I think the Indians had a big say in how the column lost momentum. I would imagine that the column would have been in attack mode, but what happens if a column in attack mode, suddenly comes under attack themselves, because according to the Cheyenne, that is just what happened.
As the soldiers got close to the river, warriors were hiding in the benches along the river and opened fire, so the column would be taking fire from soft cover.
If Custer was placing all of his eggs in one basket in an attempt to capture as many no-coms as possible, then this plan would have become unstuck as what he thought would be an unopposed river crossing to get at the non-coms, would be suddenly stopped by enemy fire. So, I don’t suppose it took a master of tactics to realize that they had not only come too far, but were now blocked by unknown numbers of enemy forces hiding in the timber and firing at them.
Plus, we also have the fifty or so mounted Indians who apparently were also firing at the column from another direction. Custer must have been aware of how this would pan out if he stayed in this location any longer and decided to get away from river and get on the high ground behind them, then put into motion a way of getting back south.
|
|
|
Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 15, 2019 13:49:20 GMT
This thread "Custer's Plan at Ford D" could be a derivative of what was Custer's plan for Ford D. I am sure there was one!
Ian's response above could also be a derivative of "What was Custer's first oh Shit moment."
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 15, 2019 18:46:13 GMT
Well Tom, some people think that this is how it panned out, maybe the Indians had film equipment and made this snippet themselves
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Jul 16, 2019 10:18:56 GMT
Nice find Ian, especially after your athletic workout.
This is much closer to what actually happened. Cheers
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Jul 16, 2019 10:48:25 GMT
Good grief Mac, those Asian films still haven't improved, but at least they never jumped from roof top to roof top from a standing start. But was the good guy blind for gods sake!!!!!!
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Jul 16, 2019 16:28:12 GMT
Well Tom, some people think that this is how it panned out, maybe the Indians had film equipment and made this snippet themselves
It was known from senior Ree scouts who were debriefed at Powder River on July 4th, 1876; that Custer was shot in the bottom. The military were aware of this but have never managed to work out which one. Still trying after all these years.........
|
|
|
Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 16, 2019 21:56:12 GMT
HR, so tell me which Ree's were near either bottom?
Regards, Tom
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Apr 16, 2021 3:20:00 GMT
Perhaps we could start here now with the added expertise. As to the above, the one killed in the valley was Tom in my view.
What else would Custer be doing at Ford D, other than my original hypothesis stated to start this thread? Cheers
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Apr 16, 2021 5:07:11 GMT
Morning Mac.
Well what we agreed on at the start of your thread, that the idea of companies left behind on an unknown and tactically dead ridge line, would be just a waste of combat power that the Custer battalion didn't have.
Even if he left just one company there, would be easily bypassed and out flanked.
The points we must address is the two main areas up north, these two are key as to why they fell back south and disarray hit the companies left behind.
#1: the flats around ford D #2: cemetery ridge
These are the two areas which decided the fate if the move north.
The other two points to consider is the Cheyenne response, again;
#3: did they just blunt his river crossing making him pull back and rethink
#4: did they actually take the fight to him by crossing the river and moving on his right flank along the highway. This along with probes up the drainages on his left flank gave him no choice only to pull back.
Cemetery ridge and BRE would be a logical choices to head for, this would allow for any defence to be formed.
But I think that this was only a shirt respite as things broke down pretty quick and panic set in.
|
|