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Post by yanmacca on Aug 1, 2018 10:13:37 GMT
Chuck, you don't mean mark of the dammed do you? Glad you enjoyed the pics, I took plenty more but I didn't want to burden folks with images of vehicles on plinths and bunkers.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2018 15:26:25 GMT
Yes and no.
I know what the poor fellow was trying to say, and in most instances he was correct. But not always, and LBH was a not always.
At LBH the Army held the ground it had fought over, which is normally the role of the victor. It is the enemy force that is defeated that normally surrenders ground. For the irregular though, ground has little to no meaning, and its possession or non-possession at the end of battle is of no consequence to them. The irregular's objective is the enemy, not ground.
Casualties for the most part are the expected results of battle. It is quite normal for the victor to sustain more casualties than the vanquished. That is especially true when there is ground to be taken, that is vigorously defended by the opponent. So while casualties are expected, the effect the number of casualties have on either side is directly linked to the decisions that are made post-battle. At LBH, the 7th Cavalry on 27 June was combat ineffective due to physical casualties, and in all likelihood mentally as well. They were spent, and good for absolutely nothing save recovery of their dead, treatment and evacuation of their wounded, and withdrawal from the battle space. They would need months to recover and rebuild into a combat effective regiment. Nearly half of the regiment would need rebuilding from scratch. There is all the difference in the world between having a force, and having a capable force.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 1, 2018 19:58:01 GMT
It reminds me of wargaming and giving each force an objective or a goal to reach, if the goal for the army was to bring his enemy to battle and also destroy his infrastructure [defeat the braves in the field and capture the non-coms] then the army failed, if the goal of the Indians was to prevent the army from reaching the non-coms and force the army back, then they achieved their goal, so land does not come into it. To make this a winning situation for the Indians is further substantiated by the annihilation of over 200 soldiers and the yealding of ground by the rest [Valley and Weir peaks] and to rub salt in by pinning what was left top a hill top whilst the whole village had a party then escaped.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Aug 1, 2018 21:56:30 GMT
Contemplating this last night I came to much the same conclusion Ian, thanks to the contributor for the idea. It seems to me that the objective here was not the possession of the ground but rather the control of the Indians. The mission, by 3 forces, was to return the Indians to the reservation. This did not happen. Two of the 3 forces sent on the mission were disabled by the Indians.
It seems pretty clear to me who won.
Interesting question though.
Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Aug 2, 2018 3:20:38 GMT
I think we need to exercise caution here.
The Principle of War - OBJECTIVE - is on a sliding scale. The objective will differ, even with the same overall goal, as it descends from one echelon of command downward. For instance the campaign objective may very well be subdue the Indians by some means and return them to the reservation. When that objective slides down echelon to say the company level, it may be as simple for that company commander, as taking and holding Hill X. Taking and holding Hill X then is nothing more than an action in furtherance of the overall campaign objective of returning the Indians to the reservation.
Some very bright minds have discussed Custer's objectives for twice as long as I have been alive, and there is still no universal agreement as to what they were. Tell you the truth I am not at all sure he had one. His maneuvers don't seem to suggest any one thing that he was really trying to do to further the campaign objective. They consist of disjointed maneuvers to such an extent that no one can put a finger on what he was thinking or how any thinking he may have undertaken fit in with the overall campaign plan. There they are, go get them is not a statement of objective. There they are, now how do we use fire and maneuver in coordination with the other forces in the field, to achieve our overall goal, which in turn produce intermediate objectives are the only steps Custer could and should have taken, and there is no evidence he did.
Objective - must be viewed as a mosaic in which intermediate objectives must all fit. If one or more are selected by subordinate commanders that do not fit, the Objective picture will never be complete, and it is my belief that the entire LBH campaign, Custer and all the rest, have created a mosaic where none of the pieces fit or fit well.
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