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Post by Beth on May 20, 2018 20:50:47 GMT
I have just copy and pasted some of the explanations of formations that QC posted in the thread "Valley Sightings" I am hoping that he and others will be able to add to the discussion. It helps to have a visual aid to understand how the 7th would have moved to and through the battlefield--and why. Perhaps we can even find pictures that will help to illustrate the point further?~~~
This is a line - It is used primarily as an assault formation. It is the most difficult of all formations to control. Its advantage is that it places maximum firepower forward. It is the least secure of any formation, being subject to enfilading fire, as well as flanking and enveloping maneuver. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX This is a column - It is a formation used primarily for travel and not when contact is eminent. It is the easiest formation to control. X X X X X This is a regimental or battalion line of units in column - This is also a traveling formation, one that is more secure than the single column. It gets it name from the fact that the leading elements of both columns are parallel to each other forming a line across the front. A Box, V, or Diamond tactical formation is a variation of this one. X**X X**X X**X X**X X**X This is a regimental or battalion column units in line - This formation was once in favor for it's deployed depth. It fell out of favor with the advent of the machine gun, and the development of infiltration tactics to offset the firepower of the machine gun. The last place I can recall it was used was by the Marines in the Bois de Belleau XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX This is a regimental or battalion line, units in line - This formation represents a fully deployed brigade, regiment, or battalion with all of their subordinate units fully deployed in assault formation XXXXXX***XXXXXX***XXXXXX
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Post by yanmacca on May 21, 2018 19:23:06 GMT
I have found descriptions on what Chuck has eluded to above.
Here is a drawing of US Troops in line formation;
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on May 29, 2018 13:20:43 GMT
Military formations also need to adapt to terrain features. Colt45 pointed out that crossings of a river on a wide front reduce the overall time it takes to cross and if under fire a consideration.
I think the significance of a defile is that it can force movement to be in a single file formation. So depending on the movement in column it could involve significant time to move from for example a column of fours to single file and then reform after passing through a defile. Also since it can be single file any reduction in rate of travel is multiplied by the increased length of the formation.
There is a connection with Benteen's movement and it's effect on overall rate of travel.
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2018 21:44:11 GMT
Colt's pointing out that river crossing are made on a wide front is completely correct, under all circumstances if possible. The 9th Armored Division's crossing the bridge at Remagen, and other such crossings at confining narrow avenues are the exception, brought about by opportunity and circumstance.
That though does not tell us anything about the tactical formation used.
If the crossing is unopposed the most likely formation would be the column, with the possibility of the lead unit being on line highly probable, and the rest following and not deployed from column.
If the crossing is opposed all of the forward units must be on line at each crossing point,while the following units would still be in column during the crossing and in preparation for them to pass through the original assaulting echelon, to exploit the crossing.
Wide front is a tactical procedure not a formation. The line is a formation and the technical implementation of a tactical procedure.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on May 30, 2018 12:17:04 GMT
I agree Chuck. Tactics are a choice but you have to be able execute the chosen tactic using formations. For some of us learning formations with some sort of practical use in tactics enhances ones knowledge. What I do know is that in column a horse is more likely to know his place in formation and remain there. In line a horse may think it is more on its own or in a race. My experience with horses in formations is limited to Arizona Mounted Officers School that I attended years ago. Horse mounted formations are the only pairing of man with one brain and horse with a two sided brain which can act in concert or not.
I think a good example is a charge. You could select various formation to execute the charge. A consideration of a charge in a line formation is that all horses are not equal in speed. So charges at the top speed for each horse would lead to separation. In the early cavalry manuals they discuss this and suggest closing to within 50 yards before moving into a charge speed. The rifled barrel weapon system defeated the horse mounted charge with more accurate fire and the rest is history.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on May 30, 2018 15:46:27 GMT
Completely agree.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 30, 2018 17:20:50 GMT
I don't know if I have posted these before, if I have then please forgive me as I must be having a senior moment. Anyway since this thread is titled formations, I thought I would post these three images to show how the British and the Americans moved in a war zone during WW2. One point of interest, if you look at the tail end section in the British platoon and compare it to the US Squad, you a can see the small differences in how they set up during the march; The last image show a US Platoon in similar mode, but it is hard to pick out details, but there area a few similarities with both platoons, for one the platoon commander is behind the lead section/squad along with his platoon runner who is right behind him , and two, the American platoon sergeant is located someways behind the commander in a similar position to his British counterpart.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jun 30, 2018 19:24:44 GMT
Ian, your 2nd depiction(middle picture) is what I think the cavalry used to move on the battlefield, staggered left and right by company. If the first group(lead) becomes engaged those to the rear can pass by the lead, then tail end Charlie takes over for the lead and the lead falls in behind the main and so on. Not exactly right but close. Chuck can give you a better description and proper terminology. We discussed it. Maybe a staggered box.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 30, 2018 21:39:05 GMT
The second image is the British platoon Tom, a good formation I guess for forward movement.
It it interesting that it looks like the British platoon has a HQ group and a 'O' group [order group], unless that is all one unit and it looks like two separate groups, plus I am having trouble finding the platoon sergeant in that image, he has an icon in the box but unless my eyes are bad, I cannot find him.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 30, 2018 21:42:14 GMT
Yes. a staggered box.
The first image, although obsolete now because the squad is smaller is squad column, fire teams in column
The alternate to that would be squad column, fire teams abreast which looks something like this
X-------------X
X--(Alfa)-----X (Bravo)
X-----SL------X
X-------------X
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 5, 2018 16:37:38 GMT
Chuck, remember the discussion we had on US Task Forces? Now here is a breakdown of TF Lovelady;
2nd Battalion, 33rd Armored Regiment E Company, 36th Armored Infantry Regiment 1st Platoon Company D, 23rd Armored Engineer Battalion 1st Platoon Rcn Company, 33rd Armored Regiment
As you know, the task force was named after Lt. Col Lovelady, commander of the 2nd battalion / 3rd armored divisions and the 3rd AD was one of the old type ‘heavy divisions’ [the other being the 3rd AD].
So would the 2nd Armored Battalion have more armor then the norm or would they have an identical number to the rest. The ‘heavy divisions’ had two armored regiments of four medium tank and two light tank battalions of three companies each (total twelve tank battalions), didn’t the new type [triangular] have three regiments with three tank battalions each (total nine tank battalions)?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 5, 2018 17:27:57 GMT
The 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions were organized with two armored regiments each for a total in each division of 6 tank battalions, four equiped medium tanks and two with light tanks. It also had an armored Infantry regiment of 3 battalions.
2nd Armored Division - 66th and 67th Armored Regiments and 41st Armored Infantry Regiment
3rd Armored Division - 32nd and 33rd Armored Regiments and 36th Armored Infantry Regiment
Both divisions were identical in organizational structure, and were never reorganized until after the war.
The 1st Armored Division was organized just like the 2nd and 3rd, until late 1944. They fought as a heavy division throughout North Africa and most of the Italian Campaign. In late 1944 they were reorganized into the light configuration with 3 tank battalions and 3 armored infantry battalions. These tank battalions each had 3 medium tank companies and one light tank company. The 1st Armored Regiment (old 1st Cavalry) reorganized into the 1st Tank Battalion, and all the rest of the regiment's companies were disbanded. The 13th Armored Regiment (old 13th Cavalry) reorganized to form the 4th and 13th Tank Battalions. The 6th Armored Infantry Regiment was reorganized to form the 6th, 11th and 14th Armored Infantry Battalions.
These were the only three heavy armored divisions that served that way in combat.
All the rest of the armored divisions were originally organized as heavy armored divisions but reorganized as light armored divisions prior to going overseas
So the bottom line is that each of the heavy armored divisions had
12 medium tank companies 6 light tank companies
The light armored divisions had
9 medium tank companies 3 light tank companies
Except for the smaller number of companies the light armored divisions were far better in the exercise of command and control. The heavy divisions had far too much in the way of command overhead, and really suffered from too many, not having enough to do, therefore a wasteful structure.
None of the armored divisions, heavy or light, ever had enough Infantry. It was quite common to attach Infantry in either battalion or regimental strength to them for a given operation. This problem has never been solved, even today. What is needed is Infantry and tanks operating together on a ratio of at least two to one, and preferably three to one ratio, favoring Infantry, and the Armor community has never learned this lesson. They love and put all too much confidence in the tank, and forget that tanks cannot go anywhere without a lot of Infantry to support them. I am not exercising any branch favoritism here. I am just stating combat proven fact. Patton even said so in that letter of his you posted a couple of months ago, when he stated that armored division combat commands should have two armored Infantry battalions and only one tank battalion, as a norm. The myth of cavalry horse hockey is still alive and thriving in today's army, and unfortunately that mindset is going to lead to a good ass whipping someday. The cavalry division in the Pacific suffered from much the same problem. They had two brigades of two (two squadron) regiments each. The regimental headquarters had nothing to do most of the time in that the brigade headquarters was easily able to exercise direct control the four squadrons of the brigade, and the intermediate regimental headquarters just got in the way. Part of that was due to the nature of the combat environment. The division operated together, which meant the regimental headquarters were for the most part useless. Had they been fought the way they were organized for fighting though, a cavalry division screening a field army front, the regimental headquarters would have been required, because the division and its brigades would be spread out over a wider front. The First Cavalry Division was in reality an eight battalion Infantry Division.
Keep in mind the people that designed these armored divisions were for the most part from the Cavalry Branch, and they organized them around the concepts they were familiar with. Those concepts may have worked well for horse, but not nearly so well when you are using combined arms all the time.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 5, 2018 22:42:18 GMT
Thanks Chuck. I though there was a third, I think we have probably talked about this a few times over the last seven or eight years.
I wouldn’t mind trying to find out the tank strength of the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Armored Regiment when it was attached to TF Lovelady. Lovelady was really lacking in Infantry with just one company of armoured troops compared with one battalion of tanks.
Interesting note of yours about the 1st cavalry division in the Pacific theatre, I always thought that because the Japanese had few tanks and the ones they had where really light and no match for Stuarts and Shermans, that the US tanks were mainly deployed in the infantry support role. Tank v tank engagements in the Pacific were vary rare indeed.
Was the 1st Cavalry used only in the reconnaissance role?
I have always believed that a tank platoon and a Infantry company would be a good ration of armour and Infantry, that would give you five medium tanks to support three platoons. If you give each platoon a tank to look after and keep two tanks in reserve or for covering the assault, then each AFV would have about 40 soldiers to watch out for them and for the tank to do its job in taking out strong points.
The trouble with my tactics is that they are 75 years out of date and I have no real knowledge on much after Korea.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 5, 2018 23:07:26 GMT
The First Cavalry Division (Special) had eight Infantry battalions (called squadrons) organizationally. After they got to Australia, each of the three troop squadrons added a fourth (weapons) troop and the documents say that the four regiments (5th, 7th, 8th and 12th) were organized partially under cavalry and partially under Infantry tables of organization. That is the Army's confusing way of saying that they were in all but name Infantry battalions retaining only the cavalry name, and the organizational titles of squadron and troop.
The only reason they were there in the first place or continued to exist was MacArthur. As a kid he lived on various cavalry posts and came to be enthralled with the romance of the horse cavalry. He personally requested them for his theater when no one else wanted them. After the war they were stationed in Tokyo and considered MacArthur's palace guard. The original plan for a counterattack in Korea had the First Cavalry Division making the assault. It was called off. It would have been catastrophic. Inchon was substituted, and conducted at a later date.
After the war the Army wanted to eliminate the 1st Cavalry Division as being obsolete. MacArthur had a hissy fit, and Eisenhower ordered that they be placed eighth in the order of priority of Infantry divisions. The order of priority determines historical merit of the division, and it is used to select which divisions remain in active status. Subsequent to that in 1949 the First Cavalry Division was reorganized completely under Infantry tables of organization. They dropped the 12th Cavalry and became a triangular division, and their official designation became 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry). It's all about romance, John Wayne, John Ford movies, and the beknighted cavalry riding to the rescue of Sweet Marie and keeping her out of the clutches of Dangerous Dan. In other words it is manufactured cavalry bull shit, trying to recapture the romance of never was. All of this is basically the same thing that motivates Keogh with his cavalry mindset nonsense. With him he only knows of the romance. the trappings, the songs, and how cool he looks in a wide brimmed blue hat with crossed sabers thereunto affixed, and has not one clue that all that romance that never existed stopped with the machine gun. It's OK to keep the names alive I guess, but for me personally it is a pain in the ass to keep telling different people over the last fifty years the same thing I am telling you now, and have them walk away still not knowing where the horses are .
Now with all that said, I will tell you the other side of me. I love all that stuff (except the hat) just as much as Keogh. Something stirs inside when I watch those three troops of cavalry marching out the gate of Fort Apache. It enlivens my juices and puts a little spring in my step. That's my romantic side. My practical side says those days are gone, and the good old really weren't all that good. I understand the traditional role of the mounted arm has been split asunder, and you don't win battles mounted on a horse anymore. Cavalry today is nothing more than reconnaissance, except that we out of tradition keep the cavalry division (which is really an armored division) and two regiments (which are really Stryker brigades), and air cavalry (which are really attack helicopter battalions). The moral of the story is that there is no rhyme or reason to what we do, and it all pays homage to John Ford movies, and it has, as far as I am concerned, gotten out of hand
The First Cavalry Division was just another Infantry division that was short one battalion. Forget about them being anything but just another Infantry Division
Probably the best organization for a combination of armor and Infantry in a combined arms battalion is three Infantry companies, with one tank company of four platoons as a Company D. Five tank platoons are better than four tank platoons. Unfortunately some idiot sold the Army on the four tank platoon when the Abrams entered the force structure. Having a combined arms company where you mix tanks and Infantry platoons in the same company on a permanent basis is not such a hot idea from the training perspective. You have competing training imperatives. The best solution seems to be cross attachment on a mission to mission basis, using the combined arms battalion headquarters as the controller, dictating what the cross attachments will be. That way everyone in the battalion knows each other, but the single branch company commander Infantry or Armor control their own training schedules.
Task Force Lovelady I know very little about. What I can tell you is that when CCR of the 4th Armored Division broke into Bastogne the 37th Tank Battalion the CC's armored component was down to less than 20 tanks.
So I guess what I am telling you here is that if you want to determine the actual strength of these various task forces you must look beyond what is listed as their composition and conclude that these units are at full strength. Most of the time, I say again, most of the time units that have been in combat for an extended period without rest or refit, are far below what they are authorized in men and material. It was not uncommon for there to be only six or seven tanks operational in any given company, because of battle loss in material, personnel loss where all their equipment could not be manned, and loss through wear and tear on equipment, what we call deadlined equipment. The best thing to do is look at the narratives, and if you have them available the after action and morning reports. Most times a rifle company commander, authorized 200 plus personnel, would be giddy with delight if he could put eighty effectives in the field. That's the way war is. That's why organizationally I prefer very strong in personnel companies and platoons, because your losses mount up fast, and not all because of combat. A bad cold or the flu in the winter puts a man down as fast as a bullet. Trench foot, accidents, noncombat injuries, are just as deadly or restrictive to what you, the commander, want to do as anything the enemy can throw at you. Extreme cold or extreme heat can destroy a company in a very few days. Then you face the enemy with what you have left, and hope and pray it is enough. A good friend of mine from the basic officer course at Benning was given a battlefield (direct) commission. The platoon he was given in the 1st ID was authorize one officer and 43 enlisted men. He had himself and twelve. On his second tour as a Captain, he commanded a rifle company in the 23rd (Americal) Division. That company was authorized a little over a hundred and fifty men, and he later told me that he never had any more than seventy five in the six months he held command. He later gave up his commission (RIFed) and reverted to Sergeant First Class, and retired about ten years later as a division Command Sergeant Major.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 6, 2018 17:07:15 GMT
The hat you discussed is still much loved. When I went see Beau(youngest son) off to Kuwait/Iraq 10 or so years a 29th Division, Cavalry Captain, waring that hat and placing a sabre on the table gave a very nice speech in VA Beach.
Command Sergeant Major, nice Gig if you can get it.
Regards, Tom
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