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Post by yanmacca on Jul 21, 2015 18:26:18 GMT
It looks like he was trying to do two missions with the one regiment, engage the village and feel to the left.
Yan.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jul 21, 2015 18:30:57 GMT
I am definitely curious about SFRC (south fork Reno Creek) and how much was known about it as a travel corridor to the Rosebud.
I also believe that the corridors used by the warriors to move toward Crook should have been discovered on the Rosebud by the scouts if they had done a one day march distance in that direction. It indicates to me that Custer called off the scouts before the did any scouting past the turning point up Davis Creek. Since they would have discovered fresher trails of horses without tipis in large numbers. That should have lead to Custer remaining in place on the Rosebud while the scouts checked out the fresher trails.
So even if Terry was CYAing he had a valid point about Custer turning without scouting a little further up the Rosebud. There was the potential to use that route and come in behind the 7th and discover a trailing pack train.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by quincannon on Jul 21, 2015 19:01:52 GMT
That third paragraph is something I never considered, and indeed a disturbing thought. Could have turned disaster into catastrophic, and it would not have taken all that many to accomplish it.
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Post by royalwelsh on Jul 21, 2015 19:51:14 GMT
I am definitely curious about SFRC (south fork Reno Creek) and how much was known about it as a travel corridor to the Rosebud.
I also believe that the corridors used by the warriors to move toward Crook should have been discovered on the Rosebud by the scouts if they had done a one day march distance in that direction. It indicates to me that Custer called off the scouts before the did any scouting past the turning point up Davis Creek. Since they would have discovered fresher trails of horses without tipis in large numbers. That should have lead to Custer remaining in place on the Rosebud while the scouts checked out the fresher trails.
So even if Terry was CYAing he had a valid point about Custer turning without scouting a little further up the Rosebud. There was the potential to use that route and come in behind the 7th and discover a trailing pack train.
Regards
AZ Ranger AZ,
You are not alone in being curious about SFRC, and I have been trying to get across the point for many months that GAC failed to throw his scouts out far enough in any direction. An advance guard should be a few hundred yards ahead. But scouts/guides should easily at times be up to 12-24 hours ahead. Instead attacking blind and Lt Godfrey's "touch and go" quote.
RW
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 21, 2015 20:18:15 GMT
I am definitely curious about SFRC (south fork Reno Creek) and how much was known about it as a travel corridor to the Rosebud.
I also believe that the corridors used by the warriors to move toward Crook should have been discovered on the Rosebud by the scouts if they had done a one day march distance in that direction. It indicates to me that Custer called off the scouts before the did any scouting past the turning point up Davis Creek. Since they would have discovered fresher trails of horses without tipis in large numbers. That should have lead to Custer remaining in place on the Rosebud while the scouts checked out the fresher trails.
So even if Terry was CYAing he had a valid point about Custer turning without scouting a little further up the Rosebud. There was the potential to use that route and come in behind the 7th and discover a trailing pack train.
Regards
AZ Ranger Thank you Steve, until you brought this up last month I never would have thought of it.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 21, 2015 22:07:16 GMT
Just how far out were the scouts operating, you read about the scouts coming and going at all hours and keeping the column informed, just how far out is required the question.
Yan.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jul 21, 2015 23:39:35 GMT
Beth I think the Benteen oblique tells use Custer assumed the NA were distributed in discrete villages. This becomes an issue when he decides he can move right and enter the valley north of Reno. 3411 is an eye opener. Cheers
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Post by royalwelsh on Jul 22, 2015 18:04:36 GMT
Beth I think the Benteen oblique tells use Custer assumed the NA were distributed in discrete villages. This becomes an issue when he decides he can move right and enter the valley north of Reno. 3411 is an eye opener. Cheers Mac,
And it shouldn't be an eye opener, should it?
Before committing to an attack, should not GAC have known the strength of the enemy, the location of the village or villages, and (if ascending the eastern bluffs) the river crossing points back into the valley....?
Now GAC may well have winged it and pulled it all off, but why the sympathy by some for GAC's actions when he ignored basic tactical requirements and it all went horribly wrong...?
RW
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jul 22, 2015 22:25:08 GMT
RW Agreed! He should not have been in that position but I think that this is significant in terms of our understanding what did happen. It also helps show why it went so wrong. It was a massive assumption about where his opponents were and what they were doing. I imagine one of the first rules of command would be make no assumptions. Cheers
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