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Post by yanmacca on Jan 8, 2016 14:08:08 GMT
Hello all; I wanted to start a thread about Custer in his role as a leader and especially on that day. Now this is not a place to whip old George for some of his gaffs made on the campaign on a whole but mainly after he left Reno. Now how would you rate his behaviour?
Reckless and Impromptu (he made decisions right there and then that would later cost him)
Well thought out and organised (he realised that he couldn’t achieve his goal without re-enforcements so took time to consolidate)
Cautious and Wary (he thought that the risk to his men would be too great so refrained from attacking at that point)
Totally out of his depth (this means that Custer had no idea how to capture this village and his tactics adopted previous had been rudimentary charges in which he got lucky)
Now I was going to add a fifth but this would have been that Custer got cold feet and blustered about so to cover up his reluctance to engage, but I don't think he was a coward, even though he could have kept his column of over 200 virtually out of the fight whilst others under his command were fighting.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2016 16:06:38 GMT
My opinion of the scope of this thread Ian is that it is too narrowly focused.
If we are going to examine Custer's leadership and ability to command beyond the point where he left Reno, we will have by necessity examine the whole man from the day he was born. Everything from that nativity contributed to his ability to lead and command those last hours of his life. All that came before effected in some manner his decision making process, just as everything we do in our daily lives is effected by what came before in our own life. The abilities we have and the decisions we make at part and parcel of who we are.
I will sit back and see how this develops here, and what others think about what I have written above.
DAVE: Thank both you and Jodak for that material. Please pass it on to him with my appreciation.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jan 8, 2016 16:28:25 GMT
I am currently reading the book "Custer's Trials". I am not very far into it, but from a personality trait perspective, a lot of what we see at LBH comes from his time with McClellan in the ACW. McClellan surrounded himself with yes men, sycophants, and admirers. In Custer's words, he "worshipped" McClellan, and became a member of the inner circle. This could account for why he surrounded himself with relatives and other admirers when he was in charge of the 7th. He also spent a great deal of time while under McClellan in the scouting function, and apparently became pretty good at it. He and McClellan were very much alike, except that McClellan was a great organizer who was hesitant to fight. Custer was eager to fight and was not a great organizer. Custer would fight when he got the chance but seemed to revert to scouting the enemy whenever he could. Perhaps that tendency was what drove him at LBH. He committed Reno, but then kept scouting, looking for the exact right spot to attack with his own battalion and never realized that scouting time was over and fighting time was right then.
I think at LBH, as a commander, he reverted to his role in the ACW, where a unit would commit to battle while the majority of the force would seek to maneuver and scout the enemy. His role at that time in the ACW was as a captain leading scouting efforts. I think that is what he envisioned himself as doing. Reno attacks while he scouts around for a place to hit the enemy on the flank or rear. In the ACW, he was part of a force large enough to both fight a pitched battle for a lengthy time and use resources to maneuver and scout. At LBH, he didn't have the strength to do both at the same time, given the Indian strength. So he commits Reno, probably expecting that Reno could fight throughout the day while he made an end run to scout and find a place to attack from another direction. Mentally, he was acting as a scout leader not a regimental commander.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 8, 2016 16:49:43 GMT
Many thanks gentlemen.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2016 19:06:44 GMT
If Custer was a cavalry commander, that cavalry being part of a larger force and in front of it, what Custer was doing is just what he should have been doing, shaping and defining the battle space.
He was not, therefore he should not have been about what he was doing. There are at least two pages in a cavalry manual, one is for scouting, shaping and defining, the other is for fighting. Don't think Custer ever learned when it was appropriate to turn that page.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 8, 2016 19:14:56 GMT
But what I don’t understand is that the time for scouting had past, he was in full view of a village that was fully alerted and aware of his presence, a part of his regiment was already committed to battle and the rest was on its way and he could have been holding the past part of it out of the battle. He could see what he needed to see from the high ground and if he wanted to draw the Indians towards him then he would have kept his five companies together.
Caution had to be thrown out of the window by this point and he should have been exercising a text book attack not a text book recon.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Jan 9, 2016 1:22:39 GMT
I want to recommend Custer's Trials. You can see Custer developing under McClellan but it is the immediate post ACW years you see Custer of LBH start to come to the forefront. I have't yet gotten to his time in the 7th because of the holidays but hope to get back to it next week. The book is enlightening, not only about Custer but on a number of social issues that we still deal with today, but I can't help thinking it isn't as balanced a viewpoint as I tend to seek. Custer fanboys are going to hate it btw.
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Post by Beth on Jan 9, 2016 2:01:38 GMT
Yan, in the message on the other thread you mention Custer being in over his head. I feel like he had made his life and career swimming in the shallow end which made him a lazy commander. He had boundless energy and seemed productive but most of his efforts were either worthless or counterproductive to the running of the 7th. I think he spent more energy in trying to be 'good time Charlie' for the love and approval of his entourage of yes men than making sure all of those under his charge had their basic training met.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 9, 2016 12:47:35 GMT
I agree with you Beth, in like in all walks of life, if you hadn’t really been tested to the limit then you will keep on doing the same old thing hoping that it will get you through. Just how many times had Custer had been in a situation like this, with his regiment split into four. One part was engaged, another was on a mission some place and the last was a pack trail. He himself was on a high ridge looking at the largest village he had seen in his life with 200+ men, just what does he do?
No matter what he did next, I would expect him to keep composed and act like he knew what he was doing, he is Custer after all and everyone (209 of them) would be looking at him to make the right choice.
Yan.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 9, 2016 13:23:37 GMT
I think during the ACW did a number of good things. Followed orders, showed bravery/courage, energy, and knew support was going to be there and used it, for the most part. He was for the most part of the team, as time went on he began to believe his press clippings and thought he was above the team and could make his own rules.
With regard to the LBH, GAC was attempting to fight battle he wanted rather than the battle he was presented(Chuck's concept) and there was little prep and planning.
MacArthur attempted to fight the war he wanted, not the war he was presented. I would guess both Chuck and William could list a number of examples of this. The French and British attempted to fight the war they expected and were routed when they were given a different war by the Germans in the beginning of WWII.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 9, 2016 13:47:28 GMT
I agree with you Tom, well except about British and French, because in 1940 the French army was commanded by an old fool called General Gamelin who had a deep mistrust of radios and telephones. He sat in his HQ and tried to keep in touch with his army via couriers, which as you know is not going to get you far in a mobile war like the one the Germans fought. The BEF on the other hand was a fully mechanised and professional army, but it was just too small to act independently, so once the French broke they had to move back or be cut off.
Other debacles like Greece and Crete was down to bad planning, but in the western desert the British and Commonwealth armies stuck in there against the Germans and were never defeated. And had to subdue the Vichy French who were causing us problems while we were trying to free their country.
Sorry to go off topic folks, me and my pride again.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 9, 2016 13:58:40 GMT
Custer could have altered his plans at the juncture of 3411, he was fully aware of just how many men he had and a good idea on the size of the village plus he saw Reno doing his stuff down below, he must have also thought that Benteen was going to be available and that the packs could be speeded up so he must of had a clear idea of what he wanted to do next. When he finally got to the LNC complex nothing had changed, as far as he knew Reno was still active, Benteen would have been contacted and packs were still on the move, the village would be still there and probably looked just as imposing, so the battle he wanted to fight from 3411 should still be valid as an option, but on the other hand if he knew from 3411 that he was not going to attack without Benteen then we are looking at a different ball game.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 9, 2016 18:00:24 GMT
A carpenter measures twice, cuts once.
A painter prepares the surface to be painted, and primes before he paints.
Would any of you hire a carpenter or painter to work on your house whose whole history in the trades is winging it?
A commander is a carpenter and painter that uses different tools to ply his trade.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 9, 2016 18:32:12 GMT
Yes Chuck, preparations are important in any skill and Custer should have made plenty and these should have been done 24 to 48 hours earlier. He should have known just were the village was and how far it stretched, the occupants too should have been judged as well as any signs of the village moving anytime soon, I will also throw in the outlying areas and the whereabouts of the pony herd. All should be known and noted before any attack plans were laid.
I wonder just how all this data would be processed before he decided on his attack and more importantly would it make him sit back and give Terry another day or two to catch up, if he still went ahead with the attack knowing all the data then would he still split up his regiment? Well that’s a hard question because his tactics at the Washita called for multiple attacks at various point almost simultaneously, but this is no Washita and to divide and attack a village this size would be a bad move as each battalion could be caught up in its only little battle and not be able to support each other.
The only other choice would be by attacking as a regiment, but this too would not be able to stop all the people escaping and many would flee and find a bolt hole somewhere as concentration attacks do not cover a lot of ground, leaving whole areas clear.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Jan 9, 2016 19:53:57 GMT
Actually shouldn't Custer's preparations begun when he first learned of the campaign? He probably should have started with being in FAL at least no later than Feb. or March to get the 7th ready.
Custer seems to have thought that he could arrive at the last minute and everything would be ready. Was that a realistic expectation?
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