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Post by quincannon on Dec 15, 2015 3:26:42 GMT
Most of you that know me well realize that LBH and the Indian Wars in general are a pastime for me, whereas the Korean War I consider serious business for a variety of reason. Some were professional, and others because I am just plain nosey.
To that end I want to bring to your attention a book that is about to be released called "High Water Mark in The Korean War by Leo Barron. I have read both of Barron's earler books and favorably mentioned his second dealing with the break in to Bastogne by the 4th Armored Division.
This one deals with the pivotal battle of Chipyong Ni in February 1951, Chipyong Ni was held by the 23rd RCT, a heavily reinforced regimental combat team of the 2nd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Paul Freeman. In addition to the normal things attached to an RCT the 23rd had the Battalion Koree (French) as its 4th battalion plus a Ranger Company, and several other one of's that were a bit out of the ordinary.
They were surrounded by all or better parts of three Chinese divisions and cleaned their clocks. My personal opinion is that the 23rd at Chipyong Ni was the best single performance by a U S Army unit of that size in that war and arguably the best in the last half of the 20th Century. The 27th RCT was the best steady performer during the Korean War, but for those few days in February the 23rd was stellar.
I can't see how this book can avoid a lengthy discussion of Task Force Crombez (5th Cavalry RCT) sent to relieve them, but if it does you can judge the very good from the very, very bad.
If he follows his previous formats Barron will take you from regimental CP to the foxhole.
I shall report later my thoughts on the book once I receive it which should be right after Christmas.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 15, 2015 11:36:27 GMT
Well Chuck you don't get more surrounded than that, sort of like another Bastogne with the freezing weather and the 5th cavalry moving up from the south, it reminds me of the 4th AD moving up to relieve the 101st AB. Apparently it was a text book operation by Col. Freeman, straight out of FM- 22-100.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 15, 2015 15:52:40 GMT
You are absolutely correct Ian it was the 5th Cavalry RCT. Age is catching u with me.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Dec 16, 2015 2:10:38 GMT
Chuck. I am shocked that you mentioned Barron. I had just purchased his "No Silent Night" on my Kindle the other day. I was on Amazon and searching for books dealing with Korea. I had just finished rereading "Give Me Tomorrow" by O'Donnell and was going to reread The Last Stand of Fox Company by Drury. Instead I looked for other Korean Police Action books and found Barron's. I looked him up and found his book dealing with Bastogne. Thought I'd try a different war and got "No Silent Night" which I am going to start tomorrow. I'll let you know if I like Barron's work. The 2 Korean books are really good reads. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 16, 2015 14:54:02 GMT
Korea is important for a number of reasons. Chief among them is the idea of the geopolitical limited conflict, which stays with us today.
The reason it attracted/attracts me is that as an outgrowth of the Korean conflict we realized that future conflict would be expeditionary in nature, and that we would have to learn to fight outnumbered, and win. No longer could we gradually build up forces, and the logistical base that sustains them.
Korea showed us that we must be ready to go with what we had, ten minutes ago, and sustain that force in combat. It also placed limitations on deterrence, and that you cannot vaporize your path to victory.
Most of all though it showed that the firepower intensive force, organized for self sustainability, like the RCT was a more than adequate force to operate alone on a battlefield for more than just short periods of time. It was the beginning of the thinking in time of crisis --- How many brigades can we get there and how soon.
For those that do not know, a brigade of today is the rough equivalent of the RCT of Korea.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 16, 2015 15:08:37 GMT
Would these brigades be unified, commanded and trained as one or would their relevant components be grouped together for a particular task? as this grouping would take time and going on how brigades used to be formed they could alter just like a Corps could, with battalions, regiments (brigade) Brigades and Divisions (Corps) being swapped from one spear to another. I would hope that each component would know their brigade commander and how he operates.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 16, 2015 18:39:20 GMT
Ian: From about 1963 until the turn of this century we looked at brigades about the same way the combat commands operated in WWII, mixing and matching, swapping and trading, based on the mission at hand. More and more over that period though, the brigades became fixed in structure informally, usually having the same units together. In theory the maneuver battalion as assigned to the division. There were usually nine in number, although I have seen that number clime as high was twelve, and sink as low as seven. There were three brigade headquarters to each division, and as the theory went the division commander would allocate maneuver battalions to each brigade headquarters as he saw fit and the tactical situation demanded.
About 2001-02 all this started to change and the brigades became formally fixed in structure, differing only in the type of brigade (heavy-light-Stryker-etc). Today the brigade combat team (BCT) looks almost just like a RCT of Korea, having everything necessary to operate independently of a division. It is rare today for a battalion that is part of one brigade to be found operating with another. The biggest difference is that each BCT regardless of type has a cav squadron.
Our divisions today consist of a headquarters battalion (operating much like a corps headquarters in WWII) to which variable numbers and types of BCT's and other type brigades (Maneuver enhancement, aviation, fires, and support) can be assigned based upon theater and mission.
It is not uncommon that a brigade combat team from one division operates under another division headquarters for combat operations. Today a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division operates under control of Headquarters 2nd Infantry Division in Korea, while the rest of the 1st Cavalry is at Fort Hood, Texas. Two brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Lewis operate under the 7th Infantry Division.
This is a part of that historical fiction I keep talking about. We have 11 division headquarters in the active army and 33 brigades. In theory any of those brigades can operate under any of those divisions, and they routinely do. The army cannot find a way to come to grips with its own history in this still new century. There are ways to preserve the units without having to be confusing to the general public and indeed the Army itself, but the Army will not listen. The division is the sacred cow to the army and you might as well suggest that you throw the Torah, the Bible, and the Koran out of their respective religious institutions than even broach the subject of eliminating the division by name
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 16, 2015 18:58:34 GMT
What do you think of a group of independent commands with each command responsible for three brigades, three of these groups forming a corps, or would this be too similar to the divisional set up. I can see the day when the term division is a thing of the past and all the history that these formations have we be celebrated by groups of vets and enthusiasts.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 16, 2015 23:13:28 GMT
The division as we once knew them is a thing of the past. The Army, in fact the armies of the world just don't know it yet.
Your proposal above is much too fixed in structure, and as such is nothing more than a division with perhaps another name.
To replace divisions and corps we must have joint headquarters at least at the present corps level, with a ground maneuver headquarters subordinate to them. The biggest drawback to this is the word MY. MY DIVISION, MY BRIGADES, MY AVIATION, MY SUPPORT ELEMENTS. MY is a thing of the past for tomorrows warfare, for what is yours today, will be and can be someone else's tomorrow. MY is the enemy of true flexibility.
We should have no permanently structured unit above that of the brigade combat team. The BCT's should be more robust than they are today, perhaps on the order of five to six thousand. They should be self sufficient drawing nothing from anywhere else, and tapping directly into the theater logistics system for all their needs. Each BCT should get rid of the ground cavalry squadron. For ground reconnaissance push down the present ground assets to the maneuver battalions, and make that which already exists in those units stronger and capable of more variety in its mission menu. I would not be heartbroken if the word cavalry is removed from the vocabulary.
All brigades should be separately numbered. Our oldest is the First Brigade, of the 1st Infantry Division. Redesignate the damned thing as the First Brigade, give it a brigadier as a commander, give it a new patch that only they will wear, and call it a day. Repeat the process in like manner until every brigade in the Army is redesignated keeping the brigades history intact.
If you want to keep division headquarters, fine, but get rid of the function designators. If you can't get along with the 1st Infantry Division becoming simply the First Division, then you are playing into the hands of those that hold the past so sacred than they cannot change. We have no need for an airborne division headquarters. We have no need for an armored division headquarters. We have no need for an air assault division headquarters, and we certainly have no need for anything called a cavalry division and never have since the 19th century.
Before anyone gets their shorts in a twist about that last paragraph, there is a way to preserve the history of those division headquarters long into the future, that would make nearly everyone, save Captain Pretend happy. Anyone that wants to know my views on the PM me.
I love Army history and have no wish to dissolve the past with a stroke of a pen or the cutting of an order. You cannot though let history drive a train. You must let function drive the train, and function is evolutionary.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Dec 17, 2015 13:16:57 GMT
The division as we once knew them is a thing of the past. The Army, in fact the armies of the world just don't know it yet. Your proposal above is much too fixed in structure, and as such is nothing more than a division with perhaps another name. To replace divisions and corps we must have joint headquarters at least at the present corps level, with a ground maneuver headquarters subordinate to them. The biggest drawback to this is the word MY. MY DIVISION, MY BRIGADES, MY AVIATION, MY SUPPORT ELEMENTS. MY is a thing of the past for tomorrows warfare, for what is yours today, will be and can be someone else's tomorrow. MY is the enemy of true flexibility. We should have no permanently structured unit above that of the brigade combat team. The BCT's should be more robust than they are today, perhaps on the order of five to six thousand. They should be self sufficient drawing nothing from anywhere else, and tapping directly into the theater logistics system for all their needs. Each BCT should get rid of the ground cavalry squadron. For ground reconnaissance push down the present ground assets to the maneuver battalions, and make that which already exists in those units stronger and capable of more variety in its mission menu. I would not be heartbroken if the word cavalry is removed from the vocabulary. All brigades should be separately numbered. Our oldest is the First Brigade, of the 1st Infantry Division. Redesignate the damned thing as the First Brigade, give it a brigadier as a commander, give it a new patch that only they will wear, and call it a day. Repeat the process in like manner until every brigade in the Army is redesignated keeping the brigades history intact. If you want to keep division headquarters, fine, but get rid of the function designators. If you can't get along with the 1st Infantry Division becoming simply the First Division, then you are playing into the hands of those that hold the past so sacred than they cannot change. We have no need for an airborne division headquarters. We have no need for an armored division headquarters. We have no need for an air assault division headquarters, and we certainly have no need for anything called a cavalry division and never have since the 19th century. Before anyone gets their shorts in a twist about that last paragraph, there is a way to preserve the history of those division headquarters long into the future, that would make nearly everyone, save Captain Pretend happy. Anyone that wants to know my views on the PM me. I love Army history and have no wish to dissolve the past with a stroke of a pen or the cutting of an order. You cannot though let history drive a train. You must let function drive the train, and function is evolutionary. Chuck agree with most of the above, but would hold separate training commands for these specialties under the overall training command. And oh give the Cavalry partial credit for one in the 20th century, the Pancho Villa gig.
Getting back to Korea, early on it was much like my typing(hunt, peck, and cuss). I think Doug's philosophy was I shit bigger than you do. He already had the final score in the books, never thinking through the fact that the opposition often has a say in the outcome of the game. Doug was a single wing guy, everybody played both ways offense and defense. The communists put some new wrinkles in their game plan. Bend don't break defense and use the whole roster. Doug never figured on the second half. Truman was smart enough not to resort to another bomb.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 17, 2015 15:42:30 GMT
MacArthur had the Immun Gun defeated by November 1950. He crossed the line that China could not abide, instead of being satisfied with the removal of North Korean aggression. There were a lot of political factors involved and he got in bed with Rhee to reunite Korea. Bad mistake going as far north as he did, just like George.
PS: To elaborate on the above just a bit. The Korean conflict had been ongoing since 1946 on a much smaller scale. The Truman administration made one hell of a mistake when they promulgated the Truman Doctrine, which literally drew a line around the world saying OK communists don't cross over this line into the Free World. The line did not include the inter-Korean border, which was like handing the North Koreans a box seat ticket to the Super Bowl.
North Korea invaded and made steady progress southward until about the middle of August 1950. They met stalemate on the Pusan Perimeter, and that stalemate bled them dry. You all know the story of the breakout from the perimeter and the Inchon end run. The Immun Gun resisted, but that resistance was just a shell. With their supply lines cut by Inchon they were toast, and their remnants could not get back across the border fast enough. They were done.
At that point MacArthur had done what he set out to do, clear the south and restore status quo. MacArthur and Rhee wanted more. MacArthur wanted to punish aggression, and Rhee wanted to unite Korea. That was just plain stupid on both their parts. Had they just met the UN mandate, a situation much like we have today would exist with the border defended, and the promise that future aggression would be met with force. We could built the SK Army into a formidable fighting force, so that they might meet the burden of their own defense, AND at the same time build the South Korean economy into the giant world player it is today, all with no further military action, AND more importantly that economy would be a constant beacon shinning north, while the NK's were starving.
Now China. MacArthur moving north had the potential to put a Free World country directly on the border of a newly communist nation. From the Chinese point of view that was unacceptable, and if you stop being an American or an Allied nation and view it from the Chinese perspective you can readily see why. If any of this study of ours is to be valid we must look at it from our enemies perspectiveand not just our own. We tend to think of ourselves as the good guys, and our view of things is the only valid point of view. It is true here, just as it was true in the ACW, and at LBH, the other guy will fight for his point of view.
Had MacArthur not gone north, had Rhee not been far to big for his britches, there would exist from November 1950 onward at state of affairs not to far off from what we have today, and possibly better. That invasion of NK by MacArthur strengthened the will of the average NK Joe to resist. Had it not happened there is a possibility that family of incestuous morons may have been overthrown long ago.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Dec 18, 2015 3:36:48 GMT
QC
I agree with you comments regarding Truman not including Korea and that MacArthur and Rhee overplayed their hands.
jodak would be a wonderful addition to this board and this thread. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 18, 2015 5:11:40 GMT
jodak dives deep in a number of area of mutual interest. I agree.
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Post by Beth on Dec 18, 2015 18:47:00 GMT
Send him an invite
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Dec 18, 2015 22:33:37 GMT
Yan/QC While reading Barron's book No "Silent Night"---excellent read--- I was gobsmacked (for my British antecedents) that I do not have a clue how US Army units are numbered. During the War, volunteer units were assigned numbers by their state government (I think not sure) with the state name ie 11th Mississippi Infantry. How did we get the 101st Airborne? The 26th Infantry Division? Did we have a 100th Infantry Regiment? Plus we now have regiments with over 2,000 from 3 to 5 battalions instead of 10 companies of 100 equaling 1,000 like in the ole days. Change is not always good and the status quo ain't always bad. Regards Dave
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