The Emergence of Operational Art in the Great Sioux War 1876

[Beth]

Since this monograph if publicly available and covers the subject of the board, consider it open for discussion.  If anyone finds other such monographs or thesis that fit this board, let me know.


www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a606045.pdf

[Beth]

The abstract:

ABSTRACT
THE EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL ART IN THE GREAT SIOUX WAR, by MAJ
Matthew L. Blome, 58 pages.

The Sioux War of 1876-1877 was the largest campaign of the late-nineteenth century Indian
Wars. This conflict grew out of the desire of the United States Government to resolve confusing
territorial claims to the Black Hills and the “unceded territories” of the Powder and Yellowstone
River valleys. The numerous and fierce Lakota and their northern Cheyenne allies controlled
these areas and drove out rival Indian tribes and the United States Army in the late 1860s, and
established dominance in the region. The Division of the Missouri, led by Lieutenant General
Philip Sheridan, had developed a successful concept to defeat the tribes of the southern plains
from 1867 to 1873 that used converging columns, winter expeditions, and attacks against Indian
stores and possessions to catch the Indians when they were least mobile. Sheridan’s initial
campaign plan against the Lakota and their allies used this same concept, but failed to develop an
operational approach that linked tactical actions to the strategic objective. His initial plan used
against the Lakota and Cheyenne embraced the tactics of the southern plains in an environment
and against a massed enemy for which they were disastrously ill-suited, and resulted in a string of
defeats that culminated in the Battle of the Little Big Horn. This defeat provided impetus for the
additional resources that Sheridan used to develop an operational approach that turned the war
against the Lakota around in the winter and spring campaign of 1876-1877. Sheridan developed a
campaign approach that utilized the modern concept of operational art, linking tactical actions in
time, space and purpose to achieve a strategic endstate. After Little Big Horn, Sheridan linked
his main effort at the Indian reservation agencies to isolate the hostile Lakota from their summer
roaming agency Lakota that constituted the preponderance of the Lakota and Cheyenne combat
power. In order to make it possible to pacify the Lakota at the agencies, Sheridan coupled those
efforts with the establishment of a network of bases in the unceded territories and relentless
pursuit of the remaining hostile bands. Sheridan understood that Lakota and Cheyenne culture
and military capabilities revolved around their ability to hunt buffalo and raid against their
neighboring tribes from horseback with rifles. By taking away these tools and confining the
Lakota and Cheyenne on the reservation, Sheridan could successfully extend the Army’s reach
into the unceded territories and defeat the smaller hostile bands that remained.

********

Comments?

[quincannon]

I went in a little bit and skimmed what he had to say about Crook and Custer. There is a line in there about Custer charging the camp (meaning I suppose starting an offensive operation, not literally charging/assaulting) without first setting the conditions for success. Best one line summation I have heard so far.

It is papers like these, regardless of universal agreement on all points, that will make this site the go to place, where rational discussion rather that fanboy fru-fra is the order of the day.

Good find.

[Beth]

Since they turn up regularly I think I am going to give them their own area. Hang on while I perhaps knock out a wall and put in an new room

[deadwoodgultch]

Beth,
Thanks for the better location. While basic tactics seem to remain the same, implementation and delivery systems continue to evolve. Battles and wars don't come in one size fits all. The officers that write these come from different walks of military life and look at the same battles through different prisms. While we are looking back 140 years we must remember the military is looking forward and for forward and critical thinkers. Often we see a niche marketer approach, find an area not exploited by other writers. I am not saying the is a gem but we may glean something we had not really considered before. If not for special traits what would have become of Col. Eisenhower? What did Marshall or others see? Where did they see it? From 1935-1940 he was more or less a gofer MacArthur, in the Philippines. In other words he made MacArthur look good.

[deadwoodgultch]

Chuck,
To add to the above, why Halsey? Was he just the next in line? Why was Billy Mitchell ignored for so long?

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

Halsey was a Vice Admiral, and by position Commander of Aircraft (including the carriers)in the Pacific Fleet, under the old pre-war set up. You will recall he became very ill prior to Midway and was in the hospital at Pearl when that battle was fought. He did not recover until late summer, after the Guadalcanal Campaign started.

The guy down there at the start of the campaign was another Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, who was a very good in naval theory, and evidently not a bad diplomat. He was no operational commander though, and feeling he had been given a bag of crap, a campaign run on the most thin of shoestrings, he had a very bad attitude and tended to be a crybaby. He was a lose personal friend of both Nimitz and Halsey.

Ghormley was relived by Nimitz, and the reason presented was his health and in particular severe dental problems. Halsey was in the South Pacific at the time, he was senior to just about everyone, and his most redeeming quality was that he would fight when most others thought that the Navy and Marine Corps had bitten off more than it could chew.

Halsey was by no means perfect, as later events would shine light on, but he was willing to go in and mix it up when few others were willing to do so.

Tomorrow marks the seventy third anniversary of probably the greatest two day battle in U S Naval history, at least in my book, and oddly enough it falls on a Friday this year. Ghormley would have never sent Callahan, Scott and Lee into that fight, but Halsey did, knowing the losses in ships and lives would be great. They were, but the IJN never came south again.

Mitchell was a dreamer, and a futuristic thinker, who disobeyed a direct order, and the Army did not like dreamers and futuristic thinkers any more in Mitchell's day than they did in Custer's time, or they do now. Mitchell was mostly right, but he made a few bone head pronouncements on the value and war winning alone capabilities of strategic air power.

[dave]

Deadwood
Not exactly sure what you are getting at. But regarding Billy Mitchell, was guilty of heresy of predicting that air power would dominate future wars. The sinking of the the captured and surplus ships in 1921 sealed his fate. In fact the navy command not only did not want a carrier they wanted to abolish naval air.
Just idle thoughts
Regards
Dave

[dave]

QC
Toll in his book The Conquering Tide covered the performance of Vice Admiral Ghormley and the interaction of him, Halsey and Nimitz. Great read.
Ghormley reminded me so much of George McClellan as a man who just could not pull the trigger.
Regards
Dave

[deadwoodgultch]

Glad to bring you both out of your shells!

[dave]

deadwood
You just a natural leader.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

Dave: In fairness to Ghormley he was handed a bag of crap by King and told to make cupcakes. The difference is that Ghormley made mush and Halsey made very costly cupcakes, but they had sprinkles on top.

There is a reason why only Midway and Guadalcanal are studied by students in the JSDF staff colleges today, one was the end of the beginning, and the other the beginning of the end. You should be very proud that your father helped hold that line, that the IJN never crossed again.

[Beth]

Well that didn't take long to go totally off topic.

[quincannon]

I did mention Custer Beth.

As all conflict is a continuum, nothing to do with war is ever off topic. It always relates somehow, and I think the man who wrote that monograph would be the first to realize that the early part of the Centennial Campaign was run on just as much of a shoestring, as the early days on Guadalcanal, and I think he would fully agree that the thing that made the difference was the professionalism of the Marines and Navy (but not all of them) as opposed to the completely unprofessional approach made by the Army in 1876.

[Beth]

Message boards just like battle plans often take turns you never expect.

If you guys know of other studies that you think would like a home here give them a thread.